Anu Aravind P vs Department Of Empowerment Of Persons With Disabilities Minisitry Of Social Justice And Empowerment

$~1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of Decision: October 14 , 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010730722024
+ W.P.(C) 14922/2024
ANU ARAVIND P .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Dushyant Kishan Kaul, Mr.
Jaimon Andrews, Mr. Piyo
Harold and Mr. Adhishwar
Suri, Advocates.
versus
DEPARTMENT OF EMPOWERMENT OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES MINISTRY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
EMPOWERMENT .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Devvrat Yadav, Mr. Kartik
Sharma, Mr. M. Chawla and
Ms. Pearl Sharma, Advocates
for R1.
Mr. Sayid Marzook Bafaki, Ms.
Lakshmi Sree P, Mr. Risvi
Muhammad, Mr Vaisakh S.,
Advocates for R2 and 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1. By the present petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Petitioner seeks a direction to Respondent
No. 1, the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities,
Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (hereafter ‘DEPwD’ ), to
include Mayer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome Type-II
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Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:15.10.2026
20:50:42

(hereafter ‘MRKH Syndrome Type-II’ ) as a specified disability under
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (hereafter ‘RPwD
Act’ ). The Petitioner also assails the communications dated
20.02.2023 and 10.10.2023 (hereafter ‘impugned communications’ ),
by which the Petitioner’s request for inclusion of MRKH Syndrome
Type-II as a disability in the RPwD Act was rejected.
2. Succinctly stated, the Petitioner suffers from MRKH Syndrome
Type-II, a congenital condition marked by the absence of the uterus
and the upper part of the vagina, along with right renal agenesis. On
the recommendation of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission,
the Government of Kerala issued G.O. (Ms) No. 165/2017/H&FWD
dated 18.11.2017, classifying ‘congenital absence of uterus’ as 50%
disability. Thereafter, on 08.03.2018, the Disability Assessment
Board, Government Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Koyilandy, certified
the Petitioner as having 50% disability.
3. The Petitioner appeared in NEET-2018 and secured All India
Rank 69012. The Petitioner’s claim for admission to the MBBS
course under the quota for persons with disabilities was rejected, as
her condition was not a specified disability under the Schedule to the
RPwD Act.
4. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner approached the Hon’ble High
Court of Kerala vide W.P.(C) No. 20639/2018, which came to be
dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 11.07.2018.
The appeal preferred thereagainst, being W.A. No. 1739/2018, was
also dismissed by the Division Bench by judgment dated 29.08.2018,
with liberty to the Petitioner to approach the Central Government for
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Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:15.10.2026
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inclusion of her condition in the Schedule. The relevant observations
of the Division Bench are as under:
“6. We have examined the contentions raised by the rival
counsel as also the reasonings given by the learned Judge for
dismissing the Writ Petition. In our assessment, since the
Petitioner's disability is not included in the Schedule under
the 2016 Act and is not recognised by the MCI and is kept out
of the admission prospectus, the decision to deny her
admission in the disabled quota seats, cannot be faulted.
Therefore we are inclined to agree with the decision of the
learned Judge who dismissed the Writ Petition. Under such
circumstances, we find the Writ Appeal to be devoid of merit
and the same is not entertained. We however, make it clear
that nothing in this judgment should incapacitate the
Petitioner from approaching the Central Government for
inclusion of her type of disability in the Schedule to the
2016 Act , to enable her to pursue future benefits, under the
2016 Act.
With the above order, the case is disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)
5. Thereafter, the Petitioner made a representation to the Ministry
of Law and Justice, Government of India dated 07.10.2018 seeking
inclusion of her condition as a specified disability. As the same
remained undecided, the Petitioner approached the Hon’ble High
Court of Kerala in W.P.(C) No. 5146/2019. By judgment dated
28.03.2019, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala directed that the
representation be decided within three months. Subsequently, the said
direction came to be modified vide order dated 02.03.2021 in R.P. No.
1212/2019; the said direction, which was originally issued to the
Ministry of Human Resource Development (Higher Education Wing),
was modified as a direction to the DEPwD, that is, Respondent No. 1.
6. In the meantime, the High-Powered Inter-Departmental
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Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:15.10.2026
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Committee constituted to consider inclusion of new disabilities
(hereafter ‘the Committee’ ) considered MRKH Syndrome in its
second meeting held on 03.01.2023. The view of the Committee was
conveyed to the Government of Kerala by letter dated 20.02.2023, in
response to the letter dated 10.02.2023. Thereafter, by letter No. 30-
66/2023 DDIII dated 10.10.2023, Respondent No. 1 disposed of the
representation dated 07.10.2018 of the Petitioner. The relevant portion
of the said letter reads as under:
“2.In this regard, it is to convey that there is a High-Powered
Inter Departmental Committee to consider the proposal
regarding inclusion of new disabilities in the list of specified
disabilities under RPwD Act, 2016. The committee, in its
second meeting, considered the representation regarding
inclusion of MRKH syndrome as specified disability. The
committee noted that the said syndrome is a congenital
anomaly but not a ground for being considered a disability
as the functioning of the individual in daily life is not
affected. The committee was also of the view that if any of
the condition including MRKH syndrome in long run
manifests into an impairment leading to restrictions in daily
life, the same is already covered in the Act as specified
disability . This position has already been conveyed to
Government of Kerala vide letter dated 20/2/2023 (copy
enclosed).
3.In view of above your representation dated 7.10.2018
stands disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner has preferred the present
petition.
8. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the
Petitioner suffers from MRKH Syndrome Type-II. He submits that
besides the absence of the uterus and the upper part of the vagina, the
condition is also associated with right renal agenesis in her case and
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Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:15.10.2026
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that the Disability Assessment Board, Government Taluk
Headquarters Hospital, Koyilandy, a duly constituted Medical Board,
has certified the Petitioner as having 50% disability on 08.03.2018.
This is well above the threshold of 40% for benchmark disability
under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act.
9. He further submits that the Government of Kerala has itself
classified ‘congenital absence of uterus’ as 50% disability vide G.O.
dated 18.11.2017, and that Respondent No. 1 has failed to take the
same into account.
10. He further submits that Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act defines a
‘person with disability’ broadly, with reference to a long-term
impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders full and
effective participation in society. He submits that the statutory
definition requires consideration of long-term impairment and the
barriers that may hinder full and effective participation in society.
11. Per contra , the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submits
that the inclusion of a new category of specified disability rests with
the Central Government under clause 6 of the Schedule to the RPwD
Act. It is a matter of policy that cannot be directed by this Court. He
submits that the request of the Petitioner was duly considered by the
Committee in its meeting held on 03.01.2023. The Committee was
chaired by the Secretary, DEPwD, and comprised medical experts
from AIIMS, DGHS, ICMR and Lady Hardinge Medical College.
12. He submits that the Committee was of the view that a disability
arises only when the activity of daily life is hindered due to an
impairment. Since MRKH Syndrome is a congenital anomaly that
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does not affect the functioning of the individual in daily life, the
Committee found no basis to include it as a separate specified
disability.
13. He further submits that the Committee applied the same
yardstick to several other conditions, such as diabetes, cystic fibrosis
and single kidney, none of which was recommended for inclusion. He
submits that if MRKH Syndrome Type-II, in the long run, results in an
impairment that restricts daily life, the same is already covered under
the appropriate category of specified disability and can be assessed
accordingly. He, therefore, submits that no separate inclusion of the
condition in the Schedule is warranted, and the present petition
deserves to be dismissed.
14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
15. The foremost relief sought by the Petitioner is a mandamus to
Respondent No. 1 to include MRKH Syndrome Type-II as a specified
disability. The Petitioner also seeks quashing of the impugned
communications on the ground that they are arbitrary.
16. Before turning to the merits, this Court must first consider the
scope of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It shall
then examine whether the decision of Respondent No. 1, refusing to
include the Petitioner’s condition, is arbitrary so as to call for
interference by this Court.
Scope of Judicial Review
17. It is trite law that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the
legislature to enact a law, nor to the executive to exercise its delegated
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legislative power in a particular manner. In Supreme Court
Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India : (1989) 4 SCC 187 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“51.There can be no doubt that no court can direct legislature
to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive
authority exercises a legislative power by way of subordinate
legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature,
such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which
he has been empowered to do under delegated legislative
authority.”
18. To the same effect, in Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P. :
(1990) 2 SCC 707 , the Administrative Tribunal had directed the State
Government to amend its service rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
set aside the said direction and held as under:
“11. The observations of the High Court which have been
made as the basis for its judgment by the Tribunal were only
of advisory nature. The High Court was aware of its
limitations under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and
as such the learned Judge deliberately used the word
"advisable" while making the observations. It is neither legal
nor proper for the High Courts or the Administrative
Tribunals to issue directions or advisory sermons to the
executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively within
the domain of the executive under the Constitution. Imagine
the executive advising the judiciary in respect of its power of
judicial review under the Constitution. We are bound to react
scowlingly to any such advice.
xxx
13. The Special Rules have been framed under Article 309 of
the Constitution of India. The power under Article 309 of the
Constitution of India to frame rules is the legislative power.
This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the
President or the Governor of a State as the case may be. The
High Courts or the Administrative Tribunals cannot issue a
mandate to the State Government to legislate under Article
309 of the Constitution of India. The courts cannot usurp the
functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution
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and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise
its rule making power in any manner. The courts cannot
assume to itself a supervisory role over the rule making power
of the executive under Article 309 of the Constitution of
India.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. This principle was reiterated in State of H.P. v. Satpal Saini :
(2017) 11 SCC 42 . Wherein, the Hon’ble High Court had directed the
State Government to amend Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and
Land Reforms Act, 1972 within ninety days. Setting aside the said
direction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“6. The grievance, in our view, has a sound constitutional
foundation. The High Court has while issuing the above
directions acted in a manner contrary to settled limitations on
the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution. A direction, it is well settled, cannot be issued to
the legislature to enact a law. The power to enact legislation is
a plenary constitutional power which is vested in Parliament
and the State Legislatures under Articles 245 and 246 of the
Constitution. The legislature as the repository of the sovereign
legislative power is vested with the authority to determine
whether a law should be enacted. The doctrine of separation
of powers entrusts to the court the constitutional function of
deciding upon the validity of a law enacted by the legislature,
where a challenge is brought before the High Court under
Article 226 (or this Court under Article 32) on the ground that
the law lacks in legislative competence or has been enacted in
violation of a constitutional provision. But judicial review
cannot encroach upon the basic constitutional function which
is entrusted to the legislature to determine whether a law
should be enacted. Whether a provision of law as enacted
subserves the object of the law or should be amended is a
matter of legislative policy. The court cannot direct the
legislature either to enact a law or to amend a law which it
has enacted for the simple reason that this constitutional
function lies in the exclusive domain of the legislature. For the
Court to mandate an amendment of a law as did the Himachal
Pradesh High Court is a plain usurpation of a power entrusted
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to another arm of the State. There can be no manner of doubt
that the High Court has transgressed the limitations imposed
upon the power of judicial review under Article 226 by issuing
the above directions to the State Legislature to amend the law.
The Government owes a collective responsibility to the State
Legislature. The State Legislature is comprised of elected
representatives. The law enacting body is entrusted with the
power to enact such legislation as it considers necessary to
deal with the problems faced by society and to resolve issues
of concern. The courts do not sit in judgment over legislative
expediency or upon legislative policy. This position is well
settled. Since the High Court has failed to notice it, we will
briefly recapitulate the principles which emerge from the
precedent on the subject.
7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P.2 and in V.K. Sood v.
Deptt. of Civil Aviation this Court held that the court under
Article 226 has no power to direct the executive to exercise its
law-making power.
xxx
12. The judiciary is one amongst the three branches of the
State; the other two being the executive and the legislature.
Each of the three branches is co- equal. Each has specified
and enumerated constitutional powers. The judiciary is
assigned with the function of ensuring that executive actions
accord with the law and that laws and executive decisions
accord with the Constitution. The courts do not frame policy
or mandate that a particular policy should be followed. The
duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the executive whose
accountability is to the legislature and, through it, to the
people. The peril of adopting an incorrect policy lies in
democratic accountability to the people. This is the basis and
rationale for holding that the court does not have the power or
function to direct the executive to adopt a particular policy or
the legislature to convert it into enacted law. It is wise to
remind us of these limits and wiser still to enforce them
without exception.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, it is well settled that this Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot direct the
legislature, or the executive exercising delegated legislative power, to
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enact or amend a law. The scope of judicial review in such matters is
confined to examining whether the decision of the authority is
arbitrary or contrary to law.
21. It is relevant to note that the list of specified disabilities is
contained in the Schedule, which is a part of the RPwD Act enacted
by Parliament. The only way to ‘include’ a disability is by a
notification of the Central Government under clause 6 of the
Schedule. Therefore, this Court cannot issue a mandamus directing the
Central Government to notify MRKH Syndrome Type-II as a
specified disability.
Statutory Framework
22. The RPwD Act was enacted to give effect to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘UNCRPD’) .
It replaced the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, which
recognised only seven disabilities, and enlarged the list to twenty-one
specified disabilities.
23. The expression ‘person with disability’ has been defined under
Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act, which reads as under:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
xxx
(s) “person with disability” means a person with long-term
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in
interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective
participation in society equally with others;”
24. Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act defines person with disabilities to
have three elements. First , there must be an impairment which is long-
term. Second , it must be physical, mental, intellectual or sensory.
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Third , the impairment, along with barriers, must hinder the person’s
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
25. The term ‘barrier’ , in turn, has been defined under Section 2(c)
of the RPwD Act to mean any factor, including communicational,
cultural, economic, environmental, institutional, political, social,
attitudinal or structural factors, which hampers the full and effective
participation of persons with disabilities in society. C ombined
reading of Sections 2(c) and 2(s) of the RPwD Act makes it clear that
the mere existence of an impairment is not sufficient. It is only when
the impairment, in interaction with such barriers, hinders the person’s
participation in society on an equal basis with others that the person
falls within the ambit of a ‘person with disability’ .
26. Insofar as the expression ‘specified disability’ is concerned, the
same has been defined under Section 2(zc) of the RPwD Act to mean
“the disabilities as specified in the Schedule”. The Schedule
enumerates the specified disabilities under five broad heads: physical
disability (comprising locomotor disability, visual impairment,
hearing impairment, and speech and language disability), intellectual
disability, mental behaviour disability, disability caused due to chronic
neurological conditions and blood disorders, and multiple disabilities.
Further, clause 6 of the Schedule empowers the Central Government
to notify “any other category” as a specified disability.
27. It is imperative to advert to the expression ‘person with
benchmark disability’ , which is defined under Section 2(r) of the
RPwD Act. The same reads as under:
“ (r) “person with benchmark disability” means a person
with not less than forty per cent. of a specified disability
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where specified disability has not been defined in
measurable terms and includes a person with disability
where specified disability has been defined in measurable
terms, as certified by the certifying authority;”
28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained this scheme in detail in
Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission : (2021) 5 SCC
370 . The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“ 38. The concept of a benchmark disability under Section
2(r) cannot be conflated with the notion of disability under
Section 2(s). The definition in Section 2(r) applies in the case
of a specified disability. The expression “specified disability”
is defined in Section 2(zc) to mean the disabilities as specified
in the Schedule. … The Central Government has been
empowered to notify any other category as a specified
disability.
39. The concept of benchmark disabilities under the 2016
RPwD Act has specifically been adopted in relation with the
provisions of Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Chapter VI
contains special provisions for persons with benchmark
disabilities. Among those provisions is Section 31 (free
education for children with benchmark disability), Section 32
(reservation in higher educational institutions), Section 33
(identification of posts for reservation), Section 34
(reservation), Section 36 (Special Employment Exchange) and
Section 37 (Special Schemes and Development Programmes).
Chapter VII contains special provisions for persons with
benchmark disabilities in need of high support. Thus, the
concept of benchmark disabilities has been adopted by the
legislation bearing in mind specific provisions which are
contained in the law for persons meeting this description.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. It is thus evident that the benefit of reservation under Section 32
of the RPwD Act is available only to a ‘person with benchmark
disability’ under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act, and cannot be claimed
merely on the strength of a percentage of disability.
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30. To qualify as such, the condition must first fall within a
‘specified disability’ under the Schedule, or a category notified by the
Central Government under clause 6 thereof. Only thereafter does the
question of assessing its extent at not less than 40% under Section 56
of the RPwD Act, and its certification under Sections 57 and 58 of the
RPwD Act, arise
31. It is pertinent to throw light on the minutes of the meeting of the
Committee held on 03.01.2023, placed on record by Respondent No. 1
along with its counter affidavit. The Committee considered sixteen
conditions in that meeting. The Committee had drawn a distinction
between a disability and a medical condition in the following words:
“ … there is a clear distinction between disability and medical
condition. The RPwD Act, 2016 mainly focuses on disability.
All the above mentioned conditions relate to specific diseases
only. Any person suffering from these disease conditions, if in
the long term, develops any of the specified disabilities
mentioned in the Schedule of the RPwD Act, 2016, is already
covered within the ambit of the said Act.”
32. Proceeding on this basis, the Committee recorded its broad
view and its view on MRKH Syndrome as under:
“ 5. The Committee deliberated each of the conditions vis-a-vis
the practices followed in various countries and also in
accordance the definition of persons with disability as
specified under Section 2 (s) of the Act. Broadly the
Committee was of the view that disability would arise only
when activity of daily life is hindered due to an impairment.
… Moreover, if any of these conditions in the long run
manifests into an impairment leading of restrictions in daily
life activities, the same is already covered in the Act as
specified disability under appropriate category. …
xxx
15. (MRKH) Syndrome — The Committee noted that this is a
congenital anomaly but not a ground for being considered a
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disability as the functioning of the individual in daily life is
not affected. ”
(emphasis supplied)
33. On a careful perusal of the record, this Court finds no
arbitrariness or perversity in the view taken by the Committee.
Pertinently, the test of whether daily functioning is affected flows
from Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act itself. The Committee is an expert
body comprising medical experts from AIIMS, DGHS, ICMR and
Lady Hardinge Medical College, and it applied the same yardstick to
other conditions as well, including diabetes, cystic fibrosis and single
kidney. There is, thus, no hostile discrimination against the condition
of the Petitioner. Nothing on record shows any hindrance in her daily
life that the Committee failed to consider.
34. This Court is not unmindful of the difficulties faced by the
Petitioner. The concerns of the Petitioner about social stigma are real
and deserve sympathy. However, sympathy alone cannot be a ground
to issue a direction that the law does not permit. Whether such social
barriers justify treating MRKH Syndrome as a disability is a matter
that the Committee and the Central Government are best placed to
weigh.
35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the
impugned communications dated 20.02.2023 and 10.10.2023 do not
suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity that calls for
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
36. Needless to say, the dismissal of this petition shall not preclude
the Petitioner from making a fresh representation to Respondent No. 1
if any new medical material comes to light. If the Petitioner makes
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any such representation, it shall be considered in accordance with law.
37. The present petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
38. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
OCTOBER 14, 2026
DU
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