National Highway Authority Of India N.H. No. 26 vs Sanjay Kumar

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
1 AA-48-2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
th
ON THE 15 OF JULY, 2026
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 48 of 2020
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA N.H. NO. 26
Versus
SANJAY KUMAR AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mohan Sausarkar - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Pradeep Kumar Sharma- Advocate for the respondent through
VC.
ORDER
Heard on I.A. No. 6728/2022 filed on 24.06.2022, an application for
condonation of delay.
2. From the perusal of the application, it is found that the application
has been filed to show sufficient cause because of which the appellant was
prevented from filing the appeal within time. The cause shown in paragraph
3 is that the counsel who was appearing before the Civil/Commercial Court
and prosecuting the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act never intimated the appellant about the status of the case
and also the fact that the matter was rejected for want of deficit court fees.
However, it is submitted that when such knowledge was gathered, the
counsel has intimated the office, and thereafter, upon receiving the said
information, the present appeal has been filed. In the grounds itself, two
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
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contradictory pleadings have been made with regard to the information not

tendered by the counsel and intimated by the counsel.
3. From perusal of the record, it is transpired that the appeal has been
filed on 20.10.2020 with delay of 669 days, as reported by the Registry.
However, the application for condonation of delay was filed with further
delay of 2 years i.e. on 24.06.2022. No explanation with regard to not filing
the application for condonation of delay along with the appeal has been
tendered in the application. The appeal, being time barred, cannot be treated
as an appeal in the eye of law unless the delay is condoned. Therefore, in
practical and legal sense, the appeal would be said to have been filed along
with the application in the year 2022, when the application for condonation
of delay was filed. However, from the perusal of the application, no reason
has been assigned as to why such an application could not have been filed
along with the appeal in the year 2020 and no sufficient cause has been put
forth to explain why such application was filed belatedly after 4 years from
the disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. As pointed out hereinabove, the reason which has been
assigned is that knowledge was gathered only when the counsel has
intimated the office, which is a self contradictory statement made by the
appellant that the appellant was not aware of the rejection of the application
because the counsel had never intimated it about the same. Therefore, in the
opinion of the this Court, the appellant was not diligent in prosecuting the
application under Section 34 as well as in filing the present appeal within
time. No sufficient cause has been shown before this Court to condone the
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Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
3 AA-48-2020
delay.

4. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh
Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, in Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.
48636/2024, decided on 29.11.2024 has categorically held that delay caused
due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials
functioning in the State machinery and directed to fix the responsibility of
the official because of whom such delay, deviation, lapses, etc. have been
caused and to value the loss caused to the Government. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced hereinunder:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner
has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi4, it
was held by this Court that even though limitation may
harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this Court in
Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram5 wherein, it was held as
follows:

“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
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RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
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not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone
the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions
and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing
the delay condonation application of the present
appellant.”
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and that, the expression
‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to
the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir6, wherein, one of us (J.B.
Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms
observed by this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted
below:


“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made
it very clear that we are not going to look into
the merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
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Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
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around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to reap
the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period
of limitation for instituting the proceedings
for which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the merits
of the main matter. The court owes a duty to
first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the appellants.
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34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of

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Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
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law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed
the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was
not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put
forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject
this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic approach in handling the
legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due
to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay
of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal
due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government lands
were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal issues,
offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the
Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who
is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if
any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously. .
5. In view of the above enunciation of law and analysis of the facts

relating to the sufficient cause pleaded, it is found that the appeal has been
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Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:52267
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filed with delay, which has not been sufficiently explained by the appellant

in the application. The application filed for condonation of delay contains
contradictory statements with regard to the lack of information and receiving
such information. Therefore, the application i.e. I.A. No. 6728/2022 being
devoid of merits and not showing any sufficient cause for condonation of the
delay, is hereby rejected.
6. Moreover, from perusal of the impugned order dated 15.02.2018
passed by the First Additional District Judge, Narsinghpur in MJC No.
63/2016, it is evident that neither appellant nor his representative/counsel
was present before the Court. The appellant was given the last opportunity to
deposit the court fees. Despite the same, neither appellant nor his counsel
appeared nor deposited the court fees. The conduct of the appellant shows
that the appellant was negligent in prosecuting the matter on merits
diligently. Thus, because of non depositing the court fees, the matter was
dismissed in default.
7. Accordingly, Arbitration Appeal is also dismissed.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
L.R.

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 22-07-2026
11:38:25