X Complainant Of Complaint Case No. 65/2026 vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Civil Sectt. Lko. And 3 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1666 of 2026
X Complainant Of Complaint Case No. 65/2026
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Civil Sectt.
Lko. And 3 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Adarsh Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Alok Kumar Singh
[A.F.R.]

Court No. - 14
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Sri. Adarsh Shukla, the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri.
Mayank Sinha, the learned A.G.A. for the State of U.P. and Sri. Gaurav
Verma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 3 and 4 and perused
the record.
2. By means of the instant appeal filed under Section 14-A(1) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 (which will hereinafter be referred to as 'the SC/ST Act'), the appellant
has challenged the validity of an order dated 17.04.2026 passed by the
learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act/Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur
Kheri, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 65/2026, whereby instead of
ordering registration of a First Information Report, the appellant's
application under Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(which will hereinafter be referred to as 'BNSS') was treated as a complaint.
3. The appellant stated in the application under Section 173 (4) BNSS that
she is a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste and was working as an
Instructor in an Upper Primary School. In the year 2024 she was residing as
a tenant in the house of the opposite party No. 2 in District Kheri, in
connection with her employment and her husband used to commute from
Lucknow. The opposite party No. 2 sold a plot belonging to his younger
brother (the opposite party No. 3), to the complainant's husband. Later, it
was discovered that the opposite party no. 3 was not the owner of the plot.
Upon making a complaint, the opposite parties no. 2 to 4 stated that they
would get the plot sold and get the money recovered. They got a sale deed
executed in favour of one Ravi Shankar. Even thereafter, some of the
complainant's money remained with the opposite parties. As the

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complainant's husband used to stay outside, taking undue advantage of her
being alone and under pretext of helping her recover her husband's money,
the opposite party no. 2 started exploiting the appellant sexually. Thereafter,
the complainant's husband shifted her to another accommodation, but some
of her belongings remained in the house of the opposite parties, including a
cheque book signed by her husband. The complainant has expressed an
apprehension that the accused persons might cause harm to her husband and
child.
4. It is mentioned in the impugned order dated 17.04.2026 that the Court had
called for a report from the Police. The police report revealed that the actual
owner of the land was Shiv Shankar Mishra. The purchaser Ravi Shankar
had lodged Case Crime No. 381/2025 against the complainant's husband and
the opposite parties in which a final report was submitted on the basis of an
amicable resolution of dispute, under which the amount in question had been
refunded.
5. The trial court found that the complainant has alleged that in furtherance
of a conspiracy the opposite parties represented themselves to be the owners
of the plot and they got its sale deed executed in favour of the complainant's
husband. The final report submitted in Case Crime No. 381/2025 discloses
that the complainant, her husband and the opposite parties had been arrayed
as accused persons in the said case. As the consideration amount of the plot
had been refunded and no other evidence was found, a final report was
submitted. The trial court further found that all the facts of the case are
within the knowledge of the complainant, which she can prove herself by
leading evidence. Accordingly, the Special Judge registered the application
under Section 173(4) BNSS as a complaint and fixed the next date for
recording the statement under Section 223 BNSS.
6. According to the averments made in the complaint, the complainant was
not involved in the purchase and sale of the plot and her husband was a party
to the transactions. The husband is not suffering from any legal disability
which may incapacitate him to institute the legal proceedings for
enforcement of his legal rights. The complainant is not the legal guardian of
her husband so as to initiate legal proceedings on his behalf. The dispute
pertains to a monetary transaction, regarding which a First Information
Report was lodged against the complainant, her husband and the opposite
parties no. 3 and 4 and after the matter was settled, a final report has already
been submitted.
7. In the application under Section 173(4) BNSS, the complainant has stated
that some amount of her husband's money still remains unpaid. Neither the
sale consideration amount has been disclosed in the application, nor has the
alleged unpaid amount been disclosed. The complainant's husband, whose

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3
money is alleged to have remained unpaid, has not instituted any
proceedings – civil or criminal.
8. The complainant has stated, in paragraph 4 of the application that as her
husband used to reside away, the opposite party no. 2 started sexually
exploiting her under allurement of returning her husband's money. A 35
years old married woman herself stating that she permitted a man to sexually
exploit her in order to recover her husband's money, although there is no
allegation of use of force or deception by the opposite party no. 2, is an
extremely unnatural and strange allegation, which no person of ordinary
prudence and reasonable understanding can believe. Even if the allegation is
taken to be correct, it does not constitute any offence.
9. The assertion made in the application that although the complainant had
vacated the accommodation of the opposite party no. 2 which she had taken
on rent, a cheque book signed by her husband was left there, is also a strange
statement, which no person of ordinary prudence would believe.
10. It appears that the petitioner is abusing the criminal justice system to
blackmail the opposite Parties Nos. 2 to 4 for recovering an undisclosed
amount of unpaid money. In Dilip Singh v. State of M.P. , (2021) 2 SCC
779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that criminal proceedings are not for
realization of disputed dues.
11. Section 528 of BNSS, which corresponds to Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
recognizes the inherent powers of this Court in the following words: -
" Nothing in this
528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. -
Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the
High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect
to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy , (1977) 2 SCC 699, it was
held that: -
" In the exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's
inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon
of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on
which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of
justice.
The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law
though justice has got to be administered according to laws made
by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these

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observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers
of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects,
it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of
that salient jurisdiction ."
(emphasis added)
13. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
" 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1)
Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused .
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
.
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
."
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge
(emphasis added)
14. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court added a word of caution in the
judgment in the case of (supra) by stating that: -
Bhajan Lal
" We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of
103.
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases;
that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or
inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
to act according to its whim or caprice."
15. The purport of the expression "rarest of rare cases" has been explained
in : (2008) 3 SCC 574, in the
Som Mittal (2) v. State of Karnataka
following words: -
' 9. When the words "rarest of rare cases" are used after the words
"sparingly and with circumspection" while describing the scope of
Section 482, those words merely emphasise and reiterate what is
intended to be conveyed by the words "sparingly and with
circumspection". They mean that the power under Section 482 to
quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely,
but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is
made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of
justice. The expression "rarest of rare cases" is not used in the
sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences
under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the power under

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Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should
be used sparingly and with circumspection.'"
16. The law regarding scope of exercise of the inherent powers of the High
Courts acknowledged by Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS stands settled by
the aforesaid judgments and the power can be exercised to quash any
criminal proceedings before a trial Court if it would result in an abuse of the
process of any Court.
17. The question which now arises is whether this Court can exercise its
inherent powers suo motu so as to quash the proceedings of a criminal
complaint, when the abuse of the process of Court has been noticed by this
Court while hearing an appeal filed by the complainant herself and the
accused persons have not come forward to challenge its validity (due to the
obvious reason that they are yet to be summoned by the trial Court).
18. In this regard, it is relevant to note the following principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Popular Muthiah v. State represented by
: (2006) 7 SCC 296: -
Inspector of Police
" 27. While exercising its appellate power, the jurisdiction of the
High Court although is limited but, in our opinion, there exists a
distinction but a significant one being that the High Court can
exercise its revisional jurisdiction and/or inherent jurisdiction not
only when an application therefor is filed but also suo motu. It is
not in dispute that suo motu power can be exercised by the High
Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. There may not,
therefore, be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its
extraordinary inherent jurisdiction while exercising other
jurisdictions in the matter . Keeping in view the intention of
Parliament, while making the new law the emphasis of Parliament
being "a case before the court" in contradistinction from "a person
who is arrayed as an accused before it" when the High Court is
seized with the entire case although would exercise a limited
jurisdiction in terms of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the same, in our considered view, cannot be held to
limit its other powers and in particular that of Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the matter which is not
before it.
*
29. The High Court while, thus, exercising its revisional or
appellate power, may exercise its inherent powers. Inherent

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power of the High Court can be exercised, it is trite, both in
.
relation to substantive as also procedural matters
In respect of the incidental or supplemental power, evidently,
30.
the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction irrespective of
the nature of the proceedings. It is not trammelled by procedural
restrictions in that:
(i) Power can be exercised suo motu in the interest of justice . If
such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice to an
accused.
(ii) Such a power can be exercised concurrently with the appellate
or revisional jurisdiction and no formal application is required to
be filed therefor .
(iii) It is, however, beyond any doubt that the power under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not unlimited. It can inter
alia be exercised where the Code is silent, where the power of the
court is not treated as exhaustive, or there is a specific provision in
the Code; or the statute does not fall within the purview of the Code
because it involves application of a special law. It acts ex debito
justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which
alone it exists."
(emphasis added)
19. When examining the scope of inherent powers of this Court, it would be
appropriate to keep into consideration the provision contained in Article 215
of the Constitution of India, which provides that: -
" 215. High Courts to be courts of record . - Every High Court shall
be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court
including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
20. In , AIR 1967 SC
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra
1, a Constitution Bench consisting of nine Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that: -
" 59. ... The High Court is a superior court of record and under
Article 215, shall have all powers of such a court of record
including the power to punish contempt of itself. One
distinguishing characteristic of such superior courts is that they
are entitled to consider questions of their jurisdiction raised
. This question fell to be considered by this Court
before them
in Special Reference No. I of 1964 [(1965) 1 SCR 413 at p 499]. In
that case, it was urged before this Court that in granting bail to
Keshav Singh, the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and as
such, the order was a nullity. Rejecting this argument, this Court

CRLA No. 1666 of 2026
8
observed that
in the case of a superior court of record, it is for the
court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction
or not. Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the superior court is
entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction
. That is why this Court did not accede to the proposition that in
passing the order for interim bail, the High Court can be said to
have exceeded its jurisdiction with the result that the order in
question was null and void. In support of this view, this Court cited
a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England where it is observed
that
"prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the
jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be
so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court
unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that
the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular
court [Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 9, p. 349] ". If the decision
of a superior court on a question of its jurisdiction is erroneous, it
can, of course, be corrected by appeal or revision as may be
permissible under the law; but until the adjudication by a superior
court on such a point is set aside by adopting the appropriate
course, it would not be open to be corrected by the exercise of the
writ jurisdiction of this Court."
(emphasis added)
21. The aforesaid decision was followed in M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan
Investment and Trading (P) Ltd. : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433, wherein the
Supreme Court reiterated that: -
" 66. The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They
have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and
plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject
to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High
Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to
determine their own powers..."
22. In Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI : (2018) 16 SCC
299, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
" 52. … First and foremost, it must be appreciated that the High
Courts are established by the Constitution and are courts of record
which will have all powers of such courts, including the power to
punish contempt of themselves (see Article 215). The High Court,
being a superior court of record, is entitled to consider questions
. In an
regarding its own jurisdiction when raised before it
instructive passage by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, In re,
Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [AIR 1965 SC 745],
Gajendragadkar, C.J. held:

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" 138. Besides, in the case of a superior court of record, it is for
the court to consider whether any matter falls within its
jurisdiction or not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the
superior court is entitled to determine for itself questions about
its own jurisdiction. "Prima facie", says Halsbury, 'no matter is
deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it
is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the
jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on
the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the
cognizance of the particular court' [Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 9, p. 349]."
*
54. It is thus clear that the inherent power of a court set up by the
Constitution is a power that inheres in such court because it is a
superior court of record, and not because it is conferred by
the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is a power vested by the
Constitution itself, inter alia, under Article 215 as aforestated.
Also, as such High Courts have the power, nay, the duty to protect
the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 226 of
the Constitution, the inherent power to do justice in cases
involving the liberty of the citizen would also sound in
Article 21 of the Constitution…."
(emphasis added)
23. In : 2026 SCC OnLine All 20629, this Court
Baldev Raj Arora v. CBI
has held that: -
" The inherent powers of this Court to secure the ends of justice
46.
and prevent the abuse of the process of law do not stem from
Section 482 CrPC or for that matter from any other statutory
provision. Such a power is an unfettered power which inheres in
this Court, because this Court is a Constitutional Court and a court
of record. Section 482 CrPC does not confer the inherent powers
on the High Courts, it merely provides that nothing contained
in CrPC will affect the inherent powers of the High Court, which
powers are inherent in the High Court by virtue of it being a
court of record as laid down under Article 215 of
the Constitution. The inherent powers are powers of a wide
amplitude with only self imposed restrictions, to be exercised in a

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suitable case to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, the
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is a statutory manifestation
of the wider inherent powers constitutionally recognized under
.
Article 215, to be exercised for securing the ends of justice
In order to fully comprehend and effectively exercise the
47.
inherent powers of the High Court, it is pertinent to note the
legislative intent and the purpose that was intended to achieved by
Section 482 CrPC and Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The
object behind Article 215 is to give power to the High Courts to
decide their own jurisdiction, apparently to confer discretionary
powers on the High Courts, to be exercised in appropriate cases in
which it deems fit to invoke its powers. Without giving the power to
decide its own jurisdiction the inherent powers to secure the ends
of justice might become meaningless. Similarly, the words "to
make such orders as may be necessary to secure the ends of
justice" used in Section 482 conclude the aforesaid section in an
open ended manner, the underlying object being to save the
discretionary inherent powers of the High Courts to decide for
itself what would be the appropriate cases in which the inherent
power should be invoked. Therefore, the object behind both the
provisions appears to be one i.e. to further the cause of
substantial justice and undertake all such measures that may be
required in this direction ."
(emphasis added)
24. In Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of U.P. : 2026 SCC OnLine SC
1004, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern and anguish
over the rising trend in vexatious litigation, in the following words: -
" 9. ... we wish to underline a worrying trend that has come to our
attention. Parties involved in matrimonial or commercial
relationships with one another are resorting to filing of frivolous
and vexatious claims and allegations of a criminal nature to settle
personal scores and grudges against each other and therefore turn
to nefarious/oblique means to attain the said objective...
9.1 ... The onus is on courts to be careful and cautious so as to
separate the wheat from the chaff and separate the genuine cases
of matrimonial oppression, rape and offences against women
from the cases wherein the legal process and procedure is being

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used as a tool to file false and frivolous cases out of vengeance .
While doing so, care should be taken to ensure that the rights and
freedoms of innocent parties are not trampled or arbitrarily taken
away by unscrupulous and baseless litigation.
...
9.2 The litigating parties and their advocates should also be
cognizant of the fact that such vexatious filing of false and
frivolous claims and cases cast unnecessary burden on the
already overburdened machinery and apparatus of the State and
Judiciary. This factor also diverts the attention of courts and its
resources whereas genuine cases of the parties with actual
verifiable grievances are not being able to be adjudicated in time
owing to the time spent in adjudicating upon phantom claims of
mischievous litigators seeking to create litigation out of thin air
or in the absence of a cause to do so .
*
9.6 While we are conscious of the fact that there are instances and
a plethora of cases that are true and deserve the utmost attention
and deft handling on the side of authorities and Courts and which
should be pursued vigorously to reach a logical conclusion, on the
other side of the spectrum, are cases invoking such serious and
heinous allegations which are prima facie vague, omnibus and
general in nature and thereby lacking any material backing or
evidence which should be shunned at the very threshold.
We say so
for the reason that if a person is made an accused and forced to
face a criminal trial on general and sweeping allegations without
bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it
would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law and court.
Hence, legal practitioners who tender advice in such cases must
restrain parties from filing such false/frivolous complaints when
requested to do so. Further, lawyers/advocates must also not
advise filing of criminal complaints which are false/concocted so
as to keep the opposite parties under a tight leash so that they
could come forward for a settlement on the terms dictated by their
parties or else, to face a criminal prosecution which can prolong
for years...
9.7 Courts then owe a duty to subject the allegations levelled in
the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to ascertain if a prima

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facie case is made out or not, and whether there is any kernel of
truth in the allegations or whether the said allegations have been
made only with the sole intent of spite so as to harass the opposite
party with a prolonged process of criminal litigation, arrest and
sometimes a conviction which later on may result in an acquittal
by a higher Court or in a worse case, no relief at all being given
to an innocent party. ..."
(emphasis added)
25. Thus, the law is well settled that being a superior Court of record, this
Court has the power to determine the questions relating to its own
jurisdiction and nothing is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, unless there
is a specific statutory bar against the jurisdiction of this Court. Section 428
Cr.P.C. /Section 528 BNSS recognize the inherent powers of this Court to
pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse
of the process of any Court. In appropriate cases, this Court can exercise its
inherent powers even suo motu , even while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction and filing of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS is
not a condition precedent for exercising the inherent powers to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court. Where
even while exercising its appellate powers, it appears to this Court that
continuance of any criminal proceedings would defeat the ends of justice
and would result in abuse of the process of any Court, this Court not only
has the power to interfere in exercise of its inherent powers, but it has the
duty to exercise that power in deserving cases, so as to secure the ends of
justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or law.
26. When the allegations levelled in the application under Section 173(4)
BNSS are examined in light of the law laid down in the above mentioned
cases, it appears that a 35-year-old married woman who is working as an
instructor in an upper primary school (although in the affidavit filed before
this Court she has stated on oath that she is merely literate), she has alleged
that she allowed herself to be sexually exploited under allurement of
recovering her husband's undisclosed amount of money, although her
husband did not take any action for recovering his money. This allegation is
wholly improbable. Moreover, she has not alleged use of force or deceit by
the opposite parties. Assuming this allegation levelled in the application is
true, it does not make out commission of any offence by the opposite party
no. 2.
27. The alleged accidental leaving of a signed cheque-book in the house of
the opposite party, without alleging that any signed cheque has been misused
by any of the opposite parties, also does not make out commission of any

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offence.
28. Although the complainant has mentioned in her application under
Section 173 (4) BNSS filed before the Special Judge, SC/ST Act that she
belongs to a Scheduled Caste, there is no allegation in the entire complaint
which may make out commission of any offence under the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
29. When the allegations levelled in the complaint do not make out
commission of any offence, continuance of the proceedings of the complaint
would result in an unwarranted persecution of the opposite parties, besides
resulting in wastage of precious judicial time of the Courts. Continuance of
the proceedings of the complaint in such circumstances would defeat the
ends of justice and would be an abuse of the process of the Courts and the
law. The frivolous and vexatious complaint having come to the knowledge
of this Court through the appeal filed by the complainant herself, warrants
suo motu exercise of the inherent powers of this Court so as to quash the
entire proceedings of the complaint.
30. Accordingly, while exercising the inherent powers of this Court in the
appeal presented by the appellant herself challenging the order dated
17.04.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act)/Additional Sessions Judge,
Lakhimpur Kheri in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 65/2026, whereby the
application under Section 173(4) BNSS was treated as a complaint whereas
the appellant wants a first information report to be registered in furtherance
of her application, the order dated 17.04.2026 passed by the Special Judge
treating the application under Section 173(4) BNSS filed by the appellant as
a complaint, is . The entire proceedings instituted on the basis of the
set aside
application under Section 173(4) BNSS filed by the appellant against the
opposite parties no. 2 to 4 are hereby quashed .
July 17, 2026
-Amit K-
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Whether the judgement is speaking :- Yes
Whether the judgement is reportable :- Yes
.
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
AMIT KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench