Raj Kumar Singh vs Veena Gupta Alias Beena Gupta

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 15.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010441202026
+ RC.REV. 350/2026, CM APPL. 63477/2026 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 63478/2026 (Ex. From filing certified copies of the
annexures)

RAJ KUMAR SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Madan Lal Sharma, Mrs.
Vidhi Kumar, Ms. Tejaswini
Verma, Mr. Raghav Bansal and
Ms. Manika Gaba, Advs.
versus

VEENA GUPTA ALIAS BEENA GUPTA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Gupta and Mr.
Shivam Sachdeva, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been filed under
1
the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ,
2
assailing the Order dated 29.05.2026 passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari
3
Courts, Delhi in RC ARC No. 356/2023, titled Veena Gupta alias

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
learned ARC
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 1 of 24

Beena Gupta v. Raj Kumar Singh , whereby the Application filed by
the Petitioner/tenant seeking leave to defend the Eviction Petition
under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act was
dismissed and an Eviction Order was consequently passed in favour of
the Respondent/landlady in respect of Shop situated on the ground
floor of the property bearing municipal No. 1468, Rang Mahal,
4
Nahar Sadat Khan, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi-110006 .

BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondent instituted the Eviction Proceedings by filing
5
the Eviction Petition dated 18.05.2023 , claiming herself to be the
owner and landlady of the Subject Premises and pleading her bona
fide requirement thereof for commercial purposes. It was her case that
the Subject Premises was required for the commercial needs of her
son, Mr. Puneet Gupta, who was dependent upon her for the purpose
of carrying on his business.
3. The Respondent pleaded that she had acquired the Subject
Premises vide registered Sale Deed dated 30.06.2009 and that the
premises, situated on the ground floor at Rang Mahal, Nahar Sadat
Khan, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi-110006, was particularly suited for
the proposed commercial activity on account of its prominent location
in the vicinity of Bhagirath Place, a major market for electronic goods.
The Respondent asserted that the Subject Premises was required for
the proposed business of electronic gadgets and allied goods, as well
as for the establishment of a departmental store, and that no other

4
Subject Premises
5
Eviction Petition
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 2 of 24

reasonably suitable alternative accommodation was available to meet
the aforesaid requirement.
4. The Petitioner entered appearance and filed an Application
6
seeking leave to defend dated 19.11.2023 , wherein he disputed the
bona fide requirement pleaded by the Respondent, contending, inter
alia , that the Respondent had not clearly specified the precise nature
of the commercial activity proposed to be carried out from the Subject
Premises or sufficiently explained the requirement for seeking the
same and contended that the requirement projected was merely a
pretext to seek his eviction, the Subject Premises being sought as
additional accommodation. It was further contended that the site plan
relied upon by the Respondent was incorrect and incomplete, as it did
not depict the entire property and the other commercial spaces
available therein. The Petitioner also relied upon the availability of
other shops, namely, Shop Nos. 1466, 1467, 1470, 1476 and 1477,
contending that the same could be utilised for the stated commercial
purpose.
5. The Petitioner also brought on record certain subsequent events,
including the alleged availability of additional commercial spaces in
the property, and sought to rely upon the same in support of his
objections to the bona fide requirement pleaded by the Respondent.
The learned ARC considered the Application seeking to place such
subsequent events on record and, vide Order dated 13.08.2025,
permitted only one subsequent event to be taken on record, rejecting
the remaining events.

6
Leave to Defend Application
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 3 of 24

6. The learned ARC, after considering the Eviction Petition, the
Leave to Defend Application, the Reply dated 14.10.2024 and the
Rejoinder dated 24.12.2024, found that the Petitioner had failed to
disclose any triable issue warranting grant of leave to defend. The
learned ARC held that the landlord-tenant relationship stood
established, accepted the Respondent’s bona fide requirement and
rejected the objection concerning the availability of alternative
accommodation. Accordingly, the Leave to Defend Application was
dismissed and an Eviction Order was passed in favour of the
Respondent in respect of the Subject Premises.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, the present Revision Petition
has been preferred. Though the Revision Petition raises various
grounds, the challenge, as canvassed before this Court, is confined to
the objection concerning the availability of reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation with the Respondent.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Respondent
has additional commercial premises available in the same property,
which could be utilised for the stated business requirement. In
particular, reliance is placed upon Shop Nos. 912, 1466, 1467, 1470,
1476 and 1477. It is contended that the availability of these premises
has not been appropriately appreciated and that the Respondent cannot
seek eviction of the Petitioner without establishing why the available
shops would not suffice for the proposed commercial activity. On this
basis, it is submitted that the learned ARC erred in rejecting the Leave
to Defend Application without adequately considering the plea of
alternative accommodation.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 4 of 24

9. Per contra , learned counsel for the Respondent supports the
Impugned Order and submits that the Subject Premises is situated on
the ground floor at a prime commercial location near Bhagirath Place
and is suitable for carrying on business in electronic gadgets and allied
goods, as well as for establishing a departmental store. With regard to
the objection concerning alternative accommodation, learned counsel
for the Respondent submits that the mere existence of other shops
does not, by itself, render them reasonably suitable for the requirement
pleaded. In this regard, it is contended that Shop Nos. 1466 and 1467
are situated towards another corner of the property, with a hall
intervening between them and the Subject Premises, whereas the
Subject Premises is a two-side-open corner shop on the ground floor.
It is further submitted that the other shops relied upon by the
Petitioner are either insufficient for the proposed business or are
occupied by tenants. Accordingly, it is argued that the learned ARC
rightly concluded that no reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation had been established and that the Petitioner had failed
to raise any triable issue warranting interference with the Impugned
Order.
10. It is lastly submitted that the present proceedings are
circumscribed by the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court under
the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. Learned counsel
contends that, in the absence of any perversity, patent illegality,
jurisdictional error or material irregularity in the Impugned Order, no
interference by this Court is warranted in the exercise of such
jurisdiction.
11. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 5 of 24

ANALYSIS:
12. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also
the Impugned Order.
13. Before proceeding to examine the individual grounds of
challenge, it is necessary to delineate the scope of jurisdiction
exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the
DRC Act. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court is supervisory in
nature and not appellate. The question, therefore, is whether the
Impugned Order is in accordance with law and whether the decision-
making process adopted by the learned ARC suffers from any
illegality, material irregularity or error warranting interference. This
Court is not required to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material
on record as though deciding the matter in appeal.
14. The scope of the aforesaid jurisdiction has been explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
7
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8 9
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua . The
consistent position emerging from these decisions is that the High
Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to
Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, is required to examine the legality of
the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, without entering into
a fresh appreciation of the material as an appellate court. The
jurisdiction is intended to ensure that the order under challenge is in
accordance with law, and not to permit a reconsideration of the matter

7
(1998) 8 SCC 119
8
(2014) 9 SCC 78
9
(2022) 6 SCC 30
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 6 of 24

merely because a different view may be possible. In this regard, the
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra)
are apposite and read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”


15. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the scope of examination
by this Court is confined to determining whether the findings recorded
by the learned ARC are sustainable in law and whether any material
infirmity in the Impugned Order warrants interference. The question is
not whether this Court would have arrived at the same conclusion
upon an independent assessment of the material, but whether the view
taken by the learned ARC suffers from any illegality, material
irregularity or perversity. Equally, any failure to consider a material
contention bearing upon the adjudication would call for scrutiny. It is
within the aforesaid parameters that the objection raised by the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order fall for consideration.
16. The Petitioner’s principal contention is that the Respondent has
other commercial accommodation available in the same property,
which, according to him, renders the requirement pleaded in respect of
the Subject Premises untenable. In the Leave to Defend Application,
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 7 of 24

the Petitioner specifically referred to Shop Nos. 912, 1466, 1467,
1470, 1476 and 1477, alleging that Shop Nos. 1466 and 1467 were in
the Respondent’s possession, Shop No. 1470 had been renovated and
subdivided into smaller shops, and Shop Nos. 1476 and 1477 were
associated with the business of M/s L.S. Caterers & Co. The Petitioner
also relied upon the alleged display of advertisements offering shops
for rent, and contended that the availability of such commercial spaces
had not been candidly disclosed.

17. The Respondent, in reply, acknowledged possession of Shop
Nos. 1466 and 1467 but specifically disputed their suitability,
explaining that they were situated towards another corner of the
property, with a hall intervening, whereas the Subject Premises was a
corner shop open on two sides. It was further stated that the proposed
business involving electronic goods and allied items, or a
departmental store, would require approximately 2,000 square feet for
display, storage, billing and accounting, which the said shops could
not adequately accommodate. As regards Shop Nos. 1476 and 1477,
the Respondent clarified that M/s L.S. Caterers & Co. was being run
by her and her husband, and that her son had no concern with the said
business, as he intended to establish an independent commercial
venture. The Petitioner has also referred to Property No. 912 as an
alleged alternative accommodation, whereas the Respondent has
specifically denied ownership of the said property.
18. Having noticed the rival submissions and the principles
governing the assessment of alternative accommodation, it is
necessary to advert to the findings recorded by the learned ARC on
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 8 of 24

this aspect. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order reads as
under:
“ ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
20) With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is
contended by the respondent that the petitioner has concealed the
various alternative accommodations. However, it is a well settled
proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the
property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out
the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with
the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property.
In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36 , the
Apex Court has that the landlord does not have an unfettered right
to choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has
some other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient
to negative the landlord’s claim if the vacant premises were not
suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. In the
light of the said principles, I proceed to consider the contentions of
the respondent.
21) In the present matter, however, no particulars of any
purported alternative accommodation have been pleaded by
the respondent. It is trite to state that the burden is upon the tenant
to show that other alternative suitable accommodation is available
with landlord and how the said premises were suitable for the
pleaded requirement. Reference is made to the judgment of the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta
Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026 , wherein it was held
as under: -
“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend
controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the
ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement
having alternate premises, having not used the same and
instead having commercially exploited the same, the
tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b)
the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said
premises were vacant and available for use at the time of
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said
premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement and (e)
how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale
or letting and support the said pleas with material on the
basis whereof such pleas will be proved.”
22) It is also contended that petitioner has alternative
accommodations in the form of shops in the same premises.
However, it is pertinent to note that nothing has been brought on
record to even prima facie show that the said premises are lying
vacant. Therefore, it is not the case whereby the said shops are
lying vacant and available as alternative accommodations.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14
RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 9 of 24

Besides, it is a well settled law that the shop on the ground floor is
much more suitable than a shop on the upper floors from the
perspective of both the buyer and seller. In this regard it is
pertinent to note the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC
503 , is to be noted where it was held that it is not for the Courts to
say that the landlord should shift to the first floor or any higher
floor as it is well known that shops and businesses are usually
conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach
there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot dictate to the
landlord which floor he should use for his business and that is for
the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a ground floor premises is
more suitable for commercial purpose than the premises on upper
floor as it has more footfall of the customers. Therefore, the shop
on the upper floors cannot be considered as a suitable alternative.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs.
Neeraj Khanna & Anr., RC.REV. 66/2017, decided on
31.08.2022. Furthermore, the landlord being the best judge of his
own requirement is the best person to decide as to which premises,
he has to choose for conducting his business and a tenant cannot
force the landlord to conduct his business from the basement or
upper floor. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Rabhahar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera
Kumar Tandon, 72 (1998) DLT 629 that the landlord is not
disentitled from seeking recovery of the possession of a ground
floor merely on the plea that he is also in possession of first floor
and second floor so long as the court is satisfied with respect to the
Bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted premises.
Similarly, in the present matter, the tenant cannot dictate the
landlord to run his business from the first floor when it is settled
law that the premises on the ground floor are much more suitable
for commercial needs.
23) Counsel for the respondent has also relied upon various
judgments to contend that ‘in cases where additional
accommodation is asked for, normally leave to defend should not
be refused’ . However, the said judgments do not lay down any
principle of law much less salutary principle of law to be applied
irrespective of the facts of the case. Hence, it is not a proposition
calling for universal application per se so that even if, facts prima
facie incredible in nature are pleaded; they should like a password
result in leave to contest being granted. Reliance in this regard is
placed upon decision of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in A. M.
Shah vs Pushpa Sood, 92 (2010) DLT 694 and Chand Daga vs
Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 2002 (610) DRJ 410 . Further, only by
looking into facts and circumstances of the case, it can be
determined whether grounds for granting leave are made out or not.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 10 of 24

It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the
premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of his
business, then, it is not for the respondent/tenant to dictate the
terms and advice as to what and what not should the landlord do
when he has other premises available. Hence, the said contention is
devoid of merits.
24) The Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have
repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the
landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the
landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute
owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way. The respondent cannot
dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. The
landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific
requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not
within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the
landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of
the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from
prescribing any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices
(residential or commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Praveen & Anr. Vs.
Mulak Raj & Ors., RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Therefore, the
said contention also does not amount to any triable issue as it is for
the landlord to decide which premises are suitable and not for the
court to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the
available property of landlord is best utilized by him.
25) Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any
triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as well. ”

19. The learned ARC considered the objection in the context of the
pleadings and the rival stands of the parties. It held that the Petitioner
had not placed material sufficient to establish, even prima facie , that
the other shops relied upon were vacant and available to meet the
requirement pleaded by the Respondent. The learned ARC also
examined the question of suitability, observing that the location and
floor of a commercial premises are material considerations,
particularly where the requirement concerns a business dependent
upon access and visibility. In this regard, reliance was placed upon
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BHATIA
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10
M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma , and Uday Shankar
11
Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari . The learned ARC further
adverted to the settled principle that the tenant cannot dictate how the
landlord ought to utilise the available accommodation. Upon this
consideration, it concluded that the objection did not disclose a triable
issue warranting leave to defend.
20. The legal position governing the assessment of alternative
accommodation is no longer res integra . In M.M. Quasim (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the mere existence of another
premises does not defeat a claim for eviction unless such premises is
reasonably suitable for the purpose for which the tenanted premises is
required. The enquiry is, therefore, not satisfied by demonstrating the
existence of other commercial spaces in the abstract; their availability
and suitability must be assessed in the context of the particular
requirement pleaded. Equally, the landlord’s choice cannot be
accepted uncritically, but must be examined against the material
brought on record. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 18. Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial
approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord
under the Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned Judge of
the first appellate court while upholding the claim of personal
requirement of Respondent 1 has observed as under:
“It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit
and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what
they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show
that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Giridih ...
The defendant-appellant has also filed certified copy of
judgment of one Suit 47 of 1973 which is Ex. D only to
show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with
respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already

10
(1981) 3 SCC 36
11
(2010) 1 SCC 503
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 350/2026 Page 12 of 24

pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide
which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the
defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant
in the near future is most suitable house for the plaintiffs.”
This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to
circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all
States in the country. The time-honoured notion that the right of re-
entry is unfettered and that the owner-landlord is the sole judge of
his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society
which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and
fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on
proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord
can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of
landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is
pointed out that there is some. vacant premises with the landlord
which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his
requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that
the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to
negative the very raison d'être of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is
shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant
premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to
negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would
expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is
not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for
which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is
commenced in the court. It would, however, be a bald statement
unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an
unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too
irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in
possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove
the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's
greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of
personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at
the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was
enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the court
administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and
intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The court must
understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and
one of the necessities of life — shelter — and the way in which
one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to
inhabit a portion of the globe. In the Sociology of Law , edited by
Pat Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in
England and Wales and observes as under:
“The prevailing paradigms of neo-classical economics and
empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual
insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that
they and other social events appear as random existences
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BHATIA
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independent of their historical formation. The force of any
theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power,
and this in turn depends on the wider image of social
relations which produces it.”

21. The aforesaid principle finds further support in the decision of
12
the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Harbans Singh v. Anand Tyagi ,
wherein the Court observed that the mere existence of other
accommodation with the landlord does not, by itself, establish the
availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. The
Court further explained that the omission to disclose other properties
in the eviction petition cannot, in isolation, disentitle the landlord from
seeking eviction, unless the tenant is able to demonstrate a material
connection between such properties and the requirement pleaded. The
assessment must turn on whether the other premises are, in fact,
suitable having regard to the landlord’s needs and requirements. Thus,
the mere identification of other properties, without establishing their
suitability for the purpose for which the tenanted premises are sought,
would not suffice to defeat the claim of bona fide requirement. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 17. Regarding the existence of alternative accommodation , the
whole premise of the tenant, before the learned ARC and this
Court, is qua omission of the landlord in disclosing the same in the
Eviction Petition before the learned ARC as also the filing of the
earlier litigations.
18. The factum of omission/non-disclosure of other alternative
accommodation with the landlord, in the considered opinion of this
Court, can be of relevance if the tenant is able to establish a
material significant, connection, linkage or like which carries
sufficient weight for it to be treated as a triable issue . All the more
so, whence, mere existence of such alternative accommodation
with the landlord, which, as per the needs/requirements of the
landlord is not “ suitable” in itself not to be treated as the landlord
having an alternative accommodation . Thus, the omission/non-

12
2025 SCC OnLine Del 10771
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BHATIA
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disclosure thereof wanes into insignificance. It is also further
relevant to bear in mind that there is a clear difference between the
landlord having an alternative accommodation and an ‘additional’
accommodation in the context of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
The parameters for reckoning both the aforesaid being different,
are not always the same. By treating them alike, the tenant herein
cannot make a case for denying the relief sought by the landlord in
an Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
19. In any event, mere omission to disclose the existence of
alternative accommodation in the pleadings cannot, by itself, be
construed as a ground to disentitle the landlord from obtaining a
decree of eviction. Reliance is placed upon Meenal Eknath
13
Kshirsagar (Mrs) v. Traders & Agencies wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held as under:—
“ 18 … …It would have been better if she had referred to
those facts but mere omission to state them in the plaint
cannot be regarded as sufficient for disentitling her from
claiming a decree for eviction, if otherwise she is able to
prove that she requires reasonably the suit premises for
her occupation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
appellate bench and the High Court clearly went wrong in
holding that the said omission was sufficient to disentitle
her from getting a decree of eviction and it also disclosed
that her claim was mala fide and not bona fide as required
by law … …”
( Emphasis supplied )
20. Although, in his leave to defend application, the tenant had
referred to the landlord possessing other suitable alternative
accommodation(s) , however, specifications qua three such
properties were only provided. In response to the said three
properties, as per landlord property bearing nos. A-1 and B1,
Sudama Puri, Moti Nagar, New Delhi were both already under
tenancy and the property bearing no. WZ-69, Basai Darapur was
under use of his family, none of those were a solution for his bona
fide requirement and, thus, could not qualify as an alternative
accommodation . Barring this, since rest of the assertions made by
the tenant were vague and bereft of any material particulars, the
14
learned ARC relying upon Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini ,
rejected them.
21. In the revision petition, the tenant has now pleaded that since
property bearing nos. A-1, Sudama Puri, Moti Nagar, New Delhi,
has been handed over to the landlord on 30.09.2017 and WZ-11,
Kailash Park, Opposite Kirti Nagar, New Delhi, during the
pendency of the present revision petition, the bona fide
requirement for which the subject premises was sought no longer

13
(1996) 5 SCC 344
14
(2005) 12 SCC 778
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survives.
22. Unfortunately, the above is/are not sufficient to qualify as a
triable issue for which the tenant can be granted leave to defend
and the impugned order is set aside, much less, since recovery of
possession of a/another premises by the landlord cannot be equated
with the suitable alternative accommodation of the subject
premises sought by the landlord. The needs/requirements of the
landlord still remain the same. This Court cannot simply agree with
the contentions raised by the tenant that the recovery of another
tenanted premises by the landlord was a substitute for the subject
premises. The belated plea by the tenant does not cut much ice.
23. Regarding property bearing no. A-1, Sudama Puri, Moti Nagar,
New Delhi, as per the landlord, it is situated in a non-confirming
area, not fit for commercial/industrial activities, and the property
bearing no. WZ-11, Kailash Park, Opposite Kirti Nagar, New
Delhi, is currently occupied by the other son of the landlord,
namely Sh. Abhimanyu Tyagi.
24. As such, this Court agrees with the findings of the learned ARC
qua there being no suitable alternative accommodations available
with the landlord, as also finds that although this Court had
allowed CM APPL. 14107/2019 and CM APPL. 4115/2023 and
allowed the tenant to bring on record new/fresh facts on record,
however, they are not sufficient for enabling this Court to set aside
the impugned order. The landlord has stuck to his stand of his bona
fide requirement of the subject premises for a particular/specific
purpose all throughout, before the learned ARC and this Court, as
has also been able to give his response(s) to both the alternative
accommodations available in the aforesaid applications, are, in the
considered opinion of this Court, broad enough to reject this
revision petition of the tenant.
25. Besides, the aforesaid, as per what has been held in Gaya
Prasad (supra) and Kuldeep Singh (supra), do not have any
material bearing on the final relief. Be that as it may, in view of
15
what has been held in Akhileshwar Kumar v. Mustaqim , Anil
16
Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand
17 18
Gupta ; Viran Wali v. Kuldeep Rai Kochhar and Kanhaiya Lal
19
Arya v. Md. Ehsan , it is now an established position that it is not
for the tenant to dictate the terms as to how the landlord should use
the subject premises, and it is the sole prerogative of the landlord
himself, that too, merely since there are other alternative
accommodations available with the landlord. More so, since the
assessment of suitability must encompass a range of factors, such

15
(2003) 1 SCC 462
16
(2014) 15 SCC 610 : AIR 2014 SC 2294
17
(1999) 6 SCC 222
18
(2010) 174 DLT 328
19
2025 SCC OnLine SC 432
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as the property's size, location, accessibility, intended use,
viability, safety considerations, etc., which collectively have to be
taken into consideration whilst dealing with the aspect of
availability of alternate suitable accommodation . Simply because
an alternate accommodation is available is not, by itself, a ground
to deny the landlord's claim for eviction.”

22. The requirements governing a plea of alternative
accommodation were delineated by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
20
in Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram , wherein the Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi delineated the particulars required to be pleaded by a tenant
raising an objection on the ground of availability of alternative
accommodation. The tenant is required to furnish the particulars of the
premises relied upon, disclose the landlord’s right or title thereto,
plead that the premises were vacant and available for use at the
relevant time, and explain how the same would be suitable for the
requirement pleaded by the landlord. The extent of such material
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the
requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord,
though at the time of requirement having alternate premises,
having not used the same and instead having commercially
exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such
premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the
said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has
deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be
proved.”

23. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, the objection concerning alternative accommodation is required
to be examined with reference to the specific premises identified by

20
2017 SCC OnLine Del 13026
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the Petitioner and the material placed on record regarding their
ownership, availability and suitability for the commercial requirement
pleaded by the Respondent.
24. Tested on this touchstone, the Respondent’s explanation
regarding Shop Nos. 1466 and 1467 assumes significance. While their
possession is not disputed, however the Respondent has disputed their
suitability for the proposed commercial activity. The Respondent has
furnished a specific explanation distinguishing them from the Subject
Premises on the basis of their location, the intervening hall, the corner
configuration and the space required for the proposed business. These
are not merely matters of subjective preference; they bear upon the
practical suitability of the accommodation for the intended
commercial use.
25. The Respondent has further asserted that the proposed business
involving electronic goods and allied items, or the establishment of a
departmental store, would require approximately 2,000 square feet for
display, storage, billing and accounting. The Petitioner’s reliance upon
the Respondent’s possession of the said shops must, therefore, be
assessed in conjunction with the explanation furnished regarding their
suitability and the material available on record. The Petitioner’s
assertion that the said shops are available with the Respondent does
not, in itself, displace this explanation or establish that they constitute

a reasonably suitable substitute for the Subject Premises.
26. As regards Property No. 912, the Respondent has specifically
denied being the owner thereof. In the absence of material prima facie
establishing the Respondent’s ownership of, or legal entitlement to
use, the said property, its mere reference by the Petitioner cannot, by
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itself, establish the availability of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation.
27. The allegations concerning Shop No. 1470 and Shop Nos. 1476
and 1477, including their alleged subdivision and association with M/s
L.S. Caterers & Co., must likewise be assessed by reference to actual
availability and suitability for the pleaded requirement. The
Respondent has clarified that the business of M/s L.S. Caterers & Co.
is conducted by her and her husband, whereas her son proposes to
establish an independent commercial venture. The existence of an
ongoing commercial activity in the property does not, without more,
establish that the premises associated with it are available for the son’s
proposed venture. The material relied upon by the Petitioner must
disclose more than the existence or commercial use of these shops; it
must raise a substantial question as to their availability and reasonable
suitability for the requirement in issue.
28. The same holds true of the allegation that advertisements were
displayed offering certain shops for rent. Even if, arguendo , that some
shops in the property were being offered on rent, that circumstance,
standing alone, cannot lead to the inference that those shops were
reasonably suitable for the Respondent’s proposed commercial use.
The offer of a premises for letting does not, by itself, establish its
availability as well as its suitability for a business involving electronic
goods and allied items or a departmental store, particularly when the
Respondent has explained the spatial and locational features
considered necessary for the proposed venture. In the absence of
material connecting the shops allegedly offered on rent with the
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specific requirement pleaded, the allegation does not, by itself, raise a
triable issue.
29. The aforesaid position finds further support in Anil Bajaj v.
21
Vinod Ahuja , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
existence of other commercial premises from which the landlord may
be carrying on business does not, by itself, foreclose the landlord’s
right to seek eviction of the tenanted premises for his own bona fide
requirement. The Court reiterated that the tenant cannot dictate the
manner in which the landlord ought to utilise his property for the
purposes of business. The principle emerging from the aforesaid
decision is that the mere existence of additional premises cannot be
equated with the availability of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation; their suitability must be assessed in the context of the
actual requirement pleaded by the landlord. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant
1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a
narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on
the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for
his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the
landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in the
narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was
declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that the landlord,
Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from
which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also
not the tenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep
vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining possession thereof or
to use the same is any way inconsistent with the need of the
landlord. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several
other shop houses from which he is carrying on different
businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from
where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be
effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of
the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to

21
(2014) 15 SCC 610
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the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord
should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the
fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises
cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted
premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for
his own business.”

30. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, the mere
identification of other shops by the Petitioner does not, in itself,
establish that such shops are available and reasonably suitable for the
commercial purpose contemplated by the Respondent. The
explanation furnished by the Respondent regarding the location,
configuration and space requirements of the proposed business must,
therefore, be considered in determining whether the material placed on
record raises a triable issue.
22
31. In Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised the significance of the location
and floor of commercial premises in assessing suitability. The
principle is pertinent here, since the Respondent has relied upon the
Subject Premises being a ground-floor, two-side-open corner shop.
These features, read with the explanation regarding the space required
for the proposed business, provide a rational basis for distinguishing
the Subject Premises from the other shops alleged to be available. The
learned ARC was, therefore, justified in examining not merely
whether other shops existed, but whether the material on record
demonstrated their availability and reasonable suitability for the
pleaded requirement. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 7. In our opinion, once it is not disputed that the landlord is in
bona fide need of the premises, it is not for the courts to say that he

22
(2010) 1 SCC 503
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should shift to the first floor or any higher floor. It is well known
that shops and businesses are usually (though not invariably)
conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach
there easily. The court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he
should use for his business; that is for the landlord himself to
decide. Hence, the view of the courts below that the sons of
Plaintiff 1 should do business on the first floor in the hall which is
being used for residential purpose was, in our opinion, wholly
arbitrary, and hence cannot be sustained. As regards the finding
that the sons of Plaintiff 1 are getting a salary of Rs 1500 from the
firm, in our opinion, this is wholly irrelevant and was wrongly
taken into consideration by the High Court.”

32. Upon an independent appraisal of the rival pleadings and the
reasoning recorded in the Impugned Order, this Court finds no
material infirmity warranting interference with the conclusion reached
by the learned ARC. The objection regarding alternative
accommodation was not rejected merely because the Petitioner had
failed to identify other premises; rather, the decisive consideration was
the absence of material sufficient to establish that the identified shops
were available and reasonably suitable for the commercial
requirement pleaded. The learned ARC’s assessment accords with the
settled legal position that the existence of other accommodation,
without more, does not suffice to defeat a bona fide claim for eviction.
Consequently, the finding that no triable issue arose on this ground
does not suffer from any patent illegality, material irregularity or
perversity warranting interference in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

CONCLUSION:
33. Having considered the objection raised by the Petitioner, this
Court finds that the challenge does not disclose any circumstance
warranting interference with the Impugned Order.
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34. The enquiry at the stage of considering an application for leave
to defend is not whether every aspect of the landlord’s case admits of
further elaboration, or whether another possible commercial
arrangement can be conceived. The material question is whether the
tenant has disclosed facts which, if established, would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of
the DRC Act. The summary procedure contemplated under Section
25B of the DRC Act cannot be displaced by objections which do not
materially undermine an essential ingredient of the landlord’s claim.
At the same time, the Court must remain alive to the possibility that a
specific and substantiated defence may warrant trial. In the present
case, however, the objections raised by the Petitioner, when
considered against the pleadings, the material placed on record and the
findings of the learned ARC, do not meet that threshold.
35. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to
Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory in nature. This Court is
not called upon to substitute its own view for that of the learned ARC
merely because another view may be conceivable. Interference would
be warranted where the Impugned Order suffers from an error of law,
material irregularity, perversity, or a failure to consider a material
aspect having a bearing on the adjudication. No such circumstance has
been demonstrated in the present case. The learned ARC has
considered the material objections raised by the Petitioner and the
conclusions reached are legally sustainable on the material before it.
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Petitioner has failed to
disclose any triable issue which could have warranted the grant of
leave to defend and the present Revision Petition is consequently
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dismissed. Consequently, the Impugned Order dated 29.05.2026
passed by the learned ARC in RC ARC No. 356/2023 does not
warrant any interference. The Eviction Order passed in respect of
Shop situated on the ground floor of the property bearing No. 1468,
Rang Mahal, Nahar Sadat Khan, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi-110006,
is accordingly affirmed.
37. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

38. The Respondent shall be entitled to seek execution of the
Eviction Order in accordance with law, subject to the statutory
protection under Section 14(7) of the DRC Act, if still applicable.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/ma
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