Ram Kripal Yadav vs Bideya Sagar Singh
- Court
- Patna High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
SECOND APPEAL No.371 of 1988
CNR No. BRHC010028331988
======================================================
1.1. Gangrati Devi Wife of Late Deo Saran Yadav, R/o Village Lasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District Kaimur.
1.2. Gunjrati Devi Wife of Kashi Nath Yadav, R/o Village Harpur, P.S. Zamania,
Dist.- Gazipur.
1.3. Dhanwarta Devi Wife of Jeetan Yadav, R/o Dewaria, P.S. Zamania District
Gazipur.
1.4. Parwati Devi Wife of Kalika Yadav, R/o Village Karhi, P.S. Durgawati
District Kaimur.
1.5. Radhika Devi Wife of Sipahi Yadav, R/o Gorasara, P.S. Bhadwara, Dist. -
Gazipur.
2. Jainandan Yadav Son of Late Jadu Yadav, Resident of Village - Gorasara,
P.S. Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
3. Lorik Yadav Son of Jainandan Yadav, Resident of Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1.1. Elamwas Kumar Wife of Late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.2. Chandrawati Devi Wife of Late Vijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.3. Shekhar Kant Singh Son of Late Vijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.4. Anil Kant Singh Son of Late Vijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.5. Amar Kant Singh Son of Late Bideya Sagar, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.6.1
.
Meena Devi Widow of Late Arun Kant Singh, Resident of Ramgarh, P.S. -
Ramgarh, District- Kaimur, (Bhabhua).
1.6.2
.
Garima Singh D/o Late Arun Kant Singh, Resident of Ramgarh, P.S. -
Ramgarh, District- Kaimur, (Bhabhua).
1.6.3
.
Name not known D/o Late Arun Kant Singh, Resident of Ramgarh, P.S. -
Ramgarh, District- Kaimur, (Bhabhua).
1.7. Ajay Kant Singh Son of Late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.8. Abhay Kant Singh Son of Late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.9. Vimal Kant Singh Son of Late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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1.10. Vinay Kant Singh Son of late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village -
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
1.11. Indudevi D/o Late Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village - Ramgarh, P.S.
- Ramgarh, District- Kaimur at Bhabhua.
2. Ramakant Singh Son of Bideya Sagar Singh, under the guardianship of Sri
Ganesh Pd. Singh, Resident of Village Dhusakha, At present village
Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
3.1. Kalawati Devi Widow of Late Bijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village
Ramgarh, P.O. and P.S. Ramgarh, District Rohtas.
3.2. Sintu Singh Son of Late Bijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village Ramgarh,
P.O. and P.S. Ramgarh, District Rohtas.
3.3. Chandra Shekhar Singh, Son of Late Bijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village
Ramgarh, P.O. and P.S. Ramgarh, District Rohtas.
4. Amar Kant Singh Son of Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village
Dhusakha, At present village Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
5. Arun Kant Singh, Son of Bideya Sagar Singh, Resident of Village
Dhusakha, At present village Ramgarh, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
6. Most. Akali Devi W/o Late Ram Naresh Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
7.1. Subash Kuer Wife of Late Lallan Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur at Bhabua
7.2. Ravi Kant Singh Son of Late Lallan Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur at Bhabua
7.3. Amar Kant Singh Son of Late Lallan Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur at Bhabua
7.4. Nitu Kumari D/o Late Lallan Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara, Police
Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur at Bhabua
8. Ashok Singh Son of Hardawar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
9. Arun Singh Son of Hardawar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
10. Manoj Singh Son of Hardwar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
11. Paban Singh Son of Banshi dhar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
12. Arbind Singh Son of Banshi dhar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
13. Babban Singh Son of Banshidhar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
District- Rohtas.
14. Vijay Kant Singh Son of Ram Bachan Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
15. Mukesh Kumar Singh @ Mantu Singh Son of Sheo Badhan Singh, Village
- Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
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16. Bijay Singh Son of Jagdish Singh, Village - Rampure, P.S. Saiyadraja, Dist.
- Varansi.
17. N/A N/A N/A
18. Hardowar Singh Son of Ram Naresh Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
19.1. Name not known Widow of Late Basudhar Singh, Resident of Village
Gorasara, Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur.
19.2. Babban Singh Son of Late Basudhar Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur.
19.3. Arbind Singh Son of Late Basudhar Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur.
19.4. Vinay Singh Son of Late Basudhar Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur.
19.5. Paka Singh Son of Late Basudhar Singh, Resident of Village Gorasara,
Police Station Ramgarh, District - Kaimur.
20.1. Sudha Singh Daughter-in-law of Late Ram bachan Singh, Wife of Late
Vijay Kant Singh, Resident of Village - Gorsara, P.S. - Ramgarh, District-
Kaimur (Bhabua).
21. Child Name not known Son of Ram Naresh Singh, Under the guardian ship
of Sri Ganesh Pd. Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh, District-
Rohtas.
22.1. Sabita Devi Wife of Late Sheo Bachan Singh Resident of Village - Gorsara,
P.S. Ramgarh, District- Kaimur (Bhabua)
23. Child name not known Sion of Hardowar Singh, Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
24. Most. Setu Kuar W/o Santo Prasad Singh, deceased. Village - Madanpura,
P.O. Barun, P.S. Zamania, Distt- Gazipure at present Village - Gorasara,
P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. Rohtas.
25.1. Gujrati Devi Wife of Late Baban Singh, Residents of Village - Kulhariya,
P.S. - Mohania, District- Kaimur (Bhabua).
25.2. Arun Singh Son of Late Baban Singh Residents of Village - Kulhariya, P.S.
- Mohania, District- Kaimur (Bhabua).
26. Chandridhari Singh Son of Sant Prasad Singh, Village - Madanpura, P.O.
Barun, P.S. Zamania, Distt- Gazipure at present Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, Distt. Rohtas.
27. Chatra Ranjan Singh Son of Sant Prasad Singh, Village - Madanpura, P.O.
Barun, P.S. Zamania, Distt- Gazipure at present Village - Gorasara, P.S.
Ramgarh, Distt. Rohtas.
28. Sudha Devi W/o Gangadhar, Village - Madanpura, P.O. Barun, P.S.
Zamania, Distt- Gazipure at present Village - Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh,
Distt. Rohtas.
29. Nagina Devi W/o Raghunandan Missir, Vill - Nauli, P.S. Gamhar, District-
Gazipur at present - Gorasara, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Rohtas.
31.1. Jay Prakash Tiwary Son of late Harbansh Tiwari, Resident of Village
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Gorsara, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur (Bhabua).
31.2. Tarkeshwar Tiwari Son of Late Harbansh Tiwari, Resident of Village
Gorsara, P.S. - Ramgarh, District- Kaimur (Bhabua).
32. Bachan name not known Son of Harbansh Tiwari, R/o Village - Goresra,
P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. - Rohtas.
33.1. Lalita Devi W/o Late Markanday Diwari, Resident of Village - Gorasara,
P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. Kaimur at Bhabua.
33.2. Satya Prakash Tiwari Son of Markanday Tiwari, Resident of Village -
Gorasara, P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. Kaimur at Bhabua.
34. Bachan name not known Son of Baikunth Tiwari R/o Village - Goresra,
P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. - Rohtas.
35. Sarup Halwai Son of Name not known Village - Dahrak at present -
Ramgarh, P.S. Ramgarh.
36. Ramgalal Teli Son of Ram Janam Teli, Village Dahrak, P.S. Ramgarh, At
present Village Ramgarh, P.S. Ramgarh, Distt. - Rohtas.
37. State of Bihar through Collector, Rohtas.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. H.P. Singh, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Yogendra Kumar, Advocate
Dr. M. K. Gautam, Advocate
Mr. Manish Kumar No.13, Advocate
Mr. Ram Naresh Roy, Advocate
Mr. Anil Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Arbind Nath Pandey, Advocate
Mr. Varun Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Shruti, Advocate
Mr. Abinash Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Kumar Satyakriti, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 02-11-2026
Heard Mr. H.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Arbind Nath
Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
2. The present second appeal has been filed
against the judgment passed on 26.05.1988 and decree prepared
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on 27.06.1988, by the Sub-Judge-I, Bhabua, in Title Appeal
No.52 of 1968, affirming the judgment dated 24.06.1968 and
decree prepared on 05.07.1968 by the Munsif-II, Sasaram, in
Title Suit No.41 of 1963. In this second appeal judgment and
decree of affirmence has been challenged.
3. The appellants/their ancestors of the present
second appeal were the plaintiffs in Title Suit and appellants in
Title Appeal; whereas the respondents/their ancestors were
defendants in Title Suit and respondents in Title Appeal.
4. With a view to decide this second appeal, a
substantial question of law has been formulated vide order No.8
dated 29.04.1993, which is as follows:
“Whether the Court of
appeal below has correctly discharged its
duty, as Court of appeal and whether its
judgment is perfunctory and binding on
this Court in second appeal?”
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
submits that with a view to decide the substantial question of
law, it is necessary to place the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the CPC’). Learned Senior Counsel submits that
order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC is a mandatory provision for the
Appellate Court and at the time of writing the judgment, it is
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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necessary to frame the points for determination. He submits that
from perusal of the judgment dated 15.06.1988 passed in Title
Suit No.52 of 1968 it transpires that the Appellate Court has
failed to frame the points for determination, and failure to frame
the points for determination has definitely resulted into a gross
violation of law laid down under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC
and on this ground alone, the appeal under challenge is fit to be
set aside. He submits that the matter be remitted back for fresh
determination with specific direction to frame the point for
determination first and, then, to decide those points for
consideration only upon consideration of oral and documentary
evidence available on record. In support of his argument,
learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court decided in the case of C. Venkata Swamy Vs.
H.N. Shivanna (D) by L.R. & Another etc. reported in (2018)
1 SCC 604 :: 2018 1 PLJR (SC) 87. He further relied on the
judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Masomat
Kanti Devi W/o. Late Chandrika Singh Vs. Narain Khawas
reported in 2010 (1) PLJR Patna 940 :: 2010 (2) BBCJ 516 .
Learned Senior Counsel submits that duty is casted upon the
Appellate Court to examine pleadings and evidences on record
and, then, determine relevant issues independently. He further
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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submits that unless there is an independent application of mind
on pleadings and evidences of parties as well as on issues
involved in suit, the lower Appellate Court cannot validly decide
legality or finding on the judgment of the Trial Court. He
submits that Ext-3 has not at all been considered by the
Appellate Court as well as Original Court, it is due to this
reason both orders are necessary to be interfered and the appeal
be allowed and both the orders passed and judgments prepared
by the Trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court be set
aside.
6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, submits that this Hon’ble Court
has already framed the substantial question of law. He submits
that the substantial question of law be decided in favour of the
present respondents, due to the reason that the Appellate Court
has correctly discharged its duty as Court of Appeal. He
submits that the provision of law laid down under Order XLI
Rule 31 of the CPC is basically a procedural aspect, whose
substantial compliance is required. The learned Appellate Court
at the time of deciding the appeal against original decree has
substantially decided all the points and the questions, which
were directly involved in the issue as well as discussed the
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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relevant evidences thereafter decided the appeal on the disputed
points with the reasons for the decision. He further submits
that at the time of deciding the appeal, the Appellate Court has
rightly touched upon the points involved in the appeal,
discussed the reasons for decision on the basis of different
evidences, assigned the reasons for the decision and, thereafter,
affirmed the judgment and decree passed and prepared in the
Title Suit. He further submits that though the points for
determination have not been expressly framed but those points
of determination have been elaborated by touching the issues
framed under Title Suit particularly Issue Nos. 4 to 6, which are
most relevant for the just decision of the appeal against the
original jurisdiction. He further submits that the Appellate
Court has touched all the relevant points/evidences, i.e.,
whether the settlement could be made by the Government or
not, whether prior to the settlement with the plaintiff by the
Government sale of the said land was made by the land lord in
favour of the respondents or not and for deciding the same the
appellate Court have discussed about Ext-C series and Ext-D
series, those are rent receipts issued to the respondents by the
land lord and the rent receipt issued by the Government.
7. In support of his argument learned Counsel
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for the respondents relied on the judgments of Girijanandani
Devi and others Vs. Vijendra Narayan Chaudhary reported
in AIR 1967 SC 1124 para-12, Abdul Salam (Dead) Taiyaba
Vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatoon and Others reported in 2006 (3)
PLJR 489 para-7, Ajit Ojha Vs. Lalan Ojha reported in
2006(1) PLJR 594 paras-7, 9 and 10, Santosh Hazari Vs.
Purushottam Tiwari reported in 2001 (3) SCC 179 para-15, he
also relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Parvathi Nairthi and Others Vs. Laxmi Nairthy reported in
2026 (4)PLJR SC 75 para-37.
After placing those judgments he submits that
mere non-compliance of provisions under Order XLI Rule 31 of
the CPC may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void
and the said defect may be ignored if there has been substantial
compliance with it by way of discussing the reason for
accepting the conclusion of the Trial Court judgment. He
further submits that provision laid down under Order XLI Rule
31 of the CPC is obligatory in nature and not mandatory since
the reason for decision has been mentioned by the Appellate
Court on the basis of materials available on record. Therefore,
in this background, the purpose and principles of Order XLI
Rule 31 of the CPC may be treated to be validly complied and
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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just on the point of technicalities, a dispute which has arisen in
the year 1963 for which second appeal is pending before this
Hon’ble Court since 1988 may not be remanded back in the year
2026 otherwise the entire purpose of justice system shall be
failed.
8. At the time of passing judgment, it transpires
to this Court that in the present appeal the original order has
been passed by the Court of Munsif, but the Title Appeal has
been heard by Subordinate Judge. Normally, the order passed
by the Munsif is challengeable in appeal always before the
District Judge and it used to be heard either by the District
Judge himself or by any Additional District Judge. The suit has
been decided in the year 1968, title appeal has been decided in
the year 1988 and the present second appeal is pending before
this Hon’ble Court since 1988, but this point has neither been
raised by the Office nor by the Counsels either at first appellate
level or at the second appellate level.
This Court is very much surprised to see that
under what circumstances original order, which has been passed
by the Munsif whose appeal used to lie always before the
District Judge has been heard by the Sub-Judge and no objection
has been raised. Upon research, this Court finds the following
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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facts:
“The jurisdiction with regard to
entertainment of appeal has been guided by
Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Bengal, Agra and
Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 ( Act 12 of 1887)”.
According to those sections, it is very much clear
that appeal against the order of Munsif always lie before the
District Judge but the said appeal may be heard by the Sub-
Judge also. Prior to that in the light of Hon’ble High Court’s
th
Letter No.673-85 dated 4 of February, 1948 addressed to all the
District Judges of Bihar including the Judicial Commissioner of
Chotanagpur, content of which states as follows:
“Copy of Court's letter no.
673-85, dated the 4th February, 1948,
addressed to all the District Judges of Bihar
including the Judicial Commissioner of
Chotanagpur.
I am directed to say that on
an examination of the quarterly statements,
it has come, to the notice of the Court that a
large number of Sub-Judge appeals is
pending in several judgeships, which should
have received proper attention. The Court
consider that, if the criminal files permit, the
District and Additional District Judges
should hear Sub-Judge appeals so long as
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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they are available, in preference to Munsif
appeals, which should be left to be heard by
Subordinate Judges, and where Additional
Judges are more than one, one of them
should be employed exclusively on the
hearing of these appeals. If and when
Criminal file and Civil appellant file are
light and can be managed single-handed by
the District Judge, the Additional Judges
should try Sub-Judge suits especially such of
them as are intricate.
The quarterly statements
should, in future, show the number of Sub-
Judge appeals decided by the District
Judges and the Additional District Judges.”
Subsequently, in the year 1986 another letter has
been issued by the High Court being Letter No.17676-708 dated
th
20 of September, 1986, which is as follows:
“ I am directed to say that the Court
have been pleased to decide that in view of the
present satisfactory position of the cadre strength
of Additional District and Sessions Judges and
corresponding paucity of Subordinate Judges, the
Civil appeals from the decisions of Munsifs at
district headquarters should now be heard by the
Additional District and Sessions Judges. This will,
however, not apply to part heard appeals already
running in the Courts of Subordinate Judges.
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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The Court have, however, also
decided that at Sub-divisional headquarters where
a Subordinate Judge is posted, such appeals may
continue to be heard by the Subordinate Judges, as
before. But in such Subdivisions where no
Subordinate Judge is posted, appeals from
decisions of Munsifs shall be heard by the
Additional District and Sessions Judges.
This may be brought to the notice of
the all concerned.”
Upon perusal of both the letters, it transpires that
th
by the special order of the High Court dated 4 of February,
1948, the Sub-Judge was empowered to hear appeal and since
1986 the Civil Appeal from the decision of Munsif has been
directed to be heard by Additional District Judge. Admittedly,
the present suit is of the year 1963 which is in between 1948 to
1986 and it is due to this reason that hearing of title appeal
against the order of Munsif by the Subordinate Judge is not bad-
in-law; rather it is absolutely legal in terms of the then above
mentioned letters and laws and, hence, the doubt which has
arisen in the mind of this Court at the time of deciding this
second appeal has been answered accordingly.
9. With a view to decide the substantial question,
it is necessary to reiterate the provision laid down under Order
XLI Rule 31 of the CPC which states as follows:
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“31. Contents, date and signature
of judgment.- The judgment of the Appellate Court
shall be in writing and shall state-
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision and
(d) where the decree appealed from
is reversed or varied, the relief to which the
appellant is entitled;
and shall at the time that it is
pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by
the Judges concurring therein.
Provided that where the Presiding
Judge pronounces his judgment by dictation to a
shorthand writer in open Court, the transcript of
the judgment so pronounced shall, after such
revision as may be deemed necessary, be signed by
the Judge and shall bear the date of its
pronouncement.”
10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C.
Venkata Swamy (supra) in paragraphs 15 to 22 observed as
under:
“ 15. In Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179],
this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89,
para 15)
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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“15. … The appellate court has
jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings
of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable
right of the parties and unless restricted by
law, the whole case is therein open for
rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
The judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by
reasons, on all the issues arising along with
the contentions put forth, and pressed by the
parties for decision of the appellate court. …
while reversing a finding of fact the
appellate court must come into close
quarters with the reasoning assigned by the
trial court and then assign its own reasons
for arriving at a different finding. This would
satisfy the court hearing a further appeal
that the first appellate court had discharged
the duty expected of it. …”
16. The above view was followed by a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Madhukar v. Sangram [Madhukar v.
Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756], wherein it was
reiterated that sitting as a court of first
appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to
deal with all the issues and the evidence led
by the parties before recording its findings.
17. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith
[H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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SCC 243], this Court stated as under: (SCC
p. 244, para 3)
“3. The first appeal has to be decided on
facts as well as on law. In the first appeal
parties have the right to be heard both on
questions of law as also on facts and the first
appellate court is required to address itself
to all issues and decide the case by giving
reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in
the present case has not recorded any
finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as
the first appellate court it was the duty of the
High Court to deal with all the issues and
the evidence led by the parties before
recording the finding regarding title.”
18. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa
[Jagannath v. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC
303] , while considering the scope of Section
96 of the Code, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2)
“2. A court of first appeal can
reappreciate the entire evidence and come to
a different conclusion. …”
19. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V.
Sreenivasa Murthy [B.V. Nagesh v. H.V.
Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808] , this Court taking
note of all the earlier judgments of this
Court reiterated the aforementioned
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-
31, paras 3-5)
“3. How the regular first appeal is to be
disposed of by the appellate court/High
Court has been considered by this Court in
various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with
appeals from original decrees. Among the
various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the
judgment of the appellate court shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision;
and
(d) where the decree appealed from
is reversed or varied, the relief to
which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to
reverse or affirm the findings of the trial
court. The first appeal is a valuable right of
the parties and unless restricted by law, the
whole case is therein open for rehearing
both on questions of fact and law. The
judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by
reasons, on all the issues arising along with
the contentions put forth, and pressed by the
parties for decision of the appellate court.
Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the
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duty of the High Court to deal with all the
issues and the evidence led by the parties
before recording its findings. The first
appeal is a valuable right and the parties
have a right to be heard both on questions of
law and on facts and the judgment in the
first appeal must address itself to all the
issues of law and fact and decide it by giving
reasons in support of the findings. (Vide
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
[(2001) 3 SCC 179] at p. 188, para 15 and
Madhukar v. Sangram [(2001) 4 SCC 756]
at p. 758, para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary
principles, on going through the impugned
judgment, we feel that the High Court has
failed to discharge the obligation placed on
it as a first appellate court. In our view, the
judgment under appeal is cryptic and none
of the relevant aspects have even been
noticed. The appeal has been decided in an
unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal
of the judgment in the regular first appeal
shows that it falls short of considerations
which are expected from the court of first
appeal. Accordingly, without going into the
merits of the claim of both parties, we set
aside the impugned judgment and decree of
the High Court and remand the regular first
appeal to the High Court for its fresh
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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disposal in accordance with law.”
20. The aforementioned cases
were relied upon by this Court while
reiterating the same principle in SBI v.
Emmsons International Ltd. [(2011) 12 SCC
174 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 289] and Union of
India v. K.V. Lakshman [(2016) 13 SCC
124 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 230] .
21. In the light of the
foregoing discussion, we have no option but
to allow these appeals, set aside the
impugned judgment and remand the case to
the High Court for deciding the appeals
afresh on merits in accordance with law
keeping in view our observations made
supra. We, however, make it clear that we
have refrained from making any observation
on merits of the controversy having formed
an opinion to remand the case to the High
Court. The High Court would, therefore,
decide the appeals uninfluenced by any of
the observations in accordance with law.
Since the appeals are quite old, we request
the High Court to ensure expeditious
disposal of the appeals.
22. The appeals are
accordingly allowed. The impugned
judgment [C. Venkata Swamy v. H.N.
Shivanna, RFA No. 158 of 2005, order dated
2-11-2006 (KAR)] is set aside with the
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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aforesaid directions. ”
11. The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of
Masomat Kanti Devi W/o. Late Chandrika Singh (supra) in
paragraphs 17 to 20 observed as under:
“17. The law is also well
settled that an appeal under Section 96 of
the Code is a substantive right conferred by
the statute and it is continuation of the
proceedings, which comes entirely upon the
first appellate court, carrying with it a right
of rehearing on law and facts as well as
reviewing the pleadings and evidences
independently. Thus a duty is cast upon the
lower appellate court to examine the
pleadings and evidence on record and then
determine the relevant issues independently.
Reference in this regard may be made to two
decisions of the Honble Apex Court in case
of Devram Bilve vs. Indumati, reported in
(2000)10 SCC 540 and in case of Shiv Shati
Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur vs. Swaraj
Developers and Others, reported in (2003) 6
SCC 659.
18. Unless there is an
independent application of mind on the
pleadings and evidence of the parties as well
as on the issues involved in the suit, the
lower appellate court cannot validly decide
the legality or otherwise of the findings and
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
21/38
judgment of the trial court. Requirement of
Section 96 of the Code is independent
appraisal of evidence and pleadings on the
issues involved, not merely harping upon the
findings of the trial court and copying them
in the judgment of the first appellate Court.
Mere repetition and copying of the findings
of the trial court judgment in the impugned
judgment of the lower appellate court
clearly shows absence of any application of
mind on the points involved, which clearly
makes it perverse and arbitrary apart from
grossly illegal. Reference in this regard may
be made to two decisions of the Honble Apex
Court in case of Ramchandra Sakharan
Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale
(Dead) & Ors., reported in (2007) 6 SCC
737 and in case of Haryana State Industrial
Development Corporation vs. Cork
Manufacturing Co., reported in (2007) 8
SCC 120.
19. Furthermore, the learned
courts below without framing any issue and
without giving any finding regarding
relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties and regarding any ground of
eviction under Section 11 of the Act, decided
the eviction suit on the basis of title only
failing to appreciate that in such suits
question of title has to be gone into only
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
22/38
incidentally without deciding it in a full
fledged manner, as the main issues to be
decided in such a proceeding were
relationship of landlord and tenant as well
as the ground of eviction. Thus, it transpires
that the learned courts below were from the
very beginning determined to dismiss the
eviction suit on the basis of title. This is not
a question of fact rather is a pure question of
law to which Section 100 of the Code is
attracted in full, whereas, Section 101
thereof cannot legally be made applicable.
20. Moreover, it was the duty
of the lower appellate court under the
provision of Order XLI Rules 30 and 31 of
the Code to frame its own points for
deciding the title appeal and if in any view of
the matter the lower appellate court was of
the opinion that all the issues framed by the
trial court were to be re-decided by the
lower appellate court, it should have
considered and given its independent
findings on all the said issues. From the
judgment of the learned court of appeal
below, it is quite apparent that none of the
aforesaid two options were followed by the
lower appellate court, which decided the
matter vaguely and generally. This also
cannot be legally said to be a question of
fact rather it is squarely an error in law and
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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procedure.”
12. The judgments on which respondents have
put reliance is Girijanandani Devi and Others (supra) whose
paragraph-7 is relevant which states as follows:
“7. Partition may ordinarily
be effected by institution of a suit, by
submitting the dispute as to division of the
properties to arbitrators, by a demand for a
share in the properties, or by conduct which
evinces an intention to sever the joint family:
it may also be effected by agreement to
divide the property. But in each case the
conduct must evidence unequivocally
intention to sever the joint family status.
Merely because one member of a family
severs his relation, there is no presumption
that there is severance be-tween the other
members: the question whether there is
severance between the other members is one
of fact to be determined on a review of all
the attendant circumstances.”
13. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied
on the judgment of Ajit Ojha Vs. Lalan Ojha reported in
2006(1) PLJR 594, whose paras-7, 9 and 10 states as follows:
“ 7. Let it be mention that
ordinarily, the points and the provisions
made in clauses (a) to (d) in Order XLI Rule
31 of the Code are required to be observed
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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before writing and signing the judgment.
However, the said provisions are procedural
in nature. Apart from the issue as to whether
they are mandatory or directory, it is not
necessary to be gone into in this Second
Appeal since there is substantial compliance
and without any prejudice to anyone.
9. Procedural law is designed
and devised to advance cause of justice and
not to retard it. The trial court, ordinarily, is
obliged to consider all the aspects
enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of the
aforesaid Rule. However, failure to
specifically mention points for consideration
and determination, would not vitiate the
entire judgment when over all compliance in
judgment is manifested. This proposition is
very much enunciated and settled in catena
of judicial pronouncements.
10. Referring such points in
the judgment could not be said to be in any
way affecting the merits of the decision. No
procedural law could be interpreted,
ordinarily, to thwart the substantive right of
the party. In the case on hand, it is, also,
noticed that the first appellate court had
taken into consideration all points as
propounded in judgment, without specific
mention of them. Therefore, the contention
that the failure to mention the points for
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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determination as provided in clause (a) of
Rule 31 of Order XLI of the Code, is fatal
warranting interference with the impugned
judgment and decree recorded by the first
appellate court in Title Appeal as a
substantial question of law, cannot be
accepted. ”
14. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied
on the judgment of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari
(DECEASED) BY LRS. reported in 2001 (3) SCC 179 whose
para-15 states as follows:
“ 15. A perusal of the
judgment of the trial court shows that it has
extensively dealt with the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the
parties for deciding the issues on which the
parties went to trial. It also found that in
support of his plea of adverse possession on
the disputed land, the defendant did not
produce any documentary evidence while the
oral evidence adduced by the defendant was
conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of
reliance. The first appellate court has, in a
very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on
question of possession and dispossession as
alleged by the plaintiff as also on the
question of adverse possession as pleaded by
the defendant. The appellate court has
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings
of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable
right of the parties and unless restricted by
law, the whole case is therein open for
rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
The judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by
reasons, on all the issues arising along with
the contentions put forth, and pressed by the
parties for decision of the appellate court.
The task of an appellate court affirming the
findings of the trial court is an easier one.
The appellate court agreeing with the view
of the trial court need not restate the effect
of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given
by the trial court; expression of general
agreement with reasons given by the court,
decision of which is under appeal, would
ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v.
Bijendra Narain Choudhary [AIR 1967 SC
1124] ). We would, however, like to sound a
note of caution. Expression of general
agreement with the findings recorded in the
judgment under appeal should not be a
device or camouflage adopted by the
appellate court for shirking the duty cast on
it. While writing a judgment of reversal the
appellate court must remain conscious of
two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
27/38
based on conflicting evidence arrived at by
the trial court must weigh with the appellate
court, more so when the findings are based
on oral evidence recorded by the same
Presiding Judge who authors the judgment.
This certainly does not mean that when an
appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is
not competent to reverse a finding of fact
arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of
law if the appraisal of the evidence by the
trial Court suffers from a material
irregularity or is based on inadmissible
evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the
appellate court is entitled to interfere with
the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v.
Narayanibai [(1983) 1 SCC 35 : AIR 1983
SC 114] The rule is — and it is nothing more
than a rule of practice — that when there is
conflict of oral evidence of the parties on
any matter in issue and the decision hinges
upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless
there is some special feature about the
evidence of a particular witness which has
escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a
sufficient balance of improbability to
displace his opinion as to where the
credibility lie, the appellate court should not
interfere with the finding of the trial Judge
on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad
Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
28/38
Singh [AIR 1951 SC 120]. Secondly, while
reversing a finding of fact the appellate
court must come into close quarters with the
reasoning assigned by the trial court and
then assign its own reasons for arriving at a
different finding. This would satisfy the court
hearing a further appeal that the first
appellate court had discharged the duty
expected of it. We need only remind the first
appellate courts of the additional obligation
cast on them by the scheme of the present
Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first
appellate court continues, as before, to be a
final court of facts; pure findings of fact
remain immune from challenge before the
High Court in second appeal. Now the first
appellate court is also a final court of law in
the sense that its decision on a question of
law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable
before the High Court in second appeal
because the jurisdiction of the High Court
has now ceased to be available to correct the
errors of law or the erroneous findings of the
first appellate court even on questions of law
unless such question of law be a substantial
one.”
15. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied
on the judgment of Parvathi Nairthi (Dead) and Others Vs.
Laxmi Nairthy (Dead) through L.Rs. & Others reported in
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
29/38
2026 (4) PLJR SC 75 whose para-37 states as follows:
“37. In view of the above
position of law, we are of the view that mere
non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of
the CPC may not vitiate the judgment and
make it wholly void and may be ignored if
there has been substantial compliance with it
and the rule should not be interpreted
technically to compromise substantial
justice. The findings in the decision passed
by the First Appellate Court have properly
scrutinised the evidence on record, even if
the points of consideration are general and
thus, the same does not suffer from any
illegality.”
16. Upon consideration of the relevant
provisions of law, it is evident that Order XLI Rule 31 of the
CPC, mandates that the judgment of the Appellate Court shall
state the points for determination, the decisions thereon, the
reasons for such decisions, and, where the decree appealed from
is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.
The aforesaid provision is intended to ensure that the Appellate
Court duly considers the questions arising for determination and
records its findings, supported by reasons, on the issues
involved in the appeal. The law laid down in various judicial
pronouncements also emphasises the importance of compliance
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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with the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. However, in
a recent decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Parvathi Nairthi (supra), it has been observed that mere
non-compliance with the said provision does not necessarily
vitiate the appellate judgment or render it wholly void. Where
there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of
the Rule, a merely technical or formal deficiency may not, by
itself, furnish a ground for invalidating the judgment. The
provision, therefore, is not required to be construed in an unduly
technical manner, divorced from the substance of the
adjudication. In the present case, admittedly, the litigation
commenced in the year 1963, while the present second appeal
has remained pending before this Hon’ble Court since 1988.
Thus, the parties have been litigating for more than six decades.
Having regard to the extraordinary length of time for which the
dispute has remained pending, this Court considers it
appropriate to examine the judgment passed by the learned First
Appellate Court to ascertain whether, notwithstanding any
formal deficiency, there has been substantial compliance with
the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. The relevant
consideration is whether the judgment of the First Appellate
Court discloses the points arising for determination, the findings
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
31/38
recorded thereon, the reasons supporting such findings, and the
basis on which the decree under appeal was affirmed, reversed
or varied, together with the consequential relief, wherever
applicable. The dispute in the present case relates to a small
parcel of land measuring 9 decimals, out of a total area of 22
decimals, appertaining to Khata No. 157 and Plot No. 41.
During the cadastral survey, and prior to the abolition of the
Zamindari system, the land in question was recorded as
Gairmajarua Malik land. It is an admitted position between the
parties that the then landlord, Ram Narayan Lal, had settled 13
decimals of land situated towards the southern portion of the
plot in favour of the defendants of the second and third sets,
while the remaining 9 decimals situated towards the northern
portion continued to remain parti (vacant).
17. The case of the appellants is that, upon the
vesting of the Zamindari estate, the aforesaid 9 decimals of land,
which constitute the suit property, vested in the State of Bihar.
According to the appellants, the said land was thereafter settled
in favour of the appellants or their predecessors-in-interest by
the Circle Officer by virtue of the settlement letter dated
13.08.1956, marked as Exhibit 3. It is further their case that,
pursuant to the said settlement, rent was assessed by the State
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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authorities and that they and their predecessors-in-interest
continued to pay rent to the State Government. The appellants
have also relied upon the revisional survey record, marked as
Exhibit 5, in support of their claim that the suit land was
recorded in their names. The date of the relevant revisional
survey entry, however, requires verification from the original
record, as the reference in the pleadings or materials presently
available to this Court appears to contain a chronological
inconsistency. According to the appellants, in November of the
year stated in the record, the respondents or their predecessors-
in-interest began interfering with their possession and attempted
to dispossess them from the suit land. Consequently, in the year
1963, the appellants instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration
of their title and recovery of possession in respect of the
aforesaid 9 decimals of land. The appellants, however, suffered
dismissal of their claim before both the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court, whereupon they preferred the present second
appeal before this Hon’ble Court.
18. In the aforesaid factual background, the
question that arises for consideration at this stage is whether the
learned First Appellate Court, while affirming the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court, duly considered the material evidence
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
33/38
and the rival contentions of the parties and recorded findings
supported by reasons, so as to constitute substantial compliance
with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. The answer to this question must
necessarily emerge from an examination of the judgment of the
learned First Appellate Court itself, particularly its treatment of
the alleged settlement dated 13.08.1956, the relevant survey
entries, the payment of rent, and the respective claims of title
advanced by the parties.
19. Per contra, the case of the respondents is that
their ancestors had obtained a settlement of the suit land from
the ex-landlord, Ram Narayan Lal, in the year 1361 Fasli.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents further
submits that, on 06.09.1954, the ex-landlord executed a sale
deed in favour of one Prahlad Tiwari in respect of land
measuring 2 Kathas and 6 Dhurs. It is the further case of the
respondents that, in compliance with the provisions of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1950, the ex-landlord submitted the requisite
return in respect of the lands held by him, wherein the disputed
land was shown in the name of the settlee, namely, the
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Learned counsel
for the respondents further submits that the State authorities had
also commenced accepting rent from the respondents in respect
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
34/38
of the disputed land. It is further contended that, once the ex-
landlord had submitted the return showing the disputed land in
the name of the respondents or their predecessors-in-interest, the
State of Bihar had no authority to make a subsequent settlement
of the same land in favour of the appellants or their
predecessors-in-interest. Learned counsel also draws the
attention of this Court to the written statement filed by the State
of Bihar, whereby the allegations made in the plaint were
denied.
20. In view of the rival submissions advanced on
behalf of the parties, the principal controversy requiring
consideration in the present second appeal is whether the
learned First Appellate Court correctly adjudicated upon the
validity and legal effect of the alleged settlement made by the
State of Bihar in favour of the appellants or their predecessors-
in-interest and the issuance of rent receipts pursuant thereto, and
whether such settlement and revenue records could sustain the
appellants’ claim of right, title and possession over the suit land.
The Trial Court, while adjudicating upon the title suit, framed
several issues. However, Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are particularly
relevant to the controversy involved in the present appeal. The
said issues were framed as follows:
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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• Issue No. 4: Whether the Schedule-A land described in
the plaint was Gairmajarua Malik land at the time of
vesting of the Zamindari interest and whether the said
land vested in the State of Bihar?
Issue No. 5: Whether the plaintiffs had obtained a valid
•
settlement of the suit land?
• Issue No. 6: Whether the plaintiffs had any right, title or
interest over the suit land?
Upon consideration of Issue No. 4, the return
relating to the vesting of the Zamindari interest, marked as
Exhibit-A series, and the registered settlement deed of 1954,
marked as Exhibit-C, the Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish their case regarding possession over the 9
decimals of the suit land. Thereafter, upon consideration of
Exhibit-C series and the other materials available on record, the
Trial Court concluded that the Schedule-A land was not
Gairmajarua Malik land at the time of vesting of the Zamindari
interest and, consequently, that the suit land had not vested in
the State of Bihar as Gairmajarua Malik land. Similarly, while
deciding Issue Nos. 5 and 6, the Trial Court considered the oral
and documentary evidence adduced by the parties and
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
36/38
obtained a valid settlement of the Schedule-A land.
Consequently, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had failed
to establish any right, title or interest over the suit land.
Accordingly, Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were decided against the
plaintiffs, resulting in the rejection of their claim to declaration
of title and recovery of possession.
21. Upon perusal of the Appellate Court’s order,
same issues were touched by the Appellate Court and Appellate
Court prior to reaching on the conclusion had categorically
discussed the case of both the parties in paragraphs 2 to 4 and
in paragraph 5 it has been observed as under:
“5 - i{kksa us vius vius okn ds
leFkZu esa ekSf[kd rFkk izys[;kRed lk{; izLrqr fd;k
ftu ij fopkj djrs gq;s fo}ku fuEu U;k;ky; us okn
fujLr dj fn;kA vihykFkhZx.k dk dFku gS fd
muds }kjk izLrqr lk{;ksa ij fo}ku fuEu U;k;ky;
us /;kuiwoZd fopkj ugha fd;k ftlds dkj.k budk okn
fujLr gks x;kA Qyr% bl vihy esa ns[kuk gS fd
vihykFkhZx.k dks t; i= fey ldrk gSa vFkok ughaA ”
22. Upon a bare perusal of paragraph 3 of the
judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court, this Court
finds no substance in the contention advanced by learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that no points for
determination were formulated by the First Appellate Court. A
careful reading of the judgment reveals that the learned First
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
37/38
Appellate Court had formulated the points for determination
before proceeding to adjudicate upon the controversy involved
in the appeal. The findings in respect of the said points have
been recorded in paragraphs 6 to 10 of the judgment. A further
perusal of paragraphs 5 to 10 demonstrates that the learned First
Appellate Court has discussed the evidence available on record,
considered the respective cases advanced by the parties, and
assigned reasons in support of its conclusions. In view thereof,
the contention of the appellants that the learned First Appellate
Court failed to record reasons for its findings does not merit
acceptance. This Court further finds that, although the points for
determination may not have been formulated in the precise
terms now suggested by learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants, the substance of the questions requiring adjudication
is discernible from the judgment itself. The learned First
Appellate Court has considered the rival contentions of the
parties, examined the evidence adduced in support of their
respective cases, and recorded its findings on the basis of such
evidence and the reasons assigned therefor. The mere absence of
separately worded points in the precise form proposed by
learned Senior Counsel cannot, in the facts and circumstances of
the present case, be treated as a failure to comply with the
Patna High Court SA No.371 of 1988 dt.02-11-2026
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requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
23. Having regard to the discussion hereinabove
and upon an examination of the judgment of the learned First
Appellate Court as a whole, this Court is satisfied that there has
been substantial compliance with the requirements of Order XLI
Rule 31 CPC. The judgment does not suffer from such a
deficiency as would warrant interference by this Court in the
present second appeal. Accordingly, the substantial question of
law framed in the present appeal is answered against the
appellants. Consequently, this Court finds that the judgment of
the learned First Appellate Court satisfies the applicable legal
requirements, and no ground for interference has been made out.
The substantial question of law is, therefore, decided against the
appellants.
24. In the result, the present second appeal stands
dismissed.
(Dr. Anshuman, J)
Mkr./-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 01.10.2026
Uploading Date 03.11.2026
Transmission Date 03.11.2026