The State Of Punjab vs Avtar Singh

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REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 934

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No.1908/2024)




THE STATE OF PUNJAB Appellant(s)

VERSUS

AVTAR SINGH & ORS. Respondent(s)

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.
2. Under the impugned order, the High Court has
allowed the quash petition preferred by the respondents
to quash the FIR No.249 dated 25.08.2005 registered under
Sections 364,325,324,323 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, ‘IPC’) at Police Station Abohar, District
Ferozepur (now Fazilka) and all consequential proceedings
arising therefrom including the judgment/ order of
sentence dated 09.05.2012 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, whereby the respondents have
been convicted and sentenced for imprisonment and to pay
a fine under Sections 365/149 of IPC, 324/149 IPC,
325/149 IPC and 148 IPC.
3. Basing on the compromise subsequent to respondents’
conviction, the respondents preferred quash petition
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NISHA KHULBEY
Date: 2026.09.01
18:12:51 IST
Reason:
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) in which, the High Court directed
for recording of the statement of the complainant.

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4. The Trial Court recorded the statement of the
parties including the complainant, wherein the
complainant/ victim stated that the compromise has been
effected with the intervention of the respectables and
relatives, and the compromise is genuine without any
pressure and undue influence and has been arrived at
his/her own free will.
5. Referring to Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012
10 SCC 303) , the High court has quashed the subject FIR
and all the proceedings arising therefrom.
6. In Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab
and Another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , this Court has
observed that power conferred under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. is to be distinguished from the powers which lies
in the Court to compound the offence under Section 320 of
Cr.P.C. and that the High Court has inherent powers under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution only to secure ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court.
7. Reiterating the principles settled in Narinder
Singh (supra),this Court in a later judgment in the
matter of Ramgopal and Another vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh reported in (2022) 14 SCC 531 has observed thus

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in paragraph nos.13, 14, 19 and 20:
“13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings
involving non-heinous offences or where the
offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature,
can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial
has already been concluded or appeal stands
dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of delivering
justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is
always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes
without saying, that the cases where compromise is
struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to
exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in
view the circumstances surrounding the incident,
the fashion in which the compromise has been
arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and
seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of
the accused, before and after the incidence. The
touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power
under Section 482CrPC would be to secure the ends
of justice. There can be no hard-and-fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do
substantial justice. A restrictive construction of
inherent powers under Section 482CrPC may lead to
rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts
and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to
grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where
heinous offences have been proved against
perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended,
as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder
Singh v. State of Punjab [ Narinder Singh v. State
of Punjab , (2014) 6 SCC 466, para 29 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [ State of M.P. v. Laxmi
Narayan , (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Cri) 706].

14. In other words, grave or serious offences or
offences which involve moral turpitude or have a
harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of
the society or involve matters concerning public
policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals
or groups only, for such offences have the
potential to impact the society at large. Effacing
abominable offences through quashing process would
not only send a wrong signal to the community but
may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous
habitual or professional offenders, who can secure
a “settlement” through duress, threats, social
boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well
said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be
avoided”.

*

19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to
Section 320CrPC where the Court is squarely guided
by the compromise between the parties in respect of
offences “compoundable” within the statutory
framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a
High Court under Section 482CrPC or vested in this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be
invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section

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320CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers
of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully
in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,
bearing in mind:

19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the
conscience of the society;

19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;

19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the
accused and the victim; and

19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and
after the occurrence of the purported offence
and/or other relevant considerations.

20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and
weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to
invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the
criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the
conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the
reasons that:

20.1. Firstly , the occurrence(s) involved in these
appeals can be categorised as purely personal or
having overtones of criminal proceedings of private
nature.

20.2. Secondly , the nature of injuries incurred, for
which the appellants have been convicted, do not
appear to exhibit their mental depravity or
commission of an offence of such a serious nature
that quashing of which would override public
interest.

20.3. Thirdly , given the nature of the offence and
injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against
the appellants had been concluded or their
appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.

20.4. Fourthly , the parties on their own volition,
without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and
voluntarily have buried their differences and wish
to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).

20.5. Fifthly , the occurrence(s) in both the cases
took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995,
respectively. There is nothing on record to evince
that either before or after the purported
compromise, any untoward incident transpired
between the parties.

20.6. Sixthly , since the appellants and the
complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s)
and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of
criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony,
and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided
to forget and forgive any ill will and have no
vengeance against each other.

20.7. Seventhly , the cause of administration of

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criminal justice system would remain un-effected on
acceptance of the amicable settlement between the
parties and/or resultant acquittal of the
appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

8. Applying the ratio propounded by this Court in
Narinder Singh (supra) and Ramgopal (supra), we have
perused the material placed before this Court and have
found that the subject incident had occurred between
individuals and it is not a case where a very heinous
offence was committed nor it involves commission of any
economic offence or dealing with contraband under NDPS
Act or any scam worth crores of rupees where the society
at large is involved.
9. Thus, we find that present is not a case where
the impugned order should be interfered with.
10. With the above observations, the appeal is
disposed of.
11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

......................J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)



....................J.
(SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR)

New Delhi
25.08.2026