SHRI K P RAMI REDDY S/O K HANUMANTHA REDDY vs UNION OF INDIA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
th
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.108931 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION No.109763 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.109807 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.109854 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.110131 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
IN WRIT PETITION No.108931 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SHRI K.P.RAMI REDDY
S/O K.HANUMANTHA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. DOOR NO. 20/21,
BALAJI NILAYA,
MMTC COLONY,
OPPOSITE PKG BANK,
BALLARI.
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY,
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
2
MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS,
NEW DELHI – 110 001.
2 . THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY NATIONAL
HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
TH TH
4 MAIN ROAD, 5 CROSS,
OPP. GANGAPARAMESHWARI
KALYANA MANTAPPA, VIDYA NAGAR,
BELLARY – 583 104.
3 . THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
AND ARBITRATOR UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
BALLARI,
OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
OPPOSITE RAILWAY STATION,
BALLARI – 583 101.
4 . NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
C-10, “SHREE NILAYAM”,
ST ND
1 MAIN, 2 CROSS,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR,
BEHIND RTO OFFICE,
HOSAPETE – 583 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.KANAVI, CGSC FOR R-1;
SRI PADMANABH HOLLA AND
SRI SHIVASAI M.PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R-2;
SMT.GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R-3;
SRI VASANT KOPPAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I) ISSUE A WRIT OF
3
MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT DIRECTING THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXISTING ARBITRATOR
AND APPOINT A NEW INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL ARBITRATOR
UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956;
II. DIRECT THAT THE PENDING 3G(5) APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONER BE HEARD AFRESH BY A NEW ARBITRATOR.
IN WRIT PETITION No.109763 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1 . B.S.PRASHANT
S/O RAVEENDRA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
OCC.: BUSINESS,
TH
RESIDENT OF 4 CROSS
NEHARU COLONY,
SADHANA YOGA KENDRA
VTC: GANDHINAGAR,
BALLARI.
2 . C.NARASA REDDY
S/O C.VENKATAPPA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
OCC.: BUSINESS,
RESIDENT OF WARD NO.22,
MAHANDIKOTTAM,
C/O C.AYYALA REDDY,
TALLUR ROAD, BALLARI.
3 . K.BHEEMA REDDY
S/O K.SEETARAMA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
OCC.:BUSINESS,
RESIDENT OF WARD NO.1,
RD
SRINAGAR, 3 CROSS,
TALLUR ROAD, BALLARI.
4
4 . SMT.KOGILATHOTA BRAMARAMBA
W/O K.RAGHURAM REDDY
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
OCC.:HOUSEHOLD
RESIDENT OF BUGGAIAH COMPOUND
TADPATRI
DISTRICT: ANANTPUR
STATE-ANDHRA PRADESH.
5 . J.SUDHAKAR
S/O J.SOMASUNDAR BHATTA
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
OCC.:BUSINESS,
RESIDENT OF MOUKA ROAD,
GANDHI NAGAR,
BALLARI.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS,
NEW DELHI – 110 001.
2 . THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
TH TH
4 MAIN ROAD, 5 CROSS,
OPP. GANGAPARAMESHWARI
KALYANA MANTAPPA,
VIDYA NAGAR,
BELLARY – 583 104.
3 . THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
5
AND ARBITRATOR UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY OF INDIA, BALLARI
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
AND DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
OPPOSITE RAILWAY STATION,
BALLARI – 583 101.
4 . NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
C-10, “SHEE NILAYAM”,
ST ND
1 MAIN, 2 CROSS,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR,
BEHIND R.T.O. OFFICE,
HOSAPETE – 583 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.KANAVI, CGSC FOR R-1;
SRI PADMANABH HOLLA AND
SRI SHIVASAI M.PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R-2;
SMT.GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R-3;
SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
SRI SUMIT GUPTA, SRI PULKIT KAUSHIK AND
SRI HARI RAGHAV, ADVOCATES FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) ISSUE A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT
DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXISTING
ARBITRATOR AND APPOINT A NEW INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL
ARBITRATOR UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
ACT, 1956,; B) DIRECT THAT THE PENDING 3G(5) APPLICATION
VIDE ANNEXURE-B TO B4 AND C TO C8 OF THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NO.4 BE HEARD AFRESH BY A NEW ARBITRATOR.
6
IN WRIT PETITION No.109807 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1 . SMT. LAKSHMI DEVI
W/O NAGI REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
OCC.: HOUSEHOLD,
R/O REDDY STREET,
BHAIRADEVANAHALLI,
BALLARI.
2 . SHRI C.LEPAKSHI REDDY
S/O NAGI REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
R/O REDDY STREET,
BHAIRADEVANAHALLI,
BALLARI.
3 . SHRI N.HANUMANTHA REDDY
S/O THIPPA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
R/O HOUSE NO.78, WARD NO.18,
MAHANANDHI KOTTAM,
BEHIND AMBABHAVANI TEMPLE
THALUR ROAD, BALLARI.
4 . SHRI H.SANJIVAREDDY
S/O LATE H.NARAYANAREDDY,
AGED ABOUT 88 YEARS,
OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
R/O 157/C/10, INFANTRY ROAD,
OPP. POLICE OUT POST, BALLARI.
7
5 . SHRI K.B.RAVEENDRA REDDY
S/O LATE K.B.LAKSHMI REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
OCC.: BUSINESS,
R/O DOOR NO-15, T.G.LAYOUT MOKA ROAD,
OPP. WATER BOOSTER,
GANDHI NAGAR, BALLARI.
6 . SHRI K.B. SRIKANTH REDDY
S/O LATE K.B.LAKSHMI REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
OCC.: BUSINESS,
R/O: 27, SAPTAGIRI NILAYA
D.V.G. ROAD, VIDYANAGAR,
HASSAN.
7 . SHRI K.B.V.MOHAN REDDY
S/O LATE K.B.LAKSHMI REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
OCC.: BUSINESS,
R/O:NO. 27A, ASHOK NAGAR,
HAVAMBHAVI, SIRUGUPPA ROAD
BALLARI.
8 . SHRI S.RAGHUNANDAN PRATHYUSH
S/O S.BASAVARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS,
OCC.: STUDENT,
ND
R/O: 9A/18, 2 CROSS, GANDHI NAGAR,
MOKA ROAD, BALLARI.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
8
AND:
1 . UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF ROAD, TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS,
NEW DELHI – 110 001.
2 . THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
COMPETENT AUTHORITY NATIONAL
HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
TH TH
4 MAIN ROAD, 5 CROSS,
OPP.GANGAPARAMESHWARI KALYANA MANTAPPA
VIDYA NAGAR,
BELLARY – 583 104.
3 . THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
AND ARBITRATOR
UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
BALLARI,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
AND DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
OPPOSITE RAILWAY STATION,
BALLARI – 583 101.
4 . NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
C-10, “SHREE NILAYAM”,
ST ND
1 MAIN, 2 CROSS,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR,
BEHIND R.T.O. OFFICE,
HOSAPETE – 583 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.KANAVI, CGSC FOR R-1;
SRI PADMANABH HOLLA AND
SRI SHIVASAI M.PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R-2;
SMT.GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R-3;
SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
9
SRI SUMIT GUPTA, SRI PULKIT KAUSHIK AND
SRI HARI RAGHAV, ADVOCATES FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) ISSUE A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT
DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXISTING
ARBITRATOR AND APPOINT A NEW INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL
ARBITRATOR UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
ACT 1956; B) DIRECT THAT THE PENDING 3G(5) APPLICATION OF
THE PETITIONER BE HEARD AFRESH BY A NEW ARBITRATOR.
IN WRIT PETITION No.109854 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1. K.H.MURALIDHAR
S/O LATE K.H.THIPPESWAMY
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
OCC.: BUSINESS
R/O.: NO.108, WARD NO.20,
RD
AMRUTA KRUPA, 3 CROSS,
NEHRU COLONY,
GANDHI NAGAR,
BALLARI.
2. G.NAGARAJ
S/O G.JADESHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: H.NO.15, WARD NO.19,
RAGHAVENDRA COLONY, NEAR
ROYAL ENFIELD SERVICE CENTRE,
ND
2 STAGE, DEEPAK LAYOUT,
BALLARI.
3. G.JAGADISH
S/O G.JADESHAPPA
10
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
OCC.: AGRICULTURE
R/O: DOOR NO.46,
WARD NO.17,
BRUNDAVANA COLONY, ANATHAPUR
ROAD,
BALLARI.
4. G.SATYANARAYANA
S/O G. JADESHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: DOOR. NO.76/1-2, WARD
NO.25, BESIDE POLICE STATION,
COWL BAZAAR,
BALLARI.
5. G.PRAHALAD
S/O G.JADESHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: GOPA NILAY,
ST
1 CROSS,
BESIDE RAGHAVENDRA KALYAN
MANTAP,
BALLARI.
6. G.VENKATESH
S/O G.JADESHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
ND
R/O:11/17, SRI GURURAJ, 2
STAGE, AGADI MAREPPA, BALLARI.
7. B.KISHORE
S/O B.SHREE RAMULU
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
OCC: BUSINESS
11
R/O: HOUSE NO.9/B,
TH
WARD NO.17, BLOCK NO. 16, 4
CROSS, SATHYANARAYANA, PET,
BALLARI.
8. KUMARI B.K. SHARADHA D/O
K.KRISHNA
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
OCC: SERVICE
R/O. DOOR NO. 69,
BATRI MAIN ROAD,
RD
3 CROSS, KARTHIK NILAYA,
SOUDAGAR COLONY BALLARI.
9. SRI LINGAREDDY VEERAREDDY @
VIRA REDDY S/O. ERRANNA
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. NO.3/A, 23 WARD, RADIO
PARK,
OPP. JUICE CENTRE,
COWL BAZAR,
BALLARI
10. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY
S/O M.KESHAVA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCC: BUSINESS
R/O. NO.41,
GURU KRUPA COLONY,
KARI VEERAPPA SCHOOL LINE,
PATEL NAGAR, BALLARI.
11. SRI G.RAMANJINEYA REDDY
S/O. LATE AYYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O.NO.181, WARD NO.01 NEAR
12
LAXMI NARASIMHA SWAMY TEMPLE
KOLAGALLU, BALLARI.
12. M.SANNA YERRISWAMY
S/O LATE MURUNNI ERANNA AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE.
13. GOURAMMA
W/O UPPARU HULEPPA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
BOTH ARE R/O. WARD NO.4, EDURU
BASAVA TEMPLE, KOLAGALLU,
BALLARI.
14. SRI VIJAYA KUMAR L.
S/O. VEERAREDDY
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. NO.6/A, 23 WARD, VENUGOPAL
NAIDU STREET, RADIO PARK, COWL
BAZAR, BALLARI.
15. K. MURENNE SHIVANANDA
S/O MURENNE DODDAERESH AGED
ABOUT 32 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. NO. 4, BASAVANNA GUDI
ROAD,
KOLAGALLU, BALLARI.
16. MURENNE VEERESHA
S/O LATE MURENNE SHIVARAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O.:WARD NO.2,
13
TAYAMMA GUDI ROAD,
KOLAGALLU, BALLARI.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS,
NEW DELHI – 110 001.
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
COMPETENT AUTHORITY NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
TH TH
4 MAIN ROAD, 5 CROSS,
OPP. GANGAPARAMESHWARI KALYANA MANTAPPA,
VIDYA NAGAR,
BELLARY – 583 104.
3. THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
ARBITRATOR UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY OF INDIA, BALLARI
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
OPPOSITE RAILWAY STATION,
BALLARI – 583 101.
4. NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR, C-10,
st ND
"SHREE NILAYAM, 1 MAIN, 2 CROSS,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, BEHIND R.T.O. OFFICE
HOSAPETE – 583 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.KANAVI, CGSC FOR R-1;
SRI PADMANABH HOLLA AND
14
SRI SHIVASAI M.PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R – 2;
SMT.GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R-3;
SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
SRI SUMIT GUPTA, SRI PULKIT KAUSHIK AND
SRI HARI RAGHAV, ADVOCATES FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) ISSUE A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT
DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXISTING
ARBITRATOR AND APPOINT A NEW INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL
ARBITRATOR UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
ACT 1956, IN SO FAR AS PETITIONER ARE CONCERNED VIDE
ANNEXURE B TO B15 AND C TO C20; B) DIRECT THAT THE
PENDING 3G(5) APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONER BE HEARD
AFRESH BY A NEW ARBITRATOR.
IN WRIT PETITION No.110131 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1 . SWETHA N. JAVALI
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
OCC.: HOUSEHOLD
R/O. C/O. P.A. VISHNUKUMAR
ND
RAGHAVENDRA COLONY, 2 STAGE
BALLARI.
2 . AANJINEYALU S/O. SANJIVAPPA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OCC.: AGRICULTURE,
TH
R/O. 9 WARD, D.C. COLONY,
ANDRALU, BALLARI.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM. ADVOCATE)
15
AND:
1 . UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS
NEW DELHI – 110 001.
2 . THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
COMPETENT AUTHORITY NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
TH TH
4 MAIN ROAD, 5 CROSS,
OPP. GANGAPARAMESHWARI
KALYANA MANTAPPA,
VIDYA NAGAR, BELLARY – 583 104.
3 . THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
AND ARBITRATOR UNDER NATIONAL HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY OF INDIA, BALLARI,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIOENR AND
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
OPP. RAILWAY STATION
BALLARI – 583 101.
4 . NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
C-10, “SHREE NILAYAM”
ST ND
1 MAIN, 2 CROSS,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR,
BEHIND R.T.O. OFFICE
HOSAPETE – 583 201.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.KANAVI, CGSC FOR R-1;
SRI PADMANABH HOLLA AND
SRI SHIVASAI M.PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R-2;
SMT.GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R-3;
SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
SRI SUMIT GUPTA, SRI PULKIT KAUSHIK AND
SRI HARI RAGHAV, ADOCATES FOR R-4)
16
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO (A) ISSUE A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT
DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO SUBSTITUTE THE EXISTING
ARBITRATOR AND APPOINT A NEW INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL
ARBITRATOR UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
ACT, 1956 IN SO FAR AS PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED;
(B) DIRECT THAT THE PENDING 3G(5) APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONERS BE HEARD AFRESH BY A NEW ARBITRATOR.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
This batch of petitions projects a common grievance and
seeks a common prayer. The prayer is for substitution of the
Arbitrator in all these cases. The petitioners are persons who hold
certain lands, which are acquired for the purpose of the Ballari-
Moka National Highway Project. Writ Petition No.108931 of 2025 is
preferred by one K.P. Rami Reddy and Writ Petition No.109763 of
2025 is preferred by four other persons. The common respondents
are the Union of India, the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the
17
Arbitrator, who is the Additional Deputy Commissioner under the
National Highways Act, 1956 (‘the Act’ for short). Writ Petition
Nos.109807 of 2025, 109854 of 2025 and 110131 of 2025 are all
preferred by different land-losers, where the additional respondent
is the National Highways Authority of India (‘NHAI’ for short). For
the sake of brevity, the facts obtaining in Writ Petition No.108931
of 2025, being the lead petition, which are similar in the other
petitions, are noticed.
2. Heard Smt. Archana A. Magadum, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners, Sri M.B. Kanavi, learned Central
Government Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.1,
Sri Padmanabh Holla, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.2, Smt. Girija Hiremath, learned High Court Government Pleader
appearing for respondent No.3 and Sri Vasant Koppar, learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.4.
3. Facts, adumbrated, are as follows:
3.1 Pursuant to the process of acquisition, the Competent
Authority for land acquisition passes an award on 02-03-2020
18
determining compensation at the rate of ₹6,000/- per square meter
in respect of the lead petitioner’s acquired land bearing
Sy.No.74/B2 situated at Kasaba Ballari Village, Ballari Taluk and
District. An extent of 5382 square meters is acquired for the
purpose of forming a 4 lane road of National Highway 150A for
about 35 kms. of the Ballari-Moka-Karnataka/Andhra Pradesh
Border section. The petitioners in all these cases are land owners in
respect of different parcels of land acquired for the same project,
coming within the said 35 kms.
3.2 Not being satisfied with the compensation determined
by the Competent Authority, the petitioner invokes Section 3G(5) of
the Act seeking re-determination of compensation. The proceedings
come to be registered as Appeal No.73/2021-22 before the
Arbitrator under the Act. The other petitions are likewise pending
before the Arbitrator. On 09-05-2025, after about 4 years of the
invocation of arbitration, the Arbitrator, according to the
petitioners, calls for a report from the Registration Department suo
motu , which, according to the petitioners, is contrary to law. The
Registration Department submits a report, which, according to the
19
petitioners, is contrary to the registration materials relied on by
them and to the record placed before the Registration Department.
3.3 On 27-05-2025, in the proceedings concerning lands at
Kolagallu, the applicants challenged the award of the Competent
Authority fixing the market value at ₹188/- per square meter,
contending that the lands had been converted to non-agricultural
purposes and that they ought to receive treatment comparable to
an exemplar, Sy.No.894/B, for which ₹2,153/- per square meter
had been adopted. The Arbitrator accepted the claim for re-
determination and re-fixed the market value at ₹1,184/- per square
meter, which is 55% of ₹2,153/-, after applying a 45% deduction
towards roads, civic amenities and development charges, and
directed re-calculation of compensation with the admissible
statutory benefits. Therefore, the compensation which was
determined at ₹188/- per square meter is enhanced to ₹1,184/- per
square meter. On 24-07-2025, an order is passed by the Arbitrator
in ARB/986/2025 remanding the matter to the Special Land
Acquisition Officer for revision of the award.
20
3.4 The petitioner herein has also preferred Writ Petition
No.106478 of 2025 on the score that the Arbitrator may reduce the
amount of compensation awarded in respect of the land in question.
The said proceedings before the Arbitrator come to be stayed in
Writ Petition No.106478 of 2025 by a co-ordinate Bench of this
Court. This interim order is then made applicable to all the pending
cases. Therefore, the present petitions are preferred seeking a
change of the Arbitrator, from the existing Arbitrator to an impartial
Arbitrator. The bias on the part of the Arbitrator is projected on the
apprehension that the Arbitrator would reduce the compensation in
a petition preferred by the claimants and not by the National
Highways Authority of India.
4. The learned counsel, Smt. Archana A. Magadum,
appearing for the petitioners would submit that the reduction of
compensation by the Arbitrator in certain cases, in a petition which
is not filed by NHAI, is contrary to law. She would contend that
there is arbitrary classification and determination, where the
Competent Authority has determined the non-agricultural status of
the lands to be at a particular market value. She would draw
21
attention to the National Highways (Amendment) Act, 2015 to
contend that the principles contained in Sections 26 to 30 of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘the LA Act’ for short)
must be made applicable for determination of compensation under
the Act and the Arbitrator has failed to apply those parameters. The
reduction in compensation is without any basis. On all these factors,
she would submit that the Arbitrator is biased against the land
owners, relies on undisclosed material, demonstrates a prejudiced
mind, passes one-sided orders and has a pre-determined approach
favouring NHAI, and thereby denies fair adjudication. She would
also seek to place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of BHAVEN CONSTRUCTION v. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
1
SARDAR SAROVAR NARMADA NIGAM LIMITED . All other
submissions are founded upon bias and prejudice.
5. Contrariwise, the learned Additional Solicitor General of
India, along with Sri. M.B. Kanavi, learned Central Government
Standing Counsel, appearing for respondent No.1 would vehemently
1
(2022) 1 SCC 75
22
refute the submissions, contending that this Court has limited scope
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for the remedies that are sought, as the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the A&C Act’ for short) provides a self-
contained mechanism for challenging the appointment and conduct
of an Arbitrator under Sections 12 and 13, and the award itself, if
the petitioners are aggrieved, is amenable to challenge under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. He would submit that the authority of
the Arbitrator, in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act, is to
independently determine the compensation payable, and he is not
confined to the amount determined by the Competent Authority for
land acquisition. It may result in enhancement or reduction. The
learned Additional Solicitor General would further submit that the
mere fact that the Arbitrator has passed orders adverse to the
claimants, or adopted a valuation different from what is suggested
by the claimants, cannot be termed as bias. The plea that the
Arbitrator is in favour of NHAI has no basis.
5.1 The learned Additional Solicitor General of India would
further submit that the learned counsel for the petitioners has not
23
relied on a solitary case, out of all these cases, where there has
been a reduction of compensation in a petition filed by the claimant
seeking enhancement of compensation. He would submit that such
pleas, put forth before the Court, and the further proceedings being
stayed, will only delay the implementation of the project. Therefore,
he would submit that the petitions be dismissed.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record. In the
light of the submissions and contra-submissions, the only issue that
arises for consideration is, whether the petitions seeking
substitution of an Arbitrator during the pendency of arbitration
proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the Act merits acceptance?
8. Before embarking upon the consideration of the
controversy that falls for determination, it would be apposite to first
traverse the statutory landscape within which the issue is required
24
to be examined. The answer to the controversy, in fact, lies
substantially embedded in the statutory scheme itself.
8.1 Section 3G of the Act reads as follows:
“ 3-G. Determination of amount payable as
compensation .—(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act,
there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an
order of the competent authority.
(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of
an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall
be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose
right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner
whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated
at ten per cent, of the amount determined under sub-section
(1), for that land.
(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall
give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of
which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all
persons interested in the land to be acquired.
(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and
shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in
person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in
sub-section (2) of Section 3-C, before the competent authority,
at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective
interest in such land.
(5) If the amount determined by the competent
authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not
acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on
an application by either of the parties, be determined by
the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central
Government—
25
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this
Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while
determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration—
( a ) the market value of the land on the date of
publication of the notification under Section 3-A;
( b ) the damage, if any, sustained by the person
interested at the time of taking possession of the
land, by reason of the severing of such land from
other land;
( c ) the damage, if any, sustained by the person
interested at the time of taking possession of the
land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously
affecting his other immovable property in any
manner, or his earnings;
( d ) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land,
the person interested is compelled to change his
residence or place of business, the reasonable
expenses, if any, incidental to such change.”
Section 3G of the Act provides the mechanism for determination of
compensation upon acquisition. Sub-section (5) confers upon either
party, dissatisfied with the amount determined by the Competent
Authority, the right to seek determination of such amount by an
Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government. What assumes
significance is sub-section (6), which, subject to the provisions of
26
the Act, expressly engrafts the provisions of the A&C Act upon
every arbitration under the Act. It is at this statutory confluence
that the answer to the controversy begins to emerge.
8.2 Sections 12 and 13 of the A&C Act reads as follows:
“ 12. Grounds for challenge .—(1) When a person is
approached in connection with his possible appointment as an
arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances,—
( a ) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past
or present relationship with or interest in any of the
parties or in relation to the subject-matter in dispute,
whether financial, business, professional or other kind,
which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality; and
( b ) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient
time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to
complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve
months.
Explanation 1 .—The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule
shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or
impartiality of an arbitrator.
Explanation 2 .—The disclosure shall be made by such
person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and
throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay,
disclose to the parties in writing any circumstances referred to
in sub-section (1) unless they have already been informed of
them by him.
(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—
27
( a ) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality; or
( b ) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by
the parties.
(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him,
or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of
which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.
(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary,
any person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or
the subject-matter of the dispute, falls under any of the
categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible
to be appointed as an arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having
arisen between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section
by an express agreement in writing.
13. Challenge procedure .—(1) Subject to sub-section
(4), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging
an arbitrator.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1),
a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within
fifteen days after becoming aware of the Constitution of the
arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstances
referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 12, send a written
statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral
tribunal.
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section (2)
withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the
challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge.
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by
the parties or under the procedure under sub-section (2) is not
successful, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-section
(4), the party challenging the arbitrator may make an
28
application for setting aside such an arbitral award in
accordance with Section 34.
(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an application
made under sub-section (5), the Court may decide as to
whether the arbitrator who is challenged is entitled to any fees.”
Sections 12 and 13 of the A&C Act constitute a complete
mechanism for questioning the independence or impartiality of an
Arbitrator. Section 12 delineates the circumstances which may give
rise to justifiable doubts regarding the independence or impartiality
of the Arbitrator, while Section 13 prescribes the procedure by
which such a challenge is to be mounted. The legislative scheme,
therefore, neither leaves a party remediless nor permits an
apprehension of bias to wander outside the statutory framework in
search of a remedy. If bias, prejudice or want of impartiality is
alleged against an Arbitrator, the statute itself provides the
doorway through which such a grievance must ordinarily travel.
To permit every such allegation to be carried directly to
the constitutional Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India would not merely open the proverbial
floodgates; it would render nugatory the carefully crafted
29
mechanism under the A&C Act and permit interlocutory
challenges to derail arbitral proceedings at every turn.
9. The judgment of the Apex Court in BHAVEN
CONSTRUCTION supra relied upon by the petitioners, reads as
follows:
“…. …. ….
18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework,
mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a
constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. COAI [ Nivedita
Sharma v. COAI , (2011) 14 SCC 337: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947],
this Court referred to several judgments and held: (SCC p. 343,
para 11)
“ 11 . We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute
that the power of the High Courts to issue directions,
orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and
prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a
basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed
by parliamentary legislation — L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India [ L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India ,
(1997) 3 SCC 261: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577]. However, it is
one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in
it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court
can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by
or action taken by the State and/or its
agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order
passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an
altogether different thing to say that each and every
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must
be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course
ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an
effective alternative remedy . Rather, it is settled law
that when a statutory forum is created by law for
30
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise
discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the
procedure established under the enactment. This power
needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one
party is left remediless under the statute or a clear “bad
faith” shown by one of the parties. This high standard set
by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to
make the arbitration fair and efficient.
… … …
23. Respondent 1 did not take legal recourse against the
appointment of the sole arbitrator, and rather submitted
themselves before the tribunal to adjudicate on the jurisdiction
issue as well as on the merits. In this situation, Respondent 1
has to endure the natural consequences of submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator, which can
be challenged, through an application under Section 34. It may
be noted that in the present case, the award has already been
passed during the pendency of this appeal, and Respondent 1
has already preferred a challenge under Section 34 to the same.
Respondent 1 has not been able to show any exceptional
circumstance, which mandates the exercise of jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.”
The reliance placed by the petitioners upon BHAVEN
CONSTRUCTION does not carry their case any further. The Apex
Court has undoubtedly recognised that the constitutional
jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be legislatively extinguished.
Yet, the existence of constitutional power is one thing; its exercise
31
in the teeth of an efficacious statutory mechanism is quite another.
The Apex Court cautions that interference with arbitral proceedings
must remain confined to exceptional situations, where the statutory
framework leaves a party remediless or where demonstrable bad
faith stares at the Court.
10. The petitioners seek to bring their case within the
expression “bad faith”, contending that the Arbitrator has betrayed
a predetermined disposition by expressing that the compensation
may be reduced. The submission is attractive in its articulation, but
fragile in its foundation. A stray expression, observation or
interaction during the course of arbitral proceedings cannot,
by itself, metamorphose into bad faith. Every observation of
an adjudicator cannot be dissected, isolated from its setting
and elevated into an accusation of bias. Where such a course
permitted, adjudication itself would become hostage to the
subjective apprehensions of litigants.
11. The contours of judicial interference in arbitral
proceedings have been repeatedly drawn with deliberate
narrowness.
32
11.1 The Apex Court in DEEP INDUSTRIES LIMITED v.
2
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED holds as
follows:
“12. Section 5 states:
“ 5. Extent of judicial intervention .—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in matters governed
by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in this Part.”
13. Section 37 which is also material states as follows:
“ 37. Appealable orders .—(1) An appeal shall lie
from the following orders (and from no others) to the
court authorised by law to hear appeals from original
decrees of the Court passing the order, namely—
( a ) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under
Section 8;
( b ) granting or refusing to grant any measure under
Section 9;
( c ) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral
award under Section 34.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an
order granting of the Arbitral Tribunal—
( a ) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or
sub-section (3) of Section 16; or
( b ) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure
under Section 17.
2
(2020) 15 SCC 706
33
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order
passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this
section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to
the Supreme Court.”
14. What is also important to note is that under Section
29-A of the Act which was inserted by the Amendment Act,
2016 a time-limit was made within which arbitral awards must
be made, namely, 12 months from the date the Arbitral Tribunal
enters upon the reference. Also, it is important to note that
even so far as Section 34 applications are concerned, Section
34(6) added by the same amendment states that these
applications are to be disposed of expeditiously, and in any
event, within a period of one year from the date on which the
notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other
parties.
15. Given the aforesaid statutory provision and given the
fact that the 1996 Act repealed three previous enactments in
order that there be speedy disposal of all matters covered by it,
it is clear that the statutory policy of the Act is that not only are
time-limits set down for disposal of the arbitral proceedings
themselves but time-limits have also been set down for Section
34 references to be decided. Equally, in Union of India v.
Varindera Constructions Ltd. [ Union of India v. Varindera
Constructions Ltd. , (2020) 2 SCC 111: (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 277],
dated 17-9-2018, disposing of SLP (C) No. 23155 of 2013, this
Court has imposed the selfsame limitation on first appeals under
Section 37 so that there be a timely resolution of all matters
which are covered by arbitration awards.
16. Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under
Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a
constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and
orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also
provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second
appeal being filed [ see Section 37(2) of the Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt
whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under
34
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders
passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral
process would be derailed and would not come to fruition
for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that
Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains
untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the
Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is
that though petitions can be filed under Article 227
against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals
under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be
extremely circumspect in interfering with the same,
taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by
us hereinabove so that interference is restricted to orders
that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction.”
11.2 Long before these judgments, the Apex Court in SBP &
3
CO v. PATEL ENGINEERING LIMITED holds as follows:
“45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on
the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during
arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article
226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an
approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral
Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has
an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award
including any in-between orders that might have been passed
by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The
party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has
a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until
the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the
scheme of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature
of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement,
even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may
constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that
would not alter the status of the Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be
a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore,
disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts
3
(2005) 8 SCC 618
35
that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of
being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not
permissible.
46. The object of minimising judicial intervention
while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated
upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be
approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the
Constitution against every order made by the Arbitral
Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once
the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal,
parties have to wait until the award is pronounced
unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them
under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.”
In DEEP INDUSTRIES , the Apex Court emphasised that the
architecture of the A&C Act is founded upon minimum judicial
intervention. Section 5 is the statutory sentinel guarding that
legislative policy. Though the constitutional power under Article 227
remains untouched, its exercise must be exceedingly circumspect
and confined principally to orders patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction.
36
11.3 The Apex Court in BHADRA INTERNATIONAL
(INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED v. AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF
4
INDIA holds as follows:
“33. Section 18 outlines two principles: first , equal
treatment of parties; and secondly , right to a fair hearing.
The principle of equal treatment of parties applies not
only to the arbitral proceedings, but also to the procedure
for appointment of arbitrators. The section casts a
responsibility on the arbitrator to act impartially,
objectively, and without bias, and also on the parties to
adhere to standards of fairness. The principle of ‘equal
treatment of the parties' means that the parties must
have the possibility of participating in the constitution of
the arbitral tribunal on equal terms.”
… … …
45. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 lays down two
grounds for challenge to appointment of an arbitrator:
first , if any circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts about an arbitrator's independence or
impartiality. Secondly , if the arbitrator does not possess
the qualifications agreed to by the parties. Sub-section
(4) prescribes a caution. It states that a challenge to the
appointment of an arbitrator could be maintained only on
the grounds that were not disclosed during or after the
appointment.
… … …
59. The test to determine bias is not actual proof of
bias but reasonable apprehension of bias. The moment
this apprehension takes birth in the mind of a party, the
trust in the arbitral proceedings dies. A Constitution
Bench of this Court in CORE II (supra), wherein one of us,
J. B. Pardiwala, J., was a part of the Bench, laid down the
test for real likelihood of bias. It reads thus:—
4
2026 SCC OnLine SC 7
37
“ (b) Real likelihood of bias
92. The nemo judex rule may be applicable
where a Judge's conduct or circumstances give
rise to an apprehension of bias. In such situations,
the Judge does not have a financial or cause-based
interest in the outcome of the dispute but provides
benefit to a party by failing to be neutral and
impartial. The determination of bias does not
depend upon actual proof of bias but whether
there is a real possibility of bias based on the facts
and circumstances.
xxx
(iv) Indian approach to the bias test
103. This Court has consistently adopted the
real likelihood test to determine bias. [Rattan Lal
Sharma v. Hari Ram (CoEducation) Higher
Secondary School, (1993) 4 SCC 10, para 11 :
1993 SCC (L&S) 1106] In Manak Lal v. Prem
Chand Singhvi [Manak Lal v. Prem Chand Singhvi,
1957 SCC OnLine SC 10, para 4], P.B.
Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) observed that the test to determine bias
is whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend
that a bias attributable to a member of the
tribunal might have operated against him in the
final decision. In S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P.
[S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC
459, para 14: 1973 SCC (Cri) 580: 1973 SCC (L&S)
580], K.K. Mathew, J. observed that the test of
likelihood of bias is based on the reasonable
apprehension of a reasonable man fully cognizant
of the facts. The learned Judge further observed
that the question of whether the real likelihood of
bias exists is to be determined on the probabilities
to be inferred from the objective circumstances by
a court or based on impressions that might
reasonably be left on the minds of the aggrieved
party or the public at large. [S. Parthasarathi,
(1974) 3 SCC 459, p. 465, para 16. It was
observed:“16. The tests of “real likelihood” and
“reasonable suspicion” are really inconsistent with
each other. We think that the reviewing authority
must make a determination on the basis of the
whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable
38
man would in the circumstances infer that there is
real likelihood of bias.[…]. ”
In BHADRA INTERNATIONAL (INDIA) PRIVATE
LIMITED , the Apex Court reiterates that equality of treatment and
fairness of hearing lie at the heart of arbitral adjudication. An
Arbitrator must remain impartial, objective and free from
bias. Equally, however, bias is not a conclusion to be
summoned by suspicion. The test is one of a real likelihood
or reasonable apprehension founded upon objective
circumstances. Conjecture cannot masquerade as proof; nor
can an apprehension, merely because it is sincerely
entertained, acquire the character of a legally sustainable
allegation. Judged on that touchstone, the grievance of the
petitioners falls considerably short.
12. The solitary circumstance projected is that, during the
course of proceedings, the Arbitrator is stated to have observed
that the compensation may be reduced. Such an observation,
without anything more, cannot carry the weight sought to be placed
upon it. It neither establishes predetermination nor discloses a
39
closed mind. Bias cannot be manufactured out of an isolated
expression divorced from the totality of the proceedings. There
must be cogent material capable of persuading a reasonable
person, acquainted with all relevant circumstances, that there
exists a real likelihood of partiality. No such material is forthcoming.
13. What remains is bad faith which is also interpreted by
5
the Apex Court in R. ASHOKA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA as
follows:
“18. In supporting his claim for quashing, the appellant
has made a case that he has been singled out for the reason
that he belonged to a rival political establishment, and the first
complaint came six years after the end of the period in
controversy. In effect, the appellant is alleging malafides . In
opposition to such a claim, the State has put forth a position
that if there are enough materials to sustain prosecution, the
factum that the genesis is from a complaint filed by a political
rival ought not to be of any consequence. We now examine the
question of malice.
17.1 In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh , Krishna
Iyer J., in his inimitable style, wrote:—
“9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in
the jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish
unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular
concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which
invalidates the exercise of power — sometimes
called colourable exercise or fraud on power and
oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and
satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond
the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2824
40
pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use
of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate
object the actuation or catalysation by malice is
not legicidal. The action is bad where the true
object is to reach an end different from the one for
which the power is entrusted, goaded by
extraneous considerations, good or bad, but
irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian
of power is influenced in its exercise by
considerations outside those for promotion of
which the power is vested the court calls it a
colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion.
In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was
not off the mark even in law when he stated: “I
repeat . . . that all power is a trust — that we are
accountable for its exercise — that, from the
people, and for the people, all springs, and all
must exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not
exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this
context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all
cases in which the action impugned is to effect some
object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the
power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If
the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If
considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or
extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the
action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the
acquisition or other official act.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.2 In W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray , this Court studied
in detail, the meaning of malice. Relevant extracts are as
follows:
“ 15. …Malice in fact is malue animus indicating
that action against a party was actuated by spite or ill
will against him or by indirect or improper motives.
Malice in fact .—‘Malice in fact’ means express
malice.
Malice in fact or actual malice, relates to the
actual state or condition of the mind of the person who
did the act.
41
Malice in fact is where the malice is not
established by legal presumption or proof of certain
facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case.
Malice in fact implies a desire or intention to
injure, while malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent
with an honest purpose….”
17.3 In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna , a co-ordinate
bench held:
“5. Whereas fairness is synonymous with
reasonableness — bias stands included within the
attributes and broader purview of the word
“malice” which in common acceptation means and
implies “spite” or “ill will”. One redeeming feature
in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is
now well settled that mere general statements will
not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of
ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on
record to come to the conclusion as to whether in
fact, there was existing a bias or a mala fide move
which results in the miscarriage of justice (see in
this context Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v.
Girja Shankar Pant [(2001) 1 SCC 182: JT 2000
Supp (2) SC 206]). In almost all legal inquiries,
“intention as distinguished from motive is the all-
important factor” and in common parlance a
malicious act stands equated with an intentional
act without just cause or excuse. In the case of
Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens [[1955]
1 Q.B. 275: [1954] 3 All ER 677 (CA)] the Court of
Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of
Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 LJQB 463]
as below:
“For this purpose maliciously means no more
than knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley
v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463] where
Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person
who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same
thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and
servant by harbouring and keeping the servant after he
has quitted his master during his period of service,
commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in
law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act
intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v.
42
Prosser [(1825) 1 C&P 673: 4 B&C 247]. ‘Intentionally’
refers to the doing of the act; it does not mean that the
defendant meant to be spiteful, though sometimes, as
for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in defamation,
malice in fact has to be proved.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.4 In Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab SEB , it was held:
13. … Incidentally, be it noted that the
expression “mala fide” is not meaningless jargon and it
has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only
be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts
of each case. There cannot possibly be any set
guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala
fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own
facts and circumstances…. Mere user of the word
“mala fide” by the petitioner would not by itself
make the petition entertainable. The Court must
scan the factual aspect and come to its own
conclusion i.e. exactly what the High Court has done
and that is the reason why the narration has been noted
in this judgment in extenso. …”
(emphasis supplied)
17.5 In Ratnagiri Gas & Power (P) Ltd. v. RDS Projects
Ltd. ,
“25. Even otherwise the findings recorded by the
High Court on the question of mala fides do not appear
to us to be factually or legally sustainable. While we do
not consider it necessary to delve deep into this aspect
of the controversy, we may point out that allegations of
mala fides are more easily made than proved. The law
casts a heavy burden on the person alleging mala
fides to prove the same on the basis of facts that
are either admitted or satisfactorily established
and/or logical inferences deducible from the same.
This is particularly so when the petitioner alleges
malice in fact in which event it is obligatory for the
person making any such allegation to furnish
particulars that would prove mala fides on the part
of the decision-maker. Vague and general
allegations unsupported by the requisite
particulars do not provide a sound basis for the
court to conduct an inquiry into their veracity.
43
…
27. There is yet another aspect which cannot be
ignored. As and when allegations of mala fides are
made, the persons against whom the same are levelled
need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to
enable them to answer the charge. In the absence of the
person concerned as a party in his/her individual
capacity it will neither be fair nor proper to record a
finding that malice in fact had vitiated the action taken
by the authority concerned. It is important to remember
that a judicial pronouncement declaring an action to be
mala fide is a serious indictment of the person
concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences
against him. Courts have, therefore, to be slow in
drawing conclusions when it comes to holding
allegations of mala fides to be proved and only in cases
where based on the material placed before the Court or
facts that are admitted leading to inevitable inferences
supporting the charge of mala fides that the Court
should record a finding in the process ensuring that
while it does so, it also hears the person who was likely
to be affected by such a finding.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The contours of “bad faith” or mala fides have been lucidly
explained by the Apex Court in R. ASHOKA drawing upon the
celebrated exposition in STATE OF PUNJAB v. GURDIAL SINGH .
Bad faith, in public law, is not a loose synonym for dissatisfaction
with an exercise of power. It arises when power entrusted for one
purpose is consciously deployed to achieve another; when statutory
authority becomes a cloak for an extraneous object; or when
considerations alien to the purpose of the enactment infect the
decision-making process.
44
14. Allegations of mala fides are, therefore, easier made
than established. The charge is serious; consequently, the burden is
correspondingly heavy. Courts cannot return a finding of malice
upon vague assertions, broad accusations or subjective
impressions. The allegation must rest upon particulars,
demonstrable circumstances and material from which the inference
of an improper purpose follows with reasonable inevitability. Judicial
conclusions of mala fides cannot be built upon the shifting sands of
suspicion.
15. In the case at hand, neither ingredient is discernible.
There is no material to suggest that the Arbitrator has employed
the authority vested in him for a purpose foreign to the statute, nor
is there anything to indicate that extraneous or irrelevant
considerations have entered the arbitral process. What is projected
as bad faith is, at its highest, an apprehension arising from an
alleged oral observation concerning possible reduction of
compensation. Such an apprehension cannot be permitted to leap
the considerable distance between suspicion and legally cognizable
mala fides .
45
16. The statutory position, therefore, admits of little
ambiguity. The petitioners seek substitution of the Arbitrator while
proceedings under Section 3G(5) remain pending. Sections 12 and
13 of the A&C Act provide a specific and efficacious mechanism for
questioning the independence or impartiality of an Arbitrator.
Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a first refuge
merely because a party apprehends an adverse outcome from the
statutory process.
17. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution, cannot interdict an ongoing
arbitration, upon material which discloses neither patent want of
jurisdiction nor an exceptional circumstance of the kind
contemplated by the Apex Court. The allegations of bias and
predetermination, though emphatically pleaded, remain
unsupported by material of corresponding weight. An apprehension
cannot become evidence merely by repetition; nor can a speculative
fear of an adverse award furnish a constitutional cause of action.
18. The exemplars pressed into service by the petitioners to
demonstrate bias or prejudice fare no better. Indeed, they appear
46
to travel in the opposite direction. The awards rendered in
Arbitration Nos.107, 108 and 109 of 2024, relied upon by the
petitioners themselves, disclose enhancement of compensation
from ₹188/- per square metre to ₹1,184/- per square metre. The
record, therefore, does not sustain the portrait of a predetermined
Arbitrator that the petitioners seek to paint.
19. Complaints touching upon valuation, deductions or the
treatment accorded to converted lands may legitimately constitute
grounds of challenge in accordance with law at the appropriate
stage. They do not, merely by their existence, transmute
themselves into proof of bias. An adjudicator does not become
biased merely because a party disagrees with his approach,
apprehends an unfavourable conclusion or perceives an observation
made during hearing to be adverse. Bias is a conclusion of law
founded upon demonstrable circumstances; it cannot be the
offspring of conjecture.
20. Arbitration is conceived as an expeditious mechanism of
dispute resolution. Constitutional intervention cannot be allowed to
become an interlocutory detour that converts that expedition into
47
an endless journey. Where the statute provides both the remedy
and the route, a litigant cannot ordinarily abandon that route
merely because the road ahead appears unfavourable. The A&C Act
itself provides for a challenge to the appointment and conduct of an
Arbitrator under Sections 12 and 13 and to the award under Section
34.
21. In the case at hand, no circumstance of exceptional
rarity, patent want of jurisdiction, demonstrable bias,
predetermination or established bad faith is shown to exist. What
remains is apprehension, an apprehension unsupported by material
sufficient to command constitutional intervention. Viewed
cumulatively, the circumstances pleaded by the petitioners do not
cross the threshold necessary to invite the extraordinary
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. The statutory process must,
therefore, be permitted to run its course unhindered.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petitions stand disposed.
48
(ii) The petitioners are at liberty to approach the appropriate
fora in terms of the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, in the event they find that the
Arbitrator is biased or is passing lopsided orders, and
shall bear in mind the observations made in the course of
this order.
(iii) Should the petitioners institute proceedings of the nature
projected before this Court, the benefit contemplated
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be
considered, if otherwise available to them in law.
S d /-
( M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ