TANVEER AHMAD MIR TH.HIS WIFE vs UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K TH.DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR

HCP No. 167/2025


Reserved on: 07.05 2026.
Pronounced on:14.05.2026
Uploaded on:15.05.2026
Whether operative part or full
judgment has been pronounced: Full


Tanveer Ahmad Mir (Aged: 32 years)
S/o Abdul Quyoom Mir
R/o Brath Kalan Tehsil Bomia, District Baramulla Through
wife Namely Posha Begum
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. S.T.Hussain, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Nida Nazir, Adv.

Vs.
UT of J&K Through District Magistrate
Baramulla.
...Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, Dy.AG
CORAM:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, Judge.
JUDGMENT
BRIEF FACTS.
1. Through the medium of the present Habeas Corpus Petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks quashment of
Detention Order No. 09/DMB/PSA/2025 dated 29.04.2025 passed by
respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Baramulla under Section 8(a) of the
Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short “PSA”), whereby
detenue namely Tanveer Ahmad Mir S/o Abdul Qayoom Mir R/o Brath
Kalan, Tehsil Bomai Zaingeer, District Baramulla, has been placed under
preventive detention.
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2. As per the detention record, the detenue is alleged to be an active Over
Ground Worker affiliated with banned terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba and to
have provided logistical support, shelter, transportation and assistance to
terrorists operating in the area of Sopore and adjoining localities. It is further
alleged that the detenue maintained contact with active terrorists and
Pakistan-based handlers through encrypted communication applications and
proxy networks.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned
detention order is legally unsustainable and liable to be quashed as the same
has been passed mechanically and without independent application of mind
by the detaining authority.
4. It was contended that the grounds of detention are nothing but a verbatim
reproduction of the police dossier submitted by the sponsoring agency with
only cosmetic changes in language, thereby clearly demonstrating complete
non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. Reliance in
this regard was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Jai Singh and Ors. v. State of J&K , AIR 1985 SC 764.
5. Learned counsel further argued that the detenue has been deprived of his
valuable constitutional right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India as the complete material relied upon by the detaining
authority was not supplied to him, thereby disabling him from making an
effective representation against the order of detention.
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6. It was additionally submitted that the allegations leveled against the detenue
are vague, bald and bereft of material particulars. According to the
petitioner, the grounds of detention do not disclose specific details regarding
the alleged activities, transportation, sheltering of terrorists or use of
encrypted applications and, therefore, the grounds are too vague to sustain
preventive detention.
7. It was further contended that the detenue was already facing criminal
prosecution in FIR No. 203/2018 and, therefore, ordinary criminal law
remedies were sufficient to deal with the matter. Learned counsel submitted
that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal
prosecution.
8. Learned counsel also argued that there exists no live and proximate link
between the alleged prejudicial activities and the order of detention and that
the detention order has been passed casually and in routine manner.
9. It was additionally contended that the detenue was not supplied all relevant
documents including statements recorded during investigation and copies of
proceedings under Sections 107/151 Code of criminal procedure and
corresponding provisions of BNSS, thereby prejudicing his right to make
effective representation.
10. Reliance was also placed upon judgments in Francis Coralie Mullin v.
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi , AIR 1980 SC 849 and State of
Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande , (2 008) 3 SCC 613 to
contend that personal liberty is sacrosanct and preventive detention laws
must be strictly construed.
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11. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Jammu & Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978 was originally enacted under the constitutional framework
applicable to the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir and, therefore, after
enactment of the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019, the
expression “Security of the State” could not have been substituted with
“Security of the Union Territory” except by Parliamentary legislation. It was
further argued that the Lieutenant Governor is not competent authority to
amend or modify the PSA.
12. Learned counsel submits that the approval granted by the Government to the
detention order was legally unsustainable as the same was allegedly not
issued in accordance with the Transaction of Government Business Rules and
was not issued in the name of the President. It was additionally contended
that the detenue was neither supplied copy of the approval order nor
informed about his right to make representation before the Government.
13. Further it was submitted that the detention order was based upon unverified
material and dossier and that neither in-camera statements were recorded nor
the material was independently verified by the detaining authority. It was
argued that the dossier constituted confidential official correspondence and
could not legally form basis for preventive detention.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the
impugned detention order has been passed strictly in accordance with law
after due application of mind and upon careful examination of the dossier and
material placed before the detaining authority.
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15. It was argued that the detenue is a radicalised and hardened Over Ground
Worker affiliated with banned terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba and had
been continuously involved in activities prejudicial to the Security of the
Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir by providing logistical support,
transportation, shelter and assistance to terrorists.
16. Learned counsel submitted that the detenue has maintained active contacts
with Pakistan-based handlers and militants through encrypted
communication applications and proxy networks and posed a serious threat to
peace and security in the region, particularly in light of recent terrorist
incidents and security concerns in the Valley.
17. It was further submitted that despite earlier criminal prosecution and
preventive measures, the detenue did not abandon anti-national activities and
continued to remain involved in unlawful activities prejudicial to security of
the Union Territory.
18. Learned counsel contended that all constitutional and statutory safeguards
stood fully complied with. The detenue was supplied all relevant material
relied upon by the detaining authority and was informed of his right to make
representation before the Government and the detaining authority.
19. It was additionally submitted that the detenue in fact availed such right by
submitting representation which came to be duly considered and rejected by
the competent authority.
20. The respondents further argued that preventive detention and punitive
detention operate in separate fields and pendency of criminal proceedings or
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grant of bail does not preclude the competent authority from invoking
preventive detention laws where circumstances so warrant.
21. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Haradhan Saha v. State of West
Bengal , AIR 1974 SC 2154; Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad , (2019)
20 SCC 609 and State of Maharashtra v. BhauraoPunjabrao Gawande ,
(2008) 3 SCC 613.

22. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the challenge
to constitutional validity of adaptation/modification of the PSA is wholly
misconceived and contrary to the statutory scheme of the Jammu & Kashmir
Reorganization Act, 2019.
23. It was submitted that Sections 95 and 96 of the Jammu & Kashmir
Reorganization Act expressly preserved applicability of laws mentioned in
the Fifth Schedule and conferred power upon the Central Government to
make adaptations and modifications necessary for facilitating their
application to the successor Union Territories.
24. Reliance was placed upon S.O. 1229(E) dated 31.03.2020 issued by the
Ministry of Home Affairs in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the
Reorganization Act, whereby adaptations and modifications in the PSA were
carried out including substitution of the expression “State” with “Union
Territory”.
25. It was argued that the adaptation neither altered the basic character of the
enactment nor rendered it unconstitutional and, therefore, the challenge
raised by the petitioner deserves to be rejected.
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26. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the detention
order dated 29.04.2025 was duly approved under Section 8(4) of the PSA by
the Government and the approval order specifically records that the same was
issued “By order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.”
27. It was further submitted that governmental business is conducted
institutionally through authorised officers and once the order is issued in the
name of the Government and authenticated by competent officer, the same
acquires full legal sanctity.
28. The respondents additionally contended that the detenue was supplied
relevant material comprising twenty-five leaves and the contents of detention
warrant and grounds of detention were read over and explained to him in
languages understood by him. It was also submitted that the detenue was
specifically informed about his right to make representation before the
Government and the detaining authority and, in fact, had availed such right
by submitting representation which was duly considered and rejected.
29. With regard to alleged non-verification of material, learned counsel
submitted that preventive detention proceedings are distinct from criminal
trials and same does not preclude the competent authority from invoking
preventive detention.
30. It was argued that the dossier and connected material furnished by the
sponsoring agency constituted relevant material capable of being considered
by the detaining authority for arriving at subjective satisfaction and that
sufficiency or adequacy of such material ordinarily falls outside scope of
judicial review.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
31. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the detention record.
At the outset, it requires to be observed that preventive detention, though
32.
constitutionally recognized, constitutes a serious encroachment upon
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
constitutional safeguards incorporated under Article 22(5) are therefore
required to be strictly adhered to and any infraction thereof would vitiate the
detention order.
33. At the same time, the constitutional scheme itself recognizes preventive
detention as a necessary measure in exceptional situations concerning
security of the State, maintenance of public order and sovereignty of the
nation. The Court while exercising jurisdiction in matters of preventive
detention does not sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by
the detaining authority. The scope of judicial review is confined to examining
whether procedural safeguards have been complied with, whether the
detention is founded upon relevant material and whether the subjective
satisfaction is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides or total non-application of
mind.
34. The constitutional validity of preventive detention laws having already been
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the scope of interference by a
Constitutional Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution remains narrow, limited and well circumscribed. This Court
does not sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the
detaining authority, nor is it expected to reassess or re-appreciate the
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sufficiency or adequacy of the material while passing the order of detention.
Judicial review in preventive detention matters is confined to examining
whether the detention order suffers from procedural illegality, mala fides,
non-application of mind, absence of relevant material, or violation of
constitutional and statutory safeguards guaranteed to the detenue. So long as
the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is founded
upon relevant material having a rational nexus with the object sought to be
achieved, this Court would refrain from substituting its own opinion for that
of the competent authority merely because another view may also be
possible.
35. The principal contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 could not have been adapted
after enactment of the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 and that
the substitution of the expression “security of the State” with “security of
the Union Territory” dehors the constitutional and statutory framework,
thereby rendering the impugned detention order legally unsustainable.
36. A careful reading of Sections 95 and 96 of the Jammu & Kashmir
Reorganisation Act, 2019 makes it abundantly clear that Parliament itself,
while enacting the Reorganisation Act, consciously provided a complete
statutory mechanism not only for continuation of the existing laws applicable
to the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir, but also for their adaptation and
modification so as to facilitate their applicability to the successor Union
Territories.
37. Section 95 specifically preserves the operation of laws enumerated in the
Fifth Schedule and declares that such laws shall continue to apply to the
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Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir in the manner provided therein. Thus,
the continuance of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 after
reorganisation does not arise from any executive action, but directly from
Parliamentary mandate embodied in the Reorganisation Act itself. The
continuance of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 after
reorganisation is not the result of any executive exercise of power, but the
Parliament itself, through the Reorganisation Act, allowed it to remain in
force. For facility of reference same is reproduced as under:
“ 95. Territorial extent of laws.— (1) All Central laws in Table-1
of the Fifth Schedule to this Act, on and from the appointed day,
shall apply in the manner as provided therein, to the Union
territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union territory of Ladakh.
(2) All other laws in Fifth Schedule, applicable to existing State of
Jammu and Kashmir immediately before the appointed day, shall
apply in the manner as provided therein, to the Union territory of
Jammu and Kashmir and Union territory of Ladakh.”
38. Further, Section 96 expressly authorises the Central Government to make
“adaptations and modifications” in the existing laws, including by way of
“repeal or amendment”, for the purpose of facilitating their application to the
successor Union Territories. The statute itself delegates limited adaptation
powers to the Central Government to remove inconsistencies and align pre-
existing laws with the altered constitutional and administrative framework
brought about by reorganisation. For facility of reference same is reproduced
as under:
“96. Power to adapt laws.—For the purpose of facilitating the
application in relation to the successor Union territories, of
any law made before the appointed day, as detailed in Fifth
Schedule to this Act, the Central Government may, before the
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expiration of one year from that day, by order, make such
adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of
repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and
thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the
adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed
or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority.”
39. It is in exercise of this statutory authority that S.O. 1229(E) dated 31.03.2020
came to be issued, whereby references to “State” in the Public Safety Act
were substituted with “Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir”. The argument
that only Parliament could carry out such substitution overlooks the fact that
Parliament itself, by virtue of Section 96 of the Reorganisation Act, delegated
such limited power of adaptation to the Central Government. Once the parent
law itself gives such power, the action taken under it cannot be said to be
outside the statute or unconstitutional.
40. This Court also finds that the adaptation does not change the basic nature,
object or policy of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. The
replacement of the word “State” with “Union Territory” is only a
consequential change made because of the reorganization of 2019. The
purpose and operation of the law remain the same.
41. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, if accepted,
would render every adaptation and modification carried out pursuant to the
Reorganisation Act vulnerable, despite Parliament having expressly
sanctioned such exercise under Section 96. Such interpretation would defeat
the very scheme and object of the Reorganisation Act.
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42. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the adaptation of the
Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 was carried out strictly within the
four corners of the statutory authority conferred by Parliament under the
Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 and does not suffer from any
infirmity.
43. Accordingly, the challenge laid by the petitioner to the constitutional validity
of the provisions of the Public Safety Act is devoid of any merit and
therefore, rejected.
44. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the approval
accorded to the impugned detention order under Section 8(4) of the Jammu &
Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 by contending that the same was not issued
in conformity with Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government Business Rules
framed for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and was also not
expressed in the name of the President. It has been argued that under Rule 33,
the matter ought to have been routed through the Chief Secretary and
thereafter placed before the competent authority in the manner prescribed
under the Rules and failure to do so renders the approval void.
45. Section 8(4) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 itself
contemplates that where a detention order is passed by an officer authorized
under the Act, such order shall not remain in force beyond the prescribed
period unless approved by the Government. Thus, the statutory requirement
under the Act is approval by the Government within the stipulated period.
46. In the present case, the detention order dated 29.04.2025 passed by the
District Magistrate, Baramulla admittedly came to be approved by the
Government within the statutory period vide order dated 05.05.2025. A
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perusal of the approval order reveals that the Government examined the
grounds of detention and the material relied upon by the detaining authority
and thereafter accorded approval in exercise of powers under Section 8(4) of
the Act. The approval order has been issued “By order of the Government of
Jammu & Kashmir,” thereby clearly indicating that the approval was granted
in the name and authority of the Government itself through duly authorized
mode of transaction of business
47. The challenge raised upon Rule 33 of the Transaction of Government
Business Rules proceeds on an erroneous assumption that every alleged
deviation in internal governmental procedure would automatically invalidate
substantive statutory action. Rule 33 essentially regulates the transaction and
disposal of governmental business and allocation of functions amongst
officers and departments.
48. The petitioner has failed to place any material on record to establish that the
officer authenticating the approval order lacked competence under the
applicable Rules of Business or that the approval itself was not accorded by
the Government.Merely because the approval order has been authenticated
by an officer of the Home Department does not invalidate the same.
49. Preventive detention under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act is a
statutory exercise undertaken by the Government of the Union Territory
under the scheme of the Act itself.
50. Further, no prejudice whatsoever has been shown to have been caused to the
detenue on account of the alleged violation of Rule 33. On the contrary, the
record reveals that the detenue was informed of his right to make
representation and, in fact, exercised such right which came to be duly
considered by the competent authority.
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51. It is well settled that procedural provisions regulating internal governmental
functioning cannot be interpreted in a hyper-technical manner so as to defeat
substantive action validly taken under a statutory enactment, particularly in
matters concerning preventive detention and security of the Union Territory.
52. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the challenge laid either to the
approval accorded under Section 8(4) of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety
Act, 1978 or to the alleged infraction of Rule 33 of the Transaction of
Government Business Rules, and the same deserves to be rejected.
53. The principal grievance projected by learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the grounds of detention are merely a verbatim reproduction of the police
dossier and, therefore, the impugned detention order stands vitiated for want
of independent application of mind by the detaining authority. In support of
the said contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jai Singh v. State of J&K.
54. There can be no disagreement with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid
judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme court that if the detaining authority acts
mechanically and reproduces the police dossier without independently
examining the material placed before it, such exercise would strike at the
very root of the subjective satisfaction required under preventive detention
law. Preventive detention being a serious encroachment upon personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, the satisfaction recorded by
the detaining authority must be real, conscious and based upon independent
consideration of the material available on record.
55. However, at the same time, it is equally well settled that every similarity
between the police dossier and the grounds of detention cannot automatically
lead to an inference of non-application of mind. The sponsoring agency
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necessarily supplies the factual material to the detaining authority and
reference to such material in the grounds of detention is both natural and
expected. What the Court is required to examine is whether the detaining
authority merely as a conduit of the police or whether it independently
evaluated the material before arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction.
56. This Court also finds that the petitioner has neither impleaded the Senior
Superintendent of Police, who is the author of the dossier forming basis of
the impugned detention order, nor the Home Department which accorded
approval to the detention under the provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir
Public Safety Act and their presence was necessary for complete, proper and
effective adjudication of the matter. In absence of such necessary parties,
against whom specific allegations have been levelled, the present petition
suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties and is, therefore, not
maintainable.
57. This Court in the case titled as Waseem Ahmad Dar Versus UT of J&K
and Others reported as 2025 SCC Online J&K 1213 has held that:
“8. Regarding second ground that has been urged by the
petitioner, it is to be noted that while formulating the grounds
of detention, the detaining authority has narrated the
background of the petitioner by incorporating the facts
narrated in the police dossier. However, after narrating the
background facts, the detaining authority has clearly framed its
opinion that the activities of the petitioner are highly
prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory of the Jammu
and Kashmir. So, it is not a case where the detaining authority
has mechanically copied the contents of the police dossier while
formulating the grounds of detention but it is a case where the
detaining authority has applied its mind to the police dossier
and the material annexed thereto, whereafter it has framed its
opinion that it is imperative to detain the petitioner under the
provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act. The contention of the
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petitioner that the detaining authority has acted in a
mechanical manner is, therefore, misconceived”

58. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court
has carefully examined the detention record as well as the grounds of
detention. The material considered by the detaining authority was not
confined only to FIR No. 203/2018 under section 7/25 of UA (P) Act
registered against the detenue. The record further reveals consideration of the
antecedents of the detenue, earlier criminal proceedings initiated under
Sections 107/151 Cr.P.C. and Sections 126/170 BNSS, intelligence inputs
regarding his continuing association with operatives of the banned terror
outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, his alleged use of encrypted communication
applications and Virtual Proxy Networks, as well as his contacts with
Pakistan-based handlers.This Court is of the considered veiw that the
detaining authority has not acted mechanically .
59. The grounds of detention further reveal that the detaining authority was
conscious of the fact that the detenue had already been enlarged on bail in the
substantive criminal case and yet, according to the intelligence inputs
received, continued to remain involved in activities prejudicial to the security
of the Union Territory. The detention order also reflects consideration of the
prevailing security situation in the Valley, particularly in the aftermath of the
Pahalgam terror attack involving killing of tourists, and the apprehension that
the detenue could be reactivated for furthering terrorist objectives.
60. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as P ebamNingolMikoi Devi
vs State Of Manipur report reported as (2010) 9 SCC 618 has
observed as under:
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“What emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a
reasonable basis for the detention order, and there must be
material to support the same. The Court is entitled to
scrutinize the material relied upon by the Authority in
coming to its conclusion, and accordingly determine if there
is an objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The
subjective satisfaction must be two fold. The detaining
authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is
likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the
State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of the public order and the authority must be
further satisfied that it is necessary to detain the said person
in order to prevent from so acting.”
61. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court
finds that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is
based upon relevant and tangible material.The detention order reflects
awareness regarding the criminal antecedents of the detenue, the threat
perception assessed by the security agencies, and the necessity felt by the
authority to prevent the detenue from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
security of the Union Territory.
62. Merely because certain factual recitals occurring in the grounds of detention
resemble portions of the police dossier would not, by itself, be sufficient to
invalidate the detention order. Similarity in language cannot be elevated to a
conclusive proof of non-application of mind unless the Court arrives at a
finding that the detaining authority mechanically reproduced the dossier
without independent consideration of the material. No such inference, in the
facts of the present case, can reasonably be drawn.
63. This Court is satisfied that the impugned detention order cannot be termed as
a mere mechanical reproduction of the police dossier. The detention record
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discloses existence of relevant material which was consciously considered by
the detaining authority while arriving at the subjective satisfaction that
preventive detention of the detenue had become necessary in the interest of
maintenance of security of the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.
64. Accordingly, the contention raised by the petitioner regarding alleged non-
application of mind is found to be without merit and is rejected.
65. Another contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution
stood violated on account of alleged non-supply of relevant material relied
upon by the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention order.
66. This Court has examined the detention record keeping in view the settled
principle that procedural safeguards in preventive detention matters are
sacrosanct and must receive strict adherence.
67. The execution report placed on record reveals that the detenue was furnished
the detention order, grounds of detention, copy of dossier, FIR and other
connected material relied upon by the detaining authority comprising twenty-
five leaves in total. The execution report further records that the contents of
the detention order and grounds of detention were read over and explained to
the detenue in Urdu and Kashmiri languages fully understood by him.
68. The record additionally reflects that the detenue was specifically informed of
his valuable constitutional and statutory right to make a representation
against the detention order before the Government as well as the detaining
authority.
69. Most importantly, the factual position emerging from the record shows that
the detenue, in fact, exercised such right by submitting a representation
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challenging the detention order, which subsequently came to be considered
and rejected by the competent authority.
70. Once the detenue had knowledge of the grounds of detention, was supplied
the material relied upon, was informed of his right to representation and
actually exercised such right, the plea regarding denial of effective
representation loses much of its force.
71. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B. K.
Jha reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 , the Apex Court has held that
“the procedural requirements are the only safeguards
available to a detenue since the court is not expected to go
behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly
complied with, if any, value is to be attached to the liberty of
the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in
that regard”
72. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle, this Court is satisfied that
the constitutional and statutory safeguards envisaged under Article 22(5) of
the Constitution and the provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety
Act stand duly complied with in the present case.
73. Accordingly, the contention regarding alleged non-supply of material and
denial of right of representation is found to be without merit.
74. The petitioner has lastly argued that the detention order is founded upon
unverified intelligence inputs and confidential police dossier and, therefore,
lacks legal foundation..
75. Preventive detention jurisprudence operates in a field distinct from ordinary
criminal prosecution. The object of preventive detention is not to punish an
individual for a past offence but to prevent him from indulging in activities
prejudicial to public order or security in future.
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76. The distinction between punitive detention and preventive detention has been
authoritatively explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha
v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 618 , wherein it has been held that:
“The power of preventive detention is qualitatively
different from punitive detention. The power of preventive
detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable
anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is
not a parallel proceeding. It does not over lap with
prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which
prosecution may be launched or may have been launched.
An order of preventive detention, may be made before or
during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may
be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or
after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of
prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention.
An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to
prosecution”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that pendency of prosecution or even
77.
grant of bail does not debar the competent authority from invoking
preventive detention laws if the authority is satisfied that detention is
necessary to prevent possible future prejudicial acts.
78. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled Naresh Kumar Goyal v.
Union of India and others (2005) 8 SCC 276 , it was held as under:-
“8. It is trite law that an order of detention is not a curative
or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action,
avowed object of which being to prevent the antisocial and
subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of the
country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the
public tranquility or from indulging in smuggling activities
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or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, etc. Preventive detention is devised
to afford protection to society. The authorities on the
subject have consistently taken the view that preventive
detention is devised to afford protection to society. The
object is not to punish a man for having done something
but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from
doing so”

79. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, this Court finds that the
detaining authority was justified in taking into consideration the antecedents
of the detenue, intelligence inputs, preventive proceedings, alleged
continuing association with operatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba and the prevailing
security scenario while arriving at the subjective satisfaction that preventive
detention had become necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in a
manner prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory of Jammu &
Kashmir.
80. The adequacy or sufficiency of the material forming basis of subjective
satisfaction cannot ordinarily be subjected to objective judicial scrutiny by
the Court once it is shown that relevant material existed before the detaining
authority.

81. In the present case, the detention order is founded not merely upon vague
allegations or isolated suspicion, but upon a combination of factors including
FIR No. 203/2018, alleged recovery of arms and ammunition, criminal
proceedings initiated under Cr.P.C./BNSS, intelligence reports regarding
continued association of the detenue with operatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba,
alleged use of encrypted communication applications, contacts with Pakistan-
based handlers and the prevailing security situation in the Valley.
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82. The material placed before the detaining authority, thus, cannot be said to be
wholly irrelevant or extraneous to the object sought to be achieved under the
preventive detention law.
83. This Court is conscious of the fact that matters concerning national security,
terrorism and activities prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory
stand on a distinct footing. While personal liberty is of paramount
constitutional importance, the same must at times yield to larger
considerations of security and public safety where the competent authority,
on the basis of relevant material, forms a bona fide subjective satisfaction
regarding necessity of preventive detention.
84. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining
authority merely because another view may also be possible on the material
available on record.
85. This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the subjective satisfaction recorded by
the detaining authority is founded upon relevant material having rational
nexus with the object sought to be achieved and does not suffer from any
perversity, mala fide or legal infirmity warranting interference in writ
.
jurisdiction

86. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that certain contentions sought to
be urged during the course of oral submissions travel substantially beyond
the grounds specifically pleaded in the writ petition. The petition, as
originally framed, primarily assails the impugned detention order on grounds
relating to alleged non-application of mind, reproduction of dossier, non-
supply of material and violation of procedural safeguards. However, during
the course of arguments, additional constitutional and technical challenges
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relating to validity of the adaptation of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety
Act and applicability of the Transaction of Government Business Rules were
sought to be projected.
87. It is a settled principle of law that a party cannot be permitted to travel
beyond its pleadings and set up an altogether new case during the course of
arguments. Pleadings constitute the foundation of litigation and the opposite
party must know the case against it. Without proper pleadings ,such
arguments cannot ordinarily be considered.
88. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya
Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor reported as (1998) 7 SCC 469 has
observed as under:
“It is too well settled that the petitioner who approaches the
court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court
under Article 226 must fully aver and establish his rights
flowing from the bundle of facts thereby requiring the
respondent to indicate its stand either by denial or by
positive assertions. But in the absence of any averments in
the writ petition or even in the rejoinder-affidavit, it is not
permissible for a court to arrive at a conclusion on a factual
position merely on the basis of submissions made in the
course of hearing.”
89. Pleadings are not mere matters of formality but constitute the very
foundation upon which judicial adjudication rests. A writ Court exercising
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution proceeds on
the basis of the case specifically pleaded and supported by material placed on
record. A party cannot be permitted to gradually expand the scope of
challenge during oral submissions by introducing altogether new grounds
which neither find mention in the pleadings nor afford the opposite side a fair
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opportunity to meet the case sought to be projected. Permitting such course
would not only prejudice the responding party but would also run contrary to
the settled principles governing judicial review, which require certainty,
fairness and procedural discipline in presentation of claims before the Court.
90. In the considered opinion of this Court, permitting the petitioner to raise
altogether fresh grounds during the course of oral arguments, without any
foundational pleadings in the writ petition, cannot be countenanced in law.
CONCLUSION
91. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the impugned order of detention has been passed upon due application of
mind and on the basis of relevant material having rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved under the preventive detention law. The
constitutional and statutory safeguards available to the detenue have been
duly complied with and no procedural illegality, mala fide, perversity or
violation of constitutional mandate has been demonstrated so as to warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
92. This Court is conscious of the fact that personal liberty occupies a cherished
position within the constitutional scheme and any restriction thereof must be
strictly examined.At the same time, the Constitution recognises that in
exceptional circumstances involving security of the State, sovereignty of the
nation and maintenance of public order, preventive detention may become
necessary in the larger interest of society. The Court is required to maintain a
balance between individual liberty and public security within the framework
of law.
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93. In the present case, the detention record reveals existence of relevant, live
and proximate material forming the basis of the subjective satisfaction
recorded by the detaining authority. The apprehension of the competent
authority cannot be said to be imaginary, extraneous or devoid of rational
basis.This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, does not sit as an appellate forum to reassess the sufficiency of the
material or substitute its own opinion merely because another view may also be
possible

94. The challenge raised by the petitioner regarding the validity of the adapted
provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, alleged violation of Rule 33
of the Transaction of Government Business Rules, non-application of mind, non-
supply of material and lack of relevant material for detention has been found to be
without merit. None of the grounds raised by the petitioner are sufficient to
invalidate the impugned detention order.
95. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the impugned order of
detention does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity, procedural illegality,
mala fide, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of
writ jurisdiction.
96. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of any merit, is dismissed along with
all connected applications, if any.
97. Registry is directed to return the detention record to learned counsel for the
respondents Mr. Hakeem Aman Ali against proper receipt.

(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)

Judge
SRINAGAR:
15.05.2026
“Mubashir”
Whether Judgment is Speaking? Yes
Whether Judgment is Reportable? Yes
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