VIVEK DAS MONGRI vs JAGESHWAR DAS
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
1
CGHC010403682022 2026:CGHC:45193
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
WPC No. 5602 of 2022
Digitally
signed by
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
Order Reserved on 20.08.2026
Order Delivered on 27.10.2026
1 - Vivek Das Mongri S/o Late Kalyan Das Mongri Aged About 34
Years Caste - Panika, R/o Village Kusma, Post Bamhin, Tahsil
Kondagaon, District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Jageshwar Das S/o Shri Pitambar Das, Caste Panika, R/o
Village Kusma, Post Bamhin, Tahsil Kondagaon, District
Kondagaon Chhattisgarh
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Collector, Kondagaon,
District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh
3 - Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, District Bastar
Chhattisgarh
4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Kondagaon, Tahsil And District
Kondagaon,Chhattisgarh
5 - Tahsildar Kondagaon, District Kondagaon Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioner :- Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1:- Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate
2
For State/Respondents No. 2 to 5:- Mr. Abhishek Gupta, P.L.
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SB-Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. The instant petition is directed against the order dated
07.11.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue,
Bilaspur (Circuit Court, Jagdalpur), in Case No.
R.N.20/A-56/06/2021, Village Kusma, Tahsil and District
Kondagaon (C.G.), in the matter of Shri Jageshwar Das vs.
Shri Vivek Das Mongri and another . By way of the instant
petition, the petitioner has called in question the legality,
validity and propriety of the aforesaid order, whereby the
Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue has decided the proceedings
against the petitioner.
2. Facts of the case are that the petitioner's father, namely, late
Kalyan Das Mongri, was serving as the Kotwar of Village
Kusma, Tahsil Kondagaon, and the Kotwari service land was
recorded in his name. After his death, since the petitioner was
a minor, his uncle, namely, Pitamber Das, who is the father of
respondent No.1, was appointed as the Village Kotwar. It is
the case of the petitioner that Pitamber Das subsequently
tendered his resignation from the post of Village Kotwar on
the ground of his ill health. Thereafter, in Revenue Case
No.02/A-56/2019-20, the Tahsildar, Kondagaon, vide order
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dated 15.01.2020, appointed respondent No.1, Jageshwar
Das, as Village Kotwar, primarily on the basis of a resolution
purportedly passed by the Gram Panchayat recommending
his appointment. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
petitioner preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional
Officer (Revenue), Kondagaon. The learned SDO (Revenue),
in Revenue Case No.04/A-56/2019-20, vide order dated
28.05.2020, allowed the appeal and set aside the
appointment of respondent No.1. While doing so, the learned
SDO (Revenue) recorded a categorical finding that the
resolution relied upon for appointment of respondent No.1
had not been passed in accordance with the prescribed rules
and procedure. It was further found that the alleged resolution
had been prepared in the absence of the Panchas, Sarpanch
and Secretary of the Gram Panchayat and that no publication
had been made inviting applications/objections for
appointment to the post of Village Kotwar. Respondent No.1,
being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur. The
learned Commissioner, vide order dated 13.07.2021,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the
SDO (Revenue). The Commissioner further directed the
Tahsildar, Kondagaon, to initiate fresh proceedings for
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appointment of Village Kotwar in accordance with the
prescribed rules and procedure within a period of three
months. Against the order passed by the Commissioner,
respondent No.1 preferred a revision before the Chhattisgarh
Board of Revenue, Bilaspur (Circuit Court, Jagdalpur). The
learned Member of the Board of Revenue, vide impugned
order dated 07.11.2022, set aside the order passed by the
Commissioner and restored the order dated 15.01.2020
passed by the Tahsildar, thereby upholding the appointment
of respondent No.1 as Village Kotwar. The petitioner has
called in question the aforesaid order passed by the Board of
Revenue, principally contending that the appointment of
respondent No.1 was made without there being a valid
resolution of the Gram Panchayat and without convening a
duly constituted meeting of the Gram Sabha. According to the
petitioner, several villagers and Panchas had specifically
objected to the alleged resolution and had stated that they
were not aware of any resignation having been tendered by
Pitamber Das on account of his health condition. It has further
been contended that no notice or publication inviting
applications or objections for appointment of Village Kotwar
was issued by the Tahsildar.
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3. The petitioner has further contended that the alleged Gram
Sabha meeting, stated to have been attended by about 230
villagers, was never convened and that the alleged resolution
was prepared in the absence of the Panchas, Village
Secretary and Sarpanch. According to the petitioner, these
material objections were duly raised before the revenue
authorities but have not been properly considered by the
Board of Revenue. It is also the case of the petitioner that
Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959
and the rules framed thereunder prescribe the procedure for
appointment of a Village Kotwar. The petitioner submits that
the Board of Revenue has failed to examine whether the
mandatory procedure prescribed under the said provision was
duly followed before making the appointment of respondent
No.1. It is contended that the Board of Revenue merely
proceeded on the basis that the resolution could not be
doubted, without examining the objections regarding the very
convening of the Gram Sabha and the validity of the
resolution allegedly passed therein. The petitioner further
submits that the Kotwari service land continues to stand
recorded in the name of his father, late Kalyan Das Mongri,
who was the original Village Kotwar. It is contended that, upon
attaining majority, the petitioner is entitled to consideration for
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appointment to the post of Village Kotwar in accordance with
law, particularly when a vacancy arises. According to the
petitioner, the Tahsildar failed to record any finding as to when
the alleged Gram Sabha was convened, whether the
resolution was passed in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, and whether the villagers were duly informed
about the proposed appointment. On these grounds, the
petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the
Board of Revenue is perverse, contrary to the statutory
procedure and liable to be set aside.
4. Following reliefs have been prayed in this petition:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders
quashing the impugned order dated
07/11/2022 passed by the Board of
Revenue (Annexure-P/1) and to restore the
order dated 13/07/2021 passed by the
Commissioner Bastar Division (Jagdalpur),
whereby it has been directed to initiate
fresh proceeding for appointment of village
Kotwar in accordance with rules and
procedure prescribed within a period of
three months.
10.2 Any other relief which may deems fit
may also be awarded along with cost of the
petition.”
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5. Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Learned counsel for the petitioner
would submit that the impugned order passed by the Board of
Revenue is contrary to the material available on record and
the statutory scheme governing appointment to the post of
Village Kotwar. It is submitted that the private respondent
No.1, namely Jageshwar Das, is the son of Pitambar Das,
who was serving as Kotwar of Village Kusma. Due to illness,
Pitambar Das tendered his resignation from the post, which
was accepted by the Tahsildar. However, while appointing
respondent No.1 vide order dated 15.01.2020, the Tahsildar
failed to record any finding as to the date on which Pitambar
Das tendered his resignation or the date on which the same
was accepted, and consequently failed to ascertain the actual
date on which the post of Kotwar fell vacant. It is further
submitted that under Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land
Revenue Code, 1959 and the Rules framed thereunder,
appointment to the post of Village Kotwar is required to be
made strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
The preference, if any, available to a near relative of an
erstwhile Kotwar does not confer upon such person any
vested right to appointment. Learned counsel places reliance
upon the judgment of this Court in Pardeshi Ram Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and Others , W.P.(S) No.7497 of 2023, wherein it
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has been held that appointment of Kotwar is governed by the
statutory Rules and that the preference to a near relative of
an ex-Kotwar under Rule 4(2) is discretionary and does not
create a vested right. Learned counsel would further submit
that the entire selection process in the present case is vitiated
from its inception. The alleged resolution of the Gram
Panchayat dated 05.10.2019, relied upon in favour of
respondent No.1, was passed even prior to issuance of the
alleged public notice dated 13.12.2019 and prior to
submission of the application by respondent No.1 dated
20.12.2019. Thus, even before applications were invited from
eligible candidates, the Gram Panchayat had allegedly
resolved to appoint respondent No.1 as Kotwar. Such a
procedure, according to learned counsel, clearly
demonstrates that the subsequent advertisement and
selection process were merely an empty formality.
6. It is next submitted that the alleged public notice dated
13.12.2019 was not duly published in accordance with law.
Respondent No.1 himself admitted during his statement
before the SDO (Revenue) that he had affixed one copy of
the advertisement on the notice board of the Gram Panchayat
and had subsequently produced another copy before the
Court of the Tahsildar. No proper publication in a newspaper
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was made and, significantly, respondent No.1 was the sole
applicant in the entire selection process. Thus, the very
person who ultimately came to be appointed had himself
affixed the alleged notice inviting applications, which renders
the selection process highly doubtful and lacking in
transparency. Learned counsel would further submit that the
learned SDO (Revenue), after recording the statements of as
many as 21 witnesses, including the petitioner and
respondent No.1, categorically found that no valid resolution
of the Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat had been passed in
accordance with the prescribed procedure and that the
alleged advertisement had not been duly affixed/published.
The SDO, therefore, rightly set aside the appointment of
respondent No.1 vide order dated 28.05.2020. The said
finding was thereafter affirmed by the Commissioner, Bastar
Division, Jagdalpur, vide order dated 13.07.2021, who
specifically observed that the publication for appointment to
the post of Kotwar was not in accordance with law and
directed the Tahsildar to initiate fresh proceedings by
following due process. It is also submitted that the aforesaid
findings of the SDO and the Commissioner stand further
corroborated by the material subsequently brought on record
by the petitioner. Along with the rejoinder, the petitioner has
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placed affidavits of about 120 villagers stating that they were
not present in the alleged meeting of the Gram Sabha and
that the signatures attributed to them on the alleged
resolution were not genuine. It is submitted that this material
goes to the root of the validity of the alleged resolution dated
05.10.2019 and could not have been brushed aside while
examining the legality of the appointment of respondent No.1.
7. Learned counsel would lastly submit that the Board of
Revenue, while setting aside the well-reasoned orders
passed by the SDO (Revenue) and the Commissioner and
restoring the order of the Tahsildar, failed to properly
appreciate the aforesaid material circumstances. The Board
of Revenue has failed to consider whether the alleged Gram
Sabha meeting was actually convened, whether the
resolution dated 05.10.2019 was validly passed, whether the
public notice was duly published, and whether all eligible
persons residing in the village were afforded a fair opportunity
to apply for the post. It is submitted that the appointment of
respondent No.1 cannot be sustained merely on the basis of
his relationship with the erstwhile Kotwar, as such relationship
does not confer any vested right of appointment. Accordingly,
learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated
07.11.2022 passed by the Board of Revenue as well as the
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order dated 15.01.2020 passed by the Tahsildar deserve to
be set aside and the orders dated 28.05.2020 passed by the
SDO (Revenue) and 13.07.2021 passed by the
Commissioner deserve to be restored. It is further prayed that
the competent authority be directed to initiate a fresh
selection process for appointment to the post of Village
Kotwar in accordance with Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh
Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the Rules framed thereunder,
after following due process and affording a fair and equal
opportunity to all eligible candidates, including the petitioner.
8. Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 would oppose the writ petition and submit
that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional
error, illegality, perversity or procedural impropriety in the
impugned order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the Board of
Revenue. It is submitted that the Board of Revenue, upon
consideration of the material available on record, has rightly
exercised its revisional jurisdiction and restored the order
dated 15.01.2020 passed by the Tahsildar appointing
respondent No.1 as Village Kotwar. Learned counsel would
further submit that the allegations subsequently raised
regarding the alleged absence of the Gram Panchayat
members from the meeting and the validity of the resolution,
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is nothing but an afterthought. According to learned counsel,
at the relevant stage no member of the Gram Panchayat had
disputed his or her presence in the meeting or questioned the
resolution passed therein. The subsequent affidavits relied
upon by the petitioner, therefore, cannot be relied upon to
unsettle the appointment which was duly considered and
upheld by the Board of Revenue. It is lastly submitted that the
petitioner has failed to establish any legally enforceable right
to seek appointment to the post of Village Kotwar and, in the
absence of any demonstrated illegality in the appointment of
respondent No.1, the relief sought by the petitioner for setting
aside the impugned order and directing a fresh selection
process cannot be granted. Accordingly, learned counsel for
respondent No.1 submits that the writ petition is devoid of
merit and deserves to be dismissed with costs.
9. Mr. Abhishek Gupta, learned State counsel, opposing the writ
petition, would submit that the grievance raised by the
petitioner is wholly misplaced and that the petitioner has
failed to make out any ground warranting interference by this
Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the
petitioner has neither established any jurisdictional error nor
pointed out any illegality, perversity or procedural impropriety
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in the impugned order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the Board
of Revenue. Learned State counsel would submit that the
petitioner's father, late Kalyan Das Mongri, was serving as
Kotwar of Village Kusma, Tahsil Kondagaon. At the time of his
death, the petitioner was a minor and, therefore, Pitamber
Das, the father of respondent No.1, was appointed as Village
Kotwar. Subsequently, Pitamber Das resigned from the post
on account of his ill health. Upon the post falling vacant, the
competent revenue authority initiated proceedings for
appointment of a Village Kotwar. It is submitted that the
Tahsildar, Kondagaon, in Revenue Case No.02/A-56/2019-20,
issued a public notice dated 13.12.2019 inviting applications
for appointment to the vacant post of Village Kotwar. It is
further submitted that the Gram Sabha had already passed a
resolution dated 05.10.2019 recommending the name of
respondent No.1, Jageshwar Das, for appointment to the
post. On consideration of the application submitted by
respondent No.1 and the aforesaid resolution, the Tahsildar,
vide order dated 15.01.2020, appointed respondent No.1 as
Village Kotwar.
10. Learned State counsel would further submit that the
petitioner challenged the aforesaid appointment before the
SDO (Revenue), Kondagaon, who, vide order dated
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28.05.2020, set aside the appointment of respondent No.1.
Against the said order, respondent No.1 preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, which
was dismissed vide order dated 13.07.2021. Thereafter,
respondent No.1 preferred a revision before the Board of
Revenue and, upon consideration of the entire material
available on record, the Board of Revenue, vide impugned
order dated 07.11.2022, set aside the order of the
Commissioner and restored the order dated 15.01.2020
passed by the Tahsildar. Learned State counsel would submit
that the appointment of respondent No.1 was made in
accordance with Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land
Revenue Code, 1959 and the Rules framed thereunder. It is
contended that the statutory scheme gives due consideration
to a person who is the nearest relative of the erstwhile
Kotwar. Respondent No.1, being the son of Pitamber Das, the
erstwhile Kotwar, was therefore entitled to the preference
contemplated under the applicable rules. However, such
preference was considered by the competent authority only in
accordance with the prescribed procedure and after issuance
of the public notice. It is further submitted that the Board of
Revenue, after examining the material on record, rightly found
no sufficient ground to doubt the resolution of the Gram
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Sabha and the proceedings undertaken by the Tahsildar.
According to learned State counsel, the allegation that the
Gram Sabha meeting was not convened or that the resolution
was fabricated is not supported by reliable material and the
subsequent objections raised by the petitioner are merely an
afterthought. The State relies upon the Gram Sabha Register
dated 05.10.2019 and the public notice dated 13.12.2019,
which form part of the record, in support of the appointment.
11. Learned State counsel would further submit that the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate any vested or
indefeasible right to appointment as Village Kotwar merely on
the ground that his father was the erstwhile Kotwar or that he
was a minor at the time of his father's death. The petitioner, at
best, could claim consideration in accordance with the
applicable rules, but could not claim appointment as a matter
of right. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has failed
to make out any ground for interference with the order dated
07.11.2022. Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that
the writ petition is devoid of merit and substance and
deserves to be dismissed.
12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties and have also carefully gone through the material
available on record, including the orders passed by the
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Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the
Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, and the
Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue. I have also considered the
rival submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner as well
as respondent No.1 and the State authorities.
13. The undisputed factual position emerging from the record is
that the post of Village Kotwar of Village Kusma fell vacant
consequent upon the resignation of Pitamber Das, who was
admittedly serving as the Village Kotwar. Thereafter,
proceedings were initiated before the Tahsildar, Kondagaon
for filling up the said post. The Tahsildar, in exercise of the
power conferred under Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land
Revenue Code, 1959 and the Rules framed thereunder,
passed the order dated 15.01.2020 appointing respondent
No.1, Jageshwar Das, as Village Kotwar. The said order was
thereafter subjected to the statutory appellate scrutiny before
the SDO (Revenue), Kondagaon and the Commissioner,
Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, and ultimately the matter reached
the Board of Revenue in revision.
14. It is equally not in dispute that the learned SDO (Revenue),
while considering the appeal preferred by the petitioner, set
aside the order of appointment passed by the Tahsildar and
thereafter the learned Commissioner affirmed the said order
17
of the SDO (Revenue) and directed initiation of fresh
proceedings for appointment of Village Kotwar in accordance
with the prescribed rules and procedure. However, the Board
of Revenue, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction,
examined the matter and, vide the impugned order dated
07.11.2022, set aside the order passed by the Commissioner
and restored the original order dated 15.01.2020 passed by
the Tahsildar.
15. The principal question which, therefore, arises for
consideration in the present writ petition is as to whether the
view taken by the Board of Revenue, after examining the
material available on record, suffers from such jurisdictional
error, patent illegality, perversity or procedural impropriety as
would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
16. In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind that the
appointment of Village Kotwar is governed by Section 230 of
the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the Rules
framed thereunder. The Tahsildar is the competent authority
to undertake the process of appointment, and the power is
required to be exercised in accordance with the statutory
scheme. At the same time, the mere fact that the order of the
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Tahsildar has subsequently been interfered with by the SDO
(Revenue) and the Commissioner would not, by itself, render
the view taken by the Board of Revenue illegal. The Board,
being the revisional authority, was competent to examine the
correctness of the orders passed by the subordinate revenue
authorities and to arrive at its own conclusion on the basis of
the material forming part of the record.
17. The petitioner has principally questioned the validity of the
resolution dated 05.10.2019, allegedly passed by the Gram
Panchayat/Gram Sabha, and has contended that the said
resolution was not passed in a duly convened meeting and
that the Panchas, Sarpanch and Secretary were not present.
It has also been contended that the alleged public notice
dated 13.12.2019 was not duly published and that respondent
No.1 himself had affixed one copy thereof on the notice board
of the Gram Panchayat. These aspects were undoubtedly
considered by the SDO (Revenue), who, after recording the
statements of several witnesses, took a view adverse to
respondent No.1. The Commissioner also concurred with the
said view.
18. However, the matter did not rest at that stage. The entire
controversy was carried before the Board of Revenue in
revision. The Board of Revenue, after considering the
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material available on record, did not find sufficient justification
to disbelieve the resolution relied upon by the Tahsildar or to
hold that the proceedings undertaken for appointment of
respondent No.1 were so fundamentally defective as to
render the appointment void. The Board, upon consideration
of the rival claims and the material produced by the parties,
took a view that the appointment made by the Tahsildar could
not be interfered with merely on the basis of the objections
raised by the petitioner.
19. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution, would interfere with the order of the statutory
revisional authority only where, despite having considered the
relevant material, the authority has arrived at a conclusion
that is perverse, based on no evidence, contrary to the
statutory provisions, or suffers from a manifest jurisdictional or
procedural error. The petitioner has to demonstrate such an
error in the impugned order; mere existence of another
possible view or the fact that the SDO and the Commissioner
had earlier taken a different view would not, by itself, furnish
sufficient ground for interference.
20. On consideration of the impugned order, this Court finds that
the Board of Revenue has duly considered the relevant
aspects concerning the appointment of respondent No.1. The
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Board has taken into consideration the resolution relied upon
in support of the appointment and the proceedings
undertaken by the Tahsildar pursuant thereto. The Board has
thereafter recorded its conclusion that the appointment of
respondent No.1 as Village Kotwar was not liable to be
disturbed. Such conclusion cannot be said to be wholly
unsupported by the record or to be one which no reasonable
authority could have arrived at.
21. Much emphasis has been placed by learned counsel for the
petitioner upon the fact that the alleged resolution dated
05.10.2019 was passed prior to the issuance of the public
notice dated 13.12.2019 and prior to the application submitted
by respondent No.1 on 20.12.2019. The chronology of these
events has certainly been relied upon by the petitioner to
contend that the selection was predetermined. However, the
mere fact that a recommendation/resolution in favour of
respondent No.1 was made prior to the subsequent
proceedings before the Tahsildar cannot, in the facts of the
present case, by itself establish that the statutory authority
acted without jurisdiction or that the appointment was
necessarily void. The legality and effect of the said resolution
have been examined by the competent revenue authorities,
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and the Board of Revenue, upon such examination, has
declined to accept the challenge raised by the petitioner.
22. Similarly, the contention regarding the alleged irregularity in
publication of the notice cannot be examined in isolation from
the entire proceedings. The record demonstrates that the
Tahsildar did undertake proceedings for filling up the vacant
post and that a public notice dated 13.12.2019 was placed on
record. The petitioner has relied upon the statement of
respondent No.1 to contend that he himself had affixed one
copy of the notice. Even assuming the said circumstance to
be correct, such circumstance, by itself, does not establish
that the entire proceedings undertaken by the competent
authority were without jurisdiction or that the appointment was
liable to be annulled in exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly
when the Board of Revenue, upon consideration of the
material, has declined to accept the challenge to the
appointment.
23. The petitioner has also relied upon the affidavits of a large
number of villagers filed along with the rejoinder and has
contended that the alleged meeting of the Gram Sabha was
never convened and that the signatures appearing on the
alleged resolution were not genuine. These allegations are
seriously disputed by the contesting respondent and the
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State. Such disputed allegations, particularly when they relate
to the genuineness of signatures, presence of villagers and
the manner in which a meeting was convened, cannot be
made the sole basis for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226, unless the material on record demonstrates
a patent and incontrovertible illegality. The Board of Revenue,
which was the competent revisional authority and had the
entire record before it, did not find the material sufficient to
invalidate the resolution or the consequential appointment.
This Court, therefore, finds no compelling ground to substitute
its own assessment for the view taken by the revisional
authority.
24. Another important aspect of the matter is the claim of the
petitioner that since his father, late Kalyan Das Mongri, was
the erstwhile Kotwar and the petitioner was a minor at the
relevant time, he ought to have been appointed after attaining
majority. Such contention cannot be accepted as conferring
upon the petitioner an indefeasible or vested right to
appointment. The appointment to the post of Village Kotwar is
governed by the statutory provisions and the applicable
Rules. Even if the Rules contemplate preference or
consideration in favour of a near relative of an erstwhile
Kotwar, such provision cannot be construed as creating an
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absolute right to appointment irrespective of the statutory
procedure.
25. In the present case, respondent No.1 is the son of Pitamber
Das, who had admittedly served as Village Kotwar after the
death of the petitioner's father. Therefore, respondent No.1
was also a person falling within the category of near relative
contemplated under the applicable statutory scheme. The
mere fact that the petitioner is also related to an erstwhile
Kotwar cannot, therefore, invalidate the appointment of
respondent No.1, particularly when the competent authority
considered his candidature and the Board of Revenue has
found the appointment to be in accordance with law.
26. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner in Pardeshi Ram Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and
Others , W.P.(S) No.7497 of 2023, also does not advance the
case of the petitioner to the extent sought. The principle that
preference to a near relative of an erstwhile Kotwar does not
create a vested right of appointment operates equally against
the claim of the petitioner. The petitioner may claim
consideration in accordance with the Rules, but he cannot
claim appointment as a matter of right merely because his
father had earlier served as Kotwar or because the petitioner
was a minor when his father died.
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27. It is also significant that the petitioner is not the person who
was appointed by the Tahsildar and whose appointment was
subsequently challenged by him on the ground that he
himself was the person entitled to appointment. The petitioner
has not demonstrated any independent statutory right which
would require the competent authority to appoint him in
preference to respondent No.1. His grievance, at its highest,
concerns the manner in which the selection process was
undertaken. Once the Board of Revenue, after considering
the material, has found the appointment to be legally
sustainable, the petitioner cannot succeed merely by
establishing that the SDO and the Commissioner had earlier
taken a different view.
28. The contention that the Board of Revenue failed to consider
the objections raised by the petitioner also cannot be
accepted in the absolute terms in which it has been urged.
The impugned order shows that the Board considered the
relevant controversy and thereafter came to the conclusion
that the orders of the SDO (Revenue) and the Commissioner
were not sustainable and that the original appointment made
by the Tahsildar deserved to be restored. The conclusion may
not be one which the petitioner considers favourable, but an
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adverse conclusion does not, by itself, amount to non-
consideration of the case.
29. It is trite that while exercising writ jurisdiction, this Court does
not ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own
conclusion for that of a competent statutory authority merely
because another conclusion is also possible. The Board of
Revenue had jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety
of the orders passed by the subordinate authorities and, upon
consideration of the record, exercised its revisional
jurisdiction. In the absence of any demonstrated jurisdictional
error or manifest illegality in the exercise of such jurisdiction,
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be
warranted.
30. In the matter of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2
SCC 610 , The Supreme Court explained the limits of
interference under Articles 226 and 227, emphasising that the
High Court cannot ordinarily reappreciate evidence, reassess
its adequacy or substitute its own factual conclusions for
those of the competent authority. The relevant paras are
quoted hereinunder:-
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is
painfully disturbing to note that the High Court
has acted as an appellate authority in the
26
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even
the evidence before the enquiry officer. The
finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not
and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its
powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court
can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent
authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to
be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
27
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry,
in case the same has been conducted in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.”
31. In Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala (2019) 20
SCC 143 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“85. The power of superintendence conferred
by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not
appellate. It is settled law that this power of
judicial superintendence must be exercised
28
sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and
tribunals within the limits of their authority.
When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction,
the High Court does not interfere in exercise of
its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is
grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation
of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be
exercised “in the cloak of an appeal in disguise”.
86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of
superintendence and/or judicial review under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Courts restrict interference to cases of
patent error of law which go to the root of the
decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or
unreasonableness; violation of principles of
natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and
usurpation of powers. The High Court does not
re-assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or
materials on record. Whether the High Court
would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a
decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court
cannot be converted into an alternative
appellate forum, just because there is no other
provision of appeal in the eye of the law.
87. In L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 577 : AIR 1997 SC 1125] the Supreme
Court in effect held that the power of the High
29
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution,
being an inviolable basic feature of the
Constitution such power cannot be abrogated
by statutory enactment or for that matter even
by constitutional amendment. L. Chandra
Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,
(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : AIR
1997 SC 1125] cannot be construed to enlarge
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution, to enable it to
exercise appellate powers.”
32. The aforesaid principle finds support from the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai and Others v. Vivek V. Gawde and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3722 , wherein, while
explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that
the High Court exercises supervisory and judicial-review
jurisdiction and does not ordinarily reassess or reanalyse the
evidence and material on record. Interference is warranted
where the impugned decision suffers from a patent error of
law going to the root of the matter, perversity, arbitrariness,
violation of the principles of natural justice, or lack of
jurisdiction. The Court further reiterated that a mere
erroneous decision does not, by itself, justify interference in
supervisory jurisdiction.
30
33. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court is required to examine whether the impugned
order passed by the Board of Revenue suffers from any
jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity or procedural
irregularity warranting interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner has questioned the
validity of the Gram Sabha resolution dated 05.10.2019, the
publication of the notice dated 13.12.2019 and the
genuineness of the signatures appearing on the resolution,
relying upon affidavits subsequently filed by several villagers.
These objections have to be considered in the light of the
material available on record and the findings recorded by the
Board of Revenue. The mere fact that the SDO (Revenue)
and the Commissioner had earlier taken a different view
would not, by itself, justify interference with the impugned
order. Unless the petitioner establishes that the conclusion
reached by the Board of Revenue suffers from a recognised
ground of judicial review, interference by this Court would not
be warranted.
34. Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court finds
that the Board of Revenue, upon examining the material
available on record, has taken the view that the appointment
of respondent No.1 as Village Kotwar was not liable to be set
31
aside. The Board has declined to accept the petitioner's
objections as sufficient to invalidate the resolution relied upon
in support of the appointment. The conclusion reached by the
Board of Revenue cannot be held to be perverse merely
because the subordinate revenue authorities had earlier
arrived at a different conclusion. In the absence of any
demonstrated jurisdictional error or patent illegality in the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, this Court finds no sufficient
ground to substitute its own assessment for that of the
statutory revisional authority.
35. So far as the claim of the petitioner based on his relationship
with the erstwhile Kotwar is concerned, such relationship
does not confer an indefeasible or vested right to
appointment. The appointment to the post of Village Kotwar is
governed by Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue
Code, 1959, and the Rules framed thereunder. Any
preference available to a near relative of an erstwhile Kotwar
must be considered in accordance with the applicable Rules
and cannot be construed as an absolute right to appointment.
In the present case, respondent No.1 is the son of Pitamber
Das, who had served as Village Kotwar after the death of the
petitioner's father. The petitioner has not established any
32
independent statutory right entitling him to appointment in
preference to respondent No.1.
36. Consequently, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to
establish any jurisdictional error, patent illegality or perversity
in the impugned order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the
Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur (Circuit Court,
Jagdalpur), in Case No. R.N.20/A-56/06/2021, warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
37. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed . The impugned
order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of
Revenue is affirmed. Consequently, the appointment of
respondent No.1, Jageshwar Das, as Village Kotwar,
pursuant to the order dated 15.01.2020 passed by the
Tahsildar, Kondagaon, shall remain undisturbed.
38. It is, however, clarified that the dismissal of the present writ
petition shall not be construed as conferring any independent
or vested right to appointment upon either the petitioner or
respondent No.1 beyond what is permissible under the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Rules
framed thereunder. The competent authority shall exercise its
statutory powers strictly in accordance with law.
33
39. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha
34
HEAD-NOTE
The High Court, in exercise of its writ and supervisory
jurisdiction, does not ordinarily reappreciate or
reanalyse the evidence on record. Interference is
warranted where the impugned decision suffers from
patent error of law, perversity, arbitrariness, violation of
natural justice or jurisdictional error. A mere erroneous
decision does not, by itself, justify interference.