MR.SUHAIB M, vs THE REGISTRAR (DISTRICT JUDICIARY)
- Court
- Kerala High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
RD
FRIDAY, THE 23 DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 / 1ST KARTHIKA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 33217 OF 2026
PETITIONER:
MR.SUHAIB M, AGED 52 YEARS
S/O.ABDUL KHADER,
RESIDING AT ‘SUBAH’,
ADUTHILA, ERIPURAM P.O.
PAZHAYANGADI,
KANNUR DISTRICT., PIN - 670303
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.MARTIN JOSE
SRI.P.PRIJITH
SRI.THOMAS P.KURUVILLA
SHRI.AJAY BEN JOSE
SRI.MANJUNATH MENON
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
SMT.ANAVADYA SANIL KUMAR
SMT.ANJALI KRISHNA
SHRI.ADARSH V. MANOJ
SHRI.ABHINAV P. S.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE REGISTRAR (DISTRICT JUDICIARY)
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM,, PIN - 682031
2 THE INQUIRING AUTHORITY IN ENQUIRY NO.RDJ 25/24-
I-1, THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM,
COCHIN – REPRESENTED BY INQUIRY OFFICER, PIN –
682031
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3 THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, ERNAKULAM,
COCHIN – 682 031
ADV. SHAJNA M . SC
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
24.09.2026 AND HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD AND RESERVED ON
09.10.2026,THE COURT ON 23.10.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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‘C.R’
JUDGMENT
The petitioner, a serving Additional District and Sessions
Judge, is before this court contending that the issuance of a revised
memo of charges during the course of disciplinary proceedings being
conducted against him in terms of the provisions contained in the
Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1960 Rules’ ) cannot be sustained in
law. He contends that, after examining some witnesses, including
the complainant, the Inquiring Authority could not have issued a
revised memo of charges to the petitioner. It is also contended that,
in the facts and circumstances of this case, the request of the
petitioner to engage a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings
before the Inquiring Authority ought to have been permitted. It is
stated that though the Inquiring Authority, initially, permitted the
request of the petitioner to engage a lawyer, subsequently, and on an
application by the Presenting Officer, the permission to engage a
lawyer was withdrawn. The petitioner is thus before this court
praying inter alia seeking to quash Ext.P13 (the order recalling the
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proceedings permitting the petitioner to engage a lawyer to represent
him in the disciplinary proceedings), Ext.P15 order rejecting the
application filed by the petitioner to engage a lawyer to represent
him in the proceedings, Ext.P18 proceedings of the Inquiring
Authority finding that the memo of charges had to be modified and
Ext.P19 modified memo of charges issued to him. The petitioner also
nd
seeks a direction to the 2 respondent (Inquiring Authority) to
proceed with the enquiry on the basis of the memo of charges
originally issued to the petitioner, in accordance with the law.
2. A reference to the allegations that resulted in the
disciplinary proceedings being initiated against the petitioner and
the response of the petitioner to those allegations are not germane to
the determination of the questions arising for consideration in this
case, as the questions raised are purely questions of law and the
allegations raised against the petitioner and his response to those
allegations are not relevant to answer those issues of law. Thus, there
will be no reference to such facts in this judgment.
3. Sri. S. Sreekumar, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner on the instructions of Adv. Martin Jose, inter alia,
contends that the act of the Inquiring Authority in choosing to issue a
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modified/altered memo of charges cannot be sustained in law. It is
submitted that, though the provisions of Rule 15(3) of the 1960 Rules
permit the Inquiring Authority to amend, alter or modify the charges
framed during the course of an enquiry, such amendment/alteration
or modification of the memo of charges could not have been made
after several witnesses, including the complainant, had been
examined in the disciplinary proceedings. It is submitted that, if the
memo of charges is permitted to be modified or altered after several
witnesses, including the complainant, had been examined, the
petitioner will be put to serious prejudice, injury, and hardship. It is
submitted that the memo of charges now issued to the petitioner in
modification of the earlier memo of charges practically alters the
entire case against the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner
had preferred an application to engage a lawyer to represent him in
the enquiry proceedings and the Inquiring Authority had permitted
the same on 02.08.2025. It is submitted that, thereafter, the enquiry
proceedings were advanced from 15.08.2025 to 06.08.2025 for
consideration of an application preferred by the Presenting Officer to
recall the proceedings dated 02.08.2025 permitting the petitioner to
engage a lawyer and thereafter, by order marked as Ext.P15, the
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Inquiring Authority rejected the application for engaging a lawyer of
the choice of the petitioner to represent him in the proceedings. It is
submitted that, though the petitioner has requested and obtained the
assistance of an officer in the cadre of District Judge to represent him
in the proceedings, since the Inquiring Authority is a Judge of this
court, the petitioner may be extended the assistance of a lawyer to
represent him in the enquiry.
4. Smt. Shajna M., the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, would submit that Rule 15(3) of the 1960 Rules
specifically authorises the Inquiring Authority to amend, alter or
modify the charges framed against the Government servant at any
stage during the course of the enquiry. It is submitted that there is
no legal backing for the submission made before this court that such
amendment ought not to be permitted after certain witnesses have
been examined. It is submitted that the petitioner may file any
application for recalling any witness who has already been examined,
if he wishes to do so. It is submitted that absolutely no prejudice is
caused to the petitioner on account of the issuance of the
modified/altered memo of charges, and the petitioner will get full
opportunity to defend the modified memo of charges. Insofar as the
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request for appointment of a lawyer to represent the petitioner in the
enquiry proceedings is concerned, the learned counsel has referred
to the provisions of Rule 15(6) of the 1960 Rules to contend that the
right to engage a legal practitioner to represent the petitioner during
the course of the enquiry is specifically prohibited.
5. Having heard the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, I
am of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for
interference with the proceedings of the Inquiring Authority, altering
the memo of charges issued to the petitioner. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 15
of the 1960 Rules specifically authorises the Inquiring Authority to
amend, alter or modify the charges framed against the delinquent
employee, and there is nothing in that Rule which would suggest that
such amendment, alteration or modification to the memo of charges
must be done at any particular stage of the enquiry. In the absence of
any challenge to Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 15 of the 1960 Rules, I hold
that the amendment, alteration or modification to the memo of
charges cannot, in the facts of this case, be declared illegal in any
manner.
6. The contention that the petitioner should have been
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permitted to engage a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings
before the Inquiring Authority is also to be rejected. Initially, on
account of the observations of the Supreme Court in Board of
Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 124
and Ramesh Chandra v. Delhi University, (2015) 5 SCC
549, I was of the view that the request of the petitioner ought to be
permitted. However, on a close reading of the ratio in Dinesh
Chandra Pandey v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and
another, (2010) 11 SCC 500 , I am of the view that in the facts of
this case, the contention of the petitioner must be rejected.
7. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (supra),
it was held:-
“12. Are we charting a new course? The answer is obviously
in the negative. In C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of
Customs, Cochin a government employee requested the
Enquiry Officer to permit him to appear through a legal
practitioner and even though a trained Public Prosecutor
was appointed as Presenting Officer, this request was turned
down. When the matter reached this Court, it was held that
the enquiry was in breach of the principles of natural justice.
The order of the domestic tribunal was sought to be sustained
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on the submission that sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957
that “the Government servant may present his case with the
assistance of any Government servant approved by the
Disciplinary Authority but may not engage a legal
practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by
the Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner
or unless the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, so permits”. The submission was
that it is a matter within the discretion of the Enquiry Officer
whether to grant permission and more so because the
relevant rule fetters the claim to appear through a legal
practitioner. Negativing this contention, this Court held that
the fact that the case against the appellant was being
handled by a trained prosecutor was by itself a good ground
for allowing the appellant to engage a legal practitioner to
defend him lest the scales should be weighted against him.
This conclusion was recorded after reference to the earlier
decisions in Brooke Bond India (Pvt) Ltd. v. Subba
Raman(S.) and Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Workmen. Reference
was made to Pett case, referred to earlier, but it is observed
that this case has not commended itself to this Court. The
earlier cases of this Court were distinguished. In our view we
have reached a stage in our onward march to fair play in
action that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal
the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind,
if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner
the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a
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reasonable request to defend himself and the essential
principles of natural justice would be violated. This view has
been taken by a learned Single Judge and while dismissing
the appeal in limine approved by the Division Bench of the
High Court commends to us. Therefore, this appeal is liable
to be dismissed.”
In Ramesh Chandra (supra) it was held:-
“70. In view of the law laid down by this Court, we are of the
view that if any person who is or was a legal practitioner,
including a retired Hon'ble Judge is appointed as an enquiry
officer in an inquiry initiated against an employee, the denial
of assistance of a legal practitioner to the charged employee
would be unfair.”
The above observation in Ramesh Chandra (supra) is, no doubt,
an indication that where the Inquiring Authority is a legally trained
mind or a Judge, the denial of legal assistance to the charged
employee would be unfair.
8. In the facts of the present case, there is no dearth of legally
trained minds in the enquiry in question. The Inquiring Authority is
a Judge of this court. The Presenting Officer is an officer in the rank
of District Judge. The delinquent employee is an officer in the rank
of Additional District Judge. The delinquent officer has chosen
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another officer in the rank of District Judge to represent him in the
proceedings. The facts in Dinesh Chandra Pandey (supra), to the
extent that it concerns the right of representation through a legal
practitioner in disciplinary proceedings, are almost identical. In that
case, the Supreme Court was considering a challenge to disciplinary
proceedings initiated against a Civil Judge in the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service. One of the contentions taken as a ground to
challenge the disciplinary proceedings was that the employee in that
case had requested the assistance of a legal practitioner to represent
him during the course of the enquiry, and this request was unfairly
denied to him. Rule 14(8) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which were
applicable in that case, is for all intents and purposes in pari materia
with the provisions of Rule 15(6) of the 1960 Rules. Rule 14(8) of the
Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966 (as extracted in the judgment of the Supreme Court)
reads thus:-
“The Government servant may take the assistance of any
other Government servant to present the case on his behalf,
but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose
unless the presenting officer appointed by the disciplinary
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authority is a legal practitioner, or, the disciplinary
authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so
permits.”
While considering the issue in Dinesh Chandra Pandey (supra) ,
the Supreme Court concluded that the Presenting Officer and the
delinquent employee had similar qualifications, professionally or
otherwise. It also held that an Additional District Judge, as the
Presenting Officer, could not under any circumstances be termed a
' Legal Practitioner '; therefore, the delinquent employee in that case
did not have the right to engage a legal practitioner/Advocate to
defend him in the departmental proceedings. The relevant findings
of the Supreme Court read thus:-
“14. The bare reading of this Rule shows that the government
servant may take the assistance of any other government
servant to represent his case but may not engage a legal
practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer
appointed by the authority is a “legal practitioner” or the
disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of
the case, so permits. The expression “may” cannot be read as
“shall”. The normal rule is that a delinquent officer would be
entitled to engage another officer to present his case. But if
the presenting officer is a “legal practitioner”, he may
normally be permitted to engage a legal practitioner. The
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third category is where the disciplinary authority having
regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. It is,
therefore, not absolutely mandatory that the disciplinary
authority should permit the engagement of a legal
practitioner irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the
case. There is some element of discretion vested with the
authority which, of course, has to be exercised properly and
in accordance with the settled principles of service
jurisprudence.
15. ……
16. ……… In the light of these principles, we are of the
considered view that the expression “may”, used in Rule 14(8)
of the 1966 Rules would have to be construed as directory
and not absolutely mandatory with reference to the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Of course, it would be
desirable that wherever the presenting officer is a legal
practitioner, the delinquent officer should be given the option
and may be permitted to engage a legal practitioner if he so
opts. But this Rule is hardly of any assistance and help to the
appellant in the present case. The presenting officer was an
Additional District Judge. He was possessed of similar
qualification, professionally or otherwise, as was the
appellant himself. The appellant could have asked for
permission to engage and take assistance of any other
judicial officer of that rank or of any rank that he wanted
which request ought to have been considered by the
disciplinary authority. It will be entirely uncalled for that an
Additional Judge should be termed as a legal practitioner
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and, therefore, vesting in the appellant a right to engage a
legal practitioner or an advocate for defending him in the
departmental proceedings. It will be rather appropriate to
apply the principles of contextual interpretation in the facts
and circumstances of the case.
17. …...
18. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to P.
Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon to emphasise that the
expression “legal practitioner” appearing in Rule 14(8) would
cover even a judicial officer. He relied upon the following
explanations given to this expression:
“Legal practitioner.—‘Legal practitioner’ defined (See
also advocate of a High Court; barrister; Government
Pleader; pleader; Public Prosecutor; recognised
agent) Act 18, 1879, Section 3; Act 18, 1881, Section
4(2); Act 16, 1887, Section 4(16); Act 17, 1889, Section
3(13); Act 23, 1923, Section 2; Act 21, 1926, Section 2.
‘Legal practitioner’ means an advocate, vakil or
attorney of any High Court, a pleader, mukhtar or
revenue agent. Act 18 of 1879 (Legal Practitioners),
Section 3.”
The abovereferred explanations clearly show that a Judge in
service cannot be termed as a legal practitioner, as it will
mean and include only an advocate or a vakil of the court
practicing in a court, may even be a barrister, special
pleader, solicitors depending on the facts of a given case.
19. Rule 2(e) of the Central Administrative Rules, 1987 also
defines the words “legal practitioner”. However, it, in turn,
requires that this expression shall have the same meaning as
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is assigned to it under the Advocates Act, 1961. In that Act the
words “legal practitioner” has been defined under Section
2(1)(i) to mean an advocate or vakil of any High Court, a
pleader, mukhtar or a revenue agent. In other words, this is
an expression of definite connotation and cannot be granted
an extended or inclusive meaning, so as to include what is
not specifically covered. A Judge may be a law graduate
holding a Bachelor Degree in Law from any university
established by law in India but this by itself would not render
him as a “legal practitioner”. On the contrary, there is a
definite restriction upon the Judge from practising law. Such
an implied inclusion, as argued by the appellant, would not
only lead to absurdity but would even offend the laws in
force in India.
20. John Indermaur, Principles of the Common Law 169
(Edmund H. Bennett Ed., 1st Am.Edn. 1878) explains the
term as follows:
“Legal practitioners may be either barristers, special
pleaders not at the Bar, certified conveyancers, or
solicitors. The three latter may recover their fees, but
the first may not, their acting being deemed of a
voluntary nature, and their fees merely in the light of
honorary payments; and it follows from this, that no
action lies against them for negligence or
unskilfulness.”
21. Thus, the expression “legal practitioner” is a well-defined
and explained term. It, by any stretch of imagination, cannot
include a serving Judge who might have been appointed as a
presenting officer in the departmental proceedings. Besides
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this legal aspect of the matter, even on the principle of
fairness we do not think that the order has caused any
prejudice to the appellant. The appellant could have asked for
appointment of any colleague whose assistance he wanted to
take and who would have been as well qualified and
experienced as the presenting officer. The request of the
appellant has been rightly rejected by the disciplinary
authority. Furthermore, the application was made on 7-12-
1988 itself and thereafter the appellant took no steps
whatsoever to challenge the order of the disciplinary
authority declining assistance of an advocate. On the
contrary, he participated without any further protest in the
entire departmental enquiry and raised no objections.
22. The enquiry officer conducted the proceedings in a just,
fair manner and in accordance with rules. In fact, there is no
challenge to that aspect of the matter. In the application, the
appellant had stated “that the complainant neither has
necessary experience nor the required skill to handle his
defence in such circumstances”. This statement ex facie is not
correct. The appellant must have dealt with a variety of cases
during his tenure as a Judge. He was fully capable of
defending himself in the departmental enquiry. In the
alternative he could easily ask for assistance of any senior
colleague from the service if he was under pressure of any
kind that the presenting officer was senior to him and
belonged to the Higher Judicial Service. He did not exercise
this choice, at any stage, for reasons best known to him.
However, he made an application praying for permission to
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engage an advocate and nothing else.
23. The charge against the appellant was not of a very
complicated nature, which a person having qualification and
experience of the appellant would not be able to defend. In
these circumstances, we are of the considered view that no
prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the interest of the
delinquent officer. These are the rules primarily of
procedure, an element of prejudice would be one of the
necessary features, before departmental proceedings can be
held to be vitiated on that ground.”
In the facts of the present case, the charges against the petitioner
may be serious. However, they are not complicated in themselves.
The petitioner, with the assistance of another officer in the cadre of
District Judge, can very well defend those charges. Though the
petitioner in this case has raised a challenge to the order of the
Inquiring Authority denying him the right to engage a legal
practitioner before the enquiry is concluded (unlike in the facts of the
case considered by the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra
Pandey ), it must be noted that in the facts of the present case, the
order of the Inquiring Authority rejecting the request of the
petitioner for engaging a legal practitioner was passed on 17.11.2025
and the petitioner had taken part in the proceedings thereafter, after
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seeking the assistance of another judicial officer of his choice.
Therefore, I find that the petitioner cannot insist that he must be
permitted to engage a legal practitioner to defend him in the
proceedings before the Inquiring Authority.
On account of the above findings, I find no reason to grant any
of the reliefs sought. The writ petition fails, and it is accordingly
dismissed. However, it is made clear that if the petitioner requires
any further time to reply to the modified/altered memo of charges,
he may file an application before the Inquiring Authority for the
same. Similarly, if the petitioner wishes to recall and examine any
person who has already been examined, he may make a request for
the same before the Inquiring Authority. I have no reason to believe
that, if such requests are made, the same will be denied by the
Inquiring Authority.
sd/-
GOPINATH P.
JUDGE
acd
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 33217 OF 2026
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF SUGGESTIONS IN WRITING
DATED 09-12-2024 SUBMITTED BY MR.AKSHY,
A CLERICKAL STAFF ATTACHED TO THE COURT
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF REPORT DATED 17-12-2024
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, KOZHIKODE
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF NOTICE BEARING NO.RDJ
25/24-I-1 DATED 07-01-2025 RECEIVED BY
THE PETITIONER FROM THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF EXPLANATION DATED 14-01-
2025 TO EXHIBIT.P3 NOTICE SUBMITTED BY
THE PETITIONER
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF SCREENSHOT OF THE DETAILS
OF THE CALL RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER
IN HIS MOBILE NUMBER ON 21-12-2024
Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF MEMO OF CHARGES ON 11-04-
2025 ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT TO
PETITIONER
Exhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF REPORT DATED 23-12-2024 OF
THE DISTRICT JUDGE, KOZHIKODE REFERRED
TO IN EXHIBIT.P6 MEMO OF CHARGES
Exhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF REPORT DATED 24-12-2024 OF
THE DISTRICT JUDGE, KOZHIKODE REFERRED
TO IN EXHIBIT.P6 MEMO OF CHARGES
Exhibit P9 TRUE COPY OF DETAILED WRITTEN STATEMENT
DATED 26-04-2025 SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER IN EXHIBIT.P6 MEMO OF CHARGES
AND IMPUTATION OF ALLEGATIONS BEFORE THE
1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P10 TRUE COPY OF ADDITIONAL WRITTEN
STATEMENT DATED 29-07-2025 SUBMITTED BY
THE PETITIONER ON 02-08-2025 BEFORE THE
1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P11 TRUE COPY OF APPLICATION DATED 04-08-
2025 SUBMITTED BY THE PRESENTING OFFICER
BEFORE THE ENQUIRING AUTHORITY
Exhibit P12 TRUE COPY OF COUNTER STATEMENT DATED 06-
08-2025 TO EXHIBIT.P11 SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE INQUIRING
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AUTHORITY
Exhibit P13 TRUE COPY OF ORDER BEARING NO.RDJ 25/24-
I-1 DATED 10-10-2025 OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT INQUIRING AUTHORITY
Exhibit P14 TRUE COPY OF OBJECTION DATED 30-10-2025
FILED BY THE PRESENTING OFFICER TO THE
APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER
Exhibit P15 TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 17-11-2025 OF
THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P16 TRUE COPY OF WRITTEN OBJECTION DATED 01-
06-2026 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P17 TRUE COPY OF OBJECTION DATED 11-06-2026
TO EXHIBIT.P16 FILED BY THE PRESENTING
OFFICER BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P18 TRUE COPY OF ORDER BEARING NO.RDJ 25/24-
I-1 DATED 13-08-2026 OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT
Exhibit P19 TRUE COPY OF MEMO OF CHARGES HAVING
NO.RDJ 25/24-I-1 DATED 14-09-2026 AND
STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS ISSUED BY THE
1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P20 TRUE COPY OF PROCEEDING SHEET OF THE
ENQUIRY