Dimple Jain vs Maya Jain & Anr.

$~52
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 14.05.2026
+ LPA 340/2026, CM APPL. 30318/2026 & CM APPL. 30321/2026
DIMPLE JAIN .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Kshitiz Ahuja & Mr. Aditya Jain,
Advocates.
versus
MAYA JAIN & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Deepak Bashta, Advocate for
R1/Maya Jain.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
TEJAS KARIA, J. ( ORAL )
CAV 209/2026
1. The learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 / Caveator has entered
appearance.
2. Caveat stands discharged.
CM APPL. 30319/2026 & CM APPL. 30320/2026
3. These Applications are filed on behalf of the Appellant seeking
condonation of delay of 16 days in filing and 01 day in re-filing the present
Letters Patent Appeal, respectively.
4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the
averments made in the Application, we are satisfied that the delay is
sufficiently been explained.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 1 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

5. Accordingly, the present Applications are allowed and the delay of 16
days in filing as well as 01 day in re-filing the present Appeal is condoned.
6. The Applications stand disposed of.
LPA 340/2026
7. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed challenging the order
dated 10.03.2026 (“ Impugned Order ”) in W.P.(C) 15532/2023 (“ Writ
Petition ”) modifying the order dated 31.08.2023 passed by the learned
Divisional Commissioner passed under Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“ Act ”), whereby the Appellant has been
directed to vacate the property in question within a period of two months
and further directing Respondent No. 1 to pay monthly rental amount of
₹15,000/- to the Appellant from the date when the Appellant vacates the
property in question.
8. The Appellant is daughter-in-law and wife of Respondent Nos. 1 and
2, respectively. The Appellant married Respondent No. 2 on 25.02.2011 and
th
has two daughters aged 13 years and 8 years, who are studying in Classes 7
rd
and 3 , respectively.
9. The Appellant and Respondent No. 2 along with their two daughters
st
have been living at property bearing No. 225, 1 Floor, Gali No. 4, Ram
Nagar, Krishna Nagar, Delhi – 110051 (“ Property ”), which is owned by
Respondent No. 1, who is a senior citizen. Due to matrimonial dispute
between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2, the Appellant instituted
proceedings under the provisions of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“ DV Act ”) in September, 2021, pursuant to
which, vide order dated 15.12.2021, learned Metropolitan Magistrate
(Mahila Court), East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi (“ Mahila Court ”)
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 2 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

restrained Respondents from dispossessing the Appellant from the Property,
selling out, transferring or in any way creating third-party rights in the
Property except in accordance with the order of a competent Court.
10. On 07.03.2022, Respondent No. 1 filed an application under the Act
before the learned District Magistrate (East), Delhi (“ District Magistrate ”)
for eviction of the Appellant from the Property. Vide order dated
24.01.2023, the District Magistrate dismissed the application under the Act
on the ground that there was a protection granted in favour of the Appellant
by the learned Mahila Court. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by
the learned District Magistrate, Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before
the learned Divisional Commissioner. Vide order dated 31.08.2023, the
learned Divisional Commissioner directed that the Appellant and her
children would be entitled to either allotment of alternate accommodation
from one of the other properties, owned by Respondent No. 1 or to a
reasonable rental accommodation in the same area / locality relying upon the
decision in the case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner , 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 1023 and Vinay Varma v. Kanika Pasricha , AIR OnLine 2019
Del 1878.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 31.08.2023 passed by the learned
Divisional Commissioner, Respondent No. 1 preferred the Writ Petition
before the learned Single Judge seeking quashing and setting aside of the
order dated 31.08.2023.
12. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, vide order dated 07.01.2026
passed in the Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge observed that it would
be appropriate to grant monthly rental of ₹15,000/- to the Appellant for an
alternate accommodation and granted liberty to the Appellant to find out an
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 3 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

appropriate alternative accommodation within a period of one month. It was
also directed therein that Respondent No. 1 shall not create any third-party
right or alienate the Property without the leave of the Court.
13. The said order dated 07.01.2026 passed in the Writ Petition was
challenged by way of LPA 100/2026 by the Appellant. The said LPA was
dismissed vide order dated 27.02.2026 by this Bench by observing that the
order dated 07.01.2026 was an interlocutory order, which only granted
liberty to the Appellant to find an appropriate alternate accommodation and,
therefore, it was only an interim arrangement, which was subject to final
outcome of the Writ Petition. Vide the Impugned Order, the learned Single
Judge has disposed of the Writ Petition whereby the order dated 31.08.2023
passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner has been affirmed with a
modification that the Appellant shall vacate the Property within a period of
two months and Respondent No. 1 shall pay a monthly rental amount of
₹15,000/- to the Appellant from the date the Appellant vacates the Property
to enable the Appellant to secure an alternate accommodation.
14. The learned Single Judge has observed that a senior citizen is entitled
to seek eviction from his or her self-acquired property under the Act;
however, such right cannot be exercised in a manner that completely defeats
the statutory safeguards available under the DV Act. It is further observed in
the Impugned Order that in cases involving competing claims under these
two enactments, the Court is required to balance the rights of the parties and
mould the relief appropriately by directing reasonable alternative provisions,
so as to protect the proprietary rights of the senior citizen, while
safeguarding the residential right of the daughter-in-law.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 4 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

15. The Impugned Order has also observed that the learned Divisional
Commissioner has noted the strained relationship between the Appellant and
the Respondents and in order to strike balance between their respective
rights, it was directed that Respondent No. 1 shall provide an alternate
accommodation to the Appellant or arrange rental accommodation if no
property is available to be provided to the Appellant. However, since
Respondent No. 1 took a stand in the Rejoinder to the Reply filed by the
Appellant to the Writ Petition that Respondent No. 1 did not own any other
property except the Property, which was not controverted by the Appellant,
the Impugned Order holds that there was no question of offering any other
property belonging to Respondent No. 1 to the Appellant. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge has found that only feasible option was securing
alternate accommodation for the Appellant by directing Respondent No. 1 to
make the payment of rent. As a result, the order passed by the learned
Divisional Commissioner was affirmed with a modification to provide
monthly rent of ₹15,000/- to the Appellant from the date when the Appellant
vacates the Property.
16. The Appellant has challenged the Impugned Order in this Appeal on
the ground that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that at the time
of filing the application under the Act for eviction of the Appellant from the
st
Property, Respondent No. 1 was owner of two other properties, i.e., J-1/1, 1
Floor, Krishna Nagar, Delhi – 110051 and J-2/1, Upper Ground Floor,
Krishna Nagar, Delhi – 110051 and, therefore, the requirement of
Respondent No. 1 was not genuine as these said two properties were sold by
Respondent No. 1 to a younger son and to one of the relatives to defeat the
right of the Appellant for an alternate accommodation.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 5 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

17. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the act of
transferring the other properties owned by Respondent No. 1 during the
pendency of the proceedings under the Act, was mala fide , which is evident
from the details as under:
PROPERTIES SOLD / TRANSFERRED AFTER FILING OF THE
APPLICATION UNDER SENIOR CITIZEN ACT BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1
S.
No.
Particulars of property Transferred to Date of transfer with
details
1. J-2/1, Krishna Nagar,
Delhi – 110051
Rajesh Kumar
Baluni
13.09.2023 vide
Registration No.
9138, Book No. 1,
Volume No. 392 at
Page No. 109 to 116
2. J-1/1, Krishna Nagar,
Delhi – 110051
Mohit Jain 28.01.2023 vide
Registration No. 947,
Book No. 1, Vol. No.
3582 Page No. 190 to
195
18. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that Respondent No.
1 also transferred certain properties prior to filing application under the Act,
the details of which are as under:
PROPERTIES AS WERE SOLD JUST PRIOR TO FILLING TO
THE APPLICATION UNDER THE SENIOR CITIZEN ACT
S.
No.
Particulars of property Transferred to Date of transfer with
details
1. 236, Ground Floor, Ram
Nagar, Krishna Nagar,
Delhi – 110051
Ajay Kumar
Mehta
03.11.2021 vide
Registration No.
10,172, Book No. 1,
Vol. No. 10,56 on
Page No. 56 to 66
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 6 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

2. 236, First Floor, Ram
Nagar, Krishna Nagar,
Delhi – 110051
Ajay Kumar
Mehta
01.12.2021 vide
Registration No.
9614, Book No. 1,
Vol. No. 10,036 on
Page No. 81 to 91
19. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned
Single Judge, without going into the merits of the matter, failed to appreciate
the abuse of the process of law adopted by Respondent No. 1 by selling /
transferring the properties before and after filing of the application under the
Act, as such transfers were only to defeat the right of the Appellant for an
alternate accommodation.
20. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Impugned
Order was passed solely based on the undertaking of Respondent No. 1 that
she did not own any other property than the Property, while brushing aside
the conduct of Respondent No. 1 by transferring one property to one of her
sons and further sold another property to her relatives after passing of the
order by the learned Divisional Commissioner with sole purpose of
defeating the right of the Appellant for grant of alternate accommodation, as
directed by the learned Divisional Commissioner.
21. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned
Single Judge failed to consider and decide the consequence of the conduct of
Respondent No. 1 by transferring the other properties owned by Respondent
No. 1 just before or after filing of the application under the Act with sole
intention of defeating the rights of the Appellant. It was further submitted
that the learned Single Judge did not appreciate that the Appellant has two
minor daughters and cannot be forced into a rented accommodation as they
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 7 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

will suffer from uncertainty or made shelter-less, as observed in the order
passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner.
22. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the proceedings
under the Act were initiated only to compel the Appellant to settle the
matrimonial dispute and to overcome the order passed by the learned Mahila
Court in favour of the Appellant.
23. It was further submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the Property
was given to the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 to live separately in the
year 2015 and, therefore, the claim made by Respondent No. 1 is baseless
and is a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by the Appellant under the
DV Act.
24. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in any event, the
monthly rent for the alternate accommodation of a similar nature, size to the
Property is available at least for ₹60,000/- and ₹15,000/- granted vide the
Impugned Order is insufficient. Accordingly, the learned Counsel for the
Appellant has sought setting aside of the Impugned Order.
25. We have heard the learned Counsel for the Appellant and have
considered the material available on record.
26. The only grievance of the Appellant is that the order passed by the
learned Divisional Commissioner with regard to grant of alternate
accommodation has been made infructuous by alienating the other properties
that were owned by Respondent No. 1 during the pendency or prior to the
initiation of the proceedings under the Act. The order of the learned
Divisional Commissioner granted two alternative remedies to the Appellant
to strike balance between the rights under the provisions of the Act and the
DV Act by directing firstly to provide alternate accommodation and in the
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 8 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

alternative, if the provision of the alternate accommodation was not feasible,
to grant adequate rent to the Appellant for shifting to an alternative rented
accommodation.
27. The learned Single Judge has recorded that Respondent No. 1 in the
Rejoinder to the Reply filed by the Appellant to the Writ Petition has
categorically stated that she does not own any other property than the
Property. Such a stand is not controverted by the Appellant, as recorded in
the Impugned Order.
28. The direction passed by the learned Mahila Court in the proceedings
initiated by the Appellant for not dispossessing the Appellant were restricted
to the Property and it was further directed that the Respondents shall not
alienate or create any third-party rights in the Property. Therefore, there was
no restriction for transferring any other property owned by Respondent No.
1 that was not occupied by the Appellant.
29. Since the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner had
provided alternative relief of payment of rent by Respondent No. 1 to the
Appellant, no prejudice was caused to the Appellant by sale of the other
properties by Respondent No. 1, as alleged by the Appellant. The order
passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner to the extent it granted an
alternative relief of payment of rent, has not been challenged by the
Appellant.
30. The learned Single Judge has also affirmed the order passed by the
learned Divisional Commissioner and modified the same to the extent that
the relief of grant of alternate accommodation was not available in view of
the stand taken by Respondent No. 1 that she did not own any other property
except the Property. Accordingly, the contention of the Appellant that
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 9 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

Respondent No. 1 sold the other properties owned by her to defeat the rights
of the Appellant, cannot be accepted as her right is fully protected by
direction to make payment of ₹15,000/- per month towards rent for an
alternate accommodation.
31. Admittedly, Respondent No. 1 is the owner of the Property and has a
right to seek eviction under the provisions of the Act. At the same time, the
rights of the Appellant under the DV Act are also required to be protected as
held in the decisions of S. Vanitha ( supra ) and Vinay Varma ( supra ). The
learned Divisional Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge has
carefully considered the interplay between the Act and the DV Act by
striking balance and granting payment of rent in favour of the Appellant.
The direction to grant alternate accommodation was only subject to
availability of the same and as there was no restriction imposed upon
Respondent No. 1 from selling other properties owned by her, which she
was entitled to sell, there is no infirmity in the Impugned Order, which
modifies the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner.
32. In any event, since the other properties are already sold by
Respondent No. 1, the relief of grant of an alternate accommodation is not
available. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that
the only recourse available was to give direction to Respondent No. 1 for
payment of monthly rent to the Appellant for an alternate accommodation.
33. The submission with regard to the insufficiency of the monthly rent of
₹15,000/- for a suitable alternate accommodation is not justified as the same
was determined vide order dated 07.01.2026 against which LPA 100/2026
was preferred by the Appellant and claimed to be dismissed by this Bench.
The Impugned Order has granted the same amount of ₹15,000/- per month,
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 10 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50

as found to be appropriate in order dated 07.01.2026 and we do not find any
justifiable reason to interfere with the same in absence of any proof that the
same is not sufficient.
34. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that there is no
requirement to interfere with the Impugned Order, which is hereby upheld.
Consequently, the present Appeal is dismissed along with the pending
Applications. There shall be no order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
MAY 14, 2026/sms
Signature Not Verified
LPA 340/2026 Page 11 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:18.05.2026
17:58:50