Sheo Shanker Singh vs State of U.P.

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2861 of 1984
Sheo Shanker Singh
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Responden t(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Krishna Kumar A/C, Mohammad Waseem
(A.C.), G.P.Dixit, Prashant Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : D.G.A.

Court No. - 45
HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.
HON'BLE PADAM NARAIN MISHRA, J.
Heard Shri Krishna Kumar, Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant, and
Shri Hari Pratap Gupta, Additional Government Advocate appearing for the
State.
The present appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated
01.10.1984 passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur, in Sessions
Trial No. 60/M/1983 (State v. Sheo Shanker Singh), arising out of Case
Crime No. 331, Police Station: Govind Nagar, District Kanpur, whereby the
appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
The prosecution case, as stated in the first information report, was that on
04.12.1982, at about 11:00 a.m., the appellant had gone to the house of his
mother-in-law, the deceased, to take his wife with him. The deceased refused
to allow her daughter to accompany the appellant, which led to a verbal
altercation between the deceased and the appellant. During the altercation,
the deceased initially threw a glass containing tea at the appellant and
thereafter struck him on his face with an iron rod, causing bleeding injuries.
The appellant became agitated, snatched the iron rod from the deceased and
struck her repeatedly on her face and head. The deceased fell on the spot and
died. The incident is said to have occurred on the road in front of the house
of the deceased. According to the first information report, the appellant was
apprehended at the spot by the first informant, Devi Charan Pal, and other
persons who had assembled there. Shanti Devi - the wife of the appellant and
daughter of the deceased, Rajesh Kumar Bajpai, Rajesh Singh and other
persons were named as witnesses to the incident. On the written report
submitted by Devi Charan Pal, Case Crime No. 331 was registered under

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Section 304 IPC at Police Station Govind Nagar, Kanpur, on 04.12.1982 at
12:15 p.m. The written report and the first information report were exhibited
as Exhibits Ka-2 and Ka-14, respectively, before the trial court.
After the inquest proceedings, the post-mortem examination of the deceased
was conducted on 05.12.1982 at 1:30 p.m. The post-mortem report,
exhibited as Exhibit Ka-1, recorded the following injuries:
1. Lacerated wound on the middle of the scalp, measuring 5 cm × 1 cm, bone
deep.
2. Lacerated wound on the forehead, 5 cm above the right ear margin, measuring
7 cm × 1.5 cm, bone deep.
3. Lacerated wound on the forehead adjacent to the right eyebrow, measuring 5
cm × 1.5 cm, bone deep.
4. Lacerated wound on the outer margin of the left eyebrow, measuring 2 cm × 1.5
cm, bone deep.
5. Lacerated wound on the bridge of the nose, measuring 1.5 cm × 1 cm, cavity
deep.
6. Lacerated wound on the left side of the face, 1 cm in front of the left ear,
measuring 1.5 cm × 1 cm, muscle deep.
7. Lacerated wound on the middle part of the chin, measuring 2 cm × 1 cm, bone
deep.
The injuries were covered with dried blood. The internal examination
disclosed fractures involving the skull, the base of the anterior cranial fossa
and the nasal bones, together with a haematoma at the base of the anterior
cranial fossa.
During the investigation, plain soil, bloodstained soil and an iron rod were
recovered from the place of occurrence on 04.12.1982. The recovery memos
were exhibited as Exhibits Ka-8 and Ka-9. After completing the
investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant. The
case was committed to the Court of Session and registered as Sessions Trial
No. 60/M/1983. The appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC. He
denied the charge and claimed trial.
The prosecution examined five witnesses. Shanti Devi, the daughter of the
deceased and wife of the appellant, was examined as PW-1. The doctor who
conducted the post-mortem examination was examined as PW-2. Devi

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3
Charan Pal, the first informant, was examined as PW-3. The investigating
officer was examined as PW-4, and the police official who prepared the chik
FIR was examined as PW-5.
PW-1, Shanti Devi, stated in her examination-in-chief that the appellant had
come to take her with him and that a verbal altercation took place between
the appellant and the deceased when the latter refused to permit the appellant
to take the witness with him. She stated that, in the heat of the altercation,
the deceased threw a glass containing tea at the appellant, whereafter the
appellant started assaulting the deceased with an iron rod kept in the house.
According to the witness, the occurrence took place at about 11:00 a.m. She
further stated that after assaulting the deceased, the appellant had moved
about ten paces from the place of occurrence when he was apprehended by
the first informant and one Bajpai. In her cross-examination, PW-1 initially
stated that the appellant had remained outside the house. At another stage,
however, she stated that the appellant had taken the iron rod from a room
inside the house. She also stated that a scuffle had taken place between the
appellant and the deceased over possession of the iron rod and that the
deceased released the rod when the appellant struck her on the nose.
Thereafter, according to the witness, the appellant started striking the
deceased with the rod. At still another stage of her cross-examination, PW-1
stated that the appellant had snatched the iron rod from the hands of the
deceased on the road in front of her house and had struck the deceased
several times, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Thus, while her
examination-in-chief referred to an iron rod kept in the house, her cross-
examination also contained an account of the appellant obtaining the rod
from the deceased during a scuffle. In her cross-examination, PW-1 denied
having stated to the investigating officer under Section 161 CrPC that the
deceased had first thrown the glass at the appellant and thereafter struck him
with an iron rod, causing injuries to his face. PW-1 further stated that the
investigating officer had recorded her statement on the date of the
occurrence and had not met her thereafter. The witness identified the iron
rod, which was exhibited as Material Exhibit 1.
PW-2, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, proved the
post-mortem report. He stated that the death had occurred due to bleeding
and shock caused by the injuries. He further stated that the injuries were
ordinarily sufficient to cause death and could have been caused by an iron
rod. According to the witness, death could have occurred immediately as a
result of the injuries.
PW-3, Devi Charan Pal, the first informant, did not support the prosecution

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4
account regarding his presence at the occurrence. In his examination-in-
chief, he denied having witnessed the incident. He stated that the appellant
was proceeding towards his shop on a bicycle when he heard three or four
persons shouting that the appellant had murdered the deceased. According to
PW-3, the appellant stopped his bicycle at the shop and told him that he had
quarreled with the deceased and had murdered her. PW-3 further stated that
he had not initially gone to the police station to lodge the report. According
to him, he was called to the police station at about 4:00 p.m., where the
investigating officer handed him a report and asked him to copy its contents
on a sheet of paper. The witness proved the written report.
The prosecution was permitted to cross-examine PW-3. During that cross-
examination, the witness denied having apprehended the appellant at the
spot and to have taken him to the police station. When confronted with the
recital in the written report regarding him having apprehended the appellant,
the witness stated that he had questioned the investigating officer about its
inclusion. According to the witness, the investigating officer asked him to
cooperate because the appellant had committed an offence, whereafter the
witness raised no further objection. PW-3 also denied having stated to the
investigating officer that the appellant had told him that the deceased had
died on the road because of the injuries.
PW-4, the investigating officer, proved the documents prepared during the
investigation. He also deposed regarding the statements recorded by him
under Section 161 CrPC. According to PW-4, the first informant had stated
during the investigation that the appellant had insisted on taking his wife
with him and that the deceased had died on the road because of the injuries.
He further referred to the account that the deceased had initially thrown a
glass at the appellant, whereafter the appellant became angry, snatched the
iron rod from her and struck her on the face. Significantly, PW-4 also stated
that PW-1 had not been examined on the date of the occurrence because she
was disturbed by the death of her mother. According to him, the statement of
PW-1 under Section 161 CrPC was recorded on 09.12.1982. This was
contrary to the statement of PW-1 that her statement had been recorded on
the date of the occurrence and that the investigating officer had not met her
thereafter.
PW-5, the police official who prepared the chik FIR, proved the relevant
general diary entry. In his cross-examination, he stated that the appellant had
injuries on his face which were bleeding and causing him pain when he was
brought to the police station.
After the prosecution evidence was concluded, the appellant was examined

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under Section 313 CrPC. He admitted that he had gone to the house of the
deceased to take his wife with him and that the deceased had refused to
allow her daughter to accompany him. He also admitted that an altercation
had taken place between them. The appellant stated that the deceased had
thrown a glass containing tea at him and thereafter struck him with an iron
rod, causing bleeding injuries. According to him, he obtained possession of
the rod and pushed the deceased during the scuffle. He claimed that the
deceased fell on the iron rod. He further stated that he became frightened and
ran away but was subsequently apprehended by some persons. He denied
having struck the deceased with the iron rod and causing her death.
The trial court relied principally upon the testimony of PW-1. It held that
there was no reason for PW-1 to falsely implicate the appellant and that her
demeanour did not disclose anything affecting her credibility. The trial court
further held that her testimony was supported by the medical evidence and
the investigation. The trial court did not accept the testimony of PW-3 and
declined to rely upon the contents of the first information report as
substantive evidence. It also noticed that the injuries sustained by the
appellant were established by the testimony of PW-5. The trial court also
rejected the plea of private defence put up by the appellant. It held that even
if the claim of the appellant that it was the deceased who had initially
assaulted the appellant was accepted, the injuries inflicted upon the deceased
were far in excess to what was necessary for his protection. It further held
that once the appellant had obtained possession of the iron rod, the
apprehension of danger contemplated under Section 102 IPC could no longer
be said to continue. On these findings, the trial court convicted the appellant
under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
Challenging the judgment of the trial court, the counsel for the appellant
submitted that the prosecution evidence itself established that the deceased
had initially assaulted the appellant and that he had sustained bleeding
injuries. It was argued that the appellant obtained possession of the iron rod
only during the confrontation and that his subsequent conduct had to be
examined in the light of the initial assault upon him. It was further submitted
that the trial court had wrongly discarded the testimony of PW-3 in its
entirety. It was argued that the evidence did not establish any intention on
the part of the appellant necessary to constitute murder under Section 300
IPC. It was argued that the trial court had also erred in its appreciation of the
plea of private defence. It was accordingly submitted that the conviction
under Section 302 IPC could not be sustained and that the appellant was
entitled to acquittal and the appeal was to be allowed.

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The Additional Government Advocate supported the judgment of the trial
court. It was submitted that PW-1 was an eyewitness and that her testimony
regarding the assault remained reliable despite the discrepancies pointed out
by the defence. It was further argued that her account was supported by the
medical evidence. It was also submitted that the repeated blows inflicted
upon the deceased established the requisite intention and that, in any event,
the appellant had exceeded any right of private defence which might initially
have been available to him. It was submitted that the trial court had rightly
convicted the appellant and the appeal was liable to be dismissed.
We have considered the rival submissions and carefully examined the
evidence on record.
PW-3 did not support the prosecution account that he had witnessed the
occurrence or apprehended the appellant at the spot. He also deposed that the
written report had been prepared at the instance of the investigating officer.
His testimony does not furnish independent support for the account of the
occurrence contained in the first information report. The case is therefore to
be examined principally on the medical evidence, the testimony of PW-1 and
the other circumstances proved at the trial.
The presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence and the quarrel
between him and the deceased are not disputed. The medical evidence
establishes that the deceased sustained seven injuries, principally on her
head and face, and that death occurred due to bleeding and shock caused by
those injuries. PW-2 stated that the injuries were ordinarily sufficient to
cause death and could have been caused by an iron rod. The number and
distribution of the injuries, considered with the testimony of PW-1, do not
support the appellant's explanation that the deceased sustained them merely
by falling on the rod. We therefore find that the appellant caused the injuries
which resulted in her death.
The issue, thus, in the present appeal is whether the appellant's act amounts
to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 IPC. The answer
depends upon the intention or knowledge accompanying the act, as
established by the evidence and the circumstances of the occurrence.
PW-1 has stated that the appellant struck the deceased several times with an
iron rod. However, her testimony regarding the circumstances in which the
appellant obtained possession of the rod is not consistent. In her cross-
examination, she initially stated that the appellant had remained outside the
house but also stated that the rod was kept inside the house. She

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7
subsequently stated that the appellant had taken the rod from a room inside
the house. At another stage, she stated that there was a scuffle over the rod
and that the deceased released it after receiving a blow on her nose. She also
stated that the appellant had snatched the rod from the deceased on the road
in front of the house. These statements have to be considered along with the
evidence that the appellant himself sustained injuries during the occurrence.
PW-1 denied having stated to the investigating officer that the deceased had
struck the appellant with the iron rod. PW-5, however, expressly stated that
the appellant had bleeding injuries on his face and was in pain when he came
to the police station. The appellant also stated in his examination under
Section 313 CrPC that the deceased had struck him with the rod. The injuries
found on the appellant support his account that the deceased initially
assaulted him. The evidence, therefore, does not rule out the reasonable
possibility that the deceased initially assaulted the appellant with the iron
rod. This circumstance is relevant in determining the nature of his
subsequent retaliation and the state of mind accompanying his act. However,
it does not establish that the repeated blows inflicted upon the deceased were
necessary in the exercise of the right of private defence of the appellant.
Sections 299 and 300 IPC distinguish between different degrees of culpable
homicide. Under Section 299, death may be caused with the intention of
causing death, with the intention of causing bodily injury likely to cause
death, or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Section 300
specifies when culpable homicide amounts to murder. Where the ingredients
of murder are not established, or a statutory exception applies, the offence is
punishable under the appropriate part of Section 304 IPC.
Under Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC, the prosecution must prove that
the accused intended to inflict the particular bodily injury found on the
deceased and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. It is not necessary to prove an intention to cause death. The
intention to inflict the particular injury is, however, an essential ingredient.
In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 , the Supreme Court
explained that the intention to inflict the particular bodily injury and the
sufficiency of that injury to cause death are separate requirements. The latter
is determined objectively, while the former must be inferred from the
circumstances in which the injury was inflicted.
In v.
Anbazhagan State represented by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 20
, the Supreme Court considered the distinction between
SCC 500 632
intention and knowledge. In paragraph 55, the Court referred to Jai Prakash
v. State (Delhi Administration) , (1991) 2 SCC 32 , where it was explained

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that a sudden quarrel and grappling may be relevant in determining whether
the accused formed the intention to inflict the particular injury. The Court
observed:
"We are concerned under clause 3rdly with the intention to cause that particular
injury which is a subjective inquiry………If …this ingredient of "intention" is not
established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard then only it would be
reasonable to infer that clause Thirdly is not attracted and that the accused must be
attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death in which
case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC."
Thus, even where the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the prosecution must establish the intention to inflict that
particular injury. If a reasonable doubt arises regarding such intention,
Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted. Where the requisite
knowledge is established, the offence may fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.
In paragraph 65 of , the Supreme Court referred to
Anbazhagan (supra)
Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 , which identifies
the circumstances relevant to determining intention. These include the nature
of the weapon, whether it was carried by the accused or picked up at the
spot, the part of the body injured, the force employed, whether the act was in
the course of sudden quarrel , previous enmity, whether the incident occurs
by chance or whether there was any premeditation, provocation , the conduct
of the accused and the number of blows inflicted. The question must be
decided upon a consideration of all the circumstances and not by treating
any single factor as conclusive.
In paragraph 66.8 of Anbazhagan (supra) , the Supreme Court clarified that
even where none of the exceptions to Section 300 IPC is established, the
prosecution must still prove that the case falls within one of the four clauses
of Section 300. The absence of a statutory exception does not, by itself,
establish murder.
In paragraph 66.9, the Supreme Court observed:
"The court must address itself to the question of mens rea."
The Court explained that the intention to inflict the particular injury is
ordinarily inferred from the proved circumstances, including the weapon
used, the part of the body injured, the force employed, the manner of attack
and the circumstances preceding and accompanying the occurrence .
In , the accused had struck the deceased on the head with an
Anbazhagan

CRLA No. 2861 of 1984
9
agricultural implement during a sudden quarrel. The deceased sustained
serious head injuries, including fractures. On examining the circumstances
of the occurrence, the Supreme Court held that the intention required under
Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC had not been established, although the
accused could be attributed with the knowledge that his act was likely to
cause death. The conviction was accordingly altered from Section 304 Part I
to Section 304 Part II IPC.
The present case is to be examined in the light of these principles.
The deceased undoubtedly sustained several injuries, including injuries on
her head and face. This circumstance cannot be disregarded. However, the
number of injuries, by itself, does not dispense with the requirement of
proving the particular intention contemplated under Clause Thirdly of
Section 300 IPC.
The circumstances preceding the assault are of particular importance. The
appellant had gone to the house of the deceased to take his wife with him.
The quarrel arose when the deceased refused to allow the appellant, who was
her son-in-law, to take her daughter with him. There is no evidence of
previous hostility between the appellant and the deceased or of any
preparation by the appellant to assault her. He had not come armed with a
weapon. The iron rod was available at the place of occurrence. The evidence
does not rule out the reasonable possibility that the deceased initially
assaulted the appellant with the rod, causing bleeding injuries on his face.
The appellant obtained possession of the rod during the same confrontation,
and the assault upon the deceased followed without any evidence of an
intervening interval or a fresh dispute. The occurrence thus arose out of a
sudden domestic quarrel in which the appellant may himself have been
physically assaulted. These circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether
the appellant, while reacting to the assault upon him, formed the intention to
inflict the particular bodily injuries which caused the death of the deceased.
The fact that the appellant struck the deceased more than once is a
circumstance supporting an inference of intention, but it is not conclusive.
Intention may be formed suddenly, and the absence of premeditation does
not by itself exclude Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. The Court must
nevertheless determine whether the requisite intention has been proved in the
circumstances of the particular occurrence. It cannot be inferred merely from
the fatal result.
In the present case, the manner of the assault and the circumstances
preceding it must be considered together. On such consideration, we are not

CRLA No. 2861 of 1984
10
satisfied that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the
intention to inflict the particular bodily injuries necessary to attract Clause
Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. For the same reasons, we are also not satisfied
that the appellant acted with the intention of causing death or of causing
bodily injury likely to cause death within the meaning of the first two
clauses of Section 299 IPC. The circumstances in which the occurrence took
place leave a reasonable doubt concerning the formation of either of those
intentions.
The absence of the requisite intention does not, however, exclude the
knowledge contemplated under Clause (c) of Section 299 IPC. The appellant
used an iron rod and struck the deceased repeatedly on her head and face. He
must be attributed with the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause
death, even though the circumstances leave a reasonable doubt regarding the
intention with which the injuries were inflicted.
We accordingly find that the prosecution has established culpable homicide
within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 299 IPC, but has not established
the intention necessary to constitute murder under Section 300 IPC or
culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC. The offence is
therefore punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained
and is liable to be altered accordingly.
The question which remains is the appropriate sentence.
Section 304 Part II IPC permits imprisonment of either description for a term
extending to ten years, or fine, or both. It does not prescribe any mandatory
minimum sentence. The punishment must therefore be determined with
reference to the degree of culpability established and the circumstances of
the case.
The occurrence took place on 04.12.1982, nearly forty-four years ago. The
appellant was approximately thirty years old when examined under Section
313 CrPC on 24.09.1984 and would now be approximately seventy-two
years old. The incident arose out of a sudden domestic quarrel. There was no
premeditation, and the appellant had himself sustained injuries during the
confrontation. The passage of time and the present age of the appellant do
not diminish the seriousness of the death caused by him. They are, however,
relevant to the question of sentence, particularly when considered with the
circumstances in which the offence was committed and the altered degree of
culpability established in appeal.

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Having considered these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the ends
of justice would be adequately served by sentencing the appellant to the
period of imprisonment already undergone, together with a fine of
₹
1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only).
The judgment and order dated 01.10.1984 passed by the District and
Sessions Judge, Kanpur, in Sessions Trial No. 60/M/1983, insofar as it
convicts the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentences him to
imprisonment for life, is modified.
The conviction of the appellant, Sheo Shanker Singh, under Section 302 IPC
is altered to one under Section 304 Part II IPC. For the altered conviction,
the appellant is sentenced to the period of imprisonment already undergone
by him and to pay a fine of ₹ 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only).
The amount of fine shall be deposited before the trial court within three
months from the date of this judgment. In default of payment of fine within
the stipulated period, the appellant shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for
one year.
Since the appellant is on bail, he shall not be required to surrender to
undergo any further substantive imprisonment, subject to compliance with
the direction regarding payment of fine. Upon deposit of the fine, his bail
bonds and sureties shall stand discharged. In the event of default, the trial
court shall take appropriate steps in accordance with law to enforce the
sentence.
Office is directed to pay Rs. 15,000/- as fees to Shri Krishna Kumar, the
Amicus Curiae for the appellant within one month from today.
With the aforesaid observations and directions, the appeal is partly allowed
Let the trial court record be transmitted forthwith to the court concerned
along with a certified copy of this judgment for information and necessary
compliance.

November 5, 2026
Vipasha
(Padam Narain Mishra,J.) (Salil Kumar Rai,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
VIPASHA MUKHERJEE
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad