M/S. TANVI ASSET HOLDINGS LLP, vs G.R. NATARAJ,
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:59975-DB
WP No. 33234 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010733852026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 28 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE N.V.BHAVANI
WRIT PETITION NO.33234 OF 2026 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
M/S. TANVI ASSET HOLDINGS LLP,
INCORPORATED UNDER THE LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP ACT, 2008,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
ND
2 FLOOR, COMMERCIAL BLOCK,
TH
WILASA GRAND VILLAMENTS, 12 KILOMETRE,
DODDAKALLASANDRA, KANAKAPURA ROAD,
TH
J.P. NAGAR ,9 PHASE,
BANGALORE – 560 062.
REPRESENTED BY ITS DESIGNATED PARTNER,
MR. CHETAN G.R.
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS.
…PETITIONER
Digitally
signed by
YASHODA K L
Location:
HIGH COURT
OF
KARNATAKA
(BY SRI. SURAJ.S, ADVOCATE)
AND:
G. R. NATARAJ,
HINDU JOINT FAMILY,
REPRESENTED BY THE
ST TH
1 TO 6 RESPONDENTS
MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
S/O. LATE G. RAJAIH SETTY,
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS,
RESIDING AT WILASA GRAND VILLAMENTS,
APARTMENT NO. Z-001, DODDAKALLASANDRA,
TH
12 KILOMETRE,
KANAKAPURA ROAD,
1.
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TH
J.P. NAGAR 9 PHASE,
BANGALORE 560062.
KARTHA OF THE HUF.
2. MRS. SUNEETHA NATARAJ,
W/O. MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS,
RESIDING AT WILASA GRAND VILLAMENTS,
APARTMENT NO. Z-001,
DODDAKALLASANDRA,
TH
12 KILOMETRE, KANAKAPURA ROAD,
TH
J.P. NAGAR, 9 PHASE,
BANGALORE – 560 062.
MEMBER OF THE HUF.
3. MR. CHETAN G.R.,
S/O. MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
RESIDING AT WILASA GRAND VILLAMENTS,
APARTMENT NO. Z-401,
DODDAKALLASANDRA,
TH
12 KILOMETRE, KANAKAPURA ROAD,
J.P. NAGAR 9TH PHASE,
BANGALORE – 560 062.
COPARCENER IN THE HUF.
4. MR. CHARAN G.R.,
S/O. MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
RESIDING AT WILASA GRAND VILLAMENTS,
APARTMENT NO. Z-404,
TH
DODDAKALLASANDRA, 12 KILOMETRE,
KANAKAPURA ROAD, J.P. NAGAR,
TH
9 PHASE, BANGALORE – 560 062.
NOW RESIDING AT TORONTO, CANADA.
COPARCENER IN THE HUF.
5. MR. SHARAN G.R.,
S/O. MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
OFFICE AT REDD EXPERIENCE DESIGN,
TH ST
1056, 7 MAIN ROAD, 1 CROSS,
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HAL II STAGE, INDIRANAGAR,
BANGALORE – 560 038.
NOW RESIDING AT MADRID, SPAIN.
COPARCENER IN THE HUF.
6. MRS. VIDYA MALLIK,
D/O. MR. G.R. NATARAJ,
W/O. MR. RAHUL MALLIK,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
RESIDING AT 19040 PORTOS DRIVE,
SARATOGA, CALIFORNIA,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - 95070.
COPARCENER IN THE HUF.
7. SOLE LEARNED SUBSTITUTE ARBITRATOR
IN A.C. NO. 515/2023, ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION CENTRE,
BANGALORE (DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL).
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SIDDHARTH SUMAN ADVOCATE FOR CR1, 2, 4, 5 & 6;
SMT. SANDYA SUSANNA BHASKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R3)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OR ANY
OTHER WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION SETTING ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 29/09/2026 PASSED IN A.C. NO.515/2023 BY
TH
THE 7 RESPONDENT (ANNEXURE-A) AND CONSEQUENTLY,
DISMISS THE APPLICATION FILED ON 01/08/2025 BY THE 1ST,
ND TH TH
2 , 4 AND 6 RESPONDENTS UNDER ORDER VI RULE 17
OF THE CPC READ WITH SECTION 23(3) OF THE ARBITRATION
AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 FOR AMENDMENT OF THEIR
COUNTER CLAIM IN A.C. NO.515/2023 (ANNEXURE-P) AND
ETC.,
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE N.V.BHAVANI
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ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI)
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The order
dated 29.09.2026 passed in AC No.515/2023 is sought to
be challenged in this petition whereby an amendment
application has been allowed by the learned Arbitrator.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that by means of the application an amendment was
sought to be made in the counter claim. It is stated that
more than 60 sessions of the arbitration has been held and
evidence of the parties have been lead and at this belated
stage, the arbitral tribunal has proceeded to allow the
application for amendment and perversity is writ large in
the order.
2. We have perused the order and the reasons
ascribed by the learned arbitral tribunal in allowing the
application.
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3. The learned arbitral tribunal has recorded
detailed reasons and relying upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders & Developers V.
Narayanaswamy and others reported in (2009) 10
SCC 84 , the amendment application has been allowed. It
has been observed that the scope and the nature of suit
remains the same inspite of the proposed amendments.
The amendment with regard to third party claims was not
in the knowledge of the respondent Nos.1, 2, 4 and 6
when they filed their defence and counter claim before the
tribunal. The heads under which various claims are made
have almost remained intact except to the extent of
increasing the claims made under the various heads. The
tribunal has further observed that taking into
consideration the totality of the pleadings filed by the
parties and the dual capacity of the respondent No.3
therein and the serious allegation made against the
respondent No.3, who is a partner of the claimant Limited
Liability Partnership for having acted in excess of the
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authority given to him under the Facilitation Agreement
and the Tripartite Agreement and the huge increase in the
cost of project from Rs.75 Corers to Rs.130 Crores, the
tribunal has expressed the opinion that the proposed
amendments are bonafide and legitimate.
4. We see no perversity in the order of the tribunal
as is claimed on behalf of the petitioners. That apart, if
the petitioner is aggrieved by the order, it is for the
petitioners, if so advised, to prefer their remedy under
Section 34/Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, at the appropriate stage.
1
5. In the case of Nivedita Sharma v COAI , the
Supreme Court held that it is a settled law that when a
statutory forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained,
ignoring statutory dispensation.
1
(2011) 14 SCC 337
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2
6. In the case of Deep Industries v. ONGC after
considering the provisions of the Arbitration Act, it was
held that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution against judgments allowing or dismissing
first appeals, it was held as follows:
"16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law, in matters that
arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so provided in
this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first
appeal against certain judgments and orders and no
others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for
one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal
being filed [see Section 37(2) of the Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever
that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals
under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be
derailed and would not come to fruition for many years.
At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a
constitutional provision which remains untouched by the
non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these
circumstances, what is important to note is that though
petitions can be filed under Article 227 against
judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under
Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be
extremely circumspect in interfering with the same,
taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated
by us hereinabove so that interference is restricted to
orders that are passed which are patently lacking in
inherent jurisdiction.”
2
(2020) 15 SCC 706
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7. In the case of Bhaven Construction v.
3
Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd .
after noting the provisions of the Arbitration Act, and the
judgments of the Supreme Court, it was observed that it is
prudent for a judge to not exercise discretion to allow
judicial interference beyond the procedure established
under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in
exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless
under the statute or "bad faith" shown by one of the
parties. This high standard set by this Court is in terms of
the legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and
efficient. The Supreme Court observed as follows:
"21. Viewed from a different perspective, the
arbitral process is strictly conditioned upon time
limitation and modelled on the “principle of
unbreakability”. This Court in P. Radha Bai v. P.
Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 773] observed : (SCC p. 459, paras 36-37)
“36.3. Third, Section 34(3) reflects the principle
of unbreakability. Dr Peter Binder in International
Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation
in U NCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, 2nd Edn.,
observed:
3
(2022) 1 SCC 75
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‘An application for setting aside an award
can only be made during the three months
following the date on which the party making
the application has received the award. Only if
a party has made a request for correction or
interpretation of the award under Article 33
does the time-limit of three months begin
after the tribunal has disposed of the request.
This exception from the three month time-
limit was subject to criticism in the working
group due to fears that it could be used as a
delaying tactics. However, although “an
unbreakable time-limit for applications for
setting aside” was sought as being desirable
for the sake of “certainty and expediency” the
prevailing view was that the words ought to
be retained “since they presented the
reasonable consequence of Article 33.’
According to this “unbreakability” of time-limit
and true to the “certainty and expediency” of the
arbitral awards, any grounds for setting aside the
award that emerge after the three month time-limit
has expired cannot be raised.
37. Extending Section 17 of the Limitation Act
would go contrary to the principle of
“unbreakability” enshrined under Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act.”
If the courts are allowed to interfere with the
arbitral process beyond the ambit of the enactment,
then the efficiency of the process will be
diminished."
8. In view of the aforesaid, and given the remedy
of the petitioners under the provisions of Sections 34 and
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, we do not
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find that this is a fit case for interference under Article 227
of the Constitution. This petition is accordingly dismissed .
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave
of the court to challenge this order before the Supreme
Court. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we
decline to grant leave.
10. This order has been passed in the presence of
Sri.Siddharth Suman, learned counsel appearing for the
Caveator/respondent Nos.1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 and
Smt.Sandhya Susanna Bhaskar, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent No.3.
SD/-
(JAYANT BANERJI)
JUDGE
SD/-
(N.V.BHAVANI)
JUDGE
DR
List No.: 4 Sl No.: 1