Smt. Pratima Singh vs The State Of Bihar and Ors
- Court
- Patna High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.20889 of 2014
======================================================
Smt. Pratima Singh Wife of Shri Parmanand Pandey, resident of Mohalla-
Laxminarayan Nagar, Bela, P.O.- Ram Krishna Ashram, Bela, P.S.-
Mithanpura, District- Muzaffarpur
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of
Bihar, Patna
3. The Director, Integrated Child Development Services, Department of Social
Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna
4. The District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur
5. The District Public Relation Officer, Muzaffarpur
6. Shri Amar Nath Mishra, Joint Secretary, Department of Social Welfare,
Government of Bihar, Patna
7. The Special Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of Bihar,
Patna
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
with
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 8002 of 2017
======================================================
Smt. Pratima Singh wife of Shri Parmanand Pandey resident of mohalla -
Laxminarayan Nagar, Bela, P.O. - Ram Krishna Ashram, Bela, P.S. -
Mithanpura, District - Muzaffarpur.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
3. The Special Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of Bihar,
Patna.
4. The Director, Integrated Child Development Services, Department of Social
Welfare, Government of Bi
5. The District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur.
6. The District Public Relation Officer, Muzaffarpur.
7. The Joint Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of Bihar,
Patna.
8. Shri Amarnath Mishra, Retired, then the Additional Secretary, Department of
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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Social Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 20889 of 2014)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Binod Kumar Singh, Adv
Ms. Vagisha Pragya Vacaknavi, Adv
Ms. Diksha Raj
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Saroj Kumar Sharma, AC to AAG-3
(In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 8002 of 2017)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Binod Kumar Singh, Adv
Ms. Vagisha Pragya Vacaknavi, Adv
Ms. Diksha Raj, Adv
For the Respondent/s : Mr. M.K. Upadhyaya, AC to G.P.-3
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 18-09-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
C.W.J.C. No. 20889 of 2014
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following relief(s):
“(i) for issuance of appropriate writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the
resolution dated 04.08.2010 issued through
Letter No.3416, Department of Social
Welfare, Government of Bihar.
(ii) for issuance of appropriate writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing order
contained in Departmental Resolution
No.1444 dated 21.3.2013; which was neither
served upon the petitioner till date nor the
petitioner had knowledge about it. She came
to know about it when she received
Departmental Resolution contained in Memo
No. 4868 dated 20.10.2014 of Department of
Social Welfare, Government of Bihar in
which there is mention of the above
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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departmental resolution.
(iii) for issuance of any other order, direction
which the court may deem fit in the facts and
circumstances of the present case for the best
interest of justice.”
C.W.J.C. No. 8002 of 2017
3. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following relief(s):
“(i) That this is a writ petition on behalf of the
Petitioner for issuance of a writ of certiorari
or writs in the nature thereof or any other
appropriate writs/orders/directions for
quashing Notification contained in Memo
No.3373 dated 28.07.2016 of Respondent
No.7 whereby and where under 90% of
pension of the petitioner has been illegally
and with mala fide intent withheld under Rule
43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.”
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
4. The facts which are essential for adjudication of
both the writ petitions and are common, therefore, were heard
together with the consent and request of the parties. The
petitioner was appointed as a Child Development Project Officer
(CDPO) on 14.12.1985 under the Department of Social Welfare,
Government of Bihar, Patna. The petitioner was posted at
different places and while she was posted at Muzaffarpur, on
30.01.2004 an allegation was leveled against the petitioner by
some unknown persons, in the Janta Darbar of the District
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Magistrate, Muzaffarpur. On the basis of the said complaint, the
District Magistrate directed the District Public Relation Officer,
Muzaffarpur to conduct an enquiry. The District Public
Information Officer, Muzaffarpur vide his letter no.18 dated
30.01.2004, submitted his report before the District Magistrate,
Muzaffarpur. Pursuant thereto, the memo of charge was issued to
the petitioner and the petitioner submitted her reply on
13.10.2007. The District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, by his letter
contained in memo No.9-12/07-519 dated 08.02.2008, addressed
to the Director, Social Welfare Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna, sent the details of the earlier memo of charge,
issued to the petitioner, the reply submitted by her and the
enquiry conducted by the then District Public Relation Officer,
Muzaffarpur, for taking necessary decision. It is the case of the
petitioner that on the letter sent by the District Magistrate,
Muzaffarpur, a note sheet was sent by the concerned clerk of the
department to the Director, Social Welfare Department, who
found the allegations leveled against the petitioner to be not
tenable and without any recommendation, closed the file.
However, some officials/employees were inimical to the
petitioner, who obtained the file from the Secretariat and
presented it before the then Minister, Social Welfare,
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Government of Bihar, however, he agreed with the decision of
the Director, ICDS. It is the case of the petitioner that although,
the Minister agreed with the decision of the Director, ICDS, but
later on the Minister reviewed his decision/own order and
reopened the matter on 04.08.2010, which was closed and the
allegations against the petitioner was dropped. On 04.08.2010,
the petitioner was a Class-I officer and pay fixation of the
petitioner was also done on a Class-I post, therefore in terms of
Rule 32 of the Rules of Executive Business, the Chief Minister
was the competent authority to approve initiation of any
disciplinary proceeding against a Class-I officer. It is the case of
the petitioner that vide memo no.3416 dated 04.08.2010, a
decision was taken to initiate departmental proceeding against
the petitioner and the said decision was issued under the
approval of the Hon’ble Minister, Social Welfare Department
and as such the resolution itself is void ab initio, without
jurisdiction, since the initiation of departmental proceeding
against the petitioner could have been made on the direction of
the Hon’ble the Chief Minister, Bihar. The Additional Collector,
Bhagalpur was appointed as the Conducting Officer and he
submitted his enquiry report, which was not accepted by the
Government. The matter was remitted back to one Deputy
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Secretary of Social Welfare Department vide letter no.1454
dated 17.03.2012.The departmental proceeding was not
concluded by the said Deputy Secretary and thereafter one Joint
Secretary was appointed as the Enquiry Officer, however he
refused for the same. Thereafter, one another person namely Sri
Debkant Diwakar was appointed as the Enquiry Officer vide
letter contained in memo no.4678 dated 01.10.2012. The
petitioner submitted an application before the Enquiry Officer
with a request to remand the departmental proceeding to the
Additional Collector, Bhagalpur, who had submitted his report.
The petitioner in her letter, referred to the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the departmental
proceeding can be remanded, but the Enquiry Authority cannot
be changed. It is further case of the petitioner that Sri Debkant
Diwakar did not conclude the proceeding and he returned the file
to the department on the ground that the petitioner retired in the
meanwhile.
5. It is further case of the petitioner that although
she retired on 31.01.2013, however the respondent authorities
did not proceed with the conclusion of the departmental
proceeding, which was kept pending for almost 10 years,
although the petitioner was present on all the dates fixed during
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the departmental proceeding. Subsequently, one another officer
was appointed as the Enquiry Officer vide memo no.3844 dated
05.08.2013 and the Presenting Officer was also replaced. The
petitioner submitted an application before the Special Secretary,
Social Welfare Department, Government of Bihar on
31.08.2013, wherein she pointed out the illegally in continuing
the delayed departmental proceeding, on the basis of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
2005 (6) SCC 636, wherein it has been held that keeping the
departmental proceeding pending for more than 7 years, is in
violation of principles of justice. In the petition, she also pointed
out that although she retired on 31.01.2013 and proceeding under
CCA rules can be carried against the government servant in
service, therefore the same may not continue, in violation of the
provisions contained in CCA Rules, 2005. The petitioner
continued sending one letter/representation after another, before
the departmental authorities, pointing out that there is a
provision that the Conducting Officer and the Enquiry Officer
cannot be changed and the departmental proceeding cannot
continue/kept pending beyond a period of 7 years. It is further
case of the petitioner that the respondent no.6, who was the Joint
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare at the relevant time, is
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taking personal interest in the departmental proceeding against
the petitioner and he himself procured attendance of some so
called witnesses through his direct correspondence and therefore,
the petitioner filed a representation before the Enquiry Authority,
on 22.09.2014. A copy of the same was also forwarded to the
Principal Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, however, no
order was passed on the letter sent by the petitioner. It is further
case of the petitioner that no information was given to the
petitioner with regard to the conversion of departmental
proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, since
the petitioner has retired in the meanwhile. The petitioner wrote
a letter on 18.10.2014 to the Conducting Officer wherein she
stated that no information was given to her with regard to the
examination of the witnesses and the same were done behind her
back and despite asking for the copy of the examination of the
witnesses, the same has not been provided to her. The petitioner
came to know about the departmental resolution no.1444 dated
21.03.2013, through departmental resolution contained in memo
No.4868 dated 20.10.2014 and the resolution no.1444 dated
21.03.2013 was never communicated to the petitioner. It is
further case of the petitioner that despite her repeated request,
the departmental proceeding was not completed and therefore,
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the petitioner was constrained to file the present writ petition i.e.
C.W.J.C. No.20889 of 2014. Subsequently final decision was
taken in the departmental proceeding and vide memo no.3373
dated 28.07.2016 issued under the signature of the Joint
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Government of Bihar,
Patna, the punishment of stoppage of 90% of the pension of the
petitioner was taken in terms of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension
Rules.
6. The petitioner assailed the said order of
punishment by filing C.W.J.C. No.8002 of 2017, which is the
subject matter of one of the present writ petition. It is further case
of the petitioner that earlier also a departmental proceeding was
initiated against her, while she was posted at Runisaidpur vide
notification no.6749 dated 30.11.2005. The petitioner had filed a
writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No.15005 of 2005. This Hon’ble
court directed that the proceeding against the petitioner be
concluded within 9 months. Pursuant thereto, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report in 2006, wherein it was stated that the
allegation against the petitioner was not proved. The suspension
of the petitioner was revoked on 17.11.2006 and she was posted
at Raniganj in Araria district. It is the case of the petitioner that
some persons inimical to the petitioner were not satisfied with the
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said revocation of suspension of the petitioner, therefore, they got
initiated the present departmental proceeding against the
petitioner. It is further case of the petitioner that the documents
relating to deposition of witnesses and their alleged examination
in the departmental proceeding, which were made available to the
petitioner, were not attested or certified by the competent
authority. This fact was brought to the notice of the authority
concerned by the petitioner in paragraph no. 15 (1) to 15 (8) of
her second show cause reply. The petitioner asked for additional
copies of all those papers and also the entire order sheet, the
entire examination in chief/cross-examination of the witnesses,
cash book of payment of honorarium, cash book relating to
adjustment of Poshahar Agrim, bank register, files regarding
comments of the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur on the show
cause of the petitioner, the comments on the show cause filed by
Subhash Kumar and others, attested/certified copy of Poshahar
purchase register, in order to save herself from conspiracy
hatched against her. It is further case of the petitioner that the
petitioner came to know through RTI that the form K (Prapatra
ka) issued to the petitioner was approved by the Minister-in-
charge of the department and not by the Chief Minister, however,
the punishment order issued against the petitioner was approved
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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by the Hon’ble Chief Minister.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the Disciplinary Authority, while passing the order
impugned, without even considering the reply/second show
cause reply filed by the petitioner, came to the conclusion that
the petitioner is has been found guilty, during course of
enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority did not consider/apply his
mind to any of the defence taken by the petitioner in her second
show cause reply and without assigning any reason for
rejecting the explanation submitted by the petitioner, proceeded
to pass the order of punishment against him. He submits that
the non discussion or deliberation of the second show cause
reply makes the entire procedure of asking the second show
cause reply, upon submission of the enquiry report, from the
delinquent redundant. The opportunity offered to the delinquent
against the inconsistencies committed by the Enquiry Officer
during course of enquiry and failure on the part of the Enquiry
Officer and/or Presenting Officer in following the procedures,
are required to be looked into by the Disciplinary Authority and
for the said purpose, a second show cause notice is given in the
rules. It is obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority,
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before inflicting the harshest punishment, to consider the
explanation submitted by the delinquent. The learned counsel
for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order of
punishment or the enquiry report does not disclose about any
action taken against one Subhash Kumar, against whom same
allegation, like the petitioner was made in the year 2004.
Nothing has been done against him and only the petitioner has
been targeted for punishment, which shows the malafide
intention of the respondent authorities. He submits that from
perusal of page 17 of the enquiry report, it would transpire that
the petitioner with one Subhash Kumar connived to make
illegal demand from the Aanganbadi sevika and sahaika.
Despite enquiry report, nothing has been done against
SubhashKumar and the doctrine of equality applies to all who
are equally placed, even amongst the persons who are found
guilty. He submits that the persons who have been found guilty
can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish
discrimination, while imposing punishment, when all of them
are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents
has also to be maintained, when punishment is being imposed.
Punishment should not be disproportionate, while comparing
the involvement of co-delinquent, who are parties to the same
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transaction or incident.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner to support
the above contention refers to and relies upon a judgment
reported in 2013 (3) SCC 73, Rajendra Yadav v/s. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors. , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in paragraph no.9 has held as under:
“9. The doctrine of equality applies to all
who are equally placed; even among
persons who are found guilty. The persons
who have been found guilty can also claim
equality of treatment, if they can establish
discrimination while imposing punishment
when all of them are involved in the same
incident. Parity among co-delinquents has
also to be maintained when punishment is
being imposed. Punishment should not be
disproportionate while comparing the
involvement of co-delinquents who are
parties to the same transaction or incident.
The disciplinary authority cannot impose
punishment which is disproportionate i.e.
lesser punishment for serious offences and
stringent punishment for lesser offences.”
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the respondents chosen to single out the petitioner, while
completely exonerating/ignoring Subhash Kumar, against
whom identical allegation of connivance was leveled. The
selective prosecution and punishment of the petitioner,
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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constitute hostile discrimination and the same is in flagrant
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. He submits that the
manner in which the Enquiry Authority recorded the deposition
of witnesses, behind the back of the petitioner and called them
personally, acting as a Presenting Officer, without granting
opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine them, is nothing
but a colorable exercise of power. The evidence, recorded
behind the back of the delinquent cannot be the basis to punish
the delinquent. He submits that from perusal of Rule 43 (b) of
the Bihar Pension Rules, it would transpire that even after the
conclusion of the departmental inquiry, it is permissible for the
government to withhold pension etc., only when a finding is
recorded either in the departmental inquiry or in a judicial
proceeding that the employee had committed grave misconduct
in the discharge of her/his duty, while in office. He submits that
from perusal of the enquiry report and the impugned order of
punishment, it is clear that there is no finding to conclude that
the petitioner has committed grave misconduct in discharge of
her duty, while in office. Therefore, without coming to such
finding in any departmental proceeding or judicial proceeding,
no order of punishment, withholding 90% of pension, could
have been passed. The learned counsel for the Petitioner further
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submits that in memo of charge, the allegation was of demand
of money from Aanganbadi sevika and sahaika, however,
admittedly, there is no single charge that the action of the
petitioner caused any pecuniary loss to the government or
amounts to grave misconduct, which is necessary for awarding
punishment under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rule. He
submits that this Hon’ble Court has already settled that for
initiation and culmination of proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of
the Bihar Pension Rules 1950, two essential ingredients must
be satisfied namely, (i) the pensioner must be found guilty of
grave misconduct or (ii) he must be found to have caused
pecuniary loss to the government by misconduct or negligence.
In the present case, neither there is any such allegation nor the
same has been proved or any finding given on the same.
Therefore, the order of punishment is in teeth of Rule 43 (b) of
the Bihar Pension Rules and is required to be interfered with by
this Hon’ble Court.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner to
support his contention above mentioned, refers to and relies
upon a judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 22.01.2026
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 5541 of 2022 (Ganesh Prasad Yadav
vs The State of Bihar &Ors.) , wherein in paragraph no.15 it
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has been held as under:
“15. In addition thereto, this Court is of the
considered view that for initiation and
culmination of proceedings under Rule
43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, two
essential ingredients must be satisfied,
namely: (i) the pensioner must be found
guilty of grave misconduct; or (ii) he must
be found to have caused pecuniary loss to
the Government by misconduct or
negligence. In this regard, a Coordinate
Bench of this Court, in the case of Ganesh
Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar &Ors .,
decided on 03.08.2021, after considering a
catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India, has held as under:
“20. What amounts to misconduct, has been
lucidly explained by the Supreme Court in
case of Union of India v. J Ahmed reported
in (1979) 2 SCC 286. Paragraph 11 of
which reads as under:-
“11. Code of conduct as set out in the
Conduct Rules clearly indicates the
conduct expected of a member of the
service. It would follow that conduct
which is blameworthy for the government
servant in the context of Conduct Rules
would be misconduct. If a servant
conducts himself in a way inconsistent
with due and faithful discharge of his duty
in service, it is misconduct (see Pierce v.
Foster [17 QB 536, 542]). A disregard of
an essential condition of the contract of
service may constitute misconduct [see
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator
Newspapers [(1959) 1 WLR 698])]. This
view was adopted in
ShardaprasadOnkarprasad Tiwari
vDivisional Superintendent, Central
Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur [61
Bom LR 1596] , and Satubha K. Vaghela
v. Moosa Raza [10 Guj LR 23] . The High
Court has noted the definition of
misconduct in Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary which runs as under:
“Misconduct means, misconduct arising
from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors
of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not
constitute such misconduct.”
“In industrial jurisprudence amongst
others, habitual or gross negligence
constitute misconduct but in Utkal
Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti
Patnaik [AIR 1966 SC 1051 : (1966) 2
SCR 434 : (1966) 1 LLJ 398 : 28 FJR
131] in the absence of standing orders
governing the employee's undertaking,
unsatisfactory work was treated as
misconduct in the context of discharge
being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda
Menon v. Union of India [(1967) 2 SCR
566 : AIR 1967 SC 1274 : (1967) 2 LLJ
249] the manner in which a member of
the service discharged his quasi judicial
function disclosing abuse of power was
treated as constituting misconduct for
initiating disciplinary proceedings. A
single act of omission or error of
judgment would ordinarily not constitute
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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misconduct though if such error or
omission results in serious or atrocious
consequences the same may amount to
misconduct as was held by this Court in
P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta [AIR
1963 SC 1756: (1964) 2 SCR 104: (1963)
1 LLJ 679: 24 FJR 464] wherein it was
found that the two mistakes committed by
the employee while checking the load-
sheets and balance charts would involve
possible accident to the aircraft and
possible loss of human life and, therefore,
the negligence in work in the context of
serious consequences was treated as
misconduct. It is, however, difficult to
believe that lack of efficiency or
attainment of highest standards in
discharge of duty attached to public office
would ipso facto constitute misconduct.
There may be negligence in performance
of duty and a lapse in performance of
duty or error of judgment in evaluating
the developing situation may be
negligence in discharge of duty but would
not constitute misconduct unless the
consequences directly attributable to
negligence would be such as to be
irreparable or the resultant damage
would be so heavy that the degree of
culpability would be very high. An error
can be indicative of negligence and the
degree of culpability may indicate the
grossness of the negligence. Carelessness
can often be productive of more harm
than deliberate wickedness or
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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malevolence. Leaving aside the classic
example of the sentry who sleeps at his
post and allows the enemy to slip through,
there are other more familiar instances of
which a railway cabinmansignals in a
train on the same track where there is a
stationery traincausing head-on collision;
a nurse giving intravenous injection
which ought to be given intramuscular
causing instantaneous death; a pilot
overlooking an instrument showing snag
in engine and the aircraft crashes causing
heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy
can be a great evil (see
NavinchandraShakerchand Shah v.
Manager, Ahmedabad Coop. Department
Stores Ltd. [(1978) 19 Guj LR 108, 120]).
But in any case, failure to attain the
highest standard of efficiency in
performance of duty permitting an
inference of negligence would not
constitute misconduct nor for the purpose
of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would
indicate lack of devotion to duty."
(Emphasis
supplied).
“21. In a case of State of Punjab v. Ex-
Constable Ram Singh reported in (1992) 4
SCC 54, the Supreme Court had again the
occasion of dealing with the term
'misconduct' and laid down in paragraphs 5
and 6 as under:-
"5. Misconduct has been defined in
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at
page 999 thus:
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"A transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior,
wilful in character, improper or wrong
behavior, its synonyms are misdemeanor,
misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency,
impropriety mismanagement, offense, but
not negligence or carelessness."
Misconduct in office has been defined as:
"Any unlawful behavior by a public
officer in relation to the duties of his
office, wilful in character. Term embraces
acts which the office holder had no right
to perform, acts performed improperly,
and failure to act in the face of an
affirmative duty to act."
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon,
Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821 defines
'misconduct' thus:
"The term misconduct implies a wrongful
intention, and not a mere error of
judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily
the same thing as conduct involving
moral turpitude. The word misconduct is
a relative term, and has to be construed
with reference to the subject matter and
the context wherein the term occurs,
having regard to the scope of the Act or
statute which is being construed.
Misconduct literally means wrong
conduct or improper conduct. In usual
parlance, misconduct means a
transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left, except what necessity
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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may demand and carelessness, negligence
and unskilfulness are transgressions of
some established, but indefinite, rule of
action, where some discretion is
necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is
a violation of definite law: carelessness
or abuse of discretion under an indefinite
law. Misconduct is a forbidden act;
carelessness, a forbidden quality of an
act, and is necessarily indefinite.
Misconduct in office may be defined as
unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public
officer, by which the rights of a party have
been affected."
“6. Thus it could be seen that the word
'misconduct' though not capable of
precise definition, on reflection receives
its connotation from the context, the
delinquency in its performance and its
effect on the discipline and the nature of
the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it
must be improper or wrong behaviour;
unlawful behaviour, wilful in character;
forbidden act, a transgression of
established and definite rule of action or
code of conduct but not mere error of
judgment, carelessness negligence in
performance of the duty; the act
complained of bears forbidden quality or
character. Its ambit has to be construed
with reference to the subject matter and
the context wherein the term occurs,
regard being had to the scope of the
statute and the public purpose it seeks to
serve. The police service is a disciplined
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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service and it requires to maintain strict
discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes
discipline in the service causing serious
effect in the maintenance of law and
order."
(Emphasis supplied).
“22. Similar view has been taken by the
Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in
case of ZunjarraoBhikajiNagarkar v.
Union of India and Others reported in
(1999) 7 SCC 409, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in case of Ex Constable
Ram Singh (supra). ”
“23. In a subsequent decision in case of
Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of
Delhi and Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC
566, the Supreme Court held that an error of
judgment per se is not a misconduct and a
negligence simpliciter also would not be a
misconduct.”
“24. It is culled out on the basis of the
tentative notes of disagreement of the
Disciplinary Authority itself read with the
finding recorded by the Enquiring Authority
that the calculation done by the petitioner of
the amount of price neutralization was not
found to be excessive because of the proper
upkeep of the register but because the
monthly rates were not obtained from
Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Ltd.”
“25. Further, Mr. Shahi has rightly placed
reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in
case of Rajendra Yadav (supra). The
Disciplinary Authority has not dealt at all
with the finding recorded by the Enquiring
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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Authority in this regard in his report and
has thus admitted that no disciplinary action
was initiated against others, who had also
submitted the proposals in the same manner
in which, the petitioner had done.”
“26. Situated thus, keeping in mind such
findings of the Enquiring Authority in
respect of which no disagreement had been
recorded in the tentative notes of
disagreement, as has been discussed
hereinabove and the law on 'misconduct' as
adjudged by the Supreme Court in its
various judicial pronouncements noticed in
this judgment, I am of the considered view
that no case of grave misconduct has been
made out against the petitioner, which is a
prerequisite for action under Rule 43(b) of
the Bihar Pension Rules in the absence of
any pecuniary loss caused to the State;
warranting punishment of withholding of
pension. Resultantly, the impugned order
requires interference. The impugned order
dated 12.10.2017 issued vide letter no. 853
is hereby quashed, accordingly.”
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further
refers to and relies upon a judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated
23.04.2026 passed in C.W.J.C. No.7122 of 2025 ( Anil Kumar
v/s The State of Bihar &Ors.) , wherein in paragraph nos.6, 11
& 18 it has been held as under:
“6. In support of the aforesaid submissions,
reliance has been placed on the judgment of
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this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 4632 of 2020
(Harish Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar
&Ors.), particularly paragraph 10 thereof.
Further reliance has been placed on the
judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 5541 of 2022
(Ganesh Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar
&Ors.), reported in 2026 (2) PLJR 170
(paragraph 15), as well as the judgment in
C.W.J.C. No. 16576 of 2017 (Ganesh
Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar &Ors.),
reported in 2021 (3) PLJR 805 (paragraphs
18, 19, 20, and 26). Reliance has also been
placed on the Division Bench judgment in
L.P.A. No. 837 of 2023 (State of Bihar vs.
Arun Kumar Dubey), particularly
paragraph 21.”
11. After consideration of the arguments of
both the parties and upon perusal of the
record, it transpires to this Court that for the
purpose of reaching on the conclusion with
regard to the present case, it is necessary to
quote the law and the relevant portion of the
judgments on which petitioner has relied.
18. Upon perusal of the impugned order, it
transpires to this Court that no pecuniary
loss has been caused to the Government by
the actions of the petitioner. In light of the
applicable judgment, this Court further
finds that the allegations made do not
constitute gross misconduct.”
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the impugned order of punishment has been passed in the
proceeding, wherein the Director, ICDS and the Hon’ble Minister
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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had already held the charges to be untenable, however without
any power vested under the Bihar CCA Rules 2005, proceeding
was initiated against the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner
is a retired widow lady and requires sympathetic consideration by
this Hon’ble Court. She has not been paid a single farthing by the
Department after her retirement in 2013. He submits that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in catena of decisions has been
pleased to hold that pension is not a bounty or a matter of grace,
dependent on the employee's will. Instead, it is a statutory,
constitutional and earned right that serves as deferred
compensation for past service rendered.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT -STATE
13 . Per contra , the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State submits that in the departmental proceeding,
in which the petitioner participated, after retirement of the
Conducting Officer, Mr. Debkant Diwakar on 30.06.2013,
Amarnath Mishra, Additional Secretary in the Department was
appointed as the Conducting Officer, vide memo no.3844,
dated 05.08.2013. The Enquiry Officer fixed numerous dates
and the petitioner was communicated the same vide various
letters through post and not a single letter was returned
unserved. He submits that in the meantime on 24.09.2014, the
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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complainants, on whose complaint the departmental proceeding
was initiated against the petitioner, appeared and recorded their
statement and supported the allegation, which they had leveled
on 30.01.2004, before the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur in
Janata Darbar. All the complainants deposed before the Enquiry
Officer and supported the allegation against the Delinquent.
The Conducting Officer provided ample opportunity to the
petitioner to defend herself and sent all the documents through
letter no.4689, dated 10.10.2014, for cross-examination by
fixing different dates, however the petitioner did not choose to
appear before the Conducting Officer and as such finding no
other option, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report
dated 28.04.2014 on 30.04.2015. One departmental proceeding
was initiated by resolution contained in memo no.3416, dated
04.08.2010, whereby the allegation was of demanding illegal
money, for which proceeding no.15 of 2013 was initiated by
the Conducting Officer, in which the enquiry report was
submitted on 28.04.2015, wherein all the charges were proved.
Vide memo no.368, dated 31.01.2013 another proceeding was
initiated for financial irregularities, financial embezzlement and
defalcation. Several letters were sent to the petitioner to appear
in the proceeding, however she did not choose to appear and
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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left with no other option, paper publication was done, by fixing
28.01.2015 as the date. The petitioner appeared on the said date
and thereafter again she did not appear on any other date.
Finally, left with no other option, the enquiry report was
submitted on 28.04.2015 by finding all the charges to be
proved. The departmental proceeding was conducted in terms
of the Bihar CCA Rules 2005, however the petitioner did not
cooperate in the departmental proceeding and kept on raising
the issues, which were not concerned with the proceeding and
chose to appear in the proceeding as per her own wish. It is
further submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the
petitioner superannuated from service on 31.01.2013 and
therefore the departmental proceeding was converted under
Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules vide notification dated
20.10.2014. The petitioner assailed the said resolution by filing
writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No.22504 of 2014. He submits
that after submission of the enquiry report, second show cause
notice was issued to the petitioner on 14.05.2015. On
25.06.2015, the petitioner submitted her reply, however, the
same was not found to be satisfactory and therefore the
impugned order of punishment has been passed on 18.07.2016,
whereby it has been directed that 90% of the pension of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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petitioner will be forfeited. The proposal for awarding
punishment was sent before the B.P.S.C., Patna, for its advice
vide letter dated 14.09.2015 and after obtaining concurrence of
the B.P.S.C., Patna, the impugned order of punishment has
been passed. He submits that every effort was made by the
respondent authorities to give opportunity to the petitioner,
however she chose to appear as per her wish and therefore
there is no procedural irregularity on the part of the respondent
authorities. He submits that during her entire service period, the
conduct of the petitioner was unsatisfactory and time and again
she was proceeded with departmentally for various omission
and commission, such as dereliction of duty, defalcation,
corruption, which were found correct in the audit report and the
inquiry initiated. The learned counsel for the State submits that
the entire departmental proceeding conducted against the
petitioner was in accordance with law. He submits that the writ
petition filed by the petitioner bearing C.W.J.C. No.19980 of
2016, wherein the petitioner had prayed for quashing memo
no.3374 dated 28.07.2016, whereby the petitioner was
punished with an order of recovery of Rs.50,49,542.50/-, under
the provisions contained in Bihar and Odisha Public Demands
Recovery Act. The said writ petition was allowed and the order
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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contained in memo no.3374 dated 28.07.2016, whereby the
petitioner was punished with an order of recovery of
Rs.50,49,542.50/-, has been set aside.
14. The learned counsel for the State to support his
contention refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Full Bench of this Court reported in 2000 (1) PLJR 665 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Full Bench has held as follows:
“It is open to an to an authority concerned
to continue with a disciplinary enquiry
which was initiated before his retirement. In
our opinion, once such proceeding is
started, even if the person concerned retires
from service, such proceeding can be
continued and it is not required that there
must be any Government order to that effect
it can be allowed to continue. The Hon'ble
Court holds as follows:-
(i) In case where a disciplinary proceeding
has already been started, even if the person
concerns attains the age of Superannuation,
the enquiry may be continued under Rule 43
of the Bihar Pension Rules 1950 for the
limited purpose of taking such action as
provided under the said Rule even after such
superannuation and for that purpose no
specific or express order of the Government
is necessary.”
CONSIDERATION
15. Having considered the rival submissions and
after going through the records, it appears that the petitioner was
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appointed as a C.D.P.O. on 14.12.1985 and was posted at
different places. While she was posted at Muzaffarpur on
31.01.2004, an allegation was leveled against her by some
unknown persons in the Janata Darbar of the District Magistrate,
Muzaffarpur. The District Magistrate directed the District Public
Relation Officer, Muzaffarpur to conduct an enquiry and to
submit his report. The report was submitted before the District
Magistrate on 30.01.2004. Memo of charge was issued to the
petitioner and she submitted her reply on 13.10.2007. The
District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur vide his letter dated 08.02.2008
submitted/sent the details to the Director, Social Welfare
Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, with regard to the
earlier memo of charge issued to the petitioner, the reply
submitted by her and the report of the enquiry, conducted by the
District Public Relation Officer, Muzaffarpur, for taking
necessary decisions.
16. The department/Director found the allegations
leveled against the petitioner to be not tenable and the file was
closed without any recommendation. Subsequently on the
directions issued by the then Minister, Social Welfare,
Government of Bihar, Patna, the disciplinary proceeding against
the petitioner was initiated on 04.08.2010. So far the contention
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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of the petitioner that since the petitioner was a Class-I officer, the
departmental proceeding was to be initiated against her after
obtaining permission from Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Bihar
and not on the permission of the Minister, Social Welfare
Department is concerned, it appears to this Court that the same
cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the final order was
passed, after getting approval of the Chief Minister, Bihar. The
Conducting Officer as well as the Presenting Officer were
appointed, however, the proceeding against the petitioner was
kept on lingering, on one pretext or the other and the petitioner
did not cooperate in the departmental proceeding. She kept on
filing one letter or another, to remand the matter to the Additional
Collector, Bhagalpur, who had submitted his report. She kept on
levelling an allegation against the Enquiry Officer. In the
meantime, the petitioner superannuated from service on
31.01.2013 and the departmental proceeding could not be
completed for the one reason or another. The petitioner submitted
an application/letter wherein she alleged that she has retired on
31.01.2013 and proceeding under CCA Rules can be carried
against a government servant in service, therefore the same may
not continue in violation of the provisions contained in CCA
Rules 2005. The petitioner further submitted a letter that in terms
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the
proceedings against the petitioner cannot continue beyond a
period of 7 years and levelled certain allegations against the
respondent no.6, who was the Joint Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare at the relevant time, with regard to him taking
personal interest in the departmental proceeding against the
petitioner. She submitted that the respondent no.6 himself
procured attendance of some of the so called witnesses through
his direct correspondence and therefore she again submitted a
representation before the Enquiry Officer. The departmental
proceeding, which was initiated against the petitioner, was
converted into a proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar
Pension Rules, since the petitioner had superannuated on
31.01.2013. She filed C.W.J.C. No.20889 of 2014, wherein she
prayed for quashing the resolution dated 04.08.2010 and the
resolution dated 21.03.2013, on the ground that the same were
never served upon the petitioner. Subsequent to filing of the
present writ petition, a final decision was taken in the
departmental proceeding and vide memo no.3373 dated
28.07.2016, issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary,
Department of Social and Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna,
the punishment of stoppage of 90% of the pension of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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petitioner was passed, in terms of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar
Pension Rules. The petitioner assailed the same by filing
C.W.J.C. No.8002 of 2017.
17. Both the writ petitions were heard together, and
the judgment was reserved by this Court. It further appears from
the records that earlier also a departmental proceeding was
initiated against the petitioner, while she was posted at
Runisaidpur on 30.11.2005. The petitioner filed a writ petition
bearing C.W.J.C. No.15005 of 2005. This Hon’ble Court
directed for conclusion of the departmental proceeding within a
period of 9 months and pursuant thereto, the suspension of the
petitioner was revoked on 17.11.2006. In the present proceeding,
the petitioner kept on asking for one document or the other and
she did not participate in the enquiry proceeding. After
retirement of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent no.6 was
appointed as the Conducting Officer on 05.08.2013. The Enquiry
Officer fixed numerous dates and the petitioner was
communicated the same by various letters through post. Not a
single letter was returned unserved and the petitioner did not
participate in the proceeding. The complainants, on whose
complaint the departmental proceeding was initiated against the
petitioner, appeared and recorded their statement on 24.09.2014.
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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They supported the charge/allegation of receiving illegal
gratification against the petitioner, which they had alleged on
30.01.2004 in the Janta Darbar of the District Magistrate,
Muzaffarpur. All the complainants deposed before the Enquiry
Officer. The petitioner was granted an opportunity vide letter
dated 10.10.2014 for cross-examination of the witnesses, by
fixing different date, however the petitioner did not choose to
appear before the Conducting Officer and in absence of the
appearance of the petitioner, the Enquiry Officer, left with no
other option submitted his enquiry report on 28.04.2015. The
petitioner had earlier also filed a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C.
No. 22504 of 2014, by which she had assailed memo no.4868
dated 2014, by which the proceeding, which was converted
under Rule 43 (b) by Department Resolution No.4736 dated
23.09.2013 was clubbed with Department Resolution No.1444
dated 21.03.2013. The said writ petition was disposed of as not
pressed vide order dated 16.08.2023. The second show-cause
notice was issued to the petitioner on 14.05.2015. She submitted
her reply on 25.06.2015, however the Disciplinary Authority did
not find the same to be satisfactory and proceeded to pass the
order of punishment, whereby it has been directed that 90 % of
the pension of the petitioner will be forfeited. The proposal for
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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awarding punishment was sent before the B.P.S.C., Patna, for its
advice vide letter dated 14.09.2015 and after obtaining
concurrence of the B.P.S.C., Patna, the order of punishment
dated 28.07.2016 has been passed. It appears from the record
that during course of departmental proceeding, opportunity was
granted to the petitioner to participate in the same, however for
the reasons best known to her, she chose to appear as and when
she desired to appear. This Court after going through the enquiry
report finds that there is no infirmity in the enquiry report, since
witnesses were examined and opportunity was granted to the
petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses, however she did not
do so. It appears from the record that while passing the
impugned order of punishment, the Disciplinary Authority did
not consider the second show-cause reply submitted by the
petitioner and the defence taken by the petitioner in the second
show-cause reply, which was elaborate one.
18. During course of hearing of the case, the
learned counsel for the petitioner had made two fold submissions
with regard to passing of order of punishment under Rule 43 (b)
of the Bihar Pension Rules. The first submission was that since
the punishment against the petitioner has been passed under Rule
43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, therefore, it was incumbent
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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upon the authorities concerned to come to the conclusion that the
petitioner has committed grave misconduct in discharge of her
duty, while in her office and without coming to such finding in
any departmental proceeding or judicial proceeding, no
punishment order, withholding of pension could have been
passed. The second submission was that for initiation of
departmental proceedings/conversion of departmental
proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, two
essential ingredients must be satisfied, namely (i) the petitioner
must be found guilty of grave misconduct or (ii) he/she must be
found to have caused pecuniary loss to the government by
misconduct or negligence. It has been submitted that in the
present case, neither there is any such allegation, nor the same
has been proved or any finding has been given to that respect.
19. This Court upon careful examination of the
records finds that the allegation against the petitioner is of taking
bribe from Aanganbadi sevika and sahaika, which amounts to
corruption and it comes under the definition of grave
misconduct. Therefore, there is no infirmity in conversion of the
proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.
20. In a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India reported in 2026 INSC 639 (Surekha Domaji
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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Bele Vs The Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL) ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph no.106 to 110
has held as under:
“106. Dismissal from service is the severest
form of penalty which can be inflicted on a
delinquent employee in service jurisprudence.
It brings the relationship of employer and
employee to an end permanently, and
ordinarily deprives the employee of the
incidents of past service, including retiral
benefits. It does not lead merely to the loss of
the existing source of income for the employee
but also for the dependent family members.
Thus, it will have a devastating effect not only
on the dismissed employee but also on all
those who are dependant on the employee.
Because of the severity of its impact not only
on the employee but also to his dependents,
the disciplinary authority must be very careful
in seeking to impose the severest form of
punishment of dismissal. It further carries
consequences beyond immediate cessation of
employment. It leaves a permanent stigma on
the service record of the employee concerned,
and may impair future employment prospects,
particularly in public employment, statutory
bodies, public sector undertakings and other
regulated establishments where antecedents
and service record are material. For this
reason, dismissal must remain reserved for
cases where the misconduct is of the most
serious nature where elements of synthetic
consideration would be undesirable and
inappropriate.
107. The misconduct found proved against the
Appellant relates to indiscipline,
insubordination, and the consequent
tampering with documents. We are not
minimizing the importance of discipline in an
office establishment. However, the material
presently noticed does not show corruption,
illegal gratification, moral turpitude,
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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misappropriation of funds, proved pecuniary
loss to the employer, public scandal, or
conduct bringing the institution into public
disrepute. The allegations substantially
appear to arise out of internal office
functioning and service-related conflict and
did not play out in the public domain.
108. In the present case, we do not find that
the competent authority undertook such an
exercise of evaluating various relevant
factors. The order does not reflect
consideration of the Appellant's long service,
past record, age, absence or presence of
dishonesty, or absence or presence of actual
loss as also commended by the Labour Court.
109. Even where the Regulations include
dismissal as one of the permissible
punishments for acts of misconduct, the
authority is not relieved of its duty to consider
all relevant factors to see whether the facts of
the case truly warrant the most extreme form
of penalty. The mere fact that a proved act
falls within the broad category of
"misconduct" under the Regulations does not
mean that dismissal must follow as a matter of
course.
110. Dismissal is ordinarily justified where
the misconduct is of such gravity that
continuance of the employee would be wholly
incompatible with discipline, trust or
institutional functioning. Cases involving
corruption, illegal gratification, moral
turpitude, misappropriation, acts causing
substantial loss to the employer, or conduct
showing complete unfitness for continued
service stand on a different footing. (However,
where the misconduct does not involve
corruption, moral turpitude, financial
misappropriation or proved loss to the
employer, and where there is long service
without much blemish, the disciplinary
authority must carefully examine whether any
lesser punishment would meet the ends of
justice.”
21. From reading of the decision of the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court of India in the case of Surekha Domaji Bele
(Supra) , this Court finds that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India has held that where the misconduct is of such gravity that
continuance of the employee would be wholly incompatible with
discipline, trust or institutional functioning. Cases involving
corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude,
misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer or
conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand
on a different footing. In the present case, the charges against the
petitioner are with regard to accepting illegal gratification from
Aanganbadi sevika and sahaika, which comes within the purview
of grave misconduct. Therefore, this Court does not find any
infirmity with regard to conducting the proceeding under Rule
43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. However, from a bare perusal
of the impugned order of punishment dated 28.07.2016, it would
transpire that the Disciplinary Authority did not take into account
the defence taken by the petitioner in her reply to the second
show cause notice. The Disciplinary Authority proceeded to pass
the order without any consideration of the said reply and
therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the matter
deserves to be remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority from
the stage of passing fresh order, after consideration of the reply,
Patna High Court CWJC No.20889 of 2014 dt.18-09-2026
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which was submitted by the petitioner on 25.06.2015.
Accordingly the order impugned contained in memo no.3373
dated 28.07.2016 passed by the Joint Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna, whereby
punishment of deduction of 90% of pension of the petitioner has
been imposed, is set aside.
22. The matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary
Authority for taking fresh decision, after considering the reply to
the second show cause notice dated 25.06.2015, filed by the
petitioner and to pass fresh order in accordance with law. This
Court is conscious of the fact that the petitioner has
superannuated from service on 31.01.2013 and the departmental
proceeding against her was kept pending for a long time,
however the allegation against the petitioner is grave in nature
and the decision to remand has been taken after considering the
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India passed in the
case of Surekha Domaji Bele (Supra) , wherein in paragraph
no.111.10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as
follows:
“111.10. Since the Appellant has already
crossed the age of superannuation, no
direction for reinstatement can be issued at
this stage. The monetary and retiral
consequences, if any, shall abide by the fresh
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order to be passed by the competent authority
in terms of this judgment and the applicable
Regulations."
23. Accordingly, in view of the directions given
above, the writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned
above. The Disciplinary Authority is directed to pass fresh order
after considering the reply dated 25.06.2015, submitted by the
petitioner within a period of three months from the date of
receipt/production of a copy of the order. The fresh order to be
passed by the Disciplinary Authority will be always open to
challenge by the petitioner in accordance with law. The decision
with regard to payment of entire pension to the petitioner, will
abide by the fresh decision to be taken by the Disciplinary
Authority.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
shital/- (Ritesh Kumar, J)
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE 14-07-2026
Uploading Date 18-09-2026
Transmission Date N/A