RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED vs SANTOSH KUMAR AND ANOTHER
- Court
- High Court of Himachal Pradesh
1 2026:HHC:20653
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
High Court of H.P.
FAO (MV) No. : 41 of 20 20
th
Reserved on : 07 May, 2026
th
Decided on 30 : May , 2026
Reliance General Insurance
Company Limited ...Appellant
Versus
Santosh Kumar & Another ...Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the appellant : Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate, for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
Virender Singh, Judge
AppellantReliance General Insurance Company
Limited, through its Manager, has preferred the present
appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the M.V. Act’), against the award
dated 31.10.2019, passed by learned Motor Accident Claims
TribunalII, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla,
H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MACT’), in M.A.C.T.
1
Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Petition No.149 of 2017, titled as ‘Santosh Kumar versus
High Court of H.P.
Joginder Singh & Another’.
2. By way of award dated 31.10.2019, the learned
MACT has allowed the claim petition, filed by respondent
No.1, under Section 166 of MV Act, by awarding a sum of
Rs.02,22,000/ with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum,
from the date of filing of the petition, till realization of the
amount, by fastening the ultimate liability to pay the
compensation amount, along with interest, upon the
appellantinsurer.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the
present lis are, hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner,
in which, they were referred to, by the learned MACT.
4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of present appeal,
before this Court, as emerge from the record, may be summed
up, as under:
4.1. Petitioner Santosh Kumar, has filed the claim
petition, under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, against the
respondents, seeking compensation on account of the injuries
sustained by him in a road side accident involving vehicle
No.HP01K5100 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending
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vehicle’), having taken place on 28.05.2015, at about 7.00
High Court of H.P.
p.m., at Kotgali, near village Kotlu, District Mandi, H.P.
4.2. According to the petitioner, he was travelling in
the offending vehicle, being driven by respondent No.1
Joginder Singh, in a rash and negligent manner and when the
offending vehicle reached at Kotlu, he could not control the
same and rolled down into the deep gorge. Consequently, the
petitioner sustained injuries.
4.3. After the accident, the petitioner was taken to
CHC Anni, where first aid was given to him. Thereafter, he
was shifted to IGMC Shimla, where, he remained admit for 21
days, as indoor patient. According to the petitioner, he has
spent a sum of Rs.1,50,000/, on his medical treatment and
is still under treatment.
4.4. The information regarding the accident was given
to Police Station Karsog, District Mandi, where, FIR No.75 of
2015, dated 29.05.2015, has been registered. The petitioner
has also asserted his bright past and bleak future by pleading
that he has become 10% permanently disabled due to the
injuries sustained by him in the accident, in question.
5. Since, the accident, in question, has solely been
attributed to the rash and negligent driving of respondent
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No.1 (ownercumdriver), as such, the petitioner has sought
High Court of H.P.
an amount of Rs.20,00,000/ as compensation from the
respondents.
6. When put to notice, the claim petition has been
contested by the respondents.
7. Respondent No.1, has filed the separate reply, by
taking the preliminary objections that the petition, as filed, is
not maintainable, as, he was neither rash nor negligent, but
the accident had taken place due to the mechanical defect,
which had suddenly occurred in the vehicle. To buttress his
contentions, respondent No.1 has further pleaded that after
investigation, cancellation report has been filed before the
Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog. He
has also taken the preliminary objections that the petitioner
has not approached the Court with clean hands; and the
learned MACT has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the
present petition.
8. On merits, the claim petition has been contested,
on the ground, that the accident had taken place due to the
mechanical defect, which had suddenly occurred in the
offending vehicle. Other contents of the claim petition have
also been denied mainly for want of knowledge.
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9. Insurance Companyinsurer of the offending
High Court of H.P.
vehicle filed its separate reply, by taking the preliminary
objections that the claim petition is not maintainable; the
offending vehicle was being plied, in violation of the terms and
conditions of the Insurance Policy; the driver of the offending
vehicle was not holding valid and effective driving licence, at
the time of the accident; the petitioner was travelling in the
vehicle as gratuitous passenger; and the claim petition has
been filed by the petitioner in collusion with respondent No.1.
10. On merits, the contents of the claim petition have
been denied for want of knowledge.
11. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal
of the claim petition.
12. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned
MACT has framed the following issues, vide order dated
04.04.2018:
1. Whether the petitioner sustained injuries on
28.05.2015, at about 7.00 p.m., at place Kotgali
near Kotlu, due to rash and negligent driving of
driver of vehicle bearing No.HP01K5100
(Bolero), as alleged? OPP
2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what
amount of compensation, the petitioners are
entitled and from whom? OPP
3. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the
present form? OPR 1&2
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4. Whether the petitioner has not come to the Court
with clean hands, as alleged? OPR1
High Court of H.P.
5. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle was
not having a valid and effective driving license at
the time of accident, as alleged? OPR2
6. Whether the vehicle was being plied in
contravention of the terms and conditions of
insurance policy, as alleged? OPR2
7. Whether the petition is filed in collusion with
respondent No.1? OPR2
8. Whether the petitioner was traveling as
gratuitous passenger in the vehicle at the time of
accident? OPR2
9. Relief.
13. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to
adduce evidence.
14. After the closure of evidence and after hearing
learned counsel for the parties, the learned MACT has allowed
the claim petition, as referred to above.
15. Feeling aggrieved from the said award passed by
the learned MACT, respondent No.2Insurance Company/
insurer of the offending vehicle, has assailed the said award
before this Court, on the ground, that in the present case, the
petitioner could not prove that sine qua non for claiming the
compensation i.e., rash and negligent driving on the part of
the driver of the offending vehicle. Although FIR has been
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lodged against respondent No.1 and the same has been
High Court of H.P.
exhibited as PW1/B, however, the police, thereafter, has filed
the cancellation report, which has now been accepted by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog.
16. All these facts have been pleaded to demonstrate
that sine qua non for seeking the compensation, i.e., rash and
negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, has not
been proved. The award has been assailed on the ground
that the learned MACT has wrongly ignored the cancellation
report submitted by the police and according to the appellant
insurer, the claim petition is required to be dismissed on this
score, by setting aside the award passed by learned MACT.
17. The award has also been assailed on the ground
that while deciding issue No.5, the learned MACT has erred in
holding that the driver of the offending vehicle was holding a
valid and effective driving licence.
18. The amount of compensation, which has been
awarded to the petitioner has also been prayed to be reduced
on the ground that the learned MACT has taken the monthly
income of the claimant as Rs.10,500/, by treating him as
mason, whereas, no evidence qua this fact has been adduced
by the petitioner.
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19. Insurance Company, has thus, prayed that in the
High Court of H.P.
absence of any evidence, the income of the petitioner can be
said to be Rs.192/ per day or to say Rs.5760/ per month,
on the basis of the minimum wages prevailing at the relevant
time.
20. The award has also been assailed on the ground
that the learned MACT has wrongly taken the disability as
10%. According to the Insurance Company, the age of the
petitioner, at the time of accident has been pleaded as 46
years, as such, the learned MACT has wrongly applied the
multiplier of 13 instead of 12. Similarly, the rate of interest,
as awarded as 7.5%, is also sought to be reduced.
21. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Jagdish
Thakur, Advocate, has prayed that the appeal may kindly be
allowed by setting aside the award and reducing the amount
of compensation.
22. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Sharma and Mr. Varun
Chauhan, Advocates, appearing for the respondents, have
supported the award and argued that the learned MACT has
rightly allowed the petition and the appeal, being devoid of
any merit, may kindly be dismissed.
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23. In this case, the controversy is confined to the fact
High Court of H.P.
as to whether the amount, which has been awarded by the
learned MACT, falls within the definition of ‘just
compensation’, as, the endeavour of the Court should be to
provide “just compensation”.
24. While holding so, the view of this Court is being
guided by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Oriental
Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and
another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987, wherein it has been held
that the provisions of M.V. Act are beneficial piece of
legislation and the endeavour of the Court should be to
provide “just compensation” to the petitioner. The relevant
paras 23 and 24 of the judgment are reproduced as under:
“23. Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are
beneficent legislation insofar as they provide for
payment of compensation to the workmen
employed by the employers and/or by use of
motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the
insurer to the petitioners suffering permanent
disability. The amount of compensation is to be de
termined in terms of the provisions of the
respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act,
the Commissioner who is a quasi judicial
authority, is bound to apply the principles and the
factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of de
termining the compensation, Section 168 of the
1988 Act enjoins the Tribunal to make an award
determining the amount of compensation which ap
pears to be just.
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24. Both the Acts aim at providing for
expeditious relief to the victims of accident. In these
cases, the accidents took place by
reason of use of motor vehicles. Both the statutes
are beneficial ones for the workmen as also the
third parties. The benefits thereof are available
only to the persons specified under the Act besides
under the Contract of Insurance. The statutes,
therefore, deserve liberal construction. The
legislative intent contained therein is required to be
interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.”
High Court of H.P.
(self emphasis supplied)
25. While determining the stand of the Insurance
Company visàvis ‘just compensation’, this Court has to
consider the evidence, so adduced, by the petitionerclaimant,
before the learned MACT, to determine the fact as to whether
the amount of compensation, which has been awarded, falls
within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not or the same
is liable to be reduced, as prayed by the appellant.
26. The factum of accident has not been disputed,
but, according to the ownercumdriver, the same had taken
place due to sudden mechanical defect, which had occurred
in the offending vehicle. In this background, evidence of the
parties is to be discussed. After framing issues, petitioner
Santosh Kumar has tendered in evidence his affidavit as
Ex.PW1/A, in his examination in chief, which is based upon
the averments, as made in the application.
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27. In addition to the affidavit, the petitioner has
High Court of H.P.
tendered in evidence copy of FIR Ex.PW1/B, discharge slip
Mark ‘X1’, disability certificate Mark X, School Leaving
Certificate Ex.PW1/D and medical bills Ex.P1 to P32.
28. In the crossexamination by learned counsel for
the Insurance Company, the petitioner has admitted that
total nine persons were travelling in the offending vehicle, out
of them, seven had expired. He has denied the suggestion
that being the mason, he is getting work occasionally. Rest,
he has denied all the suggestions put to him by the learned
counsel for the Insurance Company.
29. PW2 Sanjay Kumar, although, deposed in favour
of the petitioner about the accident, in question, but, his
affidavit is totally silent about the fact as to whether he was
present on the spot or not. As such, his evidence does not
fall within the definition of direct evidence, as per the
conditions of Section 60 of the Evidence Act (Section 55 of the
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam).
30. PW3 Dr. Asheesh Sharma, Assistant Director,
Orthopedics, Directorate of Health Services, Shimla, has
proved the disability certificate Ex.PW3/A, in which, it has
been mentioned that the Board has found 10% permanent
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disability, with respect to the right lower limb of the
High Court of H.P.
petitioner. He has further deposed that with 10% disability, a
person can perform his daily routine work, however, he
cannot be able to carry heavy load over long distance.
31. On the other hand, respondent No.1, has placed
on record copy of registration certificate Ex.RW1/A, copy of
Insurance Policy Ex.RW1/B, Contract Carriage Permit
Ex.RW1/C, Fitness Certificate Ex.RW1/D and copy of
Driving Licence Ex.RW1/E, whereas, the Insurance
Company has tendered the certified copy of the award dated
02.05.2018, in case RBT No.41R/2 of 2016/15 Ex.R1,
Certified copy of statements of RW1 to RW4 in case RBT
No.41R/2 of 2016/15, as Ex.R2.
32. In view of the evidence so discussed above, the
first and foremost question, which arises for determination,
before this Court, is about the fact whether the driver of
offending vehicle was having a valid and effective driving
licence to drive the vehicle at the relevant time.
33. As per the documentary evidence adduced on the
file, copy of RC of the offending vehicle is Ex.RW1/A. As per
this document, the offending vehicle is Bolero LX 2WD 7
Seater and its seating capacity is 9 and the said vehicle was
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having the contract carriage permit from 27.1.2012 to
High Court of H.P.
31.08.2015. The accident in question had taken place on
28.5.2015. Meaning thereby, at the relevant time, the
offending vehicle was having the valid contract carriage
permit. Fitness certificate was also valid and the driver was
holding a valid and effective driving licence, copy of which is
Ex.RW1/E. As per Ex.RW1/E, the holder of the driving
licence was authorized to drive LMV w.e.f. 8.9.2003.
34. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Cout in
Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Ltd.
Versus Rambha Devi & Others, (2025) 3 Supreme Court
Cases 95, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing
for the Insurance Company qua the fact that the driver of the
offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving
licence, are devoid of any merit, as the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in the above case, has held that the driver, who is
having driving licence to drive LMV can legally drive transport
vehicle below the gross weight of 7500 kg. Relevant
paragraphs 175 to 181 of the judgment are reproduced as
under:
175. The licensing regime under the MV Act and
the MV Rules, when read as a whole, does not
provide for a separate endorsement for operating
a ‘Transport Vehicle’, if a driver already holds a
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LMV license. We must however clarify that the
exceptions carved out by the legislature for special
vehicles like ecarts and erickshaws, or vehicles
carrying hazardous goods, will remain unaffected
by the decision of this Court.
High Court of H.P.
176. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the
definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of the MV Act
explicitly provides what a ‘Transport Vehicle’
‘means’. This Court must ensure that neither
provision i.e. the definition under Section 2(21) or
the second part of Section 3(1) which concerns the
necessity for a driving license for a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ is reduced to a dead letter of law.
Therefore, the emphasis on ‘Transport Vehicle’ in
the licensing scheme has to be understood only in
the context of the ‘medium’ See Rule 8A of MV
Rules,’Minimum training required for driving E
rickshaw or Ecart’ See Rule 9 of MV Rules,
’Educational Qualification for drivers of goods
carriages carrying dangerous or hazardous goods’
and ‘heavy’ vehicles. This harmonious reading
also aligns with the objective of the 1994
amendment in Section 10(2) to simplify the
licensing procedure.
177. The above interpretation also does not defeat
the broader twin objectives of the MV Act i.e. road
safety and ensuring timely compensation and
relief for victims of road accidents. The aspect of
road safety is earlier discussed at length. An
authoritative pronouncement by this Court would
prevent insurance companies from taking a
technical plea to defeat a legitimate claim for
compensation involving an insured vehicle
weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person
holding a driving license of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’
class.
178. In an era where autonomous or driverless
vehicles are no longer tales of science fiction and
appbased passenger platforms are a modern
reality, the licensing regime cannot remain static.
The amendments that have been carried out by
the Indian legislature may not have dealt with all
possible concerns. As we were informed by the
Learned Attorney General that a legislative
exercise is underway, we hope that a
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comprehensive amendment. The classes medium
goods vehicle[(10(2)(e)], medium passenger
vehicle[10(2)(f)],heavy goods vehicle[10(2)(g)] and
heavy passenger vehicle [10(2)(h)] were deleted and
a new class ‘Transport Vehicle’ was introduced in
Section 10(2)(e) to address the statutory lacunae will
be made with necessary corrective measures.
High Court of H.P.
179. Just to flag one concern, the legislature through
the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2)(e) in order to
introduce ‘transport vehicle’ as a separate class
could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle
(which continued as a distinct class) along with
medium, and heavy vehicles into a single class.
Else, it would give rise to a situation in which Sri
(our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in
the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training
relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which
requires a much higher degree of endurance and
athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure
that the statute remains practical and workable.
180. Now harking back to the primary issue and
noticing that the core driving skills (as enunciated in
the earlier paragraphs), expected to be mastered by
all drivers are universal – regardless of whether the
vehicle falls into “Transport” or “NonTransport”
category, it is the considered opinion of this Court
that if the gross vehicle weight is within 7,500 kg
the quintessential common man’s driver Sri, with
LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”.
We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of
the parties in this case has produced any empirical
data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence
holder, driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’, is a significant
cause for road accidents in India. The additional
eligibility criteria as specified in MV Act and MV
Rules as discussed in this judgment will apply only
to such vehicle (‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium
passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy
passenger vehicle’), whose gross weight exceeds
7,500 Kg. Our present interpretation on how the
licensing regime is to operate for drivers under the
statutory scheme is unlikely to compromise the road
safety concerns. This will also effectively address
the livelihood issues for drivers operating Transport
Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the
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wheels), in legally operating “Transport vehicles”
(below 7,500 Kg), with their LMV driving license.
Perforce Sri must drive responsibly and should have
no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot
(as mentioned in the first paragraph), while he is
behind the wheels. Such harmonious interpretation
will substantially address the vexed question of law
before this Court.
High Court of H.P.
181. Our conclusions following the above discussion
are as under:
(I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle
(LMV) class, under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with
a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted
to operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without needing
additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the
MV Act specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class.
For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport
Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An
overlap exists between the two. The special
eligibility requirements will however continue to
apply for, inter alia, ecarts, erickshaws, and
vehicles carrying hazardous goods.
(II) The second part of Section 3(1), which
emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement
to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ does not supersede
the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the
MV Act.
(III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the
MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving ‘transport
vehicles’ would apply only to those intending to
operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding
7,500 kg i.e. ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium
passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy
passenger vehicle’.
(IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is
upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this
judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission,
the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain
provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not
considered in the said judgment.”
(self emphasis supplied)
35. If the facts and circumstances of the present case
are seen, in the light of the above decision of the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court, as per the registration certificate gross weight
High Court of H.P.
of the offending vehicle does not exceed 7500 kgs. As such,
the arguments of learned counsel for the Insurance Company,
in this regard, are rejected.
36. The Insurance Company has also assailed the
award on the ground of the quantum. Learned MACT has
taken the income of the petitioner as 350/ per day, whereas,
the petitioner has pleaded that he was earning Rs.30,000/
per month. According to him, he is mason by profession and
is also earning from agricultural and horticulture pursuits.
This stand was reiterated by the petitioner, while appearing in
the witnessbox, as PW1. The assertion, qua his income as
Rs.30,000/ per month, has not been suggested to be false by
the learned counsel for the Insurance Company.
37. PW2, Sanjay Kumar, has been examined by the
petitioner to prove that his daily wages were Rs.600/ per day
as the petitioner was working as skilled mason. In the cross
examination, a suggestion was given to this witness that the
daily wages of mason was Rs.300/, but, he volunteered that
it was Rs.600/. Admittedly, the work of a mason is seasonal
one. At the relevant time, the minimum wages of the skilled
worker, including mason was Rs.214.17/ per day or to say
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Rs.6425/ per month. However, in the present case, the
High Court of H.P.
petitioner has deposed, on oath, that he was earning
Rs.30,000/ per month. In such situation, this Court has to
take a holistic view by holding that considering the
urbanization in the State, it cannot be expected from a skilled
mason to work on minimum wages. Atleast, petitioner might
be earning Rs.300/ per day, or to say Rs.9,000/ per month.
38. So far as the disability is concerned, as per the
document Ex.PW3/A, the Board found 10% disability, which
is permanent in nature, in relation to his right lower limb.
This certificate has been proved by PW3, Dr. Asheesh
Sharma, who has categorically stated that with this disability,
petitioner can perform his daily routine work, however, he
cannot carry heavy load over long distance.
39. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govind Yadav versus
New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2012 ACJ 28 has
held that while assessing the amount of compensation,
disability of a person is to be taken into consideration, as, an
injured is not only to be compensated for the physical injury,
but, also for the loss, which he suffered, as a result of such
injury. Relevant paragraphs 12 to 16 of the judgment are
reproduced as under:
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12. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2009) 13
SCC 422, this Court reiterated that the
compensation awarded under the Act should be
just and also identified the factors which should
be kept in mind while determining the amount of
compensation. The relevant portions of the
judgment are extracted below:
High Court of H.P.
"The compensation which is required to be
determined must be just. While the claimants are
required to be compensated for the loss of their
dependency, the same should not be considered
to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be
discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of
the fact that in given cases, as for example death
of the only son to a mother, she can never be
compensated in monetary terms. The question as
to the methodology required to be applied for
determination of compensation as regards
prospective loss of future earnings, however, as
far as possible should be based on certain
principles. A person may have a bright future
prospect; he might have become eligible to
promotion immediately; there might have been
chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in
another (sic situation) the nature of employment
was such that he might not have continued in
service; his chance of promotion, having regard to
the nature of employment may be distant or
remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay
down rigid tests which should be applied in all
situations. There are divergent views. In some
cases it has been suggested that some sort of
hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable.
That may be so.
In the Indian context several other factors should
be taken into consideration including education of
the dependants and the nature of job. In the
wake of changed societal conditions and global
scenario, future prospects may have to be taken
into consideration not only having regard to the
status of the employee, his educational
qualification; his past performance but also other
relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and
perks which are being offered by the private
companies these days. In fact while determining
the m ultiplicand this Court in O riental Insurance
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Co. Ltd. v. Jas huben held that even dearness
allowance and perks with regard thereto from
which the family would have derived monthly
benefit, must be taken into consideration.
High Court of H.P.
One of the incidental issues which has also to be
taken into consideration is inflation. Is the
practice of taking inflation into consideration
wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other
developed countries in India there has been no
scientific study. It is expected that with the rising
inflation the rate of interest would go up.
In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a
relevant factor which may be taken into
consideration for determining the actual ground
reality. No hardandfast rule, however, can be
laid down therefor."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India
Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC 254,
the Court considered the plea for enhancement of
compensation made by the appellant, who was a
student of final year of engineering and had
suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident.
After noticing factual matrix of the case, the Court
observed:
"We do not intend to review in detail state of
authorities in relation to assessment of all
damages for personal injury. Suffice it to say that
the basis of assessment of all damages for
personal injury is compensation. The whole idea
is to put the claimant in the same position as he
was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation
is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind
that the victim has done no wrong; he has
suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the
court must take care to give him full and fair
compensation for that he had suffered."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC
343, the Court considered some of the precedents
and held:
"The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
("the Act", for short) makes it clear that the award
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must be just, which means that compensation
should, to the extent possible, fully and
adequately restore the claimant to the position
prior to the accident. The object of awarding
damages is to make good the loss suffered as a
result of wrong done as far as money can do so,
in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The
court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the
damages objectively and exclude from
consideration any speculation or fancy, though
some conjecture with reference to the nature of
disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A
person is not only to be compensated for the
physical injury, but also for the loss which he
suffered as a result of such injury. This means
that he is to be compensated for his inability to
lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal
amenities which he would have enjoyed but for
the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as
he used to earn or could have earned.
High Court of H.P.
The heads under which compensation is awarded
in personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,
medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and
miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the
injured would have made had he not been
injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of
permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Nonpecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a
consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of
marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of
normal longevity).
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In routine personal injury cases, compensation
will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and
(iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where
there is specific medical evidence corroborating
the evidence of the claimant, that compensation
will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii),
(v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on
account of permanent disability, future medical
expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of
prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of
life."
High Court of H.P.
(emphasis supplied)
15. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind
Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company
Ltd. (supra) and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra)
must be followed by all the Tribunals and the
High Courts in determining the quantum of
compensation payable to the victims of accident,
who are disabled either permanently or
temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers
permanent disability, then efforts should always
be made to award adequate compensation not
only for the physical injury and treatment, but
also for the loss of earning and his inability to
lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he
would have enjoyed but for the disability caused
due to the accident.
16. We shall now consider whether the
compensation awarded to the appellant is just
and reasonable or he is entitled to enhanced
compensation under any of the following heads:
(i) Loss of earning and other gains due to the
amputation of leg.
(ii) Loss of future earnings on account of
permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
(iv) Compensation for pain, suffering and trauma
caused due to the amputation of leg.
(v) Loss of amenities including loss of the
prospects of marriage.
(vi) Loss of expectation of life.
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40. This Court has to determine the amount of
High Court of H.P.
compensation under various heads, which is accordingly
assessed, as under:
1. NON PECUNIARY DAMAGES:
(a) PAIN AND SUFFERINGS:
41. The learned MACT has awarded a sum of
Rs.10,000/, under this head. As per the petitioner, after the
accident, he was taken to CHC Anni, from where, he was
referred to IGMC Shimla, where, he remained admit for a
period of 21 days. The period of hospitalization must be
painful and traumatic for the petitioner, for which, he is held
entitled to a sum of Rs.2000/ per day. As such, the
petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs.2000x21= Rs.42,000/,
under this head.
(b) LOSS OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE:
42. The learned MACT has awarded a sum of
Rs.5,000/ under this head. As discussed hereinabove, the
period of hospitalization has been held to be 21 days and
Medical Board has assessed the disability of the petitioner as
10% permanent in nature. After the discharge from the
hospital, he might have taken atleast three months for
convalescence. Thus, during the said period, he could not
have enjoyed the life of a normal human being. Although.
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there is 10% disability permanent in nature, but, the said
High Court of H.P.
disability is to be considered under the head ‘loss of earning
capacity’, as such, the said disability is not liable to be
assessed here, as, the same would amount to double
enrichment, which is prohibited under the law.
43. Considering the period of hospitalization and
convalescence, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is
entitled to a sum of Rs.50,000/, under the head ‘loss of
enjoyment of life’.
(c) SHORTEN EXPECTANCY OF LIFE:
44. There is no evidence on the record to prove or to
suggest that due to disability suffered and injury sustained,
the life span of the petitioner has been shortened. As such,
no amount of compensation is being awarded, under this
head.
2. PECUNIARY DAMAGES:
(a) LOSS OF EARNINGS AND EARNING CAPACITY:
45. The monthly income of the petitioner is held to be
Rs.9,000/ per month. The period of hospitalization and
convalescence is held to be about four months. During that
period, he could not work. As such, he is entitled to a sum of
Rs.9,000/ x 4 = Rs.36,000/, whereas, learned MACT has
given a sum of Rs.10,500/, by holding that the petitioner
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was unable to work for a period of more than one month.
High Court of H.P.
The said approach of the learned MACT, does not sustain in
the judicial scrutiny by this Court, as it cannot be expected
from a person, who had suffered 10% permanent disability in
nature and remain admitted for a period of 21 days, would
commence his work, after discharge from hospital.
46. The petitioner has been held to be mason by
profession. In view of the deposition of PW3, qua the fact
that the petitioner cannot carry heavy load over long
distance, this Court is of the view that considering the nature
of the job, 10% disability can be considered as 20%
functional disability.
47. In order to grant just compensation, some amount
is liable to be added in the monthly income, which has been
held to be Rs.9,000/, in view of the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in versus
Sidram Division Manager,
United India Insurance Company Limited & Another,
(2023) 3 Supreme Court Cases 439 . Relevant paragraphs
31 to 34 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
31. It is now a well settled position of law that
even in cases of permanent disablement incurred
as a result of a motoraccident, the claimant can
seek, apart from compensation for future loss of
income, amounts for future prospects as well. We
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have come across many orders of different
tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different
High Courts, taking the view that the claimant is
not entitled to compensation for future prospects in
accident cases involving serious injuries resulting
in permanent disablement. That is not a correct
position of law. There is no justification to exclude
the possibility of compensation for future prospects
in accident cases involving serious injuries
resulting in permanent disablement. Such a
narrow reading is illogical because it denies
altogether the possibility of the living victim
progressing further in life in accident cases – and
admits such possibility of future prospects, in case
of the victim’s death.
High Court of H.P.
32. This Court has emphasised time and again
that “just compensation” should include all
elements that would go to place the victim in as
near a position as she or he was in, before the
occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of
money or other material compensation can erase
the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim
undergoes after a serious accident, (or replace the
loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is the
manner known to law, whereby society assures
some measure of restitution to those who survive,
and the victims who have to face their lives.
33. In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance
Company Limited and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421,
this Court held that:
“14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any
rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24
of the judgment in Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma
v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] that where the
deceased was selfemployed or was on a fixed
salary without provision for annual increment, etc.,
the Courts will usually take only the actual income
at the time of death and a departure from this rule
should be made only in rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances. In our view, it will
be nave to say that the wages or total
emoluments/income of a person who is self
employed or who is employed on a fixed salary
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without provision for annual increment, etc., would
remain the same throughout his life.
High Court of H.P.
15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone
across the board. It does not make any distinction
between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the
effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the
cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum
on those who are selfemployed or who get fixed
income/emoluments. They are the worst affected
people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to
generate additional income necessary for
sustaining their families.
16. The salaries of those employed under the
Central and State Governments and their
agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from
time to time to provide a cushion against the rising
prices and provisions have been made for
providing security to the families of the deceased
employees. The salaries of those employed in
private sectors have also increased manifold. Till
about two decades ago, nobody could have
imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the
Government would be in five figures and total
emoluments of those in higher echelons of service
will cross the figure of rupees one lakh.
17. Although the wages/income of those employed
in unorganised sectors has not registered a
corresponding increase and has not kept pace with
the increase in the salaries of the government
employees and those employed in private sectors,
but it cannot be denied that there has been
incremental enhancement in the income of those
who are self employed and even those engaged
on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal
basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that
with a view to meet the challenges posed by high
cost of living, the persons falling in the latter
category periodically increase the cost of their
labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an
example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by
stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and
the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for
him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be
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the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour,
like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc.
High Court of H.P.
18. Therefore, we do not think that while making
the observations in the last three lines of para 24
of Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC
121] judgment, the Court had intended to lay
down an absolute rule that there will be no
addition in the income of a person who is self
employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it
would be reasonable to say that a person who is
selfemployed or is engaged on fixed wages will
also get 30% increase in his total income over a
period of time and if he/she becomes the victim of
an accident then the same formula deserves to be
applied for calculating the amount of
compensation.”
34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC
571, the victim, a carpenter, suffered permanent
disablement, and his claim for compensation
including for loss of future prospects was
considered by a threeJudge Bench which
included, incidentally, the judges who had decided
National Insurance Company (supra). This Court
held that:
“13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680], this Court has
held that the benefit of future prospects should not
be confined only to those who have a permanent
job and would extend to selfemployed individuals.
In the case of a selfemployed person, an addition
of 40% of the established income should be made
where the age of the victim at the time of the
accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the
present case, the appellant would be entitled to an
enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future
prospects.
14. In making the computation in the present case,
the court must be mindful of the fact that the
appellant has suffered a serious disability in
which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his
hands. For a person engaged in manual activities,
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it requires no stretch of imagination to understand
that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of
the ability to earn. Nothing —at least in the facts of
this case—can restore lost hands. But the measure
of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of
the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our
yardsticks of compensation should not be so
abysmal as to lead one to question whether our
law values human life. If it does, as it must, it
must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of
loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of
compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of
rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our
conversations about law must shift from a
paternalistic subordination of the individual to an
assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to
human dignity.
High Court of H.P.
15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is
unable to even eat or to attend to a visit to the
toilet without the assistance of an attendant. In
this background, it would be a denial of justice to
compute the disability at 90%. The disability is
indeed total. Having regard to the age of the
appellant, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18.
In the circumstances, the compensation payable to
the appellant on account of the loss of income,
including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400.
In addition to this amount, the appellant should be
granted an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of
pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount
awarded by the Tribunal towards medical
expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs
25,000) and for attendant's expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is
maintained. The Tribunal has declined to award
any amount towards future treatment. The
appellant should be allowed an amount of Rs 3
lakhs towards future medical expenses. The
appellant is thus awarded a total sum of
Rs.25,38,308 by way of compensation. The
appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate
of 9% p.a. on the compensation from the date of
the filing of the claim petition. The liability to pay
compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal
and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and
driver jointly and severally which is affirmed. The
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amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal
within a period of 6 weeks from today and shall be
paid over to the appellant upon proper
identification.”
High Court of H.P.
(Self emphasis supplied)
48. The age of the petitioner at the time of accident
was 46 years and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Pranay
Sethi & Others, (2017) 16 Supreme Court Cases , 25%
amount is liable to be added towards future prospects of the
petitioner. Thus, his income, for the purpose of assessing
the loss of earning capacity, comes to Rs.9,000/+ Rs.2250/
(25% of Rs.9,000/) = Rs.11,250/.
49. The functional disability of the petitioner, in the
present case, is held to be 20%, as such, his loss of earning
capacity comes to Rs.2250/ (20% of Rs.11250) per month.
Keeping in view the age of the petitioner, which is held to be
46 years, multiplier of ‘13’ is required to be applied to
determine the amount of compensation. Therefore, the
petitioner is held entitled to Rs.2250/x12x13=
Rs.3,51,000/, under the head ‘loss of earning capacity’.
TRANSPORTATION CHARGES :
50. The learned MACT has not awarded any amount,
under this head, but, taking judicial notice of the fact that
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the accident had taken place at Kotgali near village Kotlu,
High Court of H.P.
and the petitioner was taken to CHC Anni, from where, he
was referred to IGMC Shimla, he might have spent
Rs.10,000/ on taxi charges. As such, the petitioner is held
to be entitled to Rs.10,000/ under this head.
(c) SPECIAL DIET AND ATTENDANT CHARGES:
51. Learned MACT has awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/
towards special diet and Rs.10,000/ as attendant charges.
The period of hospitalization and convalescence, has been
held to be four months. Meaning thereby, during that
period, the petitioner might have taken special diet and
might have required assistance of some attendants, for
which, it would be just and appropriate to award a sum of
Rs.200/ per day, under this head. Thus, the compensation,
under this head, comes to Rs.120x200=Rs.24,000/.
52. Considering all these facts, the petitioner is held
entitled to a sum of Rs.5,13,000/ (Rs.42,000/+
Rs.50,000/+Rs.36,000/+ Rs.3,51,000/ + Rs.10,000/
+Rs.24,000/), as compensation.
53. In view of the above discussions, the appeal is
dismissed, however, the award passed by the learned MACT
is modified and the amount of compensation is enhanced
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from Rs.2,22,000/ to Rs.5,13,000/, along with interest @
High Court of H.P.
7.5% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till
the realization of the whole amount.
54. However, keeping in view the facts and
circumstances, there shall be no order so as to costs.
55. Memo of costs be prepared.
56. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
Record be sent back.
(Virender Singh)
( ps )
May 30, 2026 Judge
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