ROHIT SINGH vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY
- Court
- Jharkhand High Court
2026:JHHC:32330-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (Cr.) (DB) No.545 of 2026
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Rohit Singh, aged about 36 years, son of Late Bir Bahadur
Singh, resident of Diaguttu, Near Bara Hanuman Mandir,
Mango, P.S. and P.O-Mango, District-East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur, Jharkhand
… … Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary having
it office at Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarathpur, District-Ranchi.
2. Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison &
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand,
having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagarnathpur, District- Ranchi.
3. The District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East
Singhbhum, P.O. & P.S.-Bistupur, Town-Jamshedpur,
District-East Singhbhum.
4. The Senior Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum,
P.O. & P.S.- Sakchi, Town-Jamshepdur, District-East
Singhbhum.
… … Respondents
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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AKHIL KUMAR
C.A.V. on 03.11.2026 Pronounced on 04/11/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant application has been filed under Article 226
of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs:
I.For issuance of an appropriate writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the Order dated
05.05.2026 contained in Memo No. 380(A)
(Annexure-2) passed by the District Magistrate-
cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum
(respondent No.3) whereby and whereunder, the
petitioner was put under preventive detention in
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terms of Section 12(1) & 12(2) of Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act, 2002; and further passed
an order dated 20.07.2026 contained in Memo
No. 543(A) (Annexure-3) passed by the District
Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East
Singhbhum (respondent No.3) whereby and
whereunder, directing the continued detention of
the petitioner under Section 12(1) & (2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act for another
three-month period.
ii. For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari
for quashing of order dated 20.07.2026
(Annexure-3) passed by the Additional Secretary,
Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand
(respondent No.2) whereby and whereunder the
order of preventive detention passed u/s 12(2) of
the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 dated
23.06.2026 has been confirmed by the
respondent No.2 on behalf of the State
Government. Further, passed an order dated
24.07.2026 (Annexure-5) whereby and
whereunder the order of preventive detention has
been further confirmed for additional three
months i.e; from 05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026 under
Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes
Act, 2002.
iii. Upon quashing the aforesaid orders passed
under Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002,
the petitioner may be directed to be released
immediately in terms of provisions of law;
Factual Matrix
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2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in
the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read
as under: -
i. It is the case of the petitioner that the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur, vide letter dated 08.04.2026 made a
recommendation to Senior Superintendent of Police,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, stating that
altogether four sanhas have been registered against
the petitioner and is indulged in criminal activities
and petitioner is an anti-social element and it was
apprehended that if the petitioner will be released
on bail, he would be a threat to the public and in
the interest of maintaining peace and public order,
the petitioner be detained under Section 12 (1) & (2)
of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act.
ii. Then pursuant to the aforesaid recommendation
made by Deputy Superintendent of Police, East
Singhbhum, the Senior Superintendent of Police,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur vide Memo No.
47/DCB letter dated 18.04.2026 addressed to the
District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur (respondent no.3)
made a further recommendation stating therein
that since the petitioner is an anti-social element
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and he may cause disruption to peace and public
order, as such, petitioner be detained in the interest
of maintaining public peace for three months.
iii. Furthermore, the Senior Superintendent of Police,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, vide Letter No.
961/DCB dated 20.07.2026, again addressed the
District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, informing that the
Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department,
Ranchi, vide order dated 23.06.2026 through Memo
No. 05/CCA/01/15/2026-202/CCA, had extended
the petitioner's detention under the Jharkhand
Crime Control Act, 2002 (herein referred as Act,
2002), for a further period of three months (from
05.05.2026 to 04.08.2026). In view of this, it was
recommended that the detention of the petitioner be
continued as he may cause disturbance to public
peace and order.
iv. The District Magistrate -cum-Deputy
Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur
(respondent No.3) passed an order vide memo no.
380(A) dated 05.05.2026 on the basis of the
aforesaid recommendation and directed the
authorities to detain the petitioner under Section
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12 (1) & (2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act
for a period of three months.
v. The District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, passed another
order vide Memo No. 543(A) dated 20.07.2026,
again based on the recommendations made by
respondent No.4, ordered the detention of the
petitioner under Section 12(1) & (2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act for a further
period of three months.
vi. The Additional Secretary, Department of Home,
Prison & Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand, (respondent No. 2) vide order dated
23.06.2026 has confirmed the order of preventive
detention passed u/s 12 of the Jharkhand Control
of Crime Act, 2002 dated 05.05.2026 and
accordingly, petitioner has been detained for a
period of 3 months, i.e. from 05.05.2026 to
04.08.2026.
vii. The Additional Secretary, vide order dated
24.07.2026 confirmed the continued detention of
the petitioner for an additional three months, i.e.,
from 05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026, under Section
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.
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viii. The S.S.P, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur had given
a list of cases based upon which the said order of
preventive detention was passed by the respondent
No.3, which is impugned herein.
Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner:
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken
the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
i. It has been submitted that the impugned detention
order issued under the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002 by the respondent is illegal and in
complete violation of the provisions of the Act and
is a clear case of abuse of the process of law.
ii. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that mere pendency of criminal cases and sanhas
cannot be a ground for detention order under
Sections 12(1) & (2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes
Act as that can be dealt with the ordinary criminal
law and on this ground alone, detention order is
illegal.
iii. It has been submitted that when general provisions
of law could suffice the purpose then there is no
need of invoking extra ordinary statute, in other
words the State could have filed and approached
the courts of law for cancellation of bail, however
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without doing so the State chose to impose the
provisions of section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002 curtailing the liberties of the
Petitioner and awarding him with the extraordinary
punishment of preventive detention.
iv. It has further been submitted that the he was not
informed about his right of representation before
the Detaining Authority and the same is a mandate
as provided by the Jharkhand Control of Crimes
Act, 2002.
v. It has been submitted that the Petitioner was
informed of his right of representation by the
relative of the Petitioner after due consultation with
the lawyer and as such his right of representation
as well as his right of being informed that he had a
right of representation were curtailed by the Jail
Authorities.
vi. Further submission has been made that even after
all of this when the Petitioner tried to send a
representation to the Detaining Authority the same
was refused by the Jail Authorities and it was
communicated to him that the same would not be
forwarded. This clearly depicts the malicious and
biased attitude of the Jail Authorities.
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vii. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that the grounds for imposing such extraordinary
measure of Preventive Detention along with the
details must be supplied to the detenu in order to
give him a fair chance for his defense by way of
representation as guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India. The detenu i.e. the petitioner
in the instant case was not supplied with the copies
of the Letters or Memos forwarded by the SSP, East
Singhbhum. The petitioner was only handed over
the copy of the Order passed by the District
Magistrate and the copy of the order confirming the
Preventive Detention issued from the office of the
Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons
and Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand.
viii. Therefore, submission has been made that the
order of preventive detention dated 05.05.2026 and
20.07.2026 as well as the order confirming the
same dated 23.06.2026 and 24.07.2026 are liable
to be quashed and set aside solely on the ground
that the representation of the petitioner has till date
not been forwarded by the Jail Authorities as well
as the order of preventive detention along with the
grounds and report of the District Magistrate has
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not till date been placed before the Advisory Board
within 3 weeks from the date of detention which is
de-hors the mandate as envisaged under the
provisions of Section 19 of the Jharkhand Control
of Crimes Act, 2002.
ix. Furthermore, the order of detention do not reflect
any satisfaction as envisaged in proviso to Section
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act and
this renders the impugned order bad in law.
x. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that mere pendency of criminal cases cannot be a
ground for detention order under Section 12(3) of
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act.
xi. It has been submitted that the Respondent
authorities cannot detain the petitioner in the garb
of maintaining 'public order' and can take away the
petitioner's Fundamental Rights entirely on false
apprehensions without any iota of evidence of any
kind whatsoever or even without establishing prima
facie any imminent threat to public order. The
Respondent authorities have acted arbitrarily, in
complete malafide and highhandedness in an
attempt to deprive the petitioner of his right to
freedom of life enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
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4. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the order of detention, therefore, suffers
from error and hence not sustainable in the eye of law.
Submission made by the learned counsel for the State
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has
defended the order of detention taking the following
grounds:
i. It has been submitted that the petitioner has been
duly provided with the information regarding his
representation and detention order by the
authorities. However, the Supreme Court in K.M.
Abdulla Kunhì & B.L. Abdul Khaderversus,
(1991)1 SCC 476 (CB) wherein it has clearly been
held that the authority has no constitutional duty
to consider the representation made by the detenue
before the order of confirmation of the detention
order. There is no constitutional mandate under
clause (5) Article 22, much less any statutory
requirement to consider representation before
confirming the order of the detention.
ii. It has been submitted that the preventive detention
order has not been passed mechanically rather
after perusing the records revealing the criminal
activities and satisfying himself with this
anticipation that the petitioner's detention is
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essential since he is detrimental to the public order
and tranquility in the society. The said order has
been passed in view of many decisions of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
iii. It has been submitted that recommendations by the
Dy. S.P., Jamshedpur to Sr. S.P. Jamshedpur vide
letter no. 504/HQ, dated-08.04.2026 and by him to
the District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur vide Memo No.
471/DCB and letter No. 961/DCB, dated
18.04.2026 and 10.07.2026 respectively, who to
passed the detention order u/s 12 (1) (2)
Jharkhand Crime of Control of Act.2022. The
recommendations were made by the police on the
basis of continuous criminal activities of the
petitioner and likelihood of his involvement in such
acts prejudicial to the public order, peace and
tranquility in the society at large.
iv. It has also been recommended that the crimes
committed by the petitioner comes under the
chapter XVI and XVII of IPC and the petitioner
comes under the category of anti-social element
defined in Section 2 (d) of the Act 2002. The District
Magistrate was satisfied with the recommendations
of the police officials and after applying his
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judicious mind passed the detention order against
the petitioner under the Act. Similarly, the
Respondent No.2 being satisfied with materials
against the petitioner, confirmed the order of
preventive detention vide Memo No.
05/CCA/01/15/2026-202/CCA. The said order is
legally sustainable and the petition filed by the
petitioner is liable to be dismissed.
v. It has further been submitted that the detention
order u/s 12 (1) & (2) of Jharkhand control of
crimes Act has not been passed against the
petitioner on the basis of only pendency of criminal
cases and Sanhas against him rather he is
continuing to commit heinous crimes even after
being released on bail.
vi. It has further been submitted that the petitioner
has been found to be involved in 05 cases i.e. (i)
Mango P.S. Case No.124/2018, u/s-302/120
(B)/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act. (ii) Mango P.S. Case
No.185/2022,u/s323/324/325/326/307/364/364
A/379/34 u/s-IPC. (iii) Mango P.S. Case No.
186/2024,u/s-17(a), 21(a), 22(a), 29 of NDPS Act.
(iv) Mango P.S. Case No.136/2025,u/s-17(a), 21(a),
22(a), 29 of NDPS Act. (v) Mango P.S. Case
No.20/2026, u/s-17 (a), 21(a), 22(a), 29 of NDPS
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Act. Total 5 cases were lodged and 4 Sanhas have
also been entered into the station diary of the Police
stations. These cases are related to commit murder
by firing by fire arms and kidnapping for murder
etc. and 3 cases of NDPS Act. As such the petitioner
has been committing heinous offence continuously
after being released on Bail and it has got a panicky
and alarming effects in the locality. He is a drug
menace the society. The people at large are feeling
insecure during their day-to-day life.
vii. It is further submitted that the bail granted to the
petitioner has nothing to do with the criminal
activities of the petitioner in the future as he has
mentioned in paragraph 12 of writ petition that he
has been granted bail in those 5 cases. The
detaining authority has formed his opinion on the
basis of his past criminal activities, being indulged
in similar nature of heinous crime after being
released on bail. Even after being release on bail, he
could not deter himself in committing the crime of
firing at public places etc. and so the detaining
authority passed the preventive detention order
under the Act.
viii. Learned counsel for the respondent has further
submitted that the detaining authorities after
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finding that in order to maintain public order, since
his activities are prejudicial to the public causing
harm and danger, the detaining authorities
detained him which was rightly approved by the
advisory board and the State Government. In as
much as the detaining authorities have taken note
of all the related materials and strictly followed all
the safeguards as provided in the act. In a catena of
judgments, the Hon'ble court has held that it is the
subjective satisfaction Detaining Authority whether
a person has to be detained for a particular period
of time not.
ix. It is well settled law that the question is whether a
particular person is disposed to commit the
prejudicial acts the duty of deciding this question is
thrown upon the state. The justification is
suspicion or reasonable probability and not
criminal charge which can only be warranted by
legal evidence. The anticipated behaviour of the
petitioner has been assessed on his past conduct in
the light of surrounding circumstances against the
petitioner and the potentiality of the criminal act of
the petitioner. Thus, the grounds for detention of
the petitioner have been found to be decisive for the
maintenance of the public order.
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6. Learned counsel appearing for the State, based upon the
aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a
case where the order of detention is said to suffer from an
error.
Analysis
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the order of detention as also the pleadings made
on behalf of the petitioners and the State as available in the
writ petition and the counter affidavits.
8. The issues which require consideration herein are-
i. Whether the representation submitted by the
petitioner was not forwarded by the jail
authorities to the Government and, if so,
whether the failure on the part of the jail
authorities amounted to mala fide action,
resulting in non-consideration of the
petitioner's representation by the
Government?
ii. Whether grant of bail to the petitioner in
pending cases and subsequent submission of
charge-sheet in the aforesaid cases, is ground
for his release from the preventive detention
passed by the authority concerned under
Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002?
iii. Whether the criminal activities of petitioner
come under the purview of definition of ‘’Anti-
social Elements’’ as defined under section
2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002?
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iv. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, can it be said that the
authorities have got the subjective satisfaction
while passing the order of detention?
Re: Issue No. (i)
9. The issue no.(i) i.e. whether the representation
submitted by the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail
authorities to the Government and, if so, whether the
failure on the part of the jail authorities amounted to
mala fide action, resulting in non-consideration of the
petitioner's representation by the Government?
10. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that petitioner was not informed about his
right of representation, and when petitioner was
informed of his right of representation by the relative of
the petitioner after due consultation with the lawyer,
then, petitioner tried to send representation to the
Detaining Authority, but, the same was refused by the
Jail Authorities and it was communicated to him that
the same would not be forwarded, which, clearly depicts
the malicious and biased attitude of the Jail Authorities.
11. Hence, contention has been raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the representation
submitted by the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail
authorities to the concerned authority and, as a result
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thereof, the Government did not decide his
representation.
12. Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to
examine and appreciate the aforesaid contention of the
petitioner on the basis of the material available on
record and in light of the settled statutory provisions
governing such matters.
13. At this juncture, Section 17 of the Jharkhand
Control of Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred herein.
Section 17 of the Act, 2002 inter alia provides that
ground of orders of detention to be disclosed and
opportunity of making a representation against the order
to the State Government shall be given to the person
affected by the order. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 reads
as under-
17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to
person affected by the order. - (1) When a person is
detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority
making the order shall, as soon as may be, but
ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing,
not later than ten days from the date of detention,
communicate to him the grounds on which the order has
been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity
of making a representation against the order to the State
Government.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority
to disclose facts which it considers to be against the
public interest to disclose.
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14. Further, Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates
that the authority making the order shall as soon as
may be communicated the grounds on which the order
has been made to the person detained and the detaining
authority shall afford to the person detained the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the
order.
15. Following the mandate of Article 22(5), provision
has been made under section 17 of Jharkhand Control
of Crimes, 2002, wherein it has been provided that the
detaining authority shall communicate the grounds to
the detenue on which the detention order has been
passed and shall afford to the detenue an earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order
to the State Government.
16. In the present case, this Court finds that at
paragraph-19 of the writ petition, detenue/petitioner has
himself admitted that petitioner was handed over the
copy of order passed by the District Magistrate (i.e.
Respondent no.3) and the copy of the order confirming
the preventive detention issued from the office of the
Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand (i.e.
Respondent no.2).
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17. Further, this Court finds from the impugned
detention order dated 05.05.2026 contained in Memo No.
380(A) (Annexure- 2) to this writ petition, wherein the
detaining authority i.e. Respondent No.3 had noted that
copies of the detention order shall be given to the detenue,
who is in custody for the compliance of the period specified
under Section 17 of the Act,2002.
18. Again, this Court finds that in the counter affidavit
dated 07.10.2026, it is specifically mentioned that
petitioner was provided with the information regarding his
representation and detention order by the authorities, as
such there is compliance of the Article 22(5) of the
constitution.
19. Hence, from the own admission of the
detenue/petitioner at paragraph-19 of the writ petition and
from the impugned detention order Annexure-2 and
counter affidavit dated 07.10.2026 filed by the State, this
Court come to the conclusion that one of the constitutional
requirements as provided under Article 22(5) of
Constitution of India and Section 17 of the Act,2002, as to
communicate the grounds to the detenue on which the
detention order has been passed has been fulfilled by the
State/Respondent, by providing the petitioner, the ground
of detention and detention order dated
05.05.2026(Annexure-2) passed by the respondent no.3
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District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, District-
East Singhbhum.
20. Now, the controversy raised by the petitioner in the
writ petition that his representation was not forwarded to
the detaining authorities, by the Jail Authorities and hence,
petitioner has alleged that jail authorities acted maliciously
and with biasness.
21. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, this
Court has gone through the entire pleading of the writ
petition as well as exhibit annexed therein and original
record also, wherefrom it is apparent that in support of
aforesaid statement the petitioner has not placed any
cogent evidence and he has just stated that his right of
representation has been curtailed by the Jail authorities.
22. It is settled position of law that allegation without
evidence has no leg to stand and in the absence of cogent
evidence the same can only be treated as bald and empty
allegation. Further the initial onus to substantiate the
allegation of not forwarding the petitioner’s representation
by the jail authorities lies on the petitioner himself and the
petitioner has not been able to produce any evidence to
substantiate his allegation.
23. At this juncture it would be pertinent to see the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court on the question of
burden of proving a case based on allegation of mala fide.
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24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandra
Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12
SCC 292 , has held that it is a proposition of law that the
burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person
who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making
such allegations is under the legal obligation to place
specific materials before the court to substantiate the said
allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing
evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides
specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same
cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is
in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted
by acceptable material, for ready reference the paragraph-
34 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein below-
“ 34. Thus, as a proposition of law, the burden of proving
mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it.
Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such
allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific
materials before the court to substantiate the said
allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing
evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides
specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the
same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption
under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order
unless contradicted by acceptable material.”
25. Further, in case of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.,
(1974) 4 SCC 3 , while dealing the issue of mala fide,
Hon’ble Apex Court laid down that the Court would be slow
to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed
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before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are
grave and they are made against the holder of an office
which has a high responsibility in the administration.
Paragraph-92 of the said judgment is being quoted herein
below-
“92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the
burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the
person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are
often more easily made than proved, and the very
seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high
order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself
once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of
oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in
itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and
if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the
confidence of the people in the political custodians of
power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the
Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree
of proof. In this context it may be noted that top
administrators are often required to do acts which affect
others adversely but which are necessary in the
execution of their duties. These acts may lend
themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the
bona fides of their author when the full facts and
surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court
would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences
from incomplete facts placed before it by a party,
particularly when the imputations are grave and they
are made against the holder of an office which has a
high responsibility in the administration. Such is the
judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy
conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not
because of any special status which they are supposed
to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life
or administrative set up—these considerations are
wholly irrelevant in judicial approach—but because
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otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult
in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must
assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made
by the petitioner against the second respondent.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove
this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has
failed to prove mala fides against the jail authorities and
has not produced any clinching evidence and merely
imputing allegation against the jail authorities that jail
authorities had not forwarded his representation, is not fit
to be accepted.
27. Accordingly, Issue No.(i) is answered against the
petitioner.
Re: Issue No.(ii)
28. The issue no.(ii), is whether grant of bail to the
petitioner in pending cases and subsequent submission of
charge-sheet in the said cases, is ground for his release
from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?
29. In this regard petitioner has submitted that
petitioner is already on regular bail or has been granted
anticipatory bail by the Court of law, and the said cases
were relied by the detaining authority while passing the
impugned order of detention dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-
2) and hence, detention order cannot be sustained.
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30. This court from perusal of record finds that in the
proposal submitted by Superintendent of Police, East
Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, vide Letter No. 471/DCB dated
18.04.2026, to the District Magistrate-cum-Deputy
Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur (Respondent
no.-3), there is inter alia reference of five cases registered
against the petitioner-
(i) Mango P.S. Case No.124/2018, u/s-302/120
(B)/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act.
(ii) Mango P.S. Case No.185/2022,u/s
323/324/325/326/307/364/364A/379/34 u/s-
IPC.
(iii) Mango P.S. Case No. 186/2024,u/s-17(a), 21(a),
22(a), 29 of NDPS Act.
(iv) Mango P.S. Case No.136/2025,u/s-17(a), 21(a),
22(a), 29 of NDPS Act.
(v) Mango P.S. Case No.20/2026, u/s-17 (a), 21(a),
22(a), 29 of NDPS Act.
31. In his interlocutory application being I.A. No.15607
of 2026 filed on 28.10.2026, petitioner has stated that in
Mango P.S. Case No.124/2018, Mango P.S. Case
No.186/2024 and in Mango P.S. Case No.20/2026, he has
been granted regular bail and in Mango P.S. Case
No.185/2022 and Mango P.S. Case No.136/2025, he has
been granted anticipatory bail. Again, in his petition,
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petitioner has stated that all these cases are pending for
trial.
32. In the present case, this Court finds from the
grounds of detention that all the five criminal cases
pending against the petitioner involve serious offences. One
or more of the said cases have been registered under
Sections 302, 307 and 364A of the Indian Penal Code, as
well as under the provisions of the Arms Act and the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS
Act). The nature and gravity of the offences alleged against
the petitioner are therefore of a serious character.
33. Hence, so far as release of the detenue/petitioner on
bail, which are registered under the various sections of IPC,
Arms Act and NDPS Act, is concerned, this Court finds that
it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to
maintenance of public order and in such circumstances,
based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it
would not be possible to control his habituality in
continuing the criminal activities by resorting the normal
procedures, the Detaining Authority had passed an
impugned order detaining him under the Jharkhand Crime
Control Act, 2002.
34. Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect
the decision taken by the competent authority of detention,
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rather the accusation so made in the First Information
Report is to be seen for the purpose to have the subjective
satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said
FIR.
35. Since the detention order is to be passed by the
competent authority anticipating the criminality of the
concerned and it would be evident from the accusation
made in the ground of detention dated 05.05.2026,
(Annexure-2) passed by the Respondent no. 3 District
Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur, wherein inter alia aforesaid five pending
criminal cases against the petitioner is mentioned.
36. The consideration of coming from judicial custody
by virtue of order passed by the court to release on bail has
been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and
others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue
had challenged his detention order. The Hon'ble Apex Court
in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after
release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same
type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life,
damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal
was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid
judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court had noted the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the
26
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detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference
D.M. Nagaraja(supra)
Paragraph-17 and 20 of case is
quoted herein below -
"17. All the abovementioned details which have been
correctly stated in the detention order clearly show that
the appellant is not amenable to ordinary course of law.
It also shows that even after his release on bail from the
prison on various occasions, he again started indulging
in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the
public life, damaging public property, etc. All these
aspects have been meticulously considered by the
detaining authority and after finding that in order to
maintain public order, since his activities are prejudicial
to the public, causing harm and danger, the detaining
authority detained him as "goonda" under Karnataka Act
12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months and the same was
rightly approved by the Advisory Board and the State
Government. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has
taken note of all the relevant materials and strictly
followed all the safeguards as provided in the Act
ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire
agreement with the decision of the detaining authority as
well as the impugned order of the High Court affirming
the same."
xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted
criminality, criminal activities starting from the age of 30
and details relating to eleven cases mentioned in the
grounds of detention. It is not in dispute that in one case
he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had
been acquitted in two cases and four cases are pending
against him wherein he was granted bail by the courts.
It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority
that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to
maintenance of public order, he was getting bail one
after another and indulging in the same activities. In
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such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and
satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be possible to
control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities
by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining authority
passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of 1985."
37. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated
05.05.2026 (Annexure-2), it is evident that the petitioner is
habitually involved in offences relating to murder,
kidnapping for ransom, Arms Act, NDPS Act etc. and
further on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining
authority has arrived to conclusion that the well-organized
manner in which such pre-judicial activities have been
carried on and nexus between dates of incidents and
passing of the detention order and the said observation is
according to the ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of
Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said
observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to be
suffer from an error.
38. Accordingly, Issue No.(ii), has been answered
herein.
Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv)
39. Since both these issues, whether the petitioner falls
within the purview of the definition of “Anti-social
Elements” ; and whether the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority was duly recorded while passing the
28
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detention order, are interlinked and inseparably connected,
this Court deems it appropriate to take them up together
for consideration, both on the basis of the material
available on record and in light of the settled principles of
law governing preventive detention.
40. But before considering these issues, the statutory
provisions as contained under the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes,2002 needs to be referred.
41. The relevant provisions which require consideration
are Sections 2(d) and section 12 of the Jharkhand Control
of Crimes,2002, which are necessary to be referred herein.
42. “Anti-social Element” has been defined in section
2(d) of the Act,2002, which reads hereunder as: -
2(d) "Anti-social element" means a person who-
(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a
gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of offences punishable under Chapter
XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code;or
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of
offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in
Women and Girls Act, 1956; or
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to
promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or
community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of
enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or
language groups or castes or communities; or
(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks
to, or teasing women or girls; or
(v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections
25,26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959
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43. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand
Crime Control Act, 2002, it is evident that "anti-social
element" is a person who habitually commits or abets
offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal
Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to refer
herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour,
not isolated incidents, and aims to identify individuals
whose acts cause alarm or terror among the public,
warranting preventive detention to maintain public order.
44. It needs to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was
meant to make special provisions for the control and
suppression of anti-social elements with a view to
maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein
that the “Law and Order” problems typically affect only
individuals or small groups, whereas “public order”
disruptions affect the community’s normal functioning on a
broader scale often generating fear or anxiety among the
general public.
45. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary
element with respect to Section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002
seems to be the word "habitual". It would thus mean that a
person who is frequently engaged in committing or
attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code
would be an antisocial element. In this context, we may
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refer to the case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of
Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14
wherein the word
"habitually" has been sought to be enumerated in the
following manner:
"31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes
provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a
person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be
detained under the Act. The detaining authority should,
therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an
order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-
social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-
clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which
are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may
be omitted from consideration for the present. The two
other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are
sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause
(i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by
himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually
commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission
of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with
offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII
dealing with offences against property, of the Penal
Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element.
Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person
who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or
teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both
these sub clauses, the word "habitually" is used. The
expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or
"persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing
together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and
similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts
are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes
frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same
kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an
aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to
be clear from the use of the word "habitually" separately
in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause (iv) of
31
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Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section
2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a
commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to
in any of the sub- clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was
sufficient to make a person an "anti-social element", the
definition would have run as "Anti-social element" means
"a person who habitually is. ..". As Section 2(d) of the Act
now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause
(v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in
them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an
'antisocial element', in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-
clause (ii) or subclause (iv), there should be a repetition
of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-
clause (i), subclause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the
person concerned to treat him as an "anti-social
element". Commission of an act or omission referred to in
one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act
or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-
clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an
"anti-social element". A single act or omission falling
under subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling
under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be
characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in
either of them. Because the idea of "habit" involves an
element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts
or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or
omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if
they are of the same kind when they are committed with
a long interval of time between them they cannot be
treated as habitual ones."
46. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a
person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained
under the Act of 2002. The detaining authority should,
therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an
order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social
element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-
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clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by
himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually
commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of
offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with
offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing
with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is
considered to be an anti-social element. Further the
expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently".
It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar
repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not
isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to
justify an inference of habit.
47. Further Section 12 of the Act,2002 empowers the
,
State Government to detain a person, which reads as
under-
12. Power to make order detaining certain persons.
- The State Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect
to any person that with a view to preventing him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and there is reason to fear that the activities
of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise
than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an
order directing that such anti-social element be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or
likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the
jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State
Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it
may by an order in writing direct, that during such
period as may be specified in the order, such District
Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
33
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section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the
said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in an order made
by the State Government under this sub-section shall
not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the
State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is
necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such
period from time to time by any period not exceeding
three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he
shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government
together with the grounds on which the order has been
made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have
a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain
in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof
unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the
State Government:
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds
of detention are communicated by the officer making the
order after five days but not later than ten days from the
date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to
the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the
words "fifteen days" shall be substituted.
48. Hence, power to make orders detaining certain
persons are provided in section 12 of the Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section 12(1) provides that if
State Government is satisfied with respect to any person
that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and
there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social
elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the
immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing
that such anti-social element be detained.
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49. So, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to
detain anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the
activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented
otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person. The
anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i)
of the Act provides that “Anti-social element” means a
person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of
gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI
or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code.
50. In the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory
provisions, the factual aspect of the present case is to be
considered in order to consider these issues as formulated
herein above.
51. Re-adverting to the factual aspect of the present
case, the petitioner has challenged the order of preventive
detention dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2) passed under
section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act,2002 by
the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy
Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, and
subsequent orders of extension of detention of the
petitioner latest one being 20.07.2026 (Annexure-3) by
which detention of petitioner has been extended from
05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026 extending the period of
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detention. The petitioner has also challenged the order of
confirmation of detention dated 23.06.2026(Annexure-4)
and 24.07.2026(Annexure-5).
52. On going through the detention order dated
05.05.2026 (Annexure-2), this Court finds this detention
order was passed by the respondent no.3 District
Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur, on the recommendations made by the
Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur,
vide Letter No. 471/DCB dated 18.04.2026.
53. This Court finds from the ground of communication
that out of the five FIR registered against the petitioner,
which are pending for trial, petitioner is habitually involved
in offences relating to murder, kidnapping for ransom,
Arms Act, NDPS Act etc.
54. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that petitioner
habitually commits offences punishable under section
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code/BNS
and hence comes under the purview of anti-social element
as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act 2002.
55. Further the question of subjective satisfaction of the
authority concerned while passing the order of detention is
questioned herein and has submitted by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that there is absence of material
linking habitual criminality of the petitioner, therefore in
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absence of subjective satisfaction, the order of preventive
detention is bad in law.
56. Before, proceeding further, it would be pertinent to
mention the case of Ameena Begum v. State of
Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, wherein Hon’ble Apex
Court has laid down certain principles to be observed by
the Constitutional Court while examining the legality of
orders of preventive detention. Paragraph-28 of this
judgment is quoted herein below-
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court
when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive
detention would be entitled to examine whether:
“28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction,
albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the
absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a
matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise
of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for
the exercise of the power not being satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the
detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant
circumstances and the same is not based on material
extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the
purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for
an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and
is therefore ultra vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently
or under the dictation of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created
rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by
the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying
its mind to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The
satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials
which are of rationally probative value, and the
37
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detaining authority has given due regard to the matters
as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in
mind existence of a live and proximate link between the
past conduct of a person and the imperative need to
detain him or is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction
is/are such which an individual, with some degree of
rationality and prudence, would consider as connected
with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the
inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be
reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive
detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent
and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the
detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the
opportunity to make a suitable representation; and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have
been strictly adhered to.”
57. Hence, Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ameena
Begum v. State of Telangana (supra), on the issue of
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has laid
down that the order based on the requisite satisfaction,
albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the
absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter
of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the
power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the
exercise of the power not being satisfied. Hon’ble Apex
Court further laid down that the Court may examine that
the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind
existence of a live and proximate link between the past
conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain or is
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based on material which is stale.
58. In the present case, ongoing to the impugned
detention order, passed by the detaining authority
Respondent No. 3 dated 05.05.2026(Anneure-2), it is
evident that the sequence of criminal cases registered
against the detenue.
59. This Court has gone through the impugned
detention order dated 05.05.2026 wherefrom it is evident
that authority concerned has taken note of the fact that
Rohit Singh (petitioner herein) has been habitually engaged
in criminal activities which ranges from murder, attempt to
murder, criminal conspiracy, extortion and the cases under
arms act and NDPS Act which are prejudicial to the
maintenance of Public Order. The catena of criminal cases
against the petitioner Rohit Singh as contained in the letter
No. 471/DCB dated 18.04.2026(Annexure-1) of
Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur,
and substantiated by Mango PS Case no. 124/2018, Mango
PS Case no. 185/2022, Mango PS Case no. 186/2024,
Mango PS Case no. 136/2025 and Mango PS Case no.
20/2026, shows that the continued criminal activities as
evidenced by the multiple criminal cases pending against
petitioner demonstrate a proclivity to disturb the public
peace and order.
60. It is further evident from the detention order
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05.05.2026 that the detaining authority has categorically
recorded his satisfaction with the material and report
placed before him and taking into consideration the said
material and further taking into consideration that the
activities of petitioner are not merely a matter of 'Law and
Order' but constitute a grave threat to "Public Order" has
passed the order of detention.
61. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that authority
concerned has expressed its subjective satisfaction based
upon the material available against the petitioner. Further
it is apparent that the detaining authority respondent no.3
while passing the detention order 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2),
has satisfied that petitioner if released from jail will act in
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
62. In the present case, the factual aspect as has been
dealt with hereinabove while deciding the issue, this Court
is of view that the detaining authority has taken into
consideration the fact in entirety which shows the
subjective satisfaction based upon the document as found
to be available with the recommending authority which has
been accepted by the detaining authority. Further, the,
satisfaction has been arrived by the detaining authority
bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link
between the past conduct of a petitioner and material
which is not stale and is in consonance of the judgment
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rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena
Begum v. State of Telangana and others(supra).
63. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual
aspect is of the view that respondent authorities after being
satisfied from the material available on record has
considered that the petitioner comes under purview of
‘’Anti-social Elements’’ as defined under section 2(d)(i) of
the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and detention
of petitioner is required to maintain public order and while
arriving the said satisfaction, the authority concerned has
followed all the constitutional mandate.
64. Accordingly, Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv) are
hereby answered.
65. On the basis of discussion made hereinabove this
Court is of the considered view that the orders of detention
need no interference.
66. Accordingly, the detention order dated
05.05.2026(Annexure-2) passed by the Respondent No.3
and subsequent extension order dated
20.07.2026(Annexure-3), extending the detention from
05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026 and orders confirming the
detention order dated 23.06.2026(Annexure-4) and
24.07.2026(Annexure-5) requires no interference.
67. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands
dismissed.
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68. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
dispose of.
69. Let the original record sent back to the authority
concerned forthwith.
I agree . (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Akhil Kumar, J.) (Akhil Kumar, J.)
Date : 04/11/2026
Alankar / A.F.R.
Uploaded On: - 04/11/2026
42