Madhukar Anantrao Pathak vs Buttepatil Properties & Ors.
- Court
- National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
- Case type
- Company Appeal(AT)
- Decided on
- 09-03-2026
<div> 1 <br /> <br /> <b>NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL </b><br /> <b>PRINCIPAL BENCH </b><br /> <b>NEW DELHI </b><br /> <b>COMPANY APPEAL (AT) NO.109/2025 </b><br /> (Arising out of judgement and order dated 02.05.2025 passed by National <br /> Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai in CA No.129/2024 and IA(Companies Act) <br /> No.82/2024 in Company Petition No.64(MB) of 2022) <br /> <b>In the matter of: </b><br /> Madhukar Anantrao Pathak, <br /> S/o Shri Anantrao Govindrao Pathak, <br /> R/o Plot No.4, Yashashree Cooperative Housing <br /> Society, Behind MIT Gate, Ex-Servicemen <br /> Colony, Kothrud, Pune 411035 Appellant <br /> <br /> Vs <br /> <br /> 1. MPTA Limited, <br /> DSHM Collage, Near Sanjeevani Hospital, <br /> Karve Road, Erandawana, Pune <br /> 411038 <br /> <br /> 2. Buttepatil Properties, <br /> 657A, Gulab Pavilion, <br /> th<br /> 7 Floor, Deccan Gymkhana, <br /> Pune 411004 <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Abhishek Madhukar Pathak, <br /> Residing at Building No.14, Flat No.6, <br /> Anand Nagar, Paud Road, Kothrud, <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411029 <br /> <br /> 4. Sandeep Vijay Khardekar, <br /> 36/17, Dadhe Ruikar Scheme, Canal Road <br /> Opposite SNDT, Pune, Maharashtra <br /> 411038 <br /> <br /> 5. Vaijinath Chandrappa Biradar <br /> Flat No.5, Building No.B 16, S.No.117, <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411052 <br /> <br /> 6. Vinayak Hanumantrao Ghorpade, <br /><br /> 2 <br /> <br /> S.No.165A, Shivanjali Apartment, <br /> Indira Nagar, Pune, Maharashtra 411033 <br /> <br /> 7. Prashant Narsignh Mane, <br /> B22A, Shivanjali Bungalow, <br /> Ragvilas Society, <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411091 Respondents <br /> <br /> For Appellant: Mr Akshay Petkar, Mr Vishesh Kalra, Ms Simran Shadija, Mr <br /> Preet Oberoi, Advocates. <br /> For Respondent: Mr Kunal Tandon, Sr Advocate, Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, <br /> Shwetal Sajepal, Mr Parth Davar, Advocates for R1. <br /> Mr Amir Arsiwala, Mr Naman Kapoor, Mr SP Singh Chawla, Ms Neha Arya, <br /> Advocates for R2. <br /> <br /> With <br /> <br /> <b>COMPANY APPEAL (AT) NO.110/2025 </b><br /> (Arising out of judgement and order dated 02.05.2025 passed by National <br /> Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai in CA No.129/2024 and IA(Companies Act) <br /> No.82/2024 in Company Petition No.64(MB) of 2022) <br /> <b>In the matter of: </b><br /> Madhukar Anantrao Pathak, <br /> S/o Shri Anantrao Govindrao Pathak, <br /> R/o Plot No.4, Yashashree Cooperative Housing <br /> Society, Behind MIT Gate, Ex-Servicemen <br /> Colony, Kothrud, Pune 411038 Appellant <br /> <br /> Vs <br /> <br /> 1. MPTA Limited, <br /> DSHM Collage, Near Sanjeevani Hospital, <br /> Karve Road, Erandawana, Pune <br /> 411038 <br /> <br /> 2. Buttepatil Properties, <br /> 657A, Gulab Pavilion, <br /> th<br /> 7 Floor, Decean Gymkhana, <br /> Pune 411004 <br /> <br /> <br /> 3. Abhishek Madhukar Pathak, <br /> Residing at Building No.14, Flat No.6, <br /> Anand Nagar, Paud Road, Kothrud, <br /><br /> 3 <br /> <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411029 <br /> <br /> 4. Sandeep Vijay Khardekar, <br /> 36/17, Dadhe Ruikar Scheme, Canal Road <br /> Opposite SNDT, Pune, Maharashtra <br /> 411038 <br /> <br /> 5. Vaijinath Chandrappa Biradar <br /> Flat No.5, Building No.B 16, S.No.117, <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411052 <br /> <br /> 6. Vinayak Hanumantrao Ghorpade, <br /> S.No.165A, Shivanjali Apartment, <br /> Indira Nagar, Pune, Maharashtra 411033 <br /> <br /> 7. Prashant Narsignh Mane, <br /> B22A, Shivanjali Bungalow, <br /> Ragvilas Society, <br /> Pune, Maharashtra 411001 Respondents <br /> <br /> For Appellant: Mr Akshay Petkar, Mr Vishesh Kalra, Ms Simran Shadija, Mr <br /> Preet Oberoi, Advocates. <br /> For Respondent: Mr Kunal Tandon, Sr Advocate, Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, <br /> Shwetal Shepal, Mr Parth Davar, Advocates for R1. <br /> Mr Amir Arsiwala, Mr Naman Kapoor, Mr SP Singh Chawla, Ms Neha Arya, <br /> Advocates for R2. <br /> <br /> <b>JUDGEMENT </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> This appeal is filed by the appellant against the common judgement and <br /> order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the Ld. NCLT, Mumbai Bench in CA <br /> No.129/2024 as well as IA No.82/2024. <br /> 2. It is stated the appellant is a part of the group forming minority <br /> shareholding in the Respondent No.1 company and allegedly it was mismanaged <br /> by its directors and its majority shareholders. It is alleged while the Company <br /> Petition No. <i>64/2022</i> was pending, the Respondent company under the control <br /><br /> 4 <br /> <br /> of majority, sold one of the two properties of the company being land bearing <br /> Final Plot No.887A/21, (TPS-1, Bhamburda, Pune, varied final) ad-measuring <br /> 446.16 sq.mts, carved out of S.No.198 A/6 and S.No.192/2 together with an old <br /> two-story residential building constructed thereon admeasuring 366.02 sq. mts <br /> built up inclusive of garage, situated at Village Bhamburda (Shivaji Nagar) of <br /> City of Pune namely Saakar Bungalow Property. <br /> 3. It is alleged the said property forms over <i>20%</i> of the undertaking of the <br /> company; was sold in gross violation of Section <i>180</i> of the Companies Act, 2013 <br /> and at a grossly undervalued rate to a related party. It was argued the sale was <br /> carried out during the pendency of Company Appeal (AT) No. <i>196/2023</i> wherein <br /> the appellant had challenged the order vacating the interim stay in Company <br /> Petition No. <i>64/2022</i> , despite hearing being complete. It is argued this Tribunal <br /> vide its order dated 06.03.2024 had directed the parties to maintain status quo <br /> till the Company Petition is decided but whereas the Ld. NCLT disposed of the <br /> two IAs and confirmed the sale of the property, rather than disposing of the <br /> company petition. Further it is argued the purchaser also acted mala fide. <br /> 4. Thus the first argument raised by the appellant is non-compliance of <br /> Section read with Explanation to the section, of the Companies Act, <br /> <i>180(1)(a)</i><br /> 2013. The provision is as under:- <br /> <b><i>“180. Restrictions on powers of Board.</i></b> <i>—(1) The Board of </i><br /> <i>Directors of a company shall exercise the following powers only </i><br /> <i>with the consent of the company by a special resolution, </i><br /> <i>namely:— </i><br /> <i>(a)</i> <i> </i> <i>to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the whole or </i><br /> <i>substantially the whole of the undertaking of the company </i><br /> <i>or where the company owns more than one undertaking, of </i><br /><br /> 5 <br /> <br /> <i>the whole or substantially the whole of any of such </i><br /> <i>undertakings. </i><br /> <i>(b)</i> <i> </i> <i>Explanation. —For the purposes of this clause, — </i><br /> <i>(i)</i> <i> </i> <i>“undertaking” shall mean an undertaking in which </i><br /> <i>the </i> <b><i>investment</i></b> <i> of the company exceeds twenty per </i><br /> <i>cent. of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet </i><br /> <i>of the preceding financial year or an undertaking </i><br /> <i>which </i> <b><i>generates</i></b> <i> twenty per cent. of the total income </i><br /> <i>of the company during the previous financial year; </i><br /> <i>(ii)</i> <i> </i> <i>the expression “substantially the whole of the </i><br /> <i>undertaking” in any financial year shall mean twenty </i><br /> <i>per cent. or more of the value of the undertaking as </i><br /> <i>per the audited balance sheet of the preceding </i><br /> <i>financial year; </i><br /> <i> </i><br /> 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant the net worth <br /> of the company <i>viz </i> share capital <i>plus</i> reserves as shown in the last relevant <br /> balance sheet was Rs. <i>20.89</i> crores and whereas the subject property was sold at <br /> value of Rs. <i>9.50</i> crores, thus being more than 20% of the net worth of the <br /> company and as such it could not have been sold <i>except</i> with the consent of the <br /> company by a special resolution. The learned counsel for the appellant has <br /> referred to the fact the Ld. NCLT had disposed of the application relying upon <br /> the judgement pronounced under the old Companies Act, 1956 and though <br /> Section <i>293</i> of the said Act of 1956 was substantially similar to Section <i>180</i> of <br /> the Companies Act, 2013 but with a difference that the <i>undertaking</i> is defined <br /> only in the later Act of 2013. <br /> 6. It was argued the Ld. NCLT has wrongly held the assets of the company <br /> does not fall within the ambit of the word <i>“undertaking”</i> as given in Explanation <br /> to Section <i>180(1)(a)</i> of the Companies Act. Further reference was made to sub-<br /> section <i>(3)</i> of Section <i>180</i> of the Companies Act, 2013 as under: - <br /><br /> 6 <br /> <br /> <b><i>“180. Restrictions on powers of Board. </i></b><br /> <i>(1)</i> <i> </i> <i>xxx </i><br /> <i>(2)</i> <i> </i> xxx <i> </i><br /> <i>(3) Nothing contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall </i><br /> <i>affect— </i><br /> <i>(a) the title of a buyer or other person who buys or takes on </i><br /> <i>lease any property, investment or undertaking as is referred to </i><br /> <i>in that clause, in good faith; or </i><br /> <i>(b) the sale or lease of any property of the company where the </i><br /> <i>ordinary business of the company consists of, or comprises, </i><br /> <i>such selling or leasing. </i><br /> 7. It was argued the purchaser was never a bona fide purchaser and has <br /> rather acted malafidely as he knew the litigation was pending <i>qua</i> the said <br /> property before the Ld. NCLT. In support of his arguments he submitted though <br /> the Ld. NCLT had granted the <i>status quo</i> upon the assets and shareholding as <br /> on 28.03.2022 but the <i>status quo</i> on the assets was vacated on 18.08.2023 and <br /> despite the filing of Company Appeal (AT) No. <i>196/2023</i> by the appellants herein <br /> on 29.09.2023, the said bungalow was sold. Reference was made to the following <br /> paras of the sale deed dated 09.11.2023 executed by the Company in favour of <br /> M/s ButtePatil Properties which allegedly reveal the purchaser knew about the <br /> pendency of litigation between the parties <i>qua </i> such property and despite <br /> knowing it, had purchased it at very less value by undervaluing it, in collusion <br /> with the Respondents herein and hence was never a bonafide purchaser but was <br /> a speculative one. The following paras of sale deed were referred to as under: <br /> <i>“The Seller company states that subsequent to vacation of the </i><br /> <i>status quo order by the Hon’ble National Company Law </i><br /> <i>Tribunal, As on date apart from the first charge of Axis Bank </i><br /> <i>Ltd on the said property, no other encumbrances exist with </i><br /> <i>respect to the said property including but no limited to any </i><br /> <i>status quo order by the Hon’ble National Company Law </i><br /> <i>Tribunal, Mumbai or the National Company Appellate Tribunal, </i><br /><br /> 7 <br /> <br /> <i>New Delhi which prohibits or stops the company from selling </i><br /> <i>the said property. </i><br /> <i>T. That, after the vacation of stay order from Hon’ble NCLT </i><br /> <i>Bench Mumbai dated 18.08.2023 and the notice(s) issued by </i><br /> <i>Axis Bank Ltd, regarding the outstanding loan the Seller has </i><br /> <i>decided to sale the said property for repaying the loan of Axis </i><br /> <i>Bank Ltd. The Seller Company has passed necessary Board </i><br /> <i>Resolution authorizing the Directors viz Mr Ravindra Undale </i><br /> <i>and Mr Hemant Bhongale for the sale of the said property. </i><br /> 8. Heard. <br /> 9. Qua non-compliance of sub-section (a) of Section 180(1) read with its <br /> explanation, the Ld. NCLT held as follow: - <br /> <i>37. Ld. Counsel for MPTA has relied on the </i> judgment in the <br /> matter <i> of Sree Yellamma Cotton, Woollen and Silk Mills Co., </i><br /> <i>wherein the Hon’ble Madras High Court while dealing with the </i><br /> <i>interpretation of the term “undertaking” under the Companies </i><br /> <i>Act had observed as follows: </i><br /> <i>“The word “undertaking” is not defined in the Act. One </i><br /> <i>has therefore necessarily to depend upon the dictionary </i><br /> <i>meaning or such secondary meaning the term might have </i><br /> <i>acquired by commercial usage or long practice governing </i><br /> <i>the workings of and borrowings by companies. </i><br /> <i>The ordinary dictionary meaning is what has already </i><br /> <i>been referred to by me while summarizing Mr. Ullal’s </i><br /> <i>arguments. It is not in its real meaning anything which </i><br /> <i>may be described as a tangible piece of property like </i><br /> <i>land, machinery or the equipment; it is in actual effect an </i><br /> <i>activity of man which in commercial or business parlance </i><br /> <i>means an activity engaged in with a view to earn profit. </i><br /> <i>Property, moveable or immoveable, used in the course of </i><br /> <i>or for the purpose of such business can more accurately </i><br /> <i>be described as the tools of business or undertaking, i.e. </i><br /> <i>things or articles which are necessarily to be used to </i><br /> <i>keep the undertaking going or to assist the carrying on of </i><br /> <i>the activities leading to the earning of profits.” </i><br /> <i>38. He further relied on P.S. Offshore Inter Land Services Pvt. </i><br /> <i>Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Bombay Offshore Suppliers Ltd. and Ors: </i><br /> <i>1991 SCC OnLine Bom 555, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court </i><br /> <i>had interpreted the expression ‘undertaking’, the relevant </i><br /> <i>paragraph of which is extracted below: </i><br /><br /> 8 <br /> <br /> <i>“18. In my judgment, the expression “undertaking” used </i><br /> <i>in this section is liable to be interpreted to mean “the </i><br /> <i>unit”, the business as a going concern, the activity of the </i><br /> <i>company duly integrated with all its components in the </i><br /> <i>form of assets and not merely some asset of the </i><br /> <i>undertaking. Having regard to the object of the provision, </i><br /> <i>it can, at the most, embrace within it all the assets of the </i><br /> <i>business as a unit or practically all such constituents. If </i><br /> <i>the question arises as to whether the major capital </i><br /> <i>assets of the company constitute the undertaking of the </i><br /> <i>company while examining the authority of the board to </i><br /> <i>dispose of the same without the authority of the general </i><br /> <b><i>whether the </i></b><br /> <i>body, the test to be applied would be to see </i><br /> <b><i>business of the company could be carried on </i></b><br /> <b><i>effectively even after disposal of the assets in </i></b><br /> <b><i>question</i></b> <i> or whether the mere husk of the undertaking </i><br /> <i>would remain after disposal of the assets? The test to be </i><br /> <i>applied would be to see whether the capital assets to be </i><br /> <i>disposed of constitute substantially the bulk of the </i><br /> <i>assets so as to constitute the integral part of the </i><br /> <i>undertaking itself in the practical sense of the term.” </i><br /> <i>39. Ld. Counsel for MPTA further submits that the Companies </i><br /> <i>Act, 2013 itself provides a legislative distinction between the </i><br /> <i>term ‘asset’ and ‘undertaking’ which is indicative from the </i><br /> <i>reading of section 2(16) of the Companies Act, 2013 </i><br /> <i>whereunder the term ‘charge’ is defined as follows: </i><br /> <i>“an interest or lien created on the </i> <b><i>assets</i></b> <i> of a company </i><br /> <i>or its </i> <b><i>undertaking</i></b> <i> or both as security and includes a </i><br /> <i>mortgage.” </i><br /> <i>40. It is submitted that the disjunctive “or” in the above </i><br /> <i>definition signifies that “asset” and “undertaking” are not </i><br /> <i>intended to be synonyms, thus, the legislative drafting by </i><br /> <i>employing “or” manifests a clear intent to ascribe distinct </i><br /> <i>meanings to these terms. </i><br /> <i>41. Close analysis of the explanation of section 180(1)(a) of the </i><br /> <i>act, 2013 shows that the meaning of undertaking for the </i><br /> <i>purpose of section 180 is “an undertaking in which the </i><br /> <i>investment of the company exceeds 20% of its net worth as per </i><br /> <i>the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year or an </i><br /> <i>undertaking which generates 20% of the total income of the </i><br /> <i>company during the previous financial year”. In other words, </i><br /> <i>the Legislature is referring to an undertaking for which </i><br /><br /> 9 <br /> <br /> <i>clarification and explanations have been given through judicial </i><br /> <i>pronouncements under 1956 Act. </i><br /> <i>42. From the perusal of the judgments cited above, we agree </i><br /> <i>with the submission of Ld. Counsel for MPTA that the </i><br /> <i>expression “undertaking” cannot be taken as synonym of </i><br /> <i>“asset”/ “property” of a company. Further, though the </i><br /> <i>Companies Act does not expressly define and differentiate the </i><br /> <i>terms “asset” and “undertaking”, yet it can be inferred from the </i><br /> <i>usage of the said expressions in the Companies Act together </i><br /> <i>with the judicial pronouncements that there has a legislative </i><br /> <i>intent to give different meanings to both the terms. </i><br /> <i>43. While ‘asset’ would generally mean a property of the </i><br /> <i>Company whether moveable or immoveable and may or may </i><br /> <i>not be used to generate revenue, an ‘undertaking’ of a company </i><br /> <i>could be referred to as something that would constitute an </i><br /> <i>integral part of a company and would be used as a tool for </i><br /> <i>business purpose thereby contributing to the Company’s </i><br /> <i>generation of revenue and/or earning of profits. </i><br /> <i>44. In the present case, Ld. Counsel for MPTA submitted that </i><br /> <i>the Saakar Bungalow Property was acquired in the year 2017 </i><br /> <i>and it constitutes only an individual asset. It is further </i><br /> <i>submitted that the said Property from the date of its purchase </i><br /> <i>until the sale date i.e. 09.11.2023, did not generate any </i><br /> <i>revenue for MPTA and in fact, it is a continuing liability due to </i><br /> <i>accruing tax liabilities. </i><br /> <i>45. During the course of the argument, Ld. Counsel for the </i><br /> <i>Petitioners admitted that the Saakar Bungalow Property is not </i><br /> <i>being used for business purpose and is not generating any </i><br /> <i>revenue. </i><br /> <i>46. Hence, we are of the view that the said Property was merely </i><br /> <i>an individual asset of MPTA and the same cannot be </i><br /> <i>intermingled or used as synonym to “undertaking” in view of </i><br /> <i>the clear distinction made under the Legislature. </i><br /> 10. The question which arose in this appeal is if the said subject property can <br /> be treated as an <i>undertaking </i> per Explanation to Section <i>180(1)(a)</i> . <br /> 11. Now admittedly, the Ld. NCLT held the <i>undertaking</i> has different meaning <br /> altogether than from the <i>assets</i> of the company, as is explained in para <i>37</i> to <i>46</i> <br /> of the impugned order above. We see no reason to differ from the findings given <br /><br /> 10 <br /> <br /> by the Ld. NCLT on the aspect. Section <i>180(1)(a)</i> applies only to disposal of an <br /> ‘ <i>undertaking’</i> or substantially the whole thereof and not to isolated assets. The <br /> explanation in the said provision <i>qua</i> the <i>20%</i> threshold applies only once the <br /> subject matter qualifies as an <i>undertaking</i> . <br /> 12. Upon considering the judgements of P.S. Offshore Inter Land Services Pvt <br /> Ltd & Others Vs Bombay Offshore Supplies & Services Ltd & Ors 1991 SCC <br /> Online Bom 555 and International Cotton Corporation (P.) Ltd. Versus Bank of <br /> Maharashtra & Anr 1969 SCC OnLine Kar 177, the following legal position <br /> emerges – <i>(a)</i> ‘ <i>undertaking’</i> means a business as a going concern, not individual <br /> assets. It is an organized profit-making activity whereas assets are merely its <br /> tools; and <i>(b)</i> disposal of a single mortgaged property is not disposal of an <br /> undertaking. <br /> 13. A comparative reading of Section <i>293(1)(a)</i> of the Companies Act, 1956 and <br /> Section <i>180(1)(a)</i> of the 2013 Act demonstrates the latter merely introduced a <br /> quantitative threshold to govern the requirement of a special resolution in <br /> respect of the sale of an “ <i>undertaking</i> .” The explanation to Section 180 expressly <br /> provides the definition of “substantially the whole of the undertaking” is “for the <br /> purposes of this explanation” alone. Thus, the 20% threshold operates only as a <br /> limitation upon the necessity of passing a special resolution and cannot be read <br /> to expand the meaning of “ <i>undertaking</i> ” to cover individual assets. In fact, the <br /> phrase “ <i>an</i> <i>undertaking in which</i> …” appearing before the specified percentages <br /> requires a preliminary qualitative assessment to ascertain whether the subject <br /><br /> 11 <br /> <br /> matter qualifies as an “ <i>undertaking</i> ” at all. It is pertinent the Act does not define <br /> “ <i>undertaking</i> ,” thereby requiring reliance on settled judicial interpretation. <br /> 14. The statutory scheme under the Companies Act, 2013 reinforces this <br /> distinction. Section <i>2(16)</i> of the Act defines ‘charge’ as an interest created on the <br /> assets or undertakings of a company— using the disjunctive 'or.' The legislative <br /> intent is that ‘ <i>assets’</i> and ‘ <i>undertakings’</i> are not synonymous. <br /> 15. Now, Saakar Bungalow, acquired in 2017, was allegedly a passive, non-<br /> revenue-generating mortgaged property, not part of the operational business. Its <br /> sale was disposal of an asset, not an undertaking. Therefore, the requirement of <br /> a special resolution under Section 180 was not necessitated. The Appellants’ <br /> interpretation of provisions of Companies Act, is wholly misplaced in law. <br /> Admittedly it was not a sole asset of the company. <br /> 16. Qua good faith <i>per</i> sub-section <i>(3)</i> of Section <i>180</i> (supra), we note it was <br /> not a sale simplicitor by the company but a distress sale under the SARFAESI <br /> Act, 2002 by Axis Bank through the company. Admittedly Axis Bank had <br /> granted loan to Respondent No.1 company and admittedly the company had <br /> defaulted in re-payment of such loan(s) and the loan account was declared NPA <br /> and the personal guarantors/directors, including the appellants herein, were all <br /> proceeded against by Axis Bank under the SARFAESI Act. <br /> 17. Accordingly IA No. <i>110/2023</i> was filed on behalf of the company wherein <br /> th<br /> it was prayed the company had availed credit facility from the Axis Bank on 16 <br /> August, 2019 and since it could not make repayments, their account was <br /><br /> 12 <br /> <br /> th<br /> declared NPA with effect from 24 August, 2022. The Axis Bank had served a <br /> notice on 05.05.2023 under Section <i>13(2)</i> of the SARFAESI Act calling upon the <br /> company and its guarantors, <i>including the appellants herein</i> to make payment of <br /> the outstanding dues, within the period of 60 days, failing which the action to <br /> take physical possession of the secured assets would be taken. Thus the <br /> <i>th</i><br /> application was filed for vacation of the <i>status quo</i> order of dated <i>28</i> <i> March, </i><br /> <i>2022</i> so that mortgaged property of the company could be sold to pay off the <br /> bank loans and the current account of the company can be made operational <br /> and the company may be able to start again. It is pertinent to mention the <br /> appellants No.1 and 2 both were also guarantors to the said loan facility. <br /> 18. In their reply to the I.A, (supra), the appellants have rather admitted the <br /> Respondent No.1 company was facing <i> financial </i> difficulty but could have availed <br /> <i>other options</i> to meet financial requirements of the company rather than to sell <br /> off its assets. In this reply the appellants only blamed other directors of the <br /> company for this situation. <br /> 19. The Ld. NCLT then passed an order dated 18.08.2023 in CP No. <i>64/2022 </i><br /> noting all the above contentions and held both the groups in the company were <br /> at logger heads; the financial statements of the company were not filed since long <br /> due to misunderstanding between the groups; the company was a headless <br /> organization; the Axis Bank had initiated SARFAESI proceedings against the <br /> company as well as its directors for enforcement of their security interest against <br /><br /> 13 <br /> <br /> the subject property mortgaged to it for recovery of its outstanding dues and the <br /> company was unable to clear such outstanding dues. <br /> 20. As the appellants in their reply have also submitted selling the property <br /> through an administrator would involve expenditure, the Ld. NCLT then directed <br /> the company to give a 15 days’ prior notice to the appellants herein with details <br /> of the buyer, price etc. so as to enable the appellants to bring any buyer offering <br /> higher amount than brought by the company as the appellants though did not <br /> object to the sale of the property but alleged the property may fetch higher <br /> amount if it is disposed of in open market. The Ld. NCLT also noted the <br /> appellants were turning down every suggestion given by the Bench as well as by <br /> Respondent No.1 company and were taking advantage of the interim order to <br /> settle their scores with the Respondents. <br /> 21. Now admittedly the sale deed noted about the pendency of the litigation; <br /> vacation of the interim order as well as the fact that the outstanding amount of <br /> loan was approximately Rs. <i>12.68</i> crores and only after seeking valuation of the <br /> property, i.e. at about Rs. 8 crores it was sold for a sum of Rs. <i>9.50 </i> crores. Now <br /> admittedly the purchaser is not a related party. <br /> 22. CA 129/2024 was then moved by the appellants herein for cancellation of <br /> the sale deed on the grounds <i>viz</i> violation of Section <i>180(1)(a)</i> ; malafide act of the <br /> purchaser; and under valuation. However, a bare perusal of the application <br /> would show no allegation was made against the purchaser and the allegations of <br /> fraud were made only against the management of Respondent no. 1 company. <br /><br /> 14 <br /> <br /> Further as is noted above CA <i>213/2023</i> for impleading Axis Bank and seeking a <br /> status quo against the Axis Bank restraining them to sell the mortgaged property <br /> was rather got dismissed as withdrawn by the appellants themselves. It was <br /> only thereafter the Axis Bank went ahead to sell properties to the purchaser. <br /> Admittedly the entire sale consideration <i>went to Axis Bank and adjusted against </i><br /> <i>loan and not a single penny was given to other group or directors in Respondent </i><br /> <i>no.1 company</i> . <br /> 23. Thus from the above facts it is clear it was a distress sale wherein the Axis <br /> Bank was pressurizing for recovery of its loan and even the appellants were <br /> aware of the fact but were of the view the property be sold to an outsider and not <br /> through the SARFAESI proceedings. Admittedly no allegations were ever made <br /> by the appellants in their pleadings against the purchasers and all allegations of <br /> malafide were made against another group of directors. Thus, the factum of good <br /> faith of purchasers cannot be questioned. Moreso by the time the Sale Deed was <br /> executed, the purchaser had already paid about Rs. <i>50</i> lakhs. <br /> 25. Qua the issue as to if the property was undervalued, the Ld. NCLT had <br /> held as under: - <br /> <i>58. It is to be noted that this Bench also had raised a query to </i><br /> <i>MPTA regarding the non-inclusion of Potential FSI in the </i><br /> <i>Valuation Report. In this regard, MPTA submitted that the FSI </i><br /> <i>derived from the TDR is contingent and subject to specific </i><br /> <i>conditions. It is further submitted that the said FSI has a limited </i><br /> <i>validity period, typically one year and it requires a separate </i><br /> <i>renewal process which would incur additional costs and </i><br /> <i>administrative procedures which cannot be undertaken since </i><br /> <i>the Respondent Company is currently non-operational and </i><br /> <i>lacks the financial resources and operational capacity. </i><br /><br /> 15 <br /> <br /> <i>Therefore, it is submitted that the potential FSI was consciously </i><br /> <i>excluded in the Valuation Report to avoid misleading and </i><br /> <i>untrue disclosures. </i><br /> <i>59. We have considered the submissions of the parties. Keeping </i><br /> <i>in view the same, we are of the view that a sale which has been </i><br /> <i>otherwise conducted in a legal manner cannot be set aside </i><br /> <i>solely on the ground that the property was sold at allegedly a </i><br /> <i>lower price than the market value. Moreover, the Sale Deed </i><br /> <i>dated 09.11.2023 clearly states that the sale is on ‘as is where </i><br /> <i>is basis’ and it is also stated in the Sale Deed that: </i><br /> <i>“The offer given by the Purchaser was deemed to be </i><br /> <i>reasonable considering the present dispute between the </i><br /> <i>shareholders and outstanding loan from the bank, the </i><br /> <i>offer extended close to fair market value as obtained from </i><br /> <i>expert valuer appointed by the Seller and Purchaser </i><br /> <i>independently as per prevailing market rate.” </i><br /> <i>60. </i> <i>Considering </i> <i>the </i> <i>same </i> <i>together </i> <i>with </i> <i>the </i><br /> <i>submissions/clarifications given by MPTA regarding the </i><br /> <i>valuation and FSI/TDR, we are of the view that there is no </i><br /> <i>discrepancy or irregularity in the valuation of Saakar Bungalow </i><br /> <i>Property conducted by MPTA warranting any interference. </i><br /> 26. We see no reason to differ from the findings of the Ld. NCLT on this count. <br /> Even otherwise the law is settled that appellate interference with discretionary <br /> orders is extremely limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox <br /> India (1990 Supp SCC 727) held– <br /> <i>“The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of </i><br /> <i>discretion of the trial court and substitute its own discretion </i><br /> <i>except where the discretion has been shown to have been </i><br /> <i>exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the </i><br /> <i>court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant </i><br /> <i>or refusal of interlocutory injunction.” </i><br /> 27. Considering the above legal position, the Hon’ble NCLT’s judicial discretion <br /> in lifting the interim status <i>qua</i> order dated 18.08.2023 and subsequently <br /> upholding the sale by its Order dated 02.05.2025 cannot be substituted by this <br /><br /> 16 <br /> <br /> Tribunal since the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity or <br /> arbitrariness in the said Orders. <br /> 28. Thus both these appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. <br /> 29. Pending applications are also disposed of. <br /> <br /> <b>(Justice Yogesh Khanna) </b><br /> <b>Member (Judicial) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>(Mr. Ajai Das Mehrotra) </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical) </b><br /> <b>Dated:09-03-2026 </b><br /> <b>BM</b> </div>