Anil Didwania vs Amarjit Singh

$~3
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 03.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010839332018
+ RC.REV. 112/2018, CM APPL. 11254/2018 (Stay), CM APPL.
52152/2025 (Dir.), CM APPL. 46105/2026 (For placing on
record the response to the alleged „Subsequent Events‟ by
Petitioner) & CM APPL. 59592/2026 (For taking on record
Written synopsis by Respondent)

ANIL DIDWANIA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Alok Kumar, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Manisha Agrawal
Narain, Mr. Amit Kumar Singh,
Mr. Varun Maheshwari, Mr.
Manan Soni, Ms. Kavita Bardia
and Ms. Suhani Jain, Advocates
versus

AMARJIT SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajeev Saxena, Senior
Advocate with Mr. R. K. Bedi
and Ms. Megha Saxena,
Advocates with Respondent in
Person

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
1
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Order dated
2
22.09.2017 passed by the Learned CCJ-cum-ARC, Central

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:05.09.2026
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RC.REV.112/2018 Page 1 of 12

3
District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in Eviction Petition bearing
4
No. E.175/2017 , titled “Sh. Amarjit Singh v. Sh. Anil Didwania” ,
whereby the application seeking leave to defend preferred by the
Petitioner herein was dismissed and an Eviction Order came to be
passed against him.
2. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
limits his challenge to the Impugned Order to two aspects. Firstly, he
submits that there was concealment on the part of the Respondent
insofar as the Respondent had failed to bring to the notice of the
learned ARC that he was running his business from premises bearing
No. 217-B, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi. To further buttress his
contentions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the
Judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in North
5
Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Kusum Lata Jain , to submit that
since the Respondent had not approached the learned ARC with clean
hands, the learned ARC erred in proceeding to pass an Eviction Order
in his favour.
3. The second aspect sought to be canvassed by learned Senior
Counsel for the Petitioner is with regard to the availability of the
aforesaid premises bearing No. 217-B, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi
as an alternative suitable accommodation. It is his submission that the
Respondent was already carrying on his business from the said
premises, which, according to him, is substantially larger in area than
the subject premises in respect of which eviction is sought. No other
submission has been advanced on behalf of the Petitioner.

3
Learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
5
2016 SCC OnLine Del 764
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BHATIA
Signing Date:05.09.2026
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4. Per contra , learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submits that there has been no concealment whatsoever
on the part of the Respondent. He further submits that, as is apparent
from the Impugned Order itself, the learned ARC has, at the very
outset, taken note of the case set up by the Respondent, including the
fact that the premises bearing No. 217-B, Bhai Parmanand Colony,
Delhi was a residential property. He submits that the bona fide
requirement projected by the Respondent was for the purpose of
carrying on and expanding his commercial activities relating to
photography, inter alia , washing and developing negatives,
preparation of photographs and installation of computers and other
equipment necessary for the said purpose. It is, therefore, submitted
that the subject premises being commercial in nature, as opposed to
being residential in nature, was required to fulfil the aforesaid bona
fide commercial requirement of the Respondent.
5. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submits that the contention
regarding alleged concealment is wholly misconceived and the
Judgment relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner has
no application to the facts of the present case.
6. Adverting thereafter to the second aspect sought to be
canvassed by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent submits that the question regarding the
availability and suitability of alternative accommodation has been
considered in detail by the learned ARC. He submits that in the
limited revisional jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, no occasion arises for this
Court to interfere with the findings returned by the learned ARC in the
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:05.09.2026
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Impugned Order. He, therefore, submits that the present Petition is
liable to be dismissed.
7. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.
8. This Court has heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and,
with their able assistance, gone through the relevant documents placed
on record as well as the Impugned Order.
9. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
10. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in S arla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
6
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
7 8
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that thejurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
11. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
9
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
10
Grover .
12. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the

6
(1998) 8 SCC 119
7
(2014) 9 SCC 78
8
(2022) 6 SCC 30
9
2024:DHC:9322
10
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

13. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
15. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Judgment are required to be
examined.
16. In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it
would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned
ARC. The relevant observations of the learned RC in the Impugned
Order are extracted hereinbelow:
“ Bona fide requirement :-
19. As regards the bona fide requirement, the petitioner has averred
that he requires the tenanted premises bona fidely as the petitioner
is a photographer by profession and is presently doing the work of
photography from his residential address at Bhai Parmanand
Colony, Delhi and have no portion to carry out his commercial
activities of photography of washing the negatives and preparing
the photographs and to install the computers and other appliances.
He has to outsource the said work which is causing loss to him.
20. Per contra , counsel for the respondent submits that the
petitioner is already having a big business premises, i.e. 91.96 sq.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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mts, where the petitioner is carrying the business of photography at
217, First Floor, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Parmanand Chowk,
Delhi-110009. The property is in the name of his wife Smt.
Joginder Kaur, where petitioner is running the photography shop in
the name and style of CPC Photography. In rebuttal, counsel for
the petitioner states that the flat no. 217-B Bhai Parmanand
Colony. It is a residential flat owned by Smt. Joginder Kaur, the
wife of the petitioner, which was previously used for his son
Amanpreet Singh, who after his marriage started working in USA.
The said flat is residential situated on the first floor which is now
under renovation as the other son of the petitioner is going to be
married recently and no commercial activity is being carried out
from the said property. It is submitted by the petitioner that he is
carrying on his photography work from a small portion of his
residential house bearing no. 128, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi.
Petitioner has also filed photocopy of various bills as well as his
ITR record clearly showing the address of his jobwork to be of
128, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi. Even otherwise, the said
premises bearing no. 217-B, Dhakka is a residential
accommodation at the first floor where no commercial activity can
be carried out.
21. In Tarsem Singh v. Gurvinder Singh 173 (2010) DLT 379 it is
observed that if the landlord wants to start his own business in the
premises owned by him, then by no stretch of imagination it can be
said that the requirement of the landlord for the premises is neither
bonafide nor genuine. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem
Machinary & Co. AIR 2000 SC 534 it is held that landlord is the
best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes
and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Further, the
petitioner, being the landlord has sole prerogative to decide as to
from where he wants to carry his business and the
respondent/tenant cannot dictate terms upon the petitioner to do his
business from residential accommodation when he has under his
ownership accommodation on the ground floor, i.e. the tenanted
premises, which is more suitable for him. In Sarla Ahuja v. United
India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 it has been held
that Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the
requirement of the landlord is not bona fide and that when the
landlord shows Prima faci e case, a presumption that the
requirement is bona fide is to be drawn. Thus, the bona fide
requirement of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises stands duly
proved.

Availability of alternative suitable accommodation :-
22. It is averred by the respondent that the petitioner is having in
his ownership various other properties which can be used by him
for his bona fide requirement, if any. However, the respondent has
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BHATIA
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failed to give any specific address or any other document to show
that the petitioner is having availability of any alternative suitable
accommodation which can be used by him for his bona fide
requirement alongwith the leave to defend application.
23. Even though in rejoinder it is submitted by the respondent that
the petitioner is having various properties i.e. 2224/6, Chah Indra
Market, Behind Jubilee Cinema, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk,
Delhi and that address is registered on the site of India Dot com, it
also mentions the phone no. 9810007424. Similarly, the petitioner
is having another shop at 7259/3A, Prem Nagar, Shakti Nagar,
Delhi-110007 where on the board a mobile no. 9711999521 of the
petitioner is written and 7259/2, Prem Nagar, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-
110007 (Near Radhey Radhey Enterprises), Prem Nagar, Shakti
Nagar, Delhi-110007. Copies of the site of India Dot Com saying
that it is certified under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act
and Photograph of shop no. 7259/3A, Prem Nagar, Shakti Nagar,
Delhi-110007 is enclosed by the respondent with the rejoinder. It is
submitted that the petitioner is having around 7 shops in the market
where the shop of the respondent is situated, the details of the
shops are as under:
(1) Two shops naming D & D1 at First Floor, 3/2793, Ashok Gali,
Delhi-6. These shops are in possession with M/s Mahesh Tractor
Industries (MTI).
(2) Two shops naming E & E1 at First Floor, 3/2793, Ashok Gali.
These shops are in possession with M/s Perfect Auto Spares.
(3) Three shops naming X at ground floor and F & F1 at First
Floor, 3/2793, Ashok Gali, Delhi-6. Shop naming X at Ground
Floor are in possession with M/s J.J. Equipments and shop naming
F & Fl at First Floor are in possession with M/s Pramod Tractors.
24. Further, the respondent, in his rejoinder cited certain case-laws
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC
222, S.M. Mehra v. D. D. Malik, Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1990
decided on 11.01.1990, Charan Dass Duggal v.Brahma Nand,
(1983) 1 SCC, 301, Prahlad Rai Mittal v. Smt. Risa Devi 196
(2013) DLT 703 stating that the Supreme Court in similar facts and
circumstances held that the burden is placed on the landlord to
prove that his need is a bonafide one, more so, when he has other
alternate accommodations in his possession.
25. It is settled principle that the respondent cannot allege any new
fact in his rejoinder as per the case law Prithipal Singh v. Satpal
Singh (Dead) through his LR's, (2010) 2 SCC 15 it has been held
that:
"The statutory time period of 15 days for filing of leave to
defend application is inflexible and whatever has to be
stated in the leave to defend application with respect to the
facts and events, which have happened prior to 15 days
period, must be stated in the leave to defend application
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BHATIA
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itself and not by way of subsequent affidavit or
documents."
26. Even on merits the contention of the respondent is not tenable
as mention of mobile number of the petitioner on the site of India
dot com has to be certified through the representative of the service
provider. Moreover the genuineness of the data given on the site of
India dot com has not been verified by any authentic person.
Similarly bald assertion regarding availability of another shop with
the petitioner, on the board of which the mobile number of the
petitioner is mentioned without any documentary proof is not
tenable. No document has been produced by the respondent to
show that the said mobile number belongs to the petitioner.
Moreover, the name of the petitioner is no where mentioned on the
said shop as seen from the photograph placed on record by the
respondent. It is admitted by the respondent that the remaining
seven shops are already under occupation of different tenants and
hence, cannot be said to be the alternative suitable accommodation
with the petitioner to carry on his work.
27. It is settled principle that no new ground can be raised in the
rejoinder by the tenant as the landlord would not have any chance
to rebut the same or otherwise a chance to rebut the same has to be
given to the landlord petitioner which would definitely delay the
disposal of the eviction petition under Section 25B of the Act
which would be against its object. In Ramesh Chand v. Uganti
Devi , 157 (2009) DLT 405, it has been held that:
"A tenant who alleges that landlord has at his disposal
other accommodation has to place before the Ld. ARC
some material to show that the landlord has a specific
alternative accommodation at his disposal". Mere bald
allegation with respect to availability of additional
accommodation with the petitioner does not hold any basis
and cannot be a basis to deny the petitioner of his right to
vacate the tenanted premises for his bona fide
requirement".

In the case of Mumtaz Begum v. Mohd. Khan RC(R) No. 78 -
79/2005 decided on 12.01.2009 the Delhi High Court has held that
a landlord is not required to disclose all his properties. Upon a plea
with respect to other properties being taken by the tenant, the
landlord is entitled to at that stage show that the same is not
alternative suitable accommodation to him. Thus, the respondent
has failed to prove the availability of any alternative suitable
accommodation with the petitioner to do his work of photography.
Hence, this averment of the respondent is without any substance
and hence, cannot be relied upon.
28. Thus, from the discussion made above, respondent has failed to
raise any triable issue, which requires evidence to be proved. The
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BHATIA
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petitioner, on the other hand, has clearly established his bona fide
requirement regarding tenanted premises. Hence, the application
for leave to defend filed by the respondent is ordered to be
dismissed. Consequently, eviction order is liable to be passed
against the respondent u/s Section 25 B (4) of the Act. The
petitioner is held entitled for recovery of the tenanted premises,
i.e., Shop bearing no. 3/2793, Ground Floor, Ashoka Gali,
Hamilton Road, Mori Gate, Delhi, as shown in red colour in the
site plan annexed with the petition. However, the petitioner would
not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of
possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months
from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the
Act.”

17. Examining the first contention urged on behalf of the Petitioner
within the aforesaid parameters, this Court finds no merit in the
submission that the Respondent had concealed the fact regarding
premises bearing No. 217-B, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi. A
perusal of the Impugned Order itself demonstrates that the learned
ARC had taken into consideration the Respondent's case regarding the
said premises and the explanation furnished by him in relation thereto.
Merely because the Respondent was carrying out certain activities
from a portion of his residential accommodation cannot lead to the
conclusion that he had concealed the existence of an alternative
suitable accommodation, particularly when the bona fide requirement
projected by him was for a commercial premises for carrying out and
expanding his photography business, including activities relating to
washing and developing negatives, preparation of photographs and
installation of computers and other necessary equipment. The same is
also clearly set out in the Eviction Petition. The contention regarding
concealment, therefore, does not merit acceptance.
18. Furthermore, insofar as the contention regarding the availability
of alternative suitable accommodation is concerned, this Court finds
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BHATIA
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that the same has been duly considered by the learned ARC. The
learned ARC has taken note of the nature of premises bearing No.
217-B, Bhai Parmanand Colony, Delhi, and has returned a finding
with regard to its residential character and its suitability qua the
requirement projected by the Respondent.
19. The learned ARC has also duly considered the contention of the
Petitioner regarding the availability of other properties as alternative
suitable accommodation with the Respondent and has found that the
Petitioner had failed to place any material on record to substantiate
that any of the said properties constituted “reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation” available to the Respondent to meet the
bona fide requirement projected in the Eviction Petition. This Court
finds no perversity or material irregularity in the aforesaid findings.
20. It is also significant to note that the bona fide requirement
projected by the Respondent was specifically with regard to having a
suitable commercial space for carrying out the activities forming part
of his photography business, inter alia , washing and developing
negatives, preparation of photographs and installation of computers
and other equipment necessary for the said purpose. The learned ARC,
upon considering the nature of the requirement so projected and the
material placed on record, has returned a finding in favour of the
Respondent.
21. The findings so returned cannot be said to be unsupported by
the material placed on record or based on an erroneous premise.
Merely because the Petitioner seeks to take a different view of the
material considered by the learned ARC would not justify interference
by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
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BHATIA
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22. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that no case for
interference with the Impugned Order is made out. The conclusions
arrived at by the learned ARC are based upon the material placed
before it and the contentions urged by the Petitioner have been duly
dealt with. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that the findings
suffer from such illegality, perversity or material irregularity as would
warrant the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

23. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no merit in the present
Petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
24. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 3, 2026/rk/ma

Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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