PAVANKUMAR vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA


AT KALABURAGI


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DATED THIS THE 28 DAY OF APRIL, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

AND


THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

WRIT APPEAL NO. 200101 OF 2026 (LB-RES)

BETWEEN:

1. PAVANKUMAR
S/O M VEERANNA,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
R/O: WARD NO.12,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

2. SRINIVAS REDDY
S/O SRISHAILAPPA,
AGE : 57 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.24,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

3. SANNA NARASAREDDY
S/O YELLAPPA,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.33,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

4. SRI TIMMAPPA
S/O NAGINDRAPPA,
AGE : 53 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.34,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 102.









Digitally signed by
VARSHA N
RASALKAR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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5. SRI JINDAPPA
S/O NARASAPPA,
AGE : 64 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.22,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

6. V.NAGARAJ
S/O SANNA BALAPPA,
AGE : 47 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.03,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

7. DARUR BASAVARAJ PATIL
S/O SIDDANNAGOUDA,
AGE : 64 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.10,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

8. SMT. SHAINAZ BEGUM
W/O G.H. HAJIBABU,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.26,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

9. SRI N.K. NAGARAJ
S/O K NAGAPPA,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.21,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

10. B.RAMESH
S/O BADESAB,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.04,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

11. P. NAVANEETA
W/O P.SRINIVASREDDY,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,

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WARD NO.27,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

12. SMT. ANJANAMMA
W/O SHAMASUNDAR,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.31,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

13. SMT. REKHA
W/O MAHENDRA REDDY,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.25,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

14. SMT. BUJJAMMA
W/O SHANKAREPPA,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.06,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

15. SMT. SWATI
W/O HARIBABU,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.35,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR – 584 101.

16. SMT. SAMEENA
W/O MUKRAM,
AGE : 50 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.32,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

17. SRI. NOOR PASHA S.,
S/O ASHIMODDIN,
AGE : 64 YEARS,

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OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.14,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

18. SMT. KHURSHIDA BANU
W/O WAHID,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.9,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

19. SRI SHAJID SAMEER
S/O MASAR ALIF,
AGE : 50 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.15,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

20. SMT. UMA JANDAR
W/O RAVINDRA JANDAR,
AGE : 48 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.13,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

21. SMT. HEMALATHA
W/O P.BODEPPA,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.19,
CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

22. JAYANNA
S/O SWAMIDAS,
AGE : 65 YEARS, OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.2, CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.

23. SMT. NARASAMMA
W/O NARASIMHALU MADAGIRI,
AGE : 45 YEARS, OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.20, CMC, RAICHUR – 584 101.
…APPELLANTS

(BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR S.PATIL, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. RAVI B.PATIL, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. THE DIRECTOR OF
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
V.V.TOWER, DR.B. R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
D.C. OFFICE, LINGASUGURU ROAD,
RAICHUR – 585 201.

4. THE COMMISSIONER,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
RAICHUR, TQ: AND DIST : RAICHUR.

5. THE UNDER SECRETARY,
KARNATAKA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION,
ND RD
NO.16, 2 AND 3 FLOOR,
BELLARY ROAD, SADASHIVA NAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 080.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. MAYA T.R., HCGP FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. GOURISH S.KHASHAMPUR, ADVOCATE FOR R4;
SRI. SUDARSHAN M., ADVOCATE FOR R5)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 26.02.2026 DISMISSING THE WRIT
TH
PETITION NO.202910/2025 WITH A DIRECTION TO THE 5
RESPONDENT TO HOLD ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM THE
DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE AND CONSEQUENTIALLY TO ALLOW THE WRIT
PETITION AS PRAYED FOR.

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 27.03.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
and
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

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CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)

1. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
“i) Call for the records in Writ Petition
No.202910/2025 on the file of the learned Single
Judge of this Hon’ble Court.

ii) To set aside the impugned order dated
26.02.2026 dismissing the Writ Petition
th
No.202910/2025 with a direction to the 5
respondent to hold elections within six months
from the date of appointment of Administrator by
the learned Single Judge and consequentially to
allow the Writ Petition as prayed for, in the
interest of justice.
iii) Pass any Order/s, direction as this Hon’ble
Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case
including an order as to the costs of the present
proceedings.”

2. The petitioners had filed W.P.No.202910/2025
seeking for the following reliefs:
“a) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the
impugned communication dated 27.01.2025
th
issued by the 5 respondent authority bearing
No.SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB as at Annexure-
G and consequential order dated 26.03.2025
bearing No.NAAAE UDA 39 MLR 2025(E) as at
st
Annexure-H issued by the 1 respondent authority
determining the date of completion of tenure of
councilors and consequentially the committee
insofar as relates to at Sl.No.174, as contrary to
Sec.3, 4 and 503 of Karnataka Municipal
Corporation Act and also contrary to Sec.18 and
Sec.315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.

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aa) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the
Notification dated 15.11.2025 bearing No.UDD-
293 MLR 2025(e) duly published in the official
Gazatte on 17.11.2025 as Annexure-L issued by
st
the 1 respondent authority as in violation of
section 503 of Karnataka Municipal Corporation
Act and Article 243-U of the Constitution in the
interest of justice. ab) Issue a writ of mandamus
directing the respondent state to permit the
petitioner and the body in administration of
municipal area to continue their tenure till
formation of new body under Section 503(3)(a) of
the Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, in the
interest of justice and equity. (Amendment carried
out as per order dated 26.02.2026)
b) Declare that the duration of the tenure of the
order dated 08.05.2023 appointing Administrator to
Raichur Municipal Council from 11.05.2023 to
27.08.2024 shall not usurp the total five years of
the tenure of the Councilors.
c) Issue writ of mandamus, directing the
respondents No.1 and 5 to calculate the five years
term of the council excluding the period from
11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 and further be directed
that term of Raichur City Municipal Council would
continue until completion of 30 months tenure by
considering the grievance of the petitioners vide
representation dated 22.09.2025 as at Annexure-J,
in the interest of justice and equity.
d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit in the fact and circumstances of
the case and in the interest of justice.”


3. The learned Single Judge of this Court vide order
dated 26.02.2026 has dismissed W.P.No.202910/
2025 by passing the following order:
“i. The Writ petition is dismissed.

ii. The respondent No.5/Election Commissioner
shall proceed further by conducting elections in

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accordance to law expeditiously within a period of
six months from the date of appointment of
administrator.
Ordered accordingly.”

4. It is challenging the above order, the petitioners are
before this Court.

5. Parties are described as in the writ petition for
convenience.

6. Petitioners claim to be elected Councilors to City
Municipal Council, Raichur (CMC) during the general
elections held on 03.09.2018. The declaration by the
Returning Officer being issued on 13.09.2019. The
first meeting of the CMC was held on 02.11.2020,
wherein the elections were held for the posts of
President and Vice President for the initial tenure of
thirty months, which came to an end on 11.05.2023.

7. There was a delay in publishing the reservation for
the post of President and Vice President for the
second tenure, which came to be published only on
28.08.2024. During the intervening period of
11.05.2023 to 28.08.2024, an Administrator had
been appointed by the State Government since the
reservation notification had been challenged before
the Courts, and as such, no elections could be held
for the said posts. The tenure of the Administrator

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came to an end on 27.08.2024, elections having
been held on 28.08.2024.

8. On 04.12.2024, the first respondent/ Principal
Secretary, Department of Urban Development,
issued a notification declaring the City Municipal area
of Raichur District as an Urban Area and Raichur City
Municipality was declared as Raichur Municipal
Corporation.

9. The Karnataka State Election Commission
(hereinafter referred as ‘Election Commission’ for
brevity) had issued a communication to the Urban
Development Department prescribing the last date of
the tenure of the Council to be 02.11.2025, and
consequently, the Urban Development Department
issued a direction to the Deputy Commissioner,
Raichur, to hold elections for the post of Councillors
on or before 02.11.2025.

10. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners had
submitted a representation on 22.09.2025 requesting
the Urban Development Department to permit the
committee to complete its tenure, which it was
deprived of in view of the appointment of an
Administrator for a period of fifteen months due to
pending litigation challenging the roster reservation
to the post of President and Vice President.

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11. It is in that background that an Administrator was
appointed on 15.11.2025. The petitioners had
initially been aggrieved by the communication dated
27.01.2025 and 26.03.2025 supra had filed
W.P.No.202910/2025 and sought a stay of those
communications, for which an interim order was
granted by the learned Single Judge on 25.09.2025.

12. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Urban
Development Department issued notification dated
15.11.2025 invoking Section 509 of the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred as
‘KMC Act’ for brevity,) and sought to appoint the
Regional Commissioner, Kalaburagi, as the
Administrator with effect from 03.11.2025 which
notification was also challenged in the pending writ
petition by way of an amendment. The writ petition
having been dismissed by way of the impugned order
dated 26.02.2026, the petitioners have preferred the
above writ appeal seeking for the reliefs indicated
supra.

13. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Ravi B. Patil, for the
petitioners would submit that,

13.1. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is
without considering the material facts available

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on record and without appreciating the
provisions of Section 503 of the KMC Act.
Section 503 of the KMC Act is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
“503. Declaration of [city municipal
area as a larger urban area] under this Act –
[(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 3, the
Governon may declare by Notification that any
municipal area for which a city municipal council is
constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1964) shall with
effect from the date to be specified in such
Notification to be a larger urban area specified
under Section 3 of this Act].
(2) The provisions of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 applicable to such 1[city
municipal area] shall not apply to any local area
declared as a 2[larger urban area] under sub-
section (1) with effect from the date specified in
the declaration:
Provided that any appointment,
notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence,
permission, rule, bye-law or form made or issued
or imposed under the said Act in respect of such
[city municipal area] which were in force as
applicable immediately before the date specified
under sub-section (1) shall continue in force and
be deemed to have been made, issued or imposed
under the provisions of this Act unless and until it
is superseded by any appointment, notification,
notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission,
rule, bye-law or form made or issued or imposed
under this Act.

(3) With effect from the date of declaration
of any area as a [larger urban area] under sub-
section (1), the following consequences shall
ensure, namely.-

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(a) the body functioning as a city
Municipal Council under the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 immediately before
the date of the said declaration in respect
of the said area shall become a body
competent to exercise the powers and
perform the duties conferred by the
provisions of the Act on a Corporation in
respect of the said area until a Corporation
is duly constituted for the area within the
jurisdiction of such body under the
provisions of this Act;

(b) the Councillors of the city Municipal
Council holding office as such immediately
before the said date shall become
Councillors of the Corporation;

(c) the president of the said city
Municipal Council shall become the Mayor
of the Corporation and discharge duties and
perform functions of the Mayor under this
Act and the vice-president of the said city
Municipal Council shall become the Deputy
Mayor of the said Corporation under this
Act;

[(cc) where, under the provisions of
Section 315 or Section 316 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 either
an administrator or an officer has been
appointed, to exercise the powers and
perform the duties of the municipal council,
then, such administrator or officer shall be
deemed to be an administrator appointed
2 3
under Section 99 [x x x x x]. [x x x x x].
The Advisory council, if any, appointed to
advise and assist the Administrator
appointed under Section 315 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 shall be
deemed to be an Advisory Committee
appointed under sub-section (6) of Section
99.]

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be disposed of as if the said area had been
included in the Corporation when they were
filed;

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referred to in sub-section (1) and from the date of
first meeting of the Corporation as so constituted
the body exercising the powers and performing
the duties of the Corporation shall stand
dissolved:

[Provided that where the larger urban area
so constituted does not have any newly added
area and the election to such smaller urban area
was held within one year before the date of
declaration of larger urban area, the election to
such larger urban area for constitution of a
Corporation need not to be held till the completion
of the term of members of smaller urban area so
elected (irrespective of whether City Municipal
Council was constituted or not) and the members
of smaller urban area shall continue to be
members of the larger urban area Corporation to
be constituted till the completion of their term so
elected and a Corporation shall be constituted by
treating the said elected members as Councillors
of the Corporation under Section 7.]

(5) The properties, rights and liabilities of
the city municipal council of a municipal area
declared as larger urban area under sub-section
(1) shall vest in the Corporation of the said larger
urban area with effect from the date of such
declaration].”


13.2. By referring to Section 503 of the KMC Act, he
submits that the said provision deals with the
consequences of the declaration of a City
Municipal Area as a Larger Urban Area, and it is
this provision which was required to be
considered by the learned Single Judge in the
proper perspective, which has not been done.

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13.3. His submission by referring to the proviso to
sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is
that, in terms thereof, the Council which was
looking after the administration and the
management shall be carried out by the
Members of the Smaller Urban Area until the
Larger Urban Corporation is constituted or till
the completion of their term by treating the said
elected members as the Councilors of the
Corporation under Section 7 of the KMC Act.

13.4. His submission therefore is that the
management of the newly constituted
Corporation would continue to vest with and be
exercised by the Councilors of the CMC,
Raichur, until elections are held to the
Corporation and as such, no Administrator could
have been appointed by the Corporation and
such appointment is completely arbitrary, illegal
and as such, is required to be interfered with by
this Court. There being an elected Council to the
CMC, Raichur, replacement of the elected
council by an Administrator disturbs the
democratic rights of a legally elected Council. It
was for the Council to serve the full term.

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13.5. The election to the second term of the CMC,
Raichur having occurred on 28.08.2024, the
said Council was required to be in office for a
period of thirty months thereafter i.e., till
February, 2027. The appointment of an
Administrator before the expiry of the said term
interferes with the tenure of the Councilors
which is not permissible.

13.6. He relies upon Article 243-U of the Constitution
of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘Constitution’
for brevity,) which is reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
“ 243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc-
(1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved
under any law for the time being in force, shall
continue for five years from the date appointed for
its first meeting and no longer:
Provided that a municipality shall be given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard before its
dissolution.
(2) No amendment of any law for the time
being in force shall have the effect of causing
dissolution of a Municipality at any level, which is
functioning immediately before such amendment,
till the expiration of its duration specified in
clause(1).
(3) An election to constitute a Municipality
shall be completed,
(a) before the expiry of its duration
specified in clause(1);

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(b) before the expiration of a period of six
months from the date of its dissolution;
Provided that where the remainder of the
period for which the dissolved Municipality would
have continued is less than six months, it shall not
be necessary to hold any election under this
clause for constituting the Municipality for such
period.
(4) A Municipality constituted upon the
dissolution of Municipality before the expiration of
its duration shall continue only for the remainder
of the period for which the dissolved Municipality
would have continued under clause(1) had it not
been so dissolved.”


13.7. By referring to Article 243-U of the Constitution,
he submits that the said Article guarantees a
five-year tenure to elected municipal bodies,
which cannot be cut short under any
circumstances. If done otherwise, it would
violate the constitutional mandate requiring
interference at the hands of this Court.

13.8. The appointment of an Administrator by
respondent No.3 is without giving an
opportunity of hearing to the elected members.
The appointment of an Administrator,
amounting to the removal of elected members,
violates the principles of natural justice. He
refers to Section 3 of the KMC Act, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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3. 1[ Specifying larger urban area and
establishment] of Corporation, etc.- 1[(1) The
Governor may, having regard to,-


a. the population of any area;

b. the density of population of such area;

c. the revenue generated for the local
administration of such area;

d. the percentage of employment in non-
agricultural activities in such area;

e. the economic importance of such area; and

f. such other factors as may be prescribed;

specify by notification such area to be larger
urban area;

Provided that no such area shall be so
specified as a larger urban area unless.-

a. such area contains a population of not less
than three lakhs;

b. the density of population in such area is not
less than three thousand inhabitants to one
square kilometer of area;

c. the revenue generated from such area for
the local administration in the year of the last
preceding census is not less than rupees six
crores per annum or an amount calculated at
the rate of rupees two hundred per capita per
annum, whichever is higher;

d. the percentage of employment in non-
agricultural activities is not less than fifty
percent of the total employment:

Provided further that no such notification shall be
issued except after consulting the local authority, if any,
concerned.

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(1A) Any area specified as larger urban area
under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a city
and a Corporation shall be established for the said
city.

(1B) The name of the city shall, where the local
area having two or more local authorities form the
city, be as determined by the Governor.]

(2)The Corporation shall be a body
corporate by the name “the Corporation of the city
of ....” and shall have perpetual succession and
common seal with power, subject to the provisions
of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of
property and to contract and may, by the said
name, sue and be sued.

1[Provided that the “Corporation of City of
Bangalore” shall be called the ―Bruhat Bangalore
Mahanagara Palike”.]


13.9. By referring to Section 3 of the KMC Act he
submits that the notification issued thereunder
declaring the Raichur Municipal Corporation on
04.12.2024 would imply that the Municipal
Council functioning under the Karnataka
Municipalities Act would continue to be a body
competent to exercise the powers and perform
the duties conferred under the KMC Act, until
the Corporation is duly constituted under the
provisions of the KMC Act. His submission is
that all Councilors of the CMC become
Councilors of the Corporation and in terms of
sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act,

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the Corporation is required to be constituted
within a period of six months from the date of
declaration and is only from the date of the first
meeting of the Corporation so constituted that
the body exercising the powers and performing
the duties of the Corporation shall stand
dissolved.

13.10. There is obligation which has been cast on the
authorities to constitute the Corporation within
six months of the notification and the
Legislature in its wisdom has though it fit to fill
the lacuna or cater to the inaction on the part of
the authorities in not constituting the
Corporation by mandating that the Councilors of
CMC shall continue to be Councilors of the
Corporation until the first meeting of the
Corporation.

13.11. His submission is also that sub-section (4) of
Section 503 of the KMC Act is an exception to
Article 243-U of the Constitution. The
continuance as a Councilor is not on the basis of
being elected as a Councilor of CMC but is for
the reason of a Smaller Urban Area being
declared as a Larger Urban Area and in that
background, he submits that there is a deeming

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fiction under the statute namely, sub-section
(4) of Section 503 that such Councilor shall hold
the office until the first meeting of the
Corporation and on that basis, he submits that
the learned Single Judge has erred in
considering Article 243-U of the Constitution
when what was required be considered was
sub-section (4) of Section 503 of KMC Act which
is an independent provision.

13.12. The first meeting, which has been referred to
under sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC
Act, being that of the Municipal Corporation, he
submits that the learned Single Judge has erred
in taking into consideration the first meeting to
be 02.11.2020, when the first meeting of the
CMC post elections was held. He again
reiterates that the election to the CMC and the
period of five years as Councillor of CMC stands
on a distinct and different footing than that of
the Councillor of the Municipal Corporation. His
submission is that on account of the actions or
inactions of the official respondents, the people
of Raichur have been denied governance by
their chosen representatives. It is the elected
representatives who are required to govern the
Council and subsequently, the Corporation.

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13.13. On account of the delay on the part of the
respondents in properly notifying the
reservation roster, the elected Councillors of
CMC were deprived of exercising their rights for
a period of eighteen months since an
Administrator had been appointed.
Subsequently, the elected representatives were
not permitted to discharge their obligations on
account of a Smaller Urban Area being declared
as a Larger Urban Area, in pursuance of which
an Administrator was appointed. Thus, he
submits that the authorities have conspired to
deprive the Councillors of their entitlement
under the respective Acts to function
democratically. His submission is that these
aspects not having been considered by the
learned Single Judge, this Court ought to come
to the rescue of the petitioners to preserve
democracy and permit the petitioners to
discharge their role as Councilors of the
Corporation until elections are held to the
Corporation since there is deeming fiction under
sub-section(4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act
that until such elections and the first meeting,
the Councilors of CMC would continue to

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operate as Councilors of the newly created
Corporation.

14. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, would
support the impugned order of the learned Single
Judge by contending that

14.1. There is neither illegality nor perversity in the
order passed by the learned Single Judge, nor
in regard to the orders passed by the Officers of
the State.

14.2. She submits that the elections to the CMC was
held on 03.09.2018, first meeting was held on
02.11.2020, the term of five years came to an
end on 01.11.2025. She refers to Section 8 of
the KMC Act which is reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
“8. Term of office of Councillors –
[(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
term of office of Councillors.-
(i) directly elected at a general election
shall be five years;
(ii) nominated by the Government under
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7 shall,
subject to the pleasure of the Government, be five
years.

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(2) The term of office of the Councillors
shall commence on the date appointed for the
first meeting of the Corporation.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, where two-thirds of the total number of
Councillors required to be elected have been
elected, the Corporation shall be deemed to have
been duly constituted under this Act].

(4) If any casual vacancy occurs it shall be
filled, as soon as may be, by the election of a
person thereto. The person so elected shall hold
office only so long as the person in whose place
he is elected would have held had the vacancy not
occurred:

Provided that no election to fill a casual
vacancy shall be held if the vacancy occurs within
four months before the expiry by efflux of time of
the term of office of the Councillors.

(5) A Councillor may resign his office at any
time by notice in writing addressed to the Mayor
and delivered to him and such resignation shall
take effect from the date on which it is delivered .”


14.3. By referring to the above provision she
contends that term of the office of the
Councilors would be five years commencing
from the date appointed in the first meeting of
the Corporation and on that basis, she submits
that the first meeting having been held on
02.11.2020, the term came to an end on
01.11.2025.

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14.4. Her submission is that the said term shall
continue to hold the floor irrespective of a
notification under Section 503 of the KMC Act.
Merely because, a Smaller Urban Area is
declared as a Larger Urban Area, the term of
the office of the Councilors would not stand
extended is her submission. She also refers to
Section 509 of the KMC Act which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
“ 509. Removal of difficulties, - If any
difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of
this Act, the Government may, by order published
in the Official Gazette as the occasion may requite
do anything with appears to it to be necessary to
remove the difficulty.”


14.5. By referring to Section 509 of the KMC Act, she
submits that the same deals with a power
vested with the authorities to remove any
difficulties. Even if there is difficulty which has
arisen on account of the declaration of a
Smaller Urban Area into a Larger Urban Area,
the same could be removed by publishing the
notification by the concerned authorities which
is so done by way of notification dated
04.12.2024.

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14.6. She also relies on Article 243-U of the
Constitution to contend that the time limit fixed
and specified for every municipality shall be no
longer than five years, and under no
circumstances shall the same be extended. If
the submission of the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners is accepted, she submits that
a mandate under Article 243-U of the
Constitution would be violated. In the absence
of a challenge to Article 243-U of the
Constitution, the said provision would have to
be applied with full rigour, requiring the
upholding of the notification that has been
issued and dismissal of the above appeal as
done by the learned Single Judge.

14.7. She relies upon the judgment of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in G.Kuppuswamy and
others vs. State of Karnataka and another
[1995(5) Kar. 618(DB)] more particularly,
paragraphs – 4, 17, 20 and 21 thereof which is
reproduced for easy reference:
“4. The Constitution was amended by the
74th Amendment Act inserting Part IX-A
containing Articles 243-P to 243-ZG into the
Constitution. Article 243-U of the Constitution
refers to duration of the Municipality and Article
243-ZF of the Constitution refers to continuance
of the existing laws and Municipalities. Under

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Article 243-ZF of the Constitution, the existing
Municipality was continued till the expiration of
their term unless sooner dissolved by a resolution
passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly
of the State or in the case of a State having a
Legislative Council by each House of the
Legislature of the State. The existing laws relating
to Municipalities inconsistent with Part IX-A of the
Constitution would continue to be in force until
amended or repealed or one year whichever is
earlier. The provisions relating to appointment of
an Administrator under Section 100(1)(c) of the
K.M.C. Act is omitted by the Karnataka Act 35 of
1994. Section 47 of the said Act 35 of 1994 and
Section 54 of Act 36 of 1994 provide that if any
difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of
the respective Acts, the Government may by
order published in the official Gazette as the
occasion may require do something which appears
to it to be necessary to remove the difficulty.
17. In substance, the contention of the
petitioners is that the appointment of
Administrators is void as no provision is made
under the relevant statute in the circumstances
arising under the various Municipal enactments.
The contention is that during the interregnum
between the expiry of the period of office to which
the Councillors are elected and the next election,
Administrators cannot be appointed as there is no
provision made under the Act, inasmuch as the
provisions in that regard had been deleted from
the statute. It is clear from the provisions of the
Constitution that none of the petitioners who had
been elected as Councillors either to Municipal
Council or Municipal Corporation, could continue in
office on the expiry of the period mentioned in
Article 243-ZF. In each of these cases, the period
either reckoned from the date of issue of Gazette
Notification declaring the elections to various
Municipalities or the date of first meeting, has
already elapsed on the expiry of 31st May, 1995
and in some cases during June/July, 1995. In the
circumstances, such Councillors cannot continue
in office under any circumstance unless any
specific provision had been made in the statute.

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There is no provision in the statute to enable
them to continue in office until their successors
are elected. Thus, there is a clear vacuum arising
on account of the absence of a relevant provision
in the statute. Whatever may be the reasons for
not holding elections to Municipalities, the fact
remains that elections have not been held prior to
the expiry of the term of the concerned Municipal
body. The administration of the Municipal body
has got to be carried on and in the absence of a
provision under the statute, the only way to
remove the difficulty is to appoint Administrators
or enable any other person or body of persons to
discharge the functions of the Municipal Council or
Corporation. Such a course can certainly fall
within the category of removing a difficulty arising
in the statute and it cannot be said that such
difficulty is dehors the statute. Hence, we do not
agree with the contention raised on behalf of the
petitioners that the difficulty arising in the present
case is outside the scope of the statute. Thus
adopting the very test provided in the decision of
the Supreme Court in Madeva Upendra Sinai's
case, supra, it must be held that the respondents
have power to appoint Administrators to remove
difficulties of a vacuum arising on account of
absence of a provision in the matter of
appointment of Administrator to the Municipal
body elections thereto not having been held prior
to the expiry of the term of such Municipal body.
20. Now the question that arises for
consideration is whether contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution or the scheme
thereof. A perusal of the various provisions of the
Constitution in unless sooner dissolved and in
case of dissolution, an Administrator could be
appointed after following the due procedure
prescribed thereto. It is not as though Municipal
bodies could not be dissolved and an
Administrator could discharge the function of the
Municipal bodies. If that is permissible in the case
of the circumstances calling for such dissolution,
we fail to understand that when the Municipal
body is not in existence on account of various
circumstances set forth earlier in the course of

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this order as to how the appointment of
Administrator to discharge the functions of a
Municipality in the absence of an elected body
being available is opposed to the scheme of the
Constitution surpasses our comprehension. After
the first Municipal Body is constituted as provided
under Article 243-Q, provisions of Article 243-U is
attracted and thereafter it will be the bounden
duty of the State Election Commission and the
Government to conduct the elections from time to
time. For the first time when the Municipal Body is
being constituted, various problems have arisen
as to delimitation, territorial limits of different
municipalities and the jurisdiction thereof and
reservation. Such problems once settled, further
restructuring would only be a consequential affair
thereafter and there would be no impediment to
the elections being held to the different Municipal
bodies in time and in which event it will not be
permissible for the Government to appoint
Administrators on the ground that elections could
not be held to the Municipal body. Article 243-U
would come into play on the constitution of a
Municipal body under Article 243-Q and not
before. Therefore, on the facts and circumstances
of this case, we must hold that the exercise of
power for appointing Administrators by the State
either under the provisions of the removal of
difficulties clause or under the executive power of
the State under Article 162 of the Constitution, is
justified.
21. Sri H.B. Datar, learned Senior
Advocate, appearing for the petitioners,
contended that the order appointing the
Administrators is an exercise in futility inasmuch
as the provisions of the K.M.C. Act or the
Municipalities Act do not enable the
Administrators to function in the circumstances in
which they are appointed. A careful perusal of the
order itself will disclose that the purpose of
appointment of Administrator is clearly set out
and to enable carrying out all such purposes they
are appointed. In the dissolution of Municipality, if
Administrators could discharge the functions of
the Municipality, same powers and functions could

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be exercised by the Administrators. Hence the
difficulty felt by the learned Counsel is unfounded
and not tenable in law.”

14.8. By relying on Kuppuswamy’s case , she
submits that Article 243-U of the Constitution
would come into play on the constitution of a
municipal body and the period would start
running from the date of the first meeting,
irrespective of the appointment of an
Administrator during the term of the Council.

14.9. She relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad
[(2006)8 SCC 352] more particularly,
paragraph-21 thereof, which is reproduced for
easy reference:
“ 21. It is true that there may be certain
man-made calamities, such as rioting or
breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities
which could distract the authorities from holding
elections to the municipality, but they are
exceptional circumstances and under no (sic
other) circumstance would the Election
Commission be justified in delaying the process of
election after consulting the State Government
and other authorities. But that should be an
exceptional circumstance and shall not be a
regular feature to extend the duration of the
municipality. Going by the provisions contained in
Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five
years fixed thereunder to constitute the
municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be
followed in all respects. It is only when the

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municipality is dissolved for any other reason and
the remainder of the period for which the
dissolved municipality would have continued is
less than six months, it shall not be necessary to
hold any elections for constituting the municipality
for such period.”


14.10. By relying upon Kishansing Tomar’s case , her
submission is that even if there is an
interference due to man-made calamities,
rioting or breakdown of land and order or
natural calamities, there are no circumstances
which are available for the Election Commission
to delay the holding of elections. On that basis,
she submits that there is artificial extension of
term of office sought to be achieved by the
petitioners which is not permissible and as such,
she submits that the writ appeal is required to
be dismissed by upholding the order passed by
the learned Single Judge.

15. Heard Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri. Ravi B. patil, for the
petitioners, Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1
to 3, Sri.Gourish S.Khashampur, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.4 and Sri Sudarshan M.,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5.
Perused the papers.

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16. The points that would arise for our consideration are:
i. Whether on the upgradation of a Smaller
Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area, the
Councillors of the Smaller Urban Area (in
this case CMC) can continue to function as
the Larger Urban Area (in this case
Corporation) until the first meeting of the
elected representatives of the Larger
Urban Area?
ii. Whether sub-section (4) of Section 503 of
the KMC Act constitutes an exception to
the term of office mandated under Article
243-U of the Constitution?

iii. Whether the petitioners are entitled to an
extended period on account of the
interruption caused by the appointment of
an Administrator in the second term of
CMC?
iv. Whether the term of five years would
exclude the period during which the
Administrator was in office?
v. Whether the impugned order passed by the
learned Single Judge suffers from any
infirmities requiring interference at the
hands of this Court?
vi. What order?


17. We answer the above points as under:

18. This writ appeal raises a question of fundamental
constitutional importance concerning the mandatory

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tenure of elected municipal bodies under Part IX-A of
the Constitution of India and its interaction with the
transitional provisions of the Karnataka Municipal
Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter "KMC Act"). At
its core, the question is whether elected Councillors
of a City Municipal Council ("CMC") which has been
upgraded to a Municipal Corporation can lawfully
continue to hold office beyond the five-year period
mandated by Article 243-U of the Constitution, by
relying upon the deeming fiction and transitional
provisions contained in Section 503 of the KMC Act.

19. The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1992 inserted Part IX-A, comprising Articles 243-P to
243-ZG, into the Constitution of India. This
amendment was a watershed moment in the history
of Indian local self-governance. Its animating
purpose was to strengthen and revitalise local bodies
by giving them constitutional recognition, ensuring
their democratic character, regularising the cycle of
elections, and preventing the prolonged supersession
of elected local governments. Prior to the 74th
Amendment, the governance of urban local bodies
was left largely to state legislation, and elected
bodies were frequently dissolved or superseded by
state governments for extended periods without
constitutional constraint. The 74th Amendment

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placed the period of tenure, the conduct of elections,
and the protection of local bodies from arbitrary
dissolution under constitutional guarantee.

20. Article 243-U is the centrepiece of Part IX-A so far as
the duration of Municipalities is concerned. Sub-
clause (1) thereof mandates that every Municipality,
unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time
being in force, shall continue for five years from the
date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.
The phrase "no longer" is an absolute constitutional
brake, it admits of no exception, no extension, no
exclusion. Sub-clause (3) further mandates that an
election to constitute a Municipality shall be
completed before the expiry of its duration or within
six months from the date of its dissolution, thereby
placing a positive constitutional obligation on the
State Election Commission and the State
Government to ensure timely elections.

21. Article 243-K of the Constitution establishes the
State Election Commission, an independent
constitutional authority, which superintends, directs,
and controls the preparation of electoral rolls for, and
the conduct of, elections to Municipalities. The
Karnataka State Election Commission ("KSEC"),
established in pursuance of Article 243-K,

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accordingly discharges its constitutional obligation to
ensure that elections are held at the constitutionally
prescribed intervals. The communications issued by
the KSEC calculating the tenure of the Raichur CMC
Councillors as ending on 01.11.2025 were issued in
direct discharge of this constitutional function.

22. The Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976,
enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature, governs
the constitution, powers, and administration of
Municipal Corporations in the State of Karnataka.
Section 8 of the KMC Act provides that the term of
office of directly elected Councillors shall be five
years from the date appointed for the first meeting of
the Corporation. This is the statutory reflection of the
constitutional mandate of Article 243-U.

23. Section 503 of the KMC Act contains a special set of
provisions governing the transition from a City
Municipal Area (governed under the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964, or "KM Act") to a Larger
Urban Area (governed under the KMC Act). Upon the
issuance of a declaration by the Governor under
Section 503(1) of the KMC Act, the CMC transitions
to a Corporation in law. Section 503(3) lays down the
immediate consequences of such a declaration,
including the deeming of CMC Councillors as

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Corporation Councillors. Section 503(4) prescribes
the timeline for the formal constitution of the
Corporation through fresh elections, and contains a
proviso which defers such elections in certain
specified circumstances.

24. In the present case, the Councillors of the City
Municipal Council, Raichur, were elected in the
general elections held on 03.09.2018. The election
results were declared on 13.09.2019. The first
meeting of the CMC was held on 02.11.2020. By
operation of Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC
Act, the five-year term of the Councillors commenced
on 02.11.2020 and was scheduled to expire on
01.11.2025.

25. During the currency of this five-year term, two
significant events occurred.

26. First, on account of disputes regarding the
reservation roster for the posts of President and Vice
President for the second thirty-month term of the
CMC, an Administrator was appointed for a limited
purpose, to manage the CMC's executive functions in
the absence of an elected President/VP from
11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024. It is critical to note that
the Councillors themselves were not removed from
office during this period.

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27. Second, on 04.12.2024, the State Government
issued a notification under Section 503(1) of the KMC
Act declaring the Raichur City Municipal area as a
Larger Urban Area and Raichur City Municipality as
Raichur Municipal Corporation. This notification came
approximately eleven months before the expiry of
the Councillors' five-year term.

28. The Karnataka State Election Commission issued a
communication on 27.01.2025 prescribing the last
date of the tenure of the Council as 02.11.2025, and
the Urban Development Department consequentially
issued a direction on 26.03.2025 to the Deputy
Commissioner, Raichur, directing that elections to
the Corporation Councillors be held on or before
02.11.2025. The petitioner Councillors submitted a
representation dated 22.09.2025 requesting that the
committee be permitted to complete its tenure,
contending that the period of the Administrator's
appointment (15 months) should be excluded from
the five-year term. The representation was not
accepted. Administrator was appointed on
15.11.2025 under Section 509 of the KMC Act.

29. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No.202910/2025
challenging, inter alia, the communications dated
27.01.2025 and 26.03.2025, and subsequently also

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challenged the notification dated 15.11.2025
appointing the Administrator by way of amendment.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition
vide order dated 26.02.2026, holding that the
Councillors' term ended on 01.11.2025 and directing
the Election Commission to hold elections within six
months from the date of appointment of the
Administrator. It is against this order that the
present writ appeal has been preferred.

30. The legal questions that arise for our determination
may be broadly categorised under two heads: (i) the
transitional effect of Section 503 of the KMC Act on
the tenure of elected Councillors; and (ii) whether
the administrative interregnum caused by the
appointment of an Administrator for presidential
posts has any effect on the computation of the five-
year term under Article 243-U. it is in tht background
that we have formulated the six points for
determination.

31. Before embarking on the analysis, it is useful to set
out the hierarchy of norms applicable in this case. At
the apex stands the Constitution, in particular, Part
IX-A inserted by the 74th Constitutional Amendment.
Below it stands the KMC Act, a State Legislature
enactment. In the event of any conflict between the

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two, the Constitution must prevail. This is not merely
the principle of constitutional supremacy, it is the
explicit mandate of Article 13(1) and (2) read with
Article 245 and the federal distribution of powers. No
State statute can, by any device, override a
mandatory constitutional provision. We keep this
hierarchy constantly in mind in our analysis.

32. It is also relevant to note the legislative history of
Section 503 of the KMC Act in the context of the 74th
Constitutional Amendment. The KMC Act was enacted
in 1976 and Section 503 was a part of the original
enactment, dealing with the transition from CMC to
Corporation. The 74th Constitutional Amendment
was enacted in 1992 and came into force on
01.06.1993. After the Amendment, the State of
Karnataka amended its municipal laws to bring them
in conformity with Part IX-A. The proviso to Section
503(4), which is the central provision in this case,
was introduced by way of an amendment to the KMC
Act. This proviso must be read in the light of the
constitutional framework introduced by the 74th
Amendment, and any interpretation that makes the
proviso inconsistent with Part IX-A must be rejected.

33. The legislative intent behind the proviso to Section
503(4) is apparent from its text. It addresses a

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specific incongruity if a CMC has very recently held
general elections (within the past year) and is then
upgraded to a Corporation, requiring fresh
Corporation elections immediately would be highly
inconvenient and wasteful. The electorate would be
asked to vote again within a very short period. To
address this incongruity, the proviso defers fresh
Corporation elections to the end of the existing five-
year term, during which the recently-elected CMC
Councillors continue as Corporation Councillors. This
is a sensible, practical, and constitutionally compliant
provision, it neither extends the five-year term nor
violates Article 243-U.

34. In the present case, however, the Councillor
elections were held in September 2018, more than
six years before the declaration of the Corporation in
December 2024. The proviso's rationale (avoiding a
fresh election shortly after a recent one) has no
application to these facts. The electorate of Raichur
had not been called upon to exercise its franchise for
Councillors since 2018. By the time of the declaration
in December 2024, the existing Councillors had
already been in office for six years. In these
circumstances, holding Corporation elections as soon
as possible is not an inconvenience, it is a
constitutional mandate and necessity.

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35. We also note the broader pattern of urban local
governance in Karnataka. The upgrading of City
Municipal Councils to Municipal Corporations is a
process that occurs periodically as urban areas grow
in population, economic activity, and administrative
complexity. Section 503 of the KMC Act has been
invoked in several instances in the past to upgrade
CMCs to Corporations. In each such case, the
constitutional framework of Article 243-U and the
statutory framework of Section 8 of the KMC Act
operate with equal force, ensuring that the transition
does not become an occasion for the extension of the
tenure of incumbents beyond the constitutional limit.

36. Before addressing the Points for Determination, it is
useful to set out in detail the relevant provisions of
law which fall for consideration, along with their
inter-relationships, so as to provide a clear analytical
framework for the subsequent discussion.

37. Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution defines
"Municipality" to mean an institution of self-
government constituted under Article 243-Q. Article
243-Q(1) provides that there shall be constituted in
every State (i) a Nagar Panchayat for a transitional
area, (ii) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban
area, and (iii) a Municipal Corporation for a larger

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urban area. A Municipal Corporation is therefore a
Municipality within the meaning of Article 243-P(e)
and is subject to all the constitutional provisions in
Part IX-A, including Article 243-U.

38. Article 243-U(1) mandates a five-year term for every
Municipality. The text reads:
"Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any
law for the time being in force, shall continue for five
years from the date appointed for its first meeting and
no longer."

39. Three features of this provision deserve careful note.
First, the operative trigger for the start of the five-
year period is the "date appointed for its first
meeting", not the date of election, not the date of
declaration of results, not any other date. Second,
the period is five years, not "approximately five
years" or "five years subject to exclusion of any
period." Third, the period ends "no longer", there is
no provision for extension whatsoever.

40. The sole exception to the five-year mandatory term
provided by Article 243-U itself is "unless sooner
dissolved under any law for the time being in force."
This exception permits a shorter term (through
dissolution) but expressly does not permit a longer
term.

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41. Article 243-U(4) provides that where a Municipality is
dissolved before the expiry of its duration, a
Municipality constituted upon such dissolution shall
continue only for the remainder of the period for
which the dissolved Municipality would have
continued.

42. Reading Articles 243-U(1) and 243-U(4) together,
the constitutional scheme is clear, the maximum life
of any Municipality is five years; dissolution can
shorten this, but nothing can lengthen it.

43. Article 243-U(3) imposes a positive obligation on the
election machinery, an election to constitute a
Municipality shall be completed (a) before the expiry
of its duration specified in sub-clause (1), i.e., before
the end of five years, and (b) before the expiration of
a period of six months from the date of its
dissolution. This provision makes plain that the
election must precede or at most coincide with the
expiry of the five-year term. The Constitution
envisages a seamless transition, the old Municipality
ends, elections are held (ideally before the old term
ends), and the new Municipality begins. If elections
cannot be held before the term ends, they must be
held within six months of the term ending.

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44. Article 243-K establishes the State Election
Commission and vests in it the superintendence,
direction, and control of elections to Municipalities.
The State Election Commission acts as an
independent constitutional body, not subject to the
control of the Executive. Its function is to ensure that
elections are held at the times mandated by the
Constitution and the applicable laws. The Karnataka
State Election Commission's calculation of the tenure
end as 02.11.2025, and its communication to that
effect dated 27.01.2025, were issued in the direct
exercise of its constitutional functions.

45. Section 8 of the KMC Act is the State law provision
giving effect to Article 243-U in the context of
Municipal Corporations in Karnataka. Section 8(1)(i)
provides that the term of office of directly elected
Councillors at a general election shall be five years.
Section 8(2) provides that this term commences
from "the date appointed for the first meeting of the
Corporation." This is the statutory reflection of the
constitutional provision that the term starts from the
date of the first meeting. There is no provision in
Section 8 for any exclusion or extension of the five-
year term.

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46. Section 503 of the KMC Act deals with the transition
from CMC to Corporation. As explained supra, this
provision governs the consequences of the
declaration of a CMC as a Larger Urban Area,
including the deeming of CMC Councillors as
Corporation Councillors and the prescription of a
timeline for fresh Corporation elections. The interplay
of Section 503 with Article 243-U and Section 8 is the
central legal question in this case.

47. Section 509 of the KMC Act empowers the
Government to remove difficulties arising in giving
effect to the provisions of the KMC Act. This provision
has been used to appoint the Administrator in the
present case. The Co-ordinate Bench in G.
Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka
and another has upheld the validity of such
Administratorships under removal of difficulties
clauses as being consistent with the constitutional
scheme.

48. We also note, for completeness, the following
provisions of the KM Act which were in force in
relation to the CMC, Raichur, prior to the declaration:

49. Section 18 (term of the City Municipal Council, five
years from the first meeting); Section 315
(appointment of Administrator in specified

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circumstances); Section 316 (power to dissolve and
appoint an Administrator). None of these provisions
contain any mechanism for extending the five-year
term, and all are consistent with Article 243-U.

50. With this legal framework in place, we now proceed
to examine each of the six Points for Determination
in detail.

51. Answer to Point No.(i): Whether on the
upgradation of a Smaller Urban Area to a Larger
Urban Area, the Councillors of the Smaller
Urban Area (in this case CMC) can continue to
function as the Larger Urban Area (in this case
Corporation) until the first meeting of the
elected representatives of the Larger Urban
Area?

51.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Ravi B. Patil for the
petitioners/appellants, submits that on the
upgradation of the City Municipal Council,
Raichur ("CMC") as a Smaller Urban Area to the
Raichur Municipal Corporation ("Corporation")
as a Larger Urban Area, by notification dated
04.12.2024 issued by the first
respondent/Principal Secretary, Department of
Urban Development, under Section 503(1) of
the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976
("KMC Act"), the Councillors of the CMC

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automatically and by operation of law became
the Councillors of the Corporation and they can
lawfully continue to function as the Councillors
of the Corporation until the first meeting of the
elected representatives of the Corporation is
held. Their continuation is mandated by the
deeming fiction created by sub-sections (3)(a),
(3)(b) and (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act.

51.2. Section 503(3)(a) of the KMC Act provides that
with effect from the date of declaration of a
City Municipal Area as a Larger Urban Area, the
body functioning as a City Municipal Council
under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964
immediately before the date of the said
declaration shall become a body competent to
exercise the powers and perform the duties
conferred by the provisions of the KMC Act on a
Corporation in respect of the said area "until a
Corporation is duly constituted for the area
within the jurisdiction of such body under the
provisions of the KMC Act." He submits that the
words "until a Corporation is duly constituted"
are of pivotal importance and mean that until
fresh elections are held to the Corporation and
the Corporation is constituted by elected

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representatives, the CMC Councillors shall
continue.

51.3. Section 503(3)(b) of the KMC Act provides that
the Councillors of the City Municipal Council
holding office as such immediately before the
said date shall become Councillors of the
Corporation. He submits that this provision
effects a seamless automatic transformation,
the Councillors of CMC become Councillors of
the Corporation by an act of the Legislature
without any further requirement of election,
notification, or other action on the part of the
Councillors or the Government.

51.4. He relies upon the proviso to sub-section (4) of
Section 503 of the KMC Act and submits that
this proviso creates a special exception, that
where the larger urban area so constituted
does not have any newly added area and the
election to such smaller urban area was held
within one year before the date of declaration
of the larger urban area, the election to such
larger urban area for constitution of a
Corporation need not be held till the completion
of the term of the members of the smaller
urban area so elected. He submits that the

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members of the smaller urban area shall
continue to be members of the larger urban
area Corporation to be constituted till the
completion of their term so elected and a
Corporation shall be constituted by treating the
said elected members as Councillors of the
Corporation under Section 7 of the KMC Act.

51.5. The expression "first meeting" used in the main
body of sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the
KMC Act is the first meeting of the Municipal
Corporation duly constituted by elections, and
NOT the first meeting of the CMC held on
02.11.2020. The Corporation has not yet been
constituted by elections. Therefore, the elected
CMC Councillors continue to function as
Corporation Councillors until such first meeting
of the elected Corporation is held.

51.6. Sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act
is an independent self-contained provision
which operates as a deeming fiction creating a
distinct legal status for the CMC Councillors as
Corporation Councillors. This deeming fiction is
independent of and operates separately from
Article 243-U of the Constitution. The learned
Senior Counsel thus submits that the

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continuation of CMC Councillors as Corporation
Councillors is not a continuation of their term
as CMC Councillors, it is a distinct and new
capacity created by the statute, to which the 5-
year clock of Article 243-U does not apply with
the same start date.

51.7. On account of the delay on the part of the
respondents in properly notifying the
reservation roster for the posts of President and
Vice President of the second term, the elected
Councillors of the CMC were deprived of
exercising the full extent of their rights for a
period of approximately fifteen months from
11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024, since an
Administrator had been appointed for managing
the presidential functions. Consequently, the
democratic rights of the people of Raichur to be
governed by their chosen representatives have
been subverted. He therefore submits that the
Councillors are entitled to continue until a
Corporation is duly constituted with elected
members.

51.8. The replacement of the elected Council by an
Administrator disturbs the democratic rights of
a legally elected Council. There was no

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opportunity of hearing given to the elected
members before the appointment of the
Administrator by notification dated 15.11.2025.
The appointment of an Administrator,
amounting effectively to the removal of elected
members from governance, violates the
principles of natural justice as well as Article
243-U of the Constitution.

51.9. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for the State/Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3, submits that the impugned order of
the learned Single Judge is correct in law and
does not suffer from any illegality or perversity.
She submits that there is neither illegality nor
perversity in the order passed by the
respondent authorities and she fully supports
the impugned order.

51.10. While Section 503(3)(a) and (b) of the KMC Act
do provide for the CMC Councillors becoming
Corporation Councillors by deeming fiction upon
the declaration, this deeming fiction does not
create a fresh or new term of office for the
Councillors. The Councillors can only continue
as Corporation Councillors to the extent of the
remainder of their original 5-year term. Since

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the 5-year term commenced on 02.11.2020
(the date of the first meeting of the CMC) and
ended on 01.11.2025, the Councillors cannot
continue in office beyond 01.11.2025.

51.11. Section 8 of the KMC Act clearly provides that
the term of office of directly elected Councillors
shall be five years, commencing from the date
appointed for the first meeting of the
Corporation. Reading Section 8 harmoniously
with Section 503, the "first meeting of the
Corporation" referred to in Section 8(2) is the
first meeting of the CMC, which is now deemed
to be a Corporation under Section 503. Thus,
the term commenced on 02.11.2020 and ended
on 01.11.2025.

51.12. Section 509 of the KMC Act empowers the
Government to remove difficulties arising in
giving effect to the provisions of the Act by
publishing a notification in the Official Gazette.
The notification dated 04.12.2024 declaring the
Raichur Municipal Corporation was issued in
exercise of this power and the subsequent
appointment of an Administrator on 15.11.2025
was also made in exercise of this power, both
of which are valid and lawful.

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51.13. Article 243-U of the Constitution of India
mandates that every Municipality shall continue
for five years from the date appointed for its
first meeting and no longer. This is a
constitutional mandate which cannot be
overridden by any statutory provision. She
therefore submits that even if Section 503(4) is
construed as the petitioners claim, it would be
in conflict with Article 243-U of the Constitution
and would have to yield to the constitutional
mandate.

51.14. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader relies upon the judgment of the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in
G.Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of
Karnataka and another and submits that it
has been held that Article 243-U comes into
play on the constitution of a municipal body
and the period starts running from the date of
the first meeting, and that once the term has
expired, Councillors cannot continue in office
under any circumstance unless a specific
provision has been made in the statute
enabling such continuation. She submits that
there is no such specific provision enabling
Councillors to continue beyond the 5-year term.

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51.15. She relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad and
submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court has
categorically held that the period of five years
fixed under Article 243-U for constituting the
municipality is mandatory in nature and has to
be followed in all respects. She submits that
even man-made calamities, rioting, breakdown
of law and order, or natural calamities do not
justify extending the duration of the
municipality. Therefore, the argument that the
Councillors can continue beyond 5 years by
virtue of Section 503(4) is contrary to the
constitutional mandate.

51.16. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned Counsel
appearing for Respondent No. 4, the
Commissioner of the Raichur Municipal
Corporation, submits that the Administrator has
been validly appointed and is lawfully
discharging the functions of the Corporation. He
submits that Section 503(3)(cc) specifically
deals with a situation where an Administrator
has been appointed under Section 315 or
Section 316 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,
1964, either before or at the time of the

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declaration of the larger urban area, and
provides that such Administrator shall be
deemed to be an Administrator appointed
under Section 99 of the KMC Act. He submits
that the Administrator in office is lawfully
holding office.

51.17. There is no infirmity in the appointment of an
Administrator after the expiry of the 5-year
term on 01.11.2025. The Corporation is
required to be governed and administered on a
day-to-day basis and since the Councillors'
term has ended, the appointment of an
Administrator is the only lawful mechanism
available to ensure that the Corporation does
not fall into administrative vacuum pending
fresh elections.

51.18. The argument of the petitioners that the CMC
Councillors should continue until the first
meeting of the elected Corporation Councillors,
without any time limit, would lead to an
indefinite extension of their term. This would be
contrary to the spirit and mandatory character
of Article 243-U of the Constitution.

51.19. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned Counsel appearing
for Respondent No. 5, the Karnataka State

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Election Commission, submits that the Election
Commission has correctly calculated the term
of the Councillors as ending on 01.11.2025
(five years from the first meeting on
02.11.2020), strictly in accordance with Article
243-U of the Constitution and Section 8 of the
KMC Act.

51.20. The Karnataka State Election Commission is a
constitutional body established under Article
243-K of the Constitution and has an
independent, superintending, and directing role
with respect to the conduct of elections to
municipalities. The communication issued by
the Election Commission on 27.01.2025
calculating the tenure end and directing that
elections be held on or before that date is a
valid and lawful communication in the discharge
of its constitutional and statutory functions.

51.21. Article 243-U(3) casts a positive obligation on
the authorities to complete elections before the
expiry of the 5-year duration. The Election
Commission is in fact fulfilling its constitutional
mandate by directing elections to be held, and
the petitioners cannot be permitted to obstruct

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this constitutionally mandated electoral
process.

51.22. The continuation of the CMC Councillors as
Corporation Councillors beyond 01.11.2025 is
not permissible and that the argument of the
petitioners is essentially one seeking
perpetuation of their term without a fresh
mandate from the electorate, which is
unconstitutional.

51.23. The central question raised in this Point for
Determination is whether, upon the
upgradation of the CMC, Raichur, as a Smaller
Urban Area to the Corporation as a Larger
Urban Area by notification dated 04.12.2024,
the Councillors of the CMC can continue to
function as the Corporation until the first
meeting of the elected representatives of the
Corporation.

51.24. To answer this question, it is necessary to
examine the relevant provisions of law in detail.
Section 503 of the KMC Act, which has been set
out in extenso earlier, is the pivotal provision.

51.25. Section 503(1) of the KMC Act empowers the
Governor to declare, by notification, that any

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municipal area for which a City Municipal
Council is constituted under the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 shall, with effect from
the date specified in the notification, be a
Larger Urban Area. In exercise of this power, a
notification was issued on 04.12.2024 declaring
Raichur City Municipality as Raichur Municipal
Corporation. Section 3(1A) of the KMC Act
provides that any area specified as a larger
urban area shall be deemed to be a city and a
Corporation shall be established for the said
city. The declaration thus has both the effect of
specifying the larger urban area and
establishing a Corporation for it.

51.26. Section 503(2) provides that the provisions of
the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964
applicable to such City Municipal Area shall not
apply to the local area declared as a Larger
Urban Area, with effect from the date of
declaration, subject to the proviso that existing
appointments, notifications, taxes, orders, etc.,
shall continue in force unless superseded under
the KMC Act.

51.27. Section 503(3) lays down the consequences of
the declaration. Sub-clause (a) provides that

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the body functioning as a City Municipal Council
immediately before the date of the declaration
shall become a body competent to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of a Corporation
"until a Corporation is duly constituted for the
area within the jurisdiction of such body under
the provisions of this Act." Sub-clause (b)
provides that the Councillors of the City
Municipal Council holding office as such
immediately before the said date "shall become
Councillors of the Corporation."

51.28. Reading sub-clauses (a) and (b) together, it is
clear that: (i) the body (CMC) becomes
competent to exercise the powers of the
Corporation until the Corporation is duly
constituted; and (ii) the Councillors of the CMC
become Councillors of the Corporation. This
transformation happens automatically and by
operation of law, no further action by any
authority or individual is required.

51.29. Sub-clause (cc) of Section 503(3) is also
material. It provides that where, under Section
315 or Section 316 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964, either an
Administrator or an Officer has been appointed

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to exercise the powers and perform the duties
of the municipal council, such Administrator or
Officer shall be deemed to be an Administrator
appointed under Section 99 of the KMC Act.
This sub-clause shows that the Legislature
specifically contemplated the possibility of an
Administrator being in place at the time of the
declaration and provided for continuity of such
administration.

51.30. We now examine the proviso to sub-section (4)
of Section 503 of the KMC Act, which is the
provision most heavily relied upon by the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The
main body of sub-section (4) provides that a
Corporation shall be duly constituted within a
period of six months from the date of
declaration, and from the date of the first
meeting of the Corporation so constituted, the
body exercising the powers and performing the
duties of the Corporation shall stand dissolved.
The proviso to sub-section (4) reads:
"Provided that where the larger urban area so
constituted does not have any newly added area
and the election to such smaller urban area was
held within one year before the date of declaration
of larger urban area, the election to such larger
urban area for constitution of a Corporation need
not to be held till the completion of the term of

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members of smaller urban area so elected
(irrespective of whether City Municipal Council
was constituted or not) and the members of
smaller urban area shall continue to be members
of the larger urban area Corporation to be
constituted till the completion of their term so
elected and a Corporation shall be constituted by
treating the said elected members as Councillors
of the Corporation under Section 7."

51.31. For the proviso to sub-section (4) to apply,
TWO cumulative conditions must be satisfied:
(i) the larger urban area so constituted must
not have any newly added area; and (ii) the
election to such smaller urban area (CMC) must
have been held within ONE YEAR before the
date of declaration of the larger urban area.
Both conditions must co-exist for the proviso to
be triggered. The word "and" between the two
conditions is conjunctive, not disjunctive.

51.32. Turning to the facts, the general elections to
the CMC, Raichur, for election of Councillors
were held on 03.09.2018. The date of
declaration of the Raichur Municipal Corporation
as a Larger Urban Area is 04.12.2024. One
year before 04.12.2024 is 04.12.2023. The
Councillor elections were held in September
2018, more than six years before the
declaration. Condition (ii) is therefore clearly

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NOT satisfied on the basis of the Councillor
elections of 2018.

51.33. The petitioners contended that the election to
the second term of the President and Vice
President held on 28.08.2024 should be treated
as an "election to the smaller urban area"
within one year of the declaration. We reject
this contention for the following reasons:

51.34. The elections of the President and Vice
President of the CMC are internal elections
conducted by the elected Councillors from
among themselves under the provisions of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. They are
NOT elections to the smaller urban area within
the meaning of the proviso. The proviso speaks
of "election to such smaller urban area", this
unmistakably refers to the general election of
the Councillors to constitute the body, not to
the internal elections for executive posts within
the already-constituted body.

51.35. The election for the posts of President and Vice
President does not result in the constitution of
the CMC or the election of Councillors. It only
results in the selection of executive heads from
within the already-constituted Council. The

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body of Councillors was constituted by the
general election in 2018, not by the presidential
election in 2024. Therefore, the election of
28.08.2024 is not an "election to the smaller
urban area."

51.36. This interpretation is consistent with the
purpose and legislative intent of the proviso.
The proviso was intended to address a situation
where fresh Councillor elections were recently
held (within one year) before the area was
upgraded, so as to avoid the incongruity of
requiring yet another election so soon after the
fresh general election. This rationale applies
only to Councillor elections, not to presidential
elections.

51.37. Since condition (ii) is not satisfied, the proviso
to Section 503(4) does NOT apply to the
present case. The deeming fiction created by
the proviso (that the members shall continue
till completion of their term without requiring
fresh Corporation elections) is therefore not
attracted.

51.38. Even if the proviso were applied (assuming, for
argument's sake, that it applies), the critical
words in the proviso are "till the completion of

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the term of members of smaller urban area so
elected." The term of the CMC Councillors is
governed by Section 8 of the KMC Act read with
Article 243-U of the Constitution, five years
from the date of the first meeting. Section
8(1)(i) provides that the term of office of
Councillors directly elected at a general election
shall be five years. Section 8(2) provides that
the term of office shall commence on the date
appointed for the first meeting of the
Corporation.

51.39. The first meeting of the CMC was held on
02.11.2020. The five-year term therefore
commenced on 02.11.2020 and ended on
01.11.2025. Even under the proviso to Section
503(4) (assuming it applies), the deeming
fiction would only have allowed the CMC
Councillors to continue as Corporation
Councillors until 01.11.2025, when their
original 5-year term ended. The proviso does
not extend the term beyond 5 years; it merely
defers the holding of fresh Corporation
elections until the completion of the 5-year
term. Therefore, as of 01.11.2025, even under
the most liberal reading of the proviso, the
Councillors ceased to hold office.

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51.40. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel
for the Petitioners that the "first meeting" in
Section 503(4) refers to the first meeting of the
newly elected Corporation (not the CMC's first
meeting in 2020) requires further examination.
The main body of Section 503(4) uses the
phrase "from the date of first meeting of the
Corporation as so constituted", which indeed
refers to the first meeting of the newly
constituted Corporation. However, this
provision deals with the timeline for the
dissolution of the existing body upon the
constitution of the new Corporation. It does not
govern the term of office of the Councillors,
that is separately and expressly governed by
Section 8 and Article 243-U.

51.41. A principle of statutory interpretation well
settled in law is that a deeming fiction must be
taken to its logical limit but NOT beyond its
purpose. The purpose of the deeming fiction in
Section 503(3)(b) is to ensure continuity of
governance, by treating CMC Councillors as
Corporation Councillors, during the transition
period. The deeming fiction does not purport to
restart the clock for the 5-year term. To accept

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the petitioners' argument would be to extend
the deeming fiction far beyond its purpose.

51.42. Section 8(2) of the KMC Act states that the
term of the Councillors shall commence on "the
date appointed for the first meeting of the
Corporation." For the purpose of computing the
5-year term, this "first meeting of the
Corporation" must be read as the first meeting
of the CMC (which is now deemed to be the
Corporation under Section 503). To hold
otherwise would mean the 5-year term starts
afresh from 04.12.2024, which would be absurd
and contrary to Article 243-U of the
Constitution.

51.43. We also address the argument regarding
natural justice. The appointment of an
Administrator after the expiry of the 5-year
term on 01.11.2025 is not a "removal" of the
Councillors, they ceased to hold office by
operation of the constitutional provision (Article
243-U). Where rights and status expire by the
efflux of time as mandated by the Constitution
itself, there is no occasion for the principles of
natural justice to be invoked. Natural justice is
required where a right or status is being taken

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away by an authority, not where the right has
expired by the passage of time. Reference to
Section 503(cc) further supports this, as it
specifically provides for the continuity of an
Administrator who was already in place at the
time of the declaration, which implies that the
administration must be maintained even when
elected representatives are not in place.

51.44. Having interpreted the statutory text, we now
examine the constitutional backdrop against
which it operates. Article 243-U(1) speaks of
"every Municipality." Article 243-P(e) of the
Constitution defines "Municipality" to mean an
institution of self-government constituted under
Article 243-Q. Article 243-Q(1) contemplates
the constitution of three types of municipal
bodies: a Nagar Panchayat, a Municipal Council,
and a Municipal Corporation. All three are
Municipalities within Article 243-U. A Municipal
Corporation is therefore squarely and
incontestably a Municipality to which the
mandatory five-year term of Article 243-U
applies. There is no category of "transitional
Corporation" or "deemed Corporation" to which
Article 243-U applies differently or with a
different starting date. Once the CMC became a

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Corporation by virtue of Section 503, it became
subject to Article 243-U as a Corporation, with
the first meeting of the CMC (02.11.2020) as
the relevant starting date.

51.45. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
has placed great reliance on the words "until a
Corporation is duly constituted" in Section
503(3)(a) of the KMC Act, arguing that these
words extend the tenure of the CMC Councillors
(as Corporation Councillors) until the formal
constitution of a Corporation through fresh
elections. We have difficulty in accepting this
submission. Section 503(3)(a) deals with the
competence of the body (the CMC) to exercise
the powers of a Corporation, it answers the
question "what body governs the area." It does
not deal with the tenure of the individual
Councillors. The tenure of the Councillors is
separately and expressly governed by Section 8
of the KMC Act and Article 243-U of the
Constitution. These are distinct legal questions,
the existence of a governing body on the one
hand, and the tenure of its individual members
on the other. Section 503(3)(a) cannot be read
to override the express tenure provision
contained in Article 243-U and Section 8,

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because it deals with a different subject matter
entirely.

51.46. This reading is reinforced by Section 503(4)
itself. The main body of Section 503(4)
provides that "a Corporation shall be duly
constituted... within a period of six months
from the date of declaration." This provision
mandates fresh elections within six months. If
the petitioners' reading of Section 503(3)(a)
were correct, that the CMC Councillors continue
as Corporation Councillors indefinitely until the
Corporation is freshly constituted, Section
503(4)'s mandate to hold elections within six
months would be rendered meaningless, since
the Councillors would have no incentive to
facilitate such elections. The only reading that
gives meaningful effect to both Section
503(3)(a) and Section 503(4) is that Section
503(3)(a) provides for interim governance by
the existing Councillors for a transitional period
(subject to the constitutional term limit), while
Section 503(4) mandates that this transitional
period culminate in fresh elections within six
months. The two provisions are
complementary, not contradictory.

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51.47. We further address the submission regarding
the "first meeting" referred to in the main body
of Section 503(4). The provision reads: "from
the date of first meeting of the Corporation as
so constituted the body exercising the powers
and performing the duties of the Corporation
shall stand dissolved." This "first meeting" is
the first meeting of the freshly elected
Corporation, the meeting that signals the
formal commencement of the new
Corporation's functioning. It is the trigger for
the dissolution of the existing body (the CMC-
turned-Corporation). This provision operates
independently of the question of the
Councillors' five-year term. It means: the old
body continues to exercise Corporation powers
UNTIL the new body holds its first meeting. But
the old body's authority to continue exercising
those powers is conditional on its individual
Councillors still holding office. Once the
Councillors' five-year term expires on
01.11.2025, there are no Councillors left to
constitute the old body, and the old body
effectively ceases to exist. The "first meeting"
trigger for dissolution is therefore rendered
academic, the body has already been

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extinguished by the expiry of the constitutional
term.

51.48. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishansing
Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the
City of Ahamadabad was dealing with a
question closely analogous to the one before
us, whether the period of five years fixed under
Article 243-U for constituting the municipality is
mandatory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
answered emphatically in the affirmative and
held that the period of five years is mandatory
in nature and has to be followed in all respects.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that
even man-made calamities, rioting, breakdown
of law and order, or natural calamities do not
justify extending the duration of the
Municipality. If such catastrophic events do not
justify an extension, the administrative
inconvenience of a contested reservation roster
for presidential posts certainly cannot do so.

51.49. We are also mindful that the argument of the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners,
taken to its logical end, would result in a
constitutionally untenable situation. If the CMC
Councillors can continue as Corporation

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Councillors until the Corporation is freshly
constituted, and if the Government is under no
time-bound obligation to hold Corporation
elections (or if such elections are delayed for
any reason), the Councillors elected in 2018
could theoretically continue to hold office for 8,
10, or even more years. This would directly
violate the mandatory five-year cycle of Article
243-U. Every Municipality, and a Corporation is
a Municipality, must face the electorate at least
once in five years. No statutory provision can
interpose itself between the Constitution and
this obligation.

51.50. In G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of
Karnataka and another , the Co-ordinate
Bench was dealing with the situation
immediately following the introduction of the
74th Constitutional Amendment in 1992.
Several municipal bodies in Karnataka had their
constitutional terms expire and the question
was whether elected Councillors could continue
in office beyond their constitutional term and
whether Administrators could be appointed to
fill the vacuum. The Co-ordinate Bench
answered both questions decisively: the
Councillors cannot continue beyond the

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constitutional term, and the appointment of
Administrators is valid to maintain
administrative continuity pending fresh
elections.

51.51. Paragraph 17 of G. Kuppuswamy holds, inter
alia:
"It is clear from the provisions of the Constitution
that none of the petitioners who had been elected
as Councillors either to Municipal Council or
Municipal Corporation, could continue in office on
the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 243-
ZF."

51.52. The Co-ordinate Bench added:
"There is no provision in the statute to enable
them to continue in office until their successors
are elected."

51.53. These holdings are fully applicable to the
present case. In this case too, there is no
provision, neither in Article 243-U nor in
Section 8 nor in Section 503, that enables the
Councillors to continue in office after the expiry
of the five-year term until their successors are
elected.

51.54. Paragraph 20 of G. Kuppuswamy further holds:
"Article 243-U would come into play on the
constitution of a Municipal body under Article 243-
Q and not before. Therefore, on the facts and
circumstances of this case, we must hold that the

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exercise of power for appointing Administrators
by the State either under the provisions of the
removal of difficulties clause or under the
executive power of the State under Article 162 of
the Constitution, is justified."

51.55. This holding confirms two important
propositions: (a) once Article 243-U is attracted
(as it is here, since the CMC was constituted
under Article 243-Q), it operates with full force;
and (b) the appointment of Administrators
under removal of difficulties provisions (such as
Section 509 of the KMC Act) is a valid exercise
of State power.

51.56. In Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering
whether the obligation of the State Election
Commission to hold elections within the time
prescribed by Article 243-U is mandatory. The
Court held emphatically in the affirmative.
Paragraph 21 of the judgment holds that
"the period of five years fixed thereunder to
constitute the municipality is mandatory in nature
and has to be followed in all respects."

51.57. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that
even man-made calamities such as rioting or
breakdown of law and order, or natural
calamities, do not justify any extension. The

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Court's enumeration of such extreme
circumstances, which still do not justify
extension, makes it clear that ordinary
administrative difficulties (such as the
appointment of an Administrator for
presidential posts) certainly cannot justify any
extension.

51.58. Sub-clause (b), "the Councillors of the city
Municipal Council holding office as such
immediately before the said date shall become
Councillors of the Corporation", must be read in
this context of continuity. It carries forward the
Councillors' status and tenure into the new
framework. It does not create a new tenure or
extend the existing tenure. The Councillors
become Corporation Councillors with the same
tenure as they had as CMC Councillors, a
tenure that ends on 01.11.2025.

51.59. The phrase "holding office as such immediately
before the said date" in sub-clause (b) is also
instructive. It confirms that only those
Councillors who are in office at the time of the
declaration (04.12.2024) become Corporation
Councillors. A Councillor whose term has
expired before the declaration does not become

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a Corporation Councillor. By analogy and by
necessary implication, a Councillor who was in
office at the time of the declaration (and who
therefore became a Corporation Councillor)
ceases to hold that office when his/her
constitutional term expires. The declaration
gave them a new designation but not a new
term.

51.60. The proviso to Section 503(4) refers to the
treating of elected members of the smaller
urban area as "Councillors of the Corporation
under Section 7" of the KMC Act. Section 7 of
the KMC Act deals with the constitution of the
Corporation and the election of Councillors to
wards. Section 7(1) provides for the division of
the city into wards and Section 7(2) provides
for the election of one Councillor for each ward
at a general election.

51.61. The reference to Section 7 in the proviso to
Section 503(4) means that the CMC Councillors
are to be treated as if they were elected
Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7.
They are to be treated as the legitimately
elected Council of the Corporation. However,
this treatment is "till the completion of their

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term", and "their term" is the five-year term
that commenced on 02.11.2020. The Section 7
reference does not create a new election or a
new term, it merely validates the status of the
existing Councillors as Corporation Councillors
for the remainder of their existing term.

51.62. For all the foregoing reasons, we answer point
no.(i) by holding that:

51.63. Upon the declaration of Raichur Municipal
Corporation on 04.12.2024 under Section
503(1) of the KMC Act, by operation of Section
503(3)(a) and (b), the CMC Councillors did
indeed become Councillors of the Corporation;

51.64. However, their continuation as Corporation
Councillors was subject to the limit of their 5-
year term, reckoned from 02.11.2020 (date of
first meeting of CMC/Corporation), which
expired on 01.11.2025;

51.65. The proviso to Section 503(4) does NOT apply,
since the Councillor elections to CMC were not
held within one year before 04.12.2024;

51.66. Even if the proviso had applied, the term of the
CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors
would have expired on 01.11.2025;

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51.67. The CMC Councillors cannot lawfully continue
beyond 01.11.2025 as Corporation Councillors,
irrespective of the Corporation not yet being
constituted by fresh elections.

51.68. The Councillors of the CMC could continue to
function as Corporation Councillors after
04.12.2024 by virtue of Section 503(3)(a) and
(b), but only until the expiry of their original 5-
year term on 01.11.2025. They CANNOT
continue thereafter.

52. Answer to Point No.(ii): Whether sub-section
(4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act constitutes
an exception to the term of office mandated
under Article 243-U of the Constitution?

52.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners, submits that sub-section (4)
of Section 503 of the KMC Act is an
independent provision which creates a special
statutory regime for the transition from a
Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area,
and that this provision operates as an exception
to Article 243-U of the Constitution.

52.2. His argument is that the concept of "term of
office" under Article 243-U of the Constitution is
fixed at 5 years for the Municipality as an

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institution (the CMC as CMC). However, once
the CMC is transformed into a Corporation
under Section 503, the Councillors transition to
a new capacity as Corporation Councillors. In
this new capacity, their term is governed by
Section 503(4) read with Section 7 of the KMC
Act, and not by Article 243-U with the same
start date as was applicable to the CMC.

52.3. Sub-section (4) of Section 503 is a specific
provision dealing with the specific situation of
transition, while Article 243-U is a general
provision dealing with all municipalities in
general. The principle of statutory
interpretation, namely generalia specialibus non
derogant , dictates that the specific provision
(Section 503(4)) must prevail over the general
provision (Article 243-U) in the context of
transition from CMC to Corporation.

52.4. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has thought it fit
to fill the lacuna and cater to the inaction on
the part of the authorities in not constituting
the Corporation within six months by
mandating that the Councillors of CMC shall
continue to operate as Councillors of the newly
created Corporation until the first meeting. This

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shows legislative intent to create an exception
to the 5-year rule in the specific context of
transition, and such exception cannot be said to
be unconstitutional.

52.5. There is a deeming fiction under sub-section (4)
of Section 503 of the KMC Act, the Councillors
are deemed to be Councillors of the
Corporation. This deeming fiction creates a
distinct and new legal status. In this new legal
status, Article 243-U's 5-year clock does not
restart from the same date (02.11.2020), but
rather the Councillors continue until the first
meeting of the Corporation, which is the trigger
for dissolution under Section 503(4).

52.6. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader submits that Article 243-U of the
Constitution was inserted by the 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 for the
specific purpose of ensuring regular democratic
governance in municipalities. It mandates a
fixed term of 5 years from the date of the first
meeting. This constitutional provision cannot be
overridden by a State Legislature by means of a
statutory provision.

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52.7. She submits that the principle generalia
specialibus non derogant can apply only when
both the general provision and the specific
provision are at the same legislative level, i.e.,
both are statutes or both are constitutional
provisions. A State Act cannot override a
provision of the Constitution by claiming to be a
specific provision. The Constitution is supreme.

52.8. She submits that the principle of constitutional
supremacy is enshrined in Articles 13, 245, and
246 of the Constitution. Under Article 13(2),
the State shall not make any law which takes
away or abridges rights conferred by Part III.
While Article 243-U is in Part IX-A and not Part
III, the same principle of constitutional
supremacy applies, a State Legislature cannot
enact a law which is in derogation of or
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions.

52.9. She relies upon Kishansing Tomar vs.
Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahamadabad and submits that the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held categorically that the
period of five years is mandatory in nature, and
any provision seeking to extend the term

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beyond 5 years would be contrary to Article
243-U.

52.10. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others
vs. State of Karnataka and another and
submits that the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court has held that none of the petitioners who
had been elected as Councillors to any
Municipal body could continue in office on the
expiry of the period specified in Article 243-ZF.
She submits that the same principle applies
with full force under Article 243-U.

52.11. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel
submits that Section 503(4) of the KMC Act
cannot be construed as an exception to Article
243-U. A correct reading of Section 503(4)
shows that it is not seeking to extend the term
beyond 5 years. The main body of Section
503(4) says the Corporation shall be
constituted within 6 months of the declaration.
The proviso merely defers the fresh elections to
the end of the existing term. In neither case
does the provision extend the term beyond the
constitutionally mandated 5 years.

52.12. He submits that a provision must be read
harmoniously with the Constitution. Any

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reading of Section 503(4) that seeks to
override Article 243-U must be rejected in
favour of a harmonious reading which keeps
both provisions alive and consistent with each
other.

52.13. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that
Article 243-U is a mandatory provision of the
Constitution. The Election Commission has the
constitutional duty to ensure elections are
completed within 5 years as mandated by
Article 243-U(3). The Election Commission
cannot be compelled to defer elections on the
ground that a State statute creates an
exception to the constitutionally mandated
term.

52.14. He submits that the independence of the State
Election Commission under Article 243-K
ensures that it functions free from executive
interference. The Election Commission's
calculation of the term as ending on 01.11.2025
is correct, and any attempt to compel it to defer
elections beyond that date would interfere with
its constitutional independence.

52.15. The question whether sub-section (4) of Section
503 of the KMC Act constitutes an exception to

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the term of office mandated under Article 243-
U of the Constitution requires an analysis of the
constitutional scheme, the legislative
provisions, and the principles of constitutional
interpretation.

52.16. Article 243-U(1) reads: "Every Municipality,
unless sooner dissolved under any law for the
time being in force, shall continue for five years
from the date appointed for its first meeting
and no longer." The words "no longer" are
absolute and categorical. The Constitution
permits no exception to the 5-year rule except
dissolution (which results in a shorter term
under Article 243-U(4), not a longer one).

52.17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar
vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahamadabad has declared, in paragraph 21
thereof, that "the period of five years fixed
thereunder to constitute the municipality is
mandatory in nature and has to be followed in
all respects." This is a binding declaration of the
law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article
141 of the Constitution. This Court is bound by
this declaration.

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52.18. A careful and harmonious reading of Section
503(4) and its proviso demonstrates that the
provision is NOT seeking to extend the
Councillors' term beyond 5 years:

52.19. The main body of Section 503(4) directs the
Corporation to be duly constituted within 6
months of the declaration. This is consistent
with Article 243-U(3)(a), which requires
elections to be completed before the expiry of
the 5-year duration.

52.20. The proviso to Section 503(4) provides that
where the specified conditions are met,
Corporation elections need not be held "till the
completion of the term of members of smaller
urban area so elected." The expression
"completion of the term" refers to the 5-year
term prescribed by Article 243-U and Section 8.
The proviso therefore defers the fresh election
to the end of the existing 5-year term, it does
NOT create a new term or extend the existing
term beyond 5 years.

52.21. The principle of generalisa specialibus non
derogant invoked by the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners is inapplicable to the present
situation. This principle applies in the

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interpretation of statutes inter se, where a
general statute and a specific statute deal with
the same subject matter, the specific statute
prevails. It does NOT apply to the relationship
between a constitutional provision and a State
statute. The Constitution is supreme and a
State statute cannot override the Constitution
by claiming to be a specific provision. This
principle of constitutional supremacy is well
settled and cannot be dislodged.

52.22. The deeming fiction argument, that once the
CMC Councillors become Corporation
Councillors under Section 503(3)(b), they are in
a new capacity to which Article 243-U applies
with a new starting date, is also untenable.
Article 243-U applies to every Municipality, and
a Corporation is a Municipality within the
meaning of Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution.
The deeming fiction in Section 503 does not
create a new constitutional entity to which
Article 243-U applies afresh; it merely changes
the character of the existing body from a City
Municipal Council to a Corporation. The same
elected body, with the same elected members,
exercising a different set of statutory powers,

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cannot claim that its term restarts merely
because of the change in designation.

52.23. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in G.
Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of
Karnataka and another has held in paragraph
20 that "it is not as though Municipal bodies
could not be dissolved and an Administrator
could discharge the function of the Municipal
bodies." The Co-ordinate Bench further held in
paragraph 17 that "none of the petitioners who
had been elected as Councillors either to
Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation,
could continue in office on the expiry of the
period." These findings reflect the absolute
constitutional mandate under Article 243-U that
the 5-year term is non-negotiable.

52.24. The constitutional supremacy argument admits
of no doubt. Articles 245 and 246 of the
Constitution confer legislative power on
Parliament and the State Legislatures
respectively. However, Article 245(1) opens
with the words "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution", which means that all legislative
power, whether of Parliament or of a State
Legislature, is exercised subject to and in

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conformity with the Constitution. Part IX-A of
the Constitution, dealing with Municipalities, is
a part of the Constitution that all State
Legislatures must respect and comply with. A
State Legislature cannot enact any provision
which is inconsistent with Part IX-A.

52.25. A constitutional provision is not merely a law
among laws, it is the grundnorm from which all
other legal norms derive their validity. The
celebrated observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of
Kerala [AIR 1973 SC 1461] established the
basic structure of the Constitution as inviolable.

52.26. The periodic election of local bodies and the
fixed five-year term under Part IX-A reflect the
basic democratic structure of the Constitution.
A statutory provision cannot chip away at this
democratic bedrock, however well-intentioned
the Legislature may have been in enacting it.

52.27. The argument of the petitioners that Section
503(4) creates a deeming fiction which
operates to give the CMC Councillors a new
constitutional identity as Corporation
Councillors, to which Article 243-U applies with
a different start date, is a creative argument,

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but it cannot withstand scrutiny. Deeming
fictions are well-known legislative devices used
to produce a legal consequence which would
not otherwise follow. The rule as to deeming
fictions would necessarily entail that it cannot
have the effect of enlarging the meaning of a
particular word or to include matters which
otherwise would not be included therein. A
deeming fiction must be taken to its logical and
reasonable limits and NOT beyond them, and
that a deeming fiction cannot override an
express constitutional provision.

52.28. The argument that Section 503(4) creates a
special exception to Article 243-U
fundamentally misunderstands the
constitutional structure. Part IX-A was inserted
into the Constitution with the specific aim of
removing the matter of local body governance
from the realm of ordinary State legislation and
placing it under constitutional protection.
Before Part IX-A, the duration of municipal
bodies, the timing of elections, and the
appointment of Administrators were all
governed by State laws alone, with the result
that elected local bodies were frequently
superseded for extended periods. Part IX-A was

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intended to put an end to this. If a State
Legislature can enact a law which, in effect,
extends the tenure of elected local body
members beyond five years by calling it a
"deeming fiction" or a "transitional provision,"
the entire purpose of the 74th Amendment
would be defeated. Every State Government
wishing to extend the tenure of a municipal
council could simply declare the area a "larger
urban area" and invoke the transitional
provisions. This Court will not permit such a
constitutional evasion.

52.29. The "first meeting of the Corporation as so
constituted" refers to the first meeting of the
newly elected Corporation, i.e., the meeting
convened under Section 8 of the KMC Act after
the fresh Corporation elections are completed.
Until this first meeting, the old body (CMC-
turned-Corporation) continues to function. But,
and this is the critical point, the old body can
only continue to function if its individual
Councillors are still in office. Once the
Councillors' five-year term expires on
01.11.2025, there are no Councillors to
constitute the old body. The old body therefore
effectively ceases to function. An Administrator

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must then step in until the fresh Corporation is
elected and holds its first meeting.

52.30. We therefore answer point No.(ii) by holding
that Section 503(4) of the KMC Act does NOT
constitute an exception to the term of office
mandated under Article 243-U of the
Constitution. On the contrary, Section 503(4) is
to be read harmoniously with Article 243-U, and
when so read, both provisions lead to the same
conclusion: the Councillors' term expires on the
completion of the 5-year period from the date
of the first meeting (01.11.2025). The
argument of the petitioners that Section 503(4)
creates an extended term beyond Article 243-U
is rejected.

53. Answer to Point No.(iii): Whether the
petitioners are entitled to an extended period
on account of the interruption caused by the
appointment of an Administrator in the second
term of CMC?

53.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners, submits that during the 5-
year tenure of the Councillors, there was a
significant interruption caused by the
appointment of an Administrator for a period of
approximately fifteen months from 11.05.2023

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to 27.08.2024. He submits that this
interruption was caused by the delay of the
respondents in properly notifying the
reservation roster for the posts of President and
Vice President for the second term, which led to
litigation and ultimately to the appointment of
an Administrator.

53.2. His submission is that the Councillors were
deprived of their right to exercise their
democratic mandate during this period of
fifteen months. The democratic rights of the
elected Councillors and of the people of Raichur
to be governed by their chosen representatives
were subverted for fifteen months due entirely
to the fault and default of the respondents.

53.3. He submits that equity and constitutional
justice demand that the period of deprivation
must be compensated by extending the tenure
of the Councillors commensurately. If the
Councillors were deprived of approximately
fifteen months of governance due to no fault of
their own, justice requires that this period be
added to their term. The 5-year term should
therefore be computed by excluding the period
of the Administrator's appointment.

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53.4. He further submits that the authorities have, by
their own actions and inactions, deprived the
Councillors of the opportunity to discharge their
democratic obligations, and the Court must
come to the rescue of the petitioners to
preserve democracy and permit the petitioners
to discharge their role as Councillors for the full
period to which they are entitled.

53.5. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader submits that the Administrator was
appointed not as an Administrator of the CMC
in its entirety, but only to discharge the
functions of the President and Vice President of
the CMC during the period when fresh elections
for those posts could not be held owing to
pending litigation before the Courts. The
Councillors themselves were never removed
from office; they continued to hold and exercise
their office throughout the period 11.05.2023 to
27.08.2024. Therefore, the Councillors' 5-year
term was never interrupted.

53.6. She further submits that even if the
Administrator's appointment could be regarded
as an interruption (which she disputes), there is
no provision in Article 243-U or Section 8 of the

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KMC Act which provides for the exclusion of any
period from the 5-year term. The 5-year term
is mandatory and runs from the date of first
meeting without any pause or deduction,
whatever be the reason.

53.7. She relies upon the binding decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs.
Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahamadabad in which it has been
categorically held that the 5-year period is
mandatory. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held
that not even man-made calamities or natural
disasters justify an extension. Surely, the
appointment of an Administrator for
presidential posts (which is a far lesser event)
cannot justify an extension of the constitutional
term.

53.8. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others
vs. State of Karnataka and another ,
particularly paragraph 17, and submits that the
Co-ordinate Bench held that "whatever may be
the reasons for not holding elections to
municipalities, the fact remains that elections
have not been held prior to the expiry of the
term of the concerned Municipal body." By

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analogy, whatever may be the reasons for the
appointment of the Administrator, the 5-year
term runs its course.

53.9. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel
submits that the appointment of the
Administrator was for a specific limited
purpose, to manage the CMC during the period
when the President/VP posts could not be filled
by elections due to pending litigation. This is
not an "interruption" in the Councillors' tenure.
The Councillors continued to hold office
throughout and their rights as Councillors were
never extinguished.

53.10. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that
Article 243-U does not contemplate any
exclusion from the 5-year term. The Election
Commission has correctly calculated the term
from the first meeting (02.11.2020) to the
expiry of 5 years (01.11.2025). Any extension
of the term beyond 5 years would violate Article
243-U and the Election Commission has a
constitutional duty to prevent such extension.

53.11. The factual background necessary for answering
this Point is as follows. The first meeting of the
CMC, Raichur, was held on 02.11.2020, and the

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5-year term of Councillors commenced from
that date. The President and Vice President are
elected from among the Councillors for a term
of 30 months each. The first 30-month term of
the President and VP commenced on
02.11.2020 and expired on 11.05.2023.

53.12. Owing to disputes regarding the reservation
roster for the posts of President and Vice
President for the second term of 30 months,
elections for those posts could not be held
immediately upon the expiry of the first term
on 11.05.2023. During this period of
uncertainty, an Administrator was appointed by
the State Government to manage the CMC. The
Administrator functioned from 11.05.2023 until
27.08.2024, when elections for President and
VP for the second term were held.

53.13. The crucial factual point, which goes to the root
of the petitioners' submission, is this: The
Administrator was appointed in connection with
the vacant presidential/VP posts, NOT in
connection with the Councillors. The Councillors
themselves were NOT removed from office
during this period. They continued to hold and
exercise their office throughout as Councillors

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of the CMC. The Administrator was appointed to
exercise the executive functions of the
President and Vice President, not to supersede
the Councillors or to take over the Council as a
whole.

53.14. This distinction is fundamental. Under Section
315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964,
an Administrator may be appointed where a
City Municipal Council fails to function, or where
it is dissolved. In the present case, the CMC
was not dissolved, nor did it as a body fail to
function. The Councillors continued to exercise
their rights and functions. The Administrator
was appointed specifically to fill the executive
vacuum in the Presidential posts pending
resolution of the reservation dispute. The
Councillors were neither removed nor
suspended.

53.15. Given this factual position, the submission that
the Councillors' tenure was "interrupted" by the
appointment of an Administrator lacks factual
foundation. There was no interruption in the
tenure of the Councillors. Their 5-year term ran
continuously from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025,

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throughout which period they continued to hold
office as Councillors.

53.16. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
there was some form of interruption in the
effective exercise of the Councillors' rights
(which we do not accept as a matter of fact),
the legal position is equally clear against the
petitioners:

53.17. Article 243-U(1) of the Constitution mandates
that every Municipality "shall continue for five
years from the date appointed for its first
meeting and no longer." There is no provision
in Article 243-U for any exclusion of any period
from the 5-year term, howsoever caused,
whether by natural calamity, man-made
calamity, administrative failure, or judicial
intervention.

53.18. Section 8 of the KMC Act similarly contains no
provision for exclusion of any period from the
5-year term.

53.19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar
vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahamadabad has held that "it is only when
the municipality is dissolved for any other

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reason and the remainder of the period for
which the dissolved municipality would have
continued is less than six months, it shall not
be necessary to hold any elections for
constituting the municipality for such period."
Beyond this single exception (dissolution with
remainder less than 6 months), no other
exception is recognised. Certainly, no exception
for exclusion of the Administrator period is
recognised.

53.20. The argument based on equity cannot override
a constitutional mandate. Courts of equity
supplement law; they do not override the
Constitution. If the Constitution mandates a 5-
year term running from the date of the first
meeting, no court can extend it on grounds of
equity. Equity follows the law, and in this case
the law is the Constitution.

53.21. We also note the argument that the
respondents caused the interruption by their
default in publishing the reservation roster.
Even assuming this is correct, the remedy for
such default lies elsewhere, for instance, in
appropriate writ proceedings to compel the
authorities to expedite the reservation

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notification. The remedy does not lie in
extending the constitutional term.
Constitutional remedies must be consistent with
the Constitution. A remedy that violates Article
243-U in order to correct an administrative
wrong is not a constitutionally permissible
remedy. Courts cannot achieve constitutionally
impermissible results, even with the best of
intentions and even in the interest of equity.

53.22. We also address the submission that the
President's 30-month second term would have
continued until approximately February 2027
and that the Councillors should correspondingly
continue. This submission conflates the term of
the President/Vice-President with the term of
the Councillors. These are two constitutionally
and statutorily separate tenures. Under the KM
Act, the President and Vice-President of a CMC
hold office for 30 months each in a five-year
term, the first 30-month term and the second
30-month term. However, the Councillors hold
office for the entire five-year term, irrespective
of the presidential tenures. It is perfectly
possible, and indeed it happens, that the
Councillors' five-year term ends while the
President/VP are still serving their 30-month

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term. In such an event, the Councillors' term
ends at five years by constitutional mandate,
and fresh elections of Councillors must be held.
The second 30-month term of the President/VP
does not and cannot extend the Councillors'
five-year term.

53.23. We observe that accepting the petitioners'
argument on this issue would lead to an absurd
result. Suppose the Councillors' first meeting
was held in Month 1. Their five-year term ends
in Month 61. Now suppose the presidential
elections for the second 30-month term were
held in Month 50 (for some reason delayed).
The President/VP would then have a 30-month
term ending in Month 80. If the petitioners'
argument is accepted, the Councillors would
also continue until Month 80, i.e., their five-
year term (60 months) would be extended to
80 months. This is a 20-month extension of the
constitutional term, achieved entirely through
the administrative accident of a delayed
presidential election. Such a result would make
the five-year constitutional term meaningless in
transitional or administratively complex
situations, precisely the situations where the

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Constitution's firm guarantee of a fixed term is
most needed.

53.24. We note, in conclusion on this Point, that the
constitutional system deliberately separates the
tenure of elected Councillors (five years) from
the tenure of the executive heads
(President/Mayor, Vice-President/Deputy
Mayor) who are elected from among the
Councillors for shorter terms within the five-
year period. This separation ensures that the
administrative leadership of the municipal body
is periodically renewed (every 30 months for
the President/VP in the CMC system, every two-
and-a-half years for the Mayor/Deputy Mayor
under the Corporation system) even as the
elected Council as a whole serves for the full
five-year constitutional term. An interruption in
the President/VP tenure, however caused, does
not and cannot affect the running of the five-
year Councillors' term.

53.25. A further conceptual clarification is necessary.
The petitioners argue that the appointment of
an Administrator from 11.05.2023 to
27.08.2024 was an "interruption" in the
Councillors' tenure akin to a dissolution. This

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argument must be carefully examined. Article
243-U distinguishes between (a) the expiry of
the five-year term (clause (1)) and (b)
dissolution before the expiry of the term
(provisos to clause (1) and clause (4)). In the
case of dissolution, the dissolved Municipality is
replaced by a fresh Municipality (constituted
upon dissolution) which continues only for the
remainder of the period. In the case of expiry
by efflux of time, the Municipality simply ceases
to exist and fresh elections must be held.

53.26. The appointment of an Administrator for
presidential posts, without the dissolutionon of
the CMC as a body, does not fall into either
category. It is neither a dissolution nor an
expiry of the term. The CMC continued to exist
as a body, with its Councillors in office. Only
the executive leadership (President/VP) was
temporarily replaced by an Administrator. This
is an intermediate situation which the
Constitution does not treat as a dissolution or
an interruption of the term. The five-year term
runs continuously through such intermediate
situations.

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53.27. We therefore answer point No.(iii) by holding
that the petitioners are NOT entitled to any
extended period on account of the interruption
caused by the appointment of an Administrator
in connection with the second term presidential
elections of the CMC. The Councillors' 5-year
term ran from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025
without any deduction.

54. Answer to Point No.(iv): Whether the term of
five years would exclude the period during
which the Administrator was in office?

54.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners, submits that the five-year
term prescribed by Article 243-U and Section 8
of the KMC Act must be computed by excluding
the period during which the Administrator was
in office, namely from 11.05.2023 to
27.08.2024, a period of approximately fifteen
months. If this period is excluded, the 5-year
term would extend to approximately February
2027.

54.2. He submits that the appointment of the
Administrator was due entirely to the fault of
the respondents in not properly notifying the
reservation roster. The Councillors cannot be
penalised for the default of the authorities. The

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legal principle that no person shall suffer for the
act or default of another requires that the
period of the Administrator's appointment,
which was caused by the State's default, be
excluded from the 5-year term of the
Councillors.

54.3. He submits that the purpose of Article 243-U is
to ensure that elected representatives govern
for a full 5-year term, so that the electorate's
mandate is given its full expression. If a portion
of those 5 years is effectively denied to the
elected representatives due to administrative
interference (the appointment of an
Administrator), the constitutional purpose is
frustrated. The provision must be interpreted
purposively so as to ensure 5 full years of
actual democratic governance.

54.4. He submits that the election to the second term
of President and Vice President having occurred
on 28.08.2024, the said council was required to
be in office for a period of thirty months
thereafter, i.e., till approximately February
2027. The appointment of an Administrator
before the expiry of the said term interferes

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with the tenure of the Councillors which is not
permissible in law or in constitutional principle.

54.5. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader submits that the period of the
Administrator's appointment cannot be
excluded from the computation of the 5-year
term. There is no provision in Article 243-U or
Section 8 of the KMC Act for any such
exclusion. The 5-year term runs from the date
of the first meeting without pause or deduction.

54.6. She submits that the argument of the
petitioners conflates two different things: the 5-
year term of the Councillors (which was never
interrupted) and the tenure of the President/VP
(which was temporarily managed by an
Administrator). The Councillors' term was at no
point suspended or interrupted.

54.7. She relies upon the binding decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs.
Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahamadabad to reiterate that the 5-year
period is mandatory and admits of no
exceptions for exclusion of any period,
howsoever caused.

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54.8. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others
vs. State of Karnataka and another to
reinforce the proposition that Article 243-U runs
its course without interruption.

54.9. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel
submits that the Administrator was appointed
for a specific limited purpose. The Councillors'
tenure was not affected. There is no basis for
deducting any period from the 5-year term.

54.10. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that
the Election Commission correctly calculated
the term from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025,
strictly in conformity with Article 243-U. The
argument that the Administrator period should
be excluded would, if accepted, render the
mandatory character of Article 243-U illusory
and would be contrary to the binding decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court.

54.11. This Point for Determination is closely related to
Point No.3 and both arise from the same factual
premise, the appointment of an Administrator
from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 during the 5-
year term of the Councillors. Having already
held in Point No.3 that the Councillors' 5-year
term was NOT interrupted by the

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Administrator's appointment (since the
Administrator was appointed only for
presidential/VP posts and the Councillors
themselves continued in office), the factual
basis for the argument in this Point does not
exist.

54.12. Nevertheless, we shall also examine the legal
position independently on the question whether
the 5-year term under Article 243-U excludes
the period of the Administrator's appointment.

54.13. The text of Article 243-U(1) is clear and admits
of no ambiguity: "Every Municipality ... shall
continue for five years from the date appointed
for its first meeting and no longer." The five-
year period runs from the date of the first
meeting. There is no proviso, exception, or
qualification that permits any exclusion from
this period. The Constitution speaks clearly and
there is nothing to interpret.

54.14. The principles of constitutional interpretation do
not permit the reading of words into the
Constitution that are not there. If the framers
of the 74th Constitutional Amendment had
intended to provide for exclusion of any period
from the 5-year term, for any reason

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whatsoever, they would have expressly
provided for it. No such provision has been
made. Courts cannot supply words that the
framers deliberately chose not to include.

54.15. The argument of "purposive interpretation",
that the purpose of Article 243-U is to ensure 5
full years of democratic governance and
therefore any period of interruption should be
excluded, is also untenable. The constitutional
purpose of Article 243-U is to ensure regular
and periodic democratic elections to local
bodies. It achieves this purpose by fixing a
mandatory 5-year term computed from a fixed
date (the first meeting). It does NOT guarantee
5 years of uninterrupted governance or 5 years
of having an elected President/VP. The
mandatory 5-year term ensures that elections
are held at regular intervals; it does not
guarantee any particular quality or
configuration of governance during that period.

54.16. The submission that the Administrator's
appointment for presidential posts amounts to
an "interruption" of the Councillors' tenure is
further flawed for the reason that even if the
Councillors' access to presidential functions was

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limited during the Administrator's tenure, the
Councillors themselves never ceased to be
Councillors. They continued to hold all the
rights, privileges, and responsibilities of
Councillors throughout. The 5-year term is the
term of office as Councillors, not the term
during which the Councillors can exercise every
conceivable function of local governance.

54.17. The legal maxim invoked by the petitioners,
that a person should not suffer for the default
of another, is a principle of equity applicable in
private law. It cannot operate to override a
constitutional provision. The Constitution itself
is the supreme law of the land and no equitable
principle can contradict it.

54.18. Even if, contrary to what we have held, the
Councillors' tenure was "interrupted" by the
Administrator for 15 months, the constitutional
remedy is not the extension of the term beyond
5 years. The remedy, if any, would be a writ of
mandamus directing the respondents to rectify
the irregularity, but such remedy cannot result
in a term longer than 5 years, since that would
directly violate Article 243-U(1).

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54.19. We are also cognisant of the public interest
dimension. The people of Raichur, who elected
these Councillors in 2018, have a constitutional
right to elect new representatives every five
years. This right is guaranteed by Article 243-U.
The State Election Commission has a
constitutional duty to ensure that elections are
held on time. The petitioners' submission, if
accepted, would deprive the electorate of
Raichur of its constitutional right to fresh
elections for approximately an additional 15
months beyond the five-year term. The
constitutional rights of the electorate, the
people, must prevail over the personal interest
of incumbent Councillors in prolonging their
tenure.

54.20. We therefore confirm that the five-year term
runs from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025 in its
entirety, without any exclusion. The period from
11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 during which the
Administrator was in office for presidential
purposes forms part of, and is counted within,
the five-year term. The Councillors' term
expired on 01.11.2025 and they ceased to hold
office from that date by operation of Article
243-U(1) of the Constitution.

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54.21. A duly elected body does not retain a
democratic mandate after the expiry of its
constitutional term. The right to contest
elections is a statutory right, and by analogy,
the right to hold office as an elected
representative is a statutory right circumscribed
by the Constitution and the applicable statutes.
Once the constitutional and statutory term
expires, the holder of the office has no further
legal right to continue. The claim to continue
beyond the term on the basis of equity alone
cannot be countenanced.

54.22. We also note that the interpretation of a
mandatory constitutional provision cannot be
influenced by practical hardship or
inconvenience. The Constitution mandates a
five-year term and mandates elections within
that period. If the authorities failed to hold
elections on time, as appears to have happened
in the present case, the constitutional remedy
is to hold elections immediately upon the expiry
of the term (i.e., within six months as directed
by Article 243-U(3)(b)), not to extend the term
of the incumbents. The Extension of the term
would reward the failure to hold elections on
time, which would create a perverse incentive

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against timely elections. The Constitution
instead places a positive obligation on the State
Election Commission to hold elections in time,
and where elections are not held before the
expiry of the term, directs that they be held as
soon as possible thereafter (within six months).

54.23. We therefore also reject the alternative prayer
of the petitioners that the term be computed
from 28.08.2024 (the date of the second
presidential election), treating that as a fresh
start date. As we have held in Points (i) and
(ii), the second presidential election does not
constitute the CMC or the Corporation afresh, it
is an internal election within an already-
constituted body. The start date for the five-
year term is fixed by Article 243-U and Section
8 of the KMC Act as the date of the first
meeting of the Corporation/CMC, which in this
case is 02.11.2020. No subsequent event,
whether an administrator's appointment, a
presidential election, or an area upgradation,
can reset this constitutional start date.

54.24. It is trite that equity follows the law and that
courts cannot create new remedies or new
rights that are not provided for by the law. The

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petitioners are seeking a remedy, extension of
the five-year term, that is not provided for
anywhere in the Constitution or the KMC Act.
This Court cannot create such a remedy by
judicial fiat. If the Constitution does not provide
for it, this Court cannot provide it.

54.25. This Court must also address whether, even
assuming the petitioners' factual premisese
were accepted (i.e., that the Councillors were
somehow deprived of effective governance for
fifteen months), this Court has the
constitutional power to extend the five-year
term by judicial order. The answer is
emphatically in the negative.

54.26. Article 243-U(1) is addressed to the Municipality
as an institutionon, it prescribes the maximum
duration of the Municipality's existence. Courts
exercise judicial review of executive and
legislative action. They do not have the power
to alter constitutional provisions. If Article 243-
U says the Municipality shall continue for five
years and no longer, no court can direct that it
continue for six years or seven years or until
elections are held. Such a direction would be
itself unconstitutional.

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54.27. The relief sought by the petitioners, in
substance a direction that the Councillors
continue until the Corporation is freshly
constituted, amounts to a direction to override
Article 243-U. This Court cannot grant such
relief even if it were sympathetic to the
petitioners' predicament. The Constitution is
supreme, and the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution is
exercised subject to and in conformity with the
Constitution. A writ court cannot issue a writ
that violates the Constitution.

54.28. The present case is not one where the
petitioners are asking the Court to enforce the
Constitution, they are asking the Court to
override the mandatory five-year term in Article
243-U. That is a request to violate the
Constitution, and it must be declined.

54.29. We, therefore answer Point No.(iv) by holding
that the term of five years does NOT exclude
the period during which the Administrator was
in office. The 5-year term of the Councillors ran
from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025, without any
deduction, in strict conformity with Article 243-

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U(1) of the Constitution and Section 8(1) of the
KMC Act.

55. Answer to Point No.(v): Whether the impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge
suffers from any infirmities requiring
interference at the hands of this Court?

55.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioners, submits that the impugned
order of the learned Single Judge is vitiated by
several infirmities and errors apparent on the
face of the record, which require interference
by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act.

55.2. His first submission is that the learned Single
Judge has failed to properly consider and apply
Section 503 of the KMC Act, particularly sub-
section (4) thereof and the proviso thereto. He
submits that the impugned order does not
discuss Section 503(4) in adequate detail and
has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition
without fully addressing the central legal
argument of the petitioners based on Section
503.

55.3. His second submission is that the learned Single
Judge has mechanically applied Article 243-U of

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the Constitution and Section 8 of the KMC Act
without considering that Section 503(4) of the
KMC Act constitutes the governing specific
provision in the context of transition from a
Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area.

55.4. His third submission is that the learned Single
Judge has not dealt with the petitioners'
argument that the Administrator's appointment
was made without opportunity of hearing to the
elected members. The appointment of an
Administrator, which amounts to the removal of
elected members from governance, violates the
principles of natural justice, and this argument
has not been addressed in the impugned order.

55.5. His fourth submission is that the impugned
order is contrary to the democratic principle
enshrined in the Constitution. The order, which
upholds the replacement of an elected council
by an Administrator, strikes at the root of
democratic governance. The learned Single
Judge has failed to consider the larger
democratic implications of the order.

55.6. His fifth submission is that the direction given
by the learned Single Judge that elections be
held within 6 months "from the date of

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appointment of administrator" is erroneous,
since the appointment of the Administrator
itself is under challenge, and if the appointment
is set aside, the direction becomes otiose and
meaningless.

55.7. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government
Pleader submits that the scope of a writ appeal
under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court
Act is limited. The Appellate Court will not
interfere with the findings of the learned Single
Judge unless there is perversity, illegality, or
gross injustice. None of these infirmities are
present in the impugned order.

55.8. She submits that the learned Single Judge's
conclusion that the 5-year term ended on
01.11.2025 is factually correct and legally
sound. The learned Single Judge correctly
applied Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC
Act.

55.9. She submits that the direction to hold elections
within 6 months from the appointment of the
Administrator is correct and is in consonance
with Article 243-U(3)(b), which requires
elections to be completed within 6 months of
dissolution. The direction ensures that

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democratic governance is restored
expeditiously.

55.10. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel
submits that there is no infirmity in the
impugned order. The learned Single Judge has
rightly dismissed the writ petition. The
argument that the Administrator's appointment
is without opportunity of hearing is legally
misconceived since the appointment comes
after the expiry of the term, there is no
"removal" attracting principles of natural
justice.

55.11. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that
the Karnataka State Election Commission has
been directed to hold elections expeditiously
within 6 months from the date of the
appointment of the Administrator. This is a
direction which the Election Commission is
duty-bound to comply with and which is in full
accordance with Article 243-U. The impugned
order is correct and does not suffer from any
infirmity.

55.12. In a writ appeal under Section 4 of the
Karnataka High Court Act, the jurisdiction of
the Division Bench is to examine whether the

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learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated
the facts and law, and whether the order is
vitiated by any illegality, perversity, or error
apparent on the face of the record. The Division
Bench does not re-examine the matter as a
court of first appeal in the strict sense; it
examines whether the learned Single Judge has
correctly exercised writ jurisdiction.

55.13. Having considered the arguments and having
held on Points (i) to (iv) above that: (i) the
CMC Councillors can continue as Corporation
Councillors only until the expiry of their 5-year
term on 01.11.2025; (ii) Section 503(4) does
not constitute an exception to Article 243-U;
(iii) the petitioners are not entitled to any
extended period on account of the
Administrator's appointment; and (iv) the 5-
year term does not exclude the period of the
Administrator's appointment, it follows that the
learned Single Judge's conclusion that the 5-
year term expired on 01.11.2025 and that
elections must be held, is correct in law and in
fact.

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55.14. We shall now examine each specific infirmity
alleged by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners:

55.15. Failure to consider Section 503(4): We have
independently examined Section 503(4) and
the proviso thereto at considerable length in
Points (i) and (ii) of this judgment. Even upon
such thorough examination, we have
unanimously held that Section 503(4) does not
assist the petitioners and does not extend the
5-year term. The learned Single Judge though
has not elaborated upon Section 503(4), it does
not lead to a different legal conclusion. It is
settled law that an Appellate Court can confirm
the conclusion of the lower court even if the
reasoning of the lower court was inadequate or
wrong, provided the conclusion is correct in
law. We find the conclusion correct.

55.16. Violation of natural justice: The submission that
the Administrator was appointed without
opportunity of hearing to the Councillors is
misconceived. The appointment of an
Administrator after the expiry of the
Councillors' 5-year term on 01.11.2025 is NOT
a "removal" of the Councillors, they ceased to

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hold office by operation of the constitutional
provision (Article 243-U). The term expired by
efflux of time as mandated by the Constitution,
not by any executive action. Natural justice is
required where a right or status is being taken
away by an authority; it does NOT apply where
the right has expired by the passage of time as
mandated by the Constitution. Once the
constitutional term expired, there was no
"right" to be heard before appointing an
Administrator.

55.17. Violation of democratic principles: The
argument that the impugned order violates
democratic principles is unfounded. Article 243-
U itself is a constitutional expression of
democratic values, it mandates regular
elections every 5 years to ensure that local
governance is periodically remanded back to
the people. It is the petitioners' argument,
which seeks to perpetuate the term of elected
representatives beyond 5 years without a fresh
mandate, that is contrary to democratic
principles. Regular and timely elections are the
foundation of democracy; allowing elected
representatives to hold office indefinitely

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beyond their constitutional term would
undermine democracy, not protect it.

55.18. Direction regarding elections: The direction
given by the learned Single Judge that elections
be held within 6 months from the date of the
appointment of the Administrator is a practical
and lawful direction consistent with Article 243-
U(3)(b). Even if the Administrator's
appointment were to be challenged and set
aside (which has not happened), the
constitutional obligation to hold elections within
the prescribed time remains. The direction is
therefore not erroneous; it is, in fact, a salutary
direction ensuring constitutional compliance.

55.19. In the exercise of writ jurisdiction, the scope of
interference by the writ court is also
circumscribed, the court will not substitute its
discretion for that of the statutory or
constitutional authority except in cases of
illegality, perversity, or manifest
unreasonableness. The learned Single Judge
has exercised jurisdiction correctly; the order is
neither illegal nor perverse nor unreasonable.

55.20. Since this judgment is delivered in the last
week of April 2026. The six-month period is

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therefore nearly expired. We accordingly direct
that the Karnataka State Election Commission
take immediate steps to complete the election
process to the Raichur Municipal Corporation
without any further delay and complete the
same within a period of further 3 months from
the date of the order, there having been no
stay of the order of the learned single judge,
the election commission ought to have gone
ahead with preparation for such election in the
interregnum.

55.21. For all the above reasons, we answer point
no.(v) by holding that the impugned order
passed by the learned Single Judge does NOT
suffer from any infirmities requiring
interference at the hands of this Court.

56. Answer to Point No.(vi): What order?

56.1. For the reasons elaborated under Points (i) to
(v) above, we pass the following:
ORDER

(i) The Writ Appeal No.200101 of 2026 (LB-RES) is
hereby DISMISSED.

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(ii) The impugned order dated 26.02.2026 passed
by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
No.202910/2025 is hereby CONFIRMED.

(iii) The Karnataka State Election Commission
(Respondent No.5) shall proceed to hold
elections to the Raichur Municipal Corporation
expeditiously and shall complete the election
process within a period of three months from
the date of passing of this order.

Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(DR.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA)
JUDGE




NB
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 31
Ct;VK