SMT. GEETA BANARASI vs PREMLATA

Court
Chhattisgarh High Court

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CGHC010456942025 2026:CGHC:46581
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1140 of 2025
Smt. Geeta Banarasi W/o Late Gunwant Banarasi Aged About 44 Years R/o
Kunwa Chowk, Nandai Ward No. 40, Police Station Basantpur, Tahsil And
District Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
Premlata D/o Late Sakhadas Satnami R/o Nandai Ward No. 40, Satnami
Para, Tahsil And District Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
.. Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Achyut Tiwari, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ravi Kumar Bodhani, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board
03/11/2026
1. Heard.
2. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 10.09.2025
passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, Circuit Court
at Raipur, in Revenue Case No. RN/15/R/A-6/74/2025 (wrongly
mentioned as 2029), whereby the revision filed by the respondent was
allowed and the orders passed by the Commissioner, Durg Division,
dated 12.02.2025 and the Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, dated 22.05.2024,

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were set aside and the order passed by the SDO (Revenue),
Rajnandgaon, dated 12.09.2024, was affirmed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the subject
property is the land bearing Khasra No. 1519/3, area 0.201 hectare,
situated at Village Nandai, P.H. No. 41, Tehsil and District Rajnandgaon
(C.G.). It was initially owned by one Sakhadas. After the death of
Sakhadas, the names of his wife, Ganga Devi, and son, Gunwant,
were mutated in the revenue records. Ganga Devi also died on
01.08.2004, and thereafter, her name was deleted from the revenue
records and the name of Gunwant alone remained. Gunwant also died
on 17.12.2023.
4. After the death of Gunwant, the respondent, Premlata, moved an
application on 26.02.2024 before the Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, claiming
that after the death of Sakhadas, the names of his legal heirs, i.e.,
Ganga Devi, Gunwant, Premlata and her sister Sumitra, should have
been mutated in the revenue records. However, the names of Premlata
and Sumitra were left out, and the names of Ganga Devi and Gunwant
were recorded in the revenue records. Even after the death of Ganga
Devi, their names could not be mutated in the revenue records, though
they are the legal heirs of Sakhadas and Ganga Devi. Therefore, their
names may also be mutated in the revenue records along with the wife
of deceased Gunwant, namely, Geeta Banarasi. The Tehsildar,
Rajnandgaon, dismissed the application filed by the respondent vide
order dated 22.05.2024, holding that the respondent had not claimed
legal heirship of Sakhadas and mutation in the revenue records on the
ground that after the death of Sakhadas, their names had not been
mutated. Rather, they were claiming their legal heirship through

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Gunwant, who is a Class-II heir, whereas his wife, Geeta, who is a
Class-I heir, is available. Therefore, the names of Premlata and
Sumitra could not be mutated in the revenue records. The said order
dated 22.05.2024 passed by the Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, was
challenged by the respondent before the SDO (Revenue),
Rajnandgaon, which was allowed vide order dated 12.09.2024,
directing mutation of the name of Premlata in the revenue records
along with the wife of Gunwant, namely, Geeta. The petitioner
challenged the order passed by the SDO (Revenue), Rajnandgaon, by
filing a second appeal before the Commissioner, Durg Division, which
was also allowed vide order dated 12.02.2025, and the order passed
by the SDO (Revenue), Rajnandgaon, was set aside, holding that
Premlata and Sumitra had not claimed mutation of their names after
the death of Sakhadas and Ganga Devi and had only claimed mutation
of their names after the death of Gunwant. The order passed by the
Commissioner, Durg Division, dated 12.02.2025, was further
challenged by the respondent before the Board of Revenue, which
allowed the revision filed by the respondent on 10.09.2025 by setting
aside the orders passed by the Commissioner, Durg Division, and the
Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, and affirming the order passed by the SDO
(Revenue), Rajnandgaon, which is under challenge in the present writ
petition.
5. He would further submit that the respondents had not claimed mutation
of their names or any right over the subject property after the death of
Sakhadas and had claimed their rights only as legal heirs of Gunwant,
who was a Class-II heir as per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Since

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the wife of Gunwant is available, who is a Class-I heir, the names of
Premlata cannot be mutated in the revenue records.
6. He would further submit that the respondent, Premlata, had executed a
relinquishment deed in favour of Gunwant on 25.02.2021, therefore,
she is not entitled to seek mutation of her name in the revenue records.
Even otherwise, Ganga Devi died in the year 2004, and much prior to
her death, the original owner of the property, namely, Sakhadas, had
died. However, till 2024, the claimant, Premlata had not claimed her
rights or sought mutation of her name over the subject property, and by
her conduct, she had relinquished her rights in the property in favour of
Gunwant. Therefore, she is not entitled to seek mutation of her name in
the revenue records. The Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, and the
Commissioner, Durg Division, had rightly appreciated the entire facts
and circumstances of the case and rejected the claim of Premlata,
which the Board of Revenue has set aside. The order passed by the
Board of Revenue suffers from non-consideration of the material facts
produced by the petitioner before the subordinate revenue authorities,
and the Board has mechanically passed the order, which is liable to be
set aside.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
and submits that in the application filed by Premlata on 26.06.2024,
she specifically claimed that after the death of Sakhadas, her name
could not be mutated in the revenue records by suppressing the
material facts before the revenue authorities. It is not in dispute that
Premlata and Sumitra are the daughters of Sakhadas and Ganga Devi
and, upon the death of their father, their names should have been

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mutated in the revenue records along with the name of Ganga Devi.
However, by suppressing the material facts, their names were not
recorded in the revenue records. When they came to know about the
revenue records after the death of Gunwant, the respondent filed an
application stating therein that she is the legal heir of late Sakhadas
and that her name should have been mutated in the revenue records
along with the name of Gunwant. The Tehsildar, without considering
the contents of the application, rejected the same, whereas the SDO,
Revenue, Rajnandgaon, rightly considered the claim of the respondent.
The Board of Revenue has also rightly appreciated the order passed
by the SDO, Revenue, Rajnandgaon, and affirmed the same, holding
that Premlata is the legal heirs of late Sakhadas and is entitled to have
her name mutated in the revenue records as title holders of the suit
property along with Gunwant. Therefore, there is no illegality in the
order passed by the Board of Revenue, and the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed.
8. With regard to the alleged relinquishment deed dated 25.02.2021, he
would submit that the said relinquishment deed relates to a house
belonging to the parties but not to the agricultural land over which they
are claiming mutation of their names.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed with the petition.
10. From the arguments raised by the petitioner, it reveals that the
controversy revolves around the issue that the respondent is not
claiming mutation of her name along with the names of the LRs of
Sumitra on the basis of legal heirship of deceased Sakhadas, but is
claiming mutation on the basis of being the legal heir of Gunwant.

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Though the application filed by Premlata before the Tehsildar,
Rajnandgaon, dated 26.02.2024, has not been annexed with the
petition, the contents of the application filed by Premlata dated
26.02.2024 before the Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon, have been reiterated in
Para 2.1 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue dated
10.09.2025. From a perusal of the contents of the application, it
transpires that the respondent Premlata is claiming that after the death
of her father, Sakhadas, her name were not mutated in the revenue
records and only the name of Gunwant was recorded in the revenue
records, suppressing their legal heirship. When the application was
filed by Premlata before the Tehsildar, the wife of Gunwant, namely,
Geeta, raised an objection that after the death of Gunwant, she is the
sole legal heir and that her name alone could be mutated in the
revenue records, as Premlata and the LRs of Sumitra are not the legal
heirs of Gunwant.
11. The parties could not dispute that Premlata and Sumitra are also the
daughters of late Sakhadas and Ganga Devi and sisters of late
Gunwant. For the reasons best known to Ganga Devi and Gunwant,
the names of Premlata and Sumitra could not be mutated at the time
when Sakhadas died, and the names of Ganga Devi and Gunwant
were mutated in the revenue records. Since Premlata and Sumitra are
the legal heirs of late Sakhadas and Ganga Devi and have rights and
title over the subject property, they are entitled to have their names
mutated along with the names of Ganga Devi and Gunwant after the
death of Sakhadas.
12. From a perusal of the order passed by the Tehsildar, Rajnandgaon,
dated 22.05.2024, it appears that the application was rejected on the

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ground that Premlata and Sumitra are not the legal heirs of Gunwant,
whereas Premlata is claiming that she is the legal heirs of Sakhadas
and Ganga Devi and that, after his death, her name should have been
mutated in the revenue records. Thus, the order passed by the
Tehsildar appears to be erroneous in view of the facts stated in the
application and the findings recorded in the order itself. While
considering the issue raised by the respondent before the SDO,
Revenue, Rajnandgaon, the SDO elaborately considered the rights of
the parties and their legal heirship and, after considering that the name
of Premlata should also have been mutated in the revenue records
after the death of Sakhadas, allowed the appeal filed by Premlata and
directed mutation of her name in the revenue records.
13. The Commissioner, Durg Division, allowed the second appeal filed by
the petitioner on the ground that the mutation order passed in favour of
Ganga Devi and Gunwant had not been challenged and that the
respondent Premlata had claimed mutation of her name in the year
2024, which was highly belated. In the facts of the present case, this
does not appear to be justified, and the denial of the right of Premlata
and Sumitra to have their names mutated in the revenue records
cannot be upheld.
14. The Board of Revenue, after considering the legal heirship and the
facts of the case, held that Premlata, being one of the daughters of late
Sakhadas and Ganga Devi, is entitled to have her name mutated in the
revenue records and accordingly allowed the revision and directed
mutation of her name in the revenue records. The relinquishment deed,
as claimed by the petitioner, is dated 25.02.2021, i.e., with respect to
the house situated at Satnami Para, Ward No. 40, Kua Chowk,

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Rajnandgaon, whereas the respondent Premlata is claiming mutation
of her name in respect of the agricultural land bearing Khasra No.
1519/3, admeasuring 0.201 hectare, situated at Village Nandai, District
Rajnandgaon (C.G.). Even otherwise, the said relinquishment deed
was allegedly executed by Premlata on 25.02.2021, i.e., much after the
mutation of the names of Ganga Devi and Gunwant following the death
of Sakhadas.
15. In the case of Mukesh Kumar Agrawal vs. Munni Devi and Others ,
decided on 09.09.2025 in First Appeal No. 287 of 2017, the coordinate
Bench of this Court has considered the definition of fraud and its effect.
The fraud has been defined under Section 17 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, which reads as under:-
"17. 'Fraud' defined.-' Fraud' means and includes any of
the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or
with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to
deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce
him to enter into the contract:-
(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by
one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having
knowledge or belief of the fact;
(3) a promise made without any intention of performing
it;
(4) any other act fitted to deceive;
(5) any such act or omission as the law specially
declares to be fraudulent.
16. In Para 20 of Mukesh Kumar Agrawal (supra), it has been held that:
20. It is well settled position of law that fraud vitiates
everything. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan Vs. The State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors. and other connected cases [2025
INSC 884] has held as under:
“a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rajendra Singh [(2000) 3 SCC 581], this Court
reiterated that fraud unravels everything: 3. “Fraud
and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which

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has never lost its temper over all these centuries.
Lord Denning observed in a language without
equivocation that “no judgment of a court, no order
of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been
obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything”
(Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB
702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502
(CA)] ).
b. In Srisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros. [(1992)
1 SCC 534] , it was held:
20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most
solemn proceedings in any civilised system of
jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human
conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's
sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, ‘wing
me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into
snares’. It has been defined as an act of trickery or
deceit. In Webster's Third New International
Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an
act or omission to act or concealment by which
one person obtains an advantage against
conscience over another or which equity or public
policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In
Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an
intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with
some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender
a legal right; a false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed, which deceives
and is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury……..
c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007)
4 SCC 221 , this Court held:
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any
judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be
said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three
centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing
fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity
and non est in the eye of the law. Such a
judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by
the final court—has to be treated as nullity by
every court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal,
revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. *

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24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading
Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of
fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment
would be res judicata and not impeachable from
within, it might be impeachable from without. In
other words, though it is not permissible to show
that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown
that it was “misled”. There is an essential
distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear
implication of the distinction is that an action to set
aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground
that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on
the merits, the decision was one which should not
have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the
court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the
judgment.
25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell
together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or
fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et
dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus
Estates Ltd. (supra), which has since been quoted
with approval by this Court in a catena of decisions
including Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted
intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the
following words:
No court … will allow a person to keep an
advantage which he has obtained by fraud. […]
Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not
to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and
proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments,
contracts and all transactions whatsoever….
……
……
85. In Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab
[(2011) 12 SCC 588] this Court held that:
17. It is a settled legal proposition that where a
person gets an order/office by making
misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the
competent authority, such order cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law as fraud unravels
everything.
“Equity is always known to defend the law from
crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to
evade law.” It is trite that “fraud and justice never
dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant).
Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a
design to secure something, which is otherwise not
due. Fraud and deception are synonymous. “Fraud
is anathema to all equitable principles and any

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affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or
saved by the application of any equitable doctrine.”
An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously.
[Vide Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy [(2010) 8
SCC 383, para 34.]
18. However, the question does arise as to
whether it is permissible for a party to treat the
judgment and order as null and void without getting
it set aside from the competent court. The issue is
no more res integra and stands settled by a catena
of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such
an order, even if void, the party has to approach
the appropriate forum. [Vide State of Kerala v.
M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth
[ (1996 1 SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd.
[(1997) 3 SCC 443].
17.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that the
claim of respondent Premlata is not founded upon their succession to
the estate of the deceased Gunwant, but upon their independent status
as a daughter and legal heir of the original owner, late Sakhadas.
Admittedly, their relationship with late Sakhadas and Ganga Devi has
not been disputed by the petitioner. Consequently, the objection raised
by the petitioner on the basis that she is the Class-I legal heir of
Gunwant and that Premlata and Sumitra do not fall within the category
of Class-I heirs of Gunwant is misconceived. The entitlement of the
respondents to succeed to the property is required to be examined with
reference to the succession opening upon the death of the original
owner, Sakhadas, and not merely on the basis of the subsequent death
of Gunwant. The omission of their names in the earlier revenue entries
cannot, by itself, defeat their lawful claim, particularly when the
respondents have specifically asserted that their names were not
recorded despite their entitlement as legal heirs of Sakhadas. The
Board of Revenue has rightly considered the actual nature of the claim

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and found that the Tehsildar rejected the application by proceeding on
an erroneous understanding of the respondents' claim.
18. So far as the allegation of fraud, relinquishment of rights and delay in
approaching the revenue authorities is concerned, the petitioner has
not been able to demonstrate from the material available on record that
the relinquishment deed dated 25.02.2021 specifically covers the
agricultural land in question. On the contrary, the material indicates that
the said deed relates to a residential house situated at Satnami Para,
Rajnandgaon. Mere execution of such a document in respect of a
different property cannot be construed as relinquishment of rights in the
subject agricultural land. Further, the mere delay in seeking mutation or
omission of names from the revenue records would not, without more,
establish abandonment or relinquishment of substantive rights. The
principles regarding fraud, as noticed in Mukesh Kumar Agrawal
(supra), and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishnu
Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan (supra), do not advance the petitioner's
case in the absence of cogent material establishing fraud or deliberate
deception in the proceedings before the revenue authorities. The Board
of Revenue has considered the relevant factual and legal aspects and
has not committed any jurisdictional error or perversity warranting
interference in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India.
19. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed .
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Alok