Smt Darshna Sachdeva vs Union Of India And Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 09.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 17.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 17.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010583092022
+ LPA 522/2022
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010411922022
+ LPA 630/2022
SMT DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010412012022
+ LPA 631/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv..
versus
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 1 of 55
UNION OF INDIA & ORS & ORS. .....Respondent
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010412042022
+ LPA 632/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv..
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondent
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010472302022
+ LPA 718/2022
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010472322022
+ LPA 719/2022
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 2 of 55
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Advs. for
Review Petitioners.
Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010325642023
+ LPA 596/2023
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
along with Ms. Aditi Ladda and
Ms. Shreem Bajpai, Adv.
versus
VIKRAM HINGORANI AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
Mr. S. R. Mehta, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
REV. PET. 430/2026 and CM APPL. 63948/2026 [Stay] in LPA
522/2022
REV. PET. 429/2026 and CM APPL. 63947/2026 [Stay] in LPA
630/2022
REV. PET. 428/2026 and CM APPL. 63941/2026 [Stay] in LPA
631/2022
REV. PET. 450/2026 and CM APPL. 66356/2026 [Stay] in LPA
632/2022
REV. PET. 427/2026 and CM APPL. 63940/2026 [Stay] in LPA
718/2022
REV. PET. 426/2026 and CM APPL. 63939/2026 [Stay] in LPA
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PASRICHA
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719/2022
REV. PET. 328/2026 and CM APPL. 47206/2026 [Stay] in LPA
596/2023
1. The present batch comprises review petitions seeking review of
the common judgment dated 22.05.2026 passed by this Court in LPA
Nos. 522/2022, 630/2022, 631/2022, 632/2022, 718/2022, 719/2022
and 596/2023. By the aforesaid judgment, this Court allowed the
Letters Patent Appeals and set aside the orders passed by the learned
Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7452/2019, including the principal order
dated 27.01.2021 and the subsequent orders passed in the review and
connected proceedings.
2. The Review Petitioners were Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 in the
Letters Patent Appeals and had instituted W.P.(C) 7452/2019. The
principal ground urged in review is that this Court, while deciding the
appeals, proceeded on the premise that the order dated 06.02.2006
passed by the Land & Development Office (L&DO), cancelling the
lease and exercising the right of re-entry in respect of the subject
property, had neither been challenged nor set aside and continued to
subsist. According to the Review Petitioners, this finding overlooks
the order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C)
3182/2006, wherein it was recorded that the re-entry order stood
withdrawn.
3. The Review Petitioners contend that the aforesaid order dated
03.03.2006 had been specifically pleaded in W.P.(C) 7452/2019 and
had also been noticed by the learned Single Judge in the order dated
27.01.2021. It is, therefore, their case that the finding in the judgment
dated 22.05.2026 that the re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 remained
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PASRICHA
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unchallenged and continued to operate constitutes an error apparent on
the face of the record.
4. The Review Petitioners have also raised other grounds
concerning the interpretation of the original lease deed, the findings
returned in relation to misuse charges, the maintainability of LPA No.
596/2023, the alleged estoppel against the L&DO and the nature of
relief granted in the Letters Patent Appeals. Learned counsel
appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submit that the
review petitions seek reconsideration of the findings already returned
by this Court and are, in substance, an attempt to secure a rehearing of
the appeals.
SCOPE OF REVIEW:
5. Before examining the grounds urged, it is necessary to reiterate
the settled limitations governing the exercise of review jurisdiction.
The power of review is not an appellate power and cannot be
exercised merely because a party seeks reconsideration of the merits
of a decision or wishes to persuade the Court to adopt a different view.
An error apparent on the face of the record must be one which is self-
evident and does not require an elaborate process of reasoning to
establish.
1
6. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi , the Supreme Court explained
that an error which is not self-evident and requires a process of
reasoning cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the
record. The jurisdiction of review cannot be invoked as an appeal in
1
(1997) 8 SCC 715
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disguise.
2
7. Similarly, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India , the Supreme
Court reiterated that the power of review is intended to correct an
error or mistake and cannot be exercised to substitute one view for
another merely because a different view is possible.
8. The principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction
3
have also been reiterated in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and High
Court of Tripura through Registrar General v. Tirtha Sarathi
4
Mukherjee . The Court, while exercising review jurisdiction, is
required to identify whether an error apparent, warranting
interference, exists on the face of the record. It cannot undertake a
fresh examination of the entire controversy or reassess the merits as
though it were hearing an appeal.
9. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, the grounds urged by
the Review Petitioners are examined hereinafter.
GROUND I: ORDER DATED 03.03.2006 PASSED IN W.P.(C)
3182/2006:
10. The principal ground urged by the Review Petitioners concerns
the order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C)
3182/2006, instituted by the Bank claiming under the Tahilramani
parties. The Review Petitioners submit that the said proceedings
concerned the re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the L&DO in
respect of the subject property. They specifically rely upon the
following portion of the order dated 03.03.2006:
2
(2000) 6 SCC 224
3
(2013) 8 SCC 320
4
(2019) 16 SCC 663
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“Learned counsel for the Respondent correctly states that a hearing shall
be granted to the Petitioner in respect of Notice dated 19.12.2005.
Petitioner to appear before Mr. A. Bhattacharyya, Deputy Land and
Development Officer on 8.03.2006 at 11:00 A.M. The Officer shall
thereafter proceed at his convenience. Re-entry Order stands withdrawn.
Petition stands disposed of in these terms.”
11. It is the submission of the Review Petitioners that the aforesaid
order was specifically brought to the notice of this Court in the
proceedings arising out of W.P.(C) 7452/2019. They refer, in this
regard, to the averments made in their writ petition, particularly
paragraphs 3(xiv), 3(xv) and 3(xvi), wherein they had referred to the
order dated 06.02.2006, the subsequent proceedings instituted by the
Bank in W.P.(C) 3182/2006 and the order dated 03.03.2006 passed
therein. They further point out that the learned Single Judge, in
paragraph 7 of the order dated 27.01.2021, had taken note of the said
order and proceeded on the basis that the re-entry order stood
withdrawn.
12. The Review Petitioners accordingly contend that the finding
returned in paragraphs 45 onwards of the judgment dated 22.05.2026,
to the effect that the order dated 06.02.2006 had neither been
challenged nor set aside and had attained finality, overlooks a material
order forming part of the record. It is submitted that the subsequent
order dated 03.03.2006, which expressly records that the re-entry
order stood withdrawn, had a direct bearing on the question examined
by this Court in the appeals.
13. Having considered the aforesaid submission and perused the
order dated 03.03.2006, this Court finds that the said order is a
material part of the record which was required to be noticed while
considering the effect of the earlier order dated 06.02.2006 passed by
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the L&DO. It is not in dispute that, by the order dated 06.02.2006, the
L&DO had cancelled the lease and exercised the right of re-entry in
respect of the subject property. However, the subsequent order dated
03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006 expressly
records that the “Re-entry Order stands withdrawn”. The fact that such
an order had already been passed could not have been overlooked
while examining the submissions concerning the continued operation
of the re-entry order.
14. The judgment dated 22.05.2026 proceeded on the premise that
the order dated 06.02.2006 had neither been questioned nor set aside
and, consequently, continued to subsist and had attained finality.
However, the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, which records
withdrawal of the re-entry order, was not considered while arriving at
the aforesaid conclusion. The finding that the re-entry order continued
to operate, without taking note of the subsequent order passed by this
Court, therefore, cannot be sustained in its present form.
15. The submission advanced on behalf of the Delhi Government
that the order dated 06.02.2006 continued to operate as an
unwithdrawn order of re-entry cannot, in view of the subsequent order
dated 03.03.2006, be accepted in the manner in which it was urged.
The latter order expressly records that the re-entry order stood
withdrawn. The legal consequences of that order, however, raise
questions which cannot appropriately be determined in the present
proceedings.
16. In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not
examining whether the order dated 03.03.2006 is binding upon all
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PASRICHA
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persons claiming rights in the subject property or whether its operation
was confined to the proceedings instituted by the Bank in W.P.(C)
3182/2006. Equally, this Court is not examining the precise effect of
the said order upon the cancellation of the lease recorded in the order
dated 06.02.2006, or the rights and obligations of the respective
parties arising therefrom. The question as to the persons upon whom
the order dated 03.03.2006 operates, the extent of its binding effect
and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are not matters which
can be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings. This Court,
therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion thereon.
17. In view of the aforesaid position, the contention of the Delhi
Government founded upon the continued subsistence of the order
dated 06.02.2006, without accounting for the subsequent order dated
03.03.2006, is rejected. It shall, however, be open to the parties to
avail of such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with
law before the appropriate forum for determination of the questions
concerning the effect and operation of the aforesaid orders. No
opinion is being expressed by this Court on those questions.
18. The omission to notice the order dated 03.03.2006 has a direct
bearing upon the determination of Issue (ii) in the judgment dated
22.05.2026. In the circumstances, this Court does not consider it
appropriate to retain the findings recorded in paragraphs 44 to 60 of
the original judgment, which dealt with the question of maintainability
of the writ petition in the context of the order dated 06.02.2006 and
proceeded on the premise that the said order continued to subsist and
had attained finality. The said issue, as originally framed, shall
accordingly stand deleted and shall not be treated as having been
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PASRICHA
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adjudicated. Consequently, paragraph 1(ii), paragraphs 44 to 60 and
paragraph 79 of the original judgment dated 22.05.2026, together with
the observations in other paragraphs specifically identified in the
concluding portion of this order, shall stand deleted or modified to the
extent indicated therein.
19. It is made clear that this Court has not adjudicated whether the
lease stood restored, whether the cancellation of the lease recorded in
the order dated 06.02.2006 continues to have any legal effect, or
whether the order dated 03.03.2006 binds all persons claiming rights
in the subject property. The precise scope, operation and legal effect
of the order dated 03.03.2006, including its effect upon the earlier
order of the L&DO, are left open to be considered by the appropriate
forum in proceedings instituted by the parties in accordance with law.
The only correction made in the present review is that the findings in
the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the continued subsistence
and finality of the re-entry order could not have been recorded without
noticing the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006.
GROUND II: INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE DEED AND
THE EFFECT OF THE PARTITION DECREE:
20. The Review Petitioners have also questioned the findings
returned in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the effect of the
partition decree and the interpretation of Clause 1(viii) of the original
lease deed. Their principal submission is that the lease deed, which
they describe as a grant, does not prohibit sub-division beyond the
initial period of five years. They further contend that they had not
sought splitting of the tenancy or an alteration of the terms of the lease
so as to bind the L&DO. According to them, the issue of sub-division
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arose because the L&DO itself had taken the stand that the rights, title
and interest of the Tahilramanis had been suspended qua their portion
of the property on account of non-payment of Government dues.
21. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it is necessary to
notice the terms of the settlement which formed the basis of the decree
dated 24.04.2008 passed by the Civil Court. The said decree was
passed in terms of paragraph 5 of the application filed under Order
XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Paragraph 5(a) of
the said application reads as under:
“ (a) That the share of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in
the suit land on which the superstructure shall be as follows:
The Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 = 1/6 share
The Plaintiff Nos. 4 to 6 = 1/6 share
The Defendant No. 1 = 1/6 share
The Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 = ½ share”
22. The aforesaid terms of settlement are required to be read in the
context of the nature of the rights which were the subject matter of the
civil proceedings. The decree dated 24.04.2008 was passed in
proceedings between the parties to that suit. The Government, which
is the lessor under the lease deed, was not a party to those
proceedings. Consequently, the decree could regulate the rights and
obligations of the parties to the suit inter se, but could not, by itself,
compel the lessor to recognise a sub-division of the leasehold plot or
to alter the terms on which the property had been leased.
23. The Review Petitioners contend that Clause 1(viii) of the
original lease deed restricts the prohibition against sub-division to the
initial period of five years and that, in view of the provisions of the
Government Grants Act, 1895, the terms of the lease must prevail.
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They further seek to contend that they had not asked for splitting of
the tenancy, but had only sought recognition of the rights flowing
from the decree passed by the Civil Court. This submission, however,
does not advance their case. Even assuming that the lease deed does
not contain an absolute prohibition against sub-division throughout the
entire term of the lease, it does not follow that the lessees acquire an
unrestricted right to sub-divide the leasehold plot or that such sub-
division must be recognised by the lessor. Any sub-division of the
leasehold plot would necessarily require the permission of the lessor
or the competent Government authority. The allocation of specified
portions of the property under a decree passed between private parties,
to which the Government was not a party, cannot, by itself, create an
obligation upon the lessor to recognise such allocation as resulting in a
splitting of the tenancy or the creation of two independent or
unconnected leasehold rights. As already noticed in the judgment
under review, Clause 4.43 of the Master Plan for Delhi prohibits sub-
division of plots. The Review Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim
recognition of two separate leases merely on the basis of the terms of
the settlement recorded in the Civil Court decree or on the ground that
the restriction contained in Clause 1(viii) of the lease deed was
confined to the initial five years.
24. The Review Petitioners have, in the review petitions, also taken
a stand which is not consistent with their contention that the question
of sub-division did not arise in the writ proceedings. In Ground II(1)
of the review petition, they have stated as follows:
“1. That the Review Petitioners, in their Writ Petition, have not
sought the splitting of the tenancy as a consequence of the Final
Partition Decree nor sought to bind the L&DO to effect an alteration
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of the terms and conditions of the lease.
It was the L&DO who, in response to the Writ Petition seeking
mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the Hingoranis,
took the stand in its Counter Affidavit dated 24.12.2019 (Annexure
RP-7) that it had suspended the rights, title and interest of the
Tahilramanis qua their portion in the suit property for non-payment of
Government Dues claimed from them.
The Review Petitioners, who claim under a different and
independent title than the Tahilramanis, submitted that this was no
ground for rejecting their request for mutation/substitution of
leasehold rights in favour of the Hingoranis. Moreover, if the L&DO
had suspended the rights, title and interest of the Tahilramanis qua
their portion in the suit property, the L&DO ought to have taken
physical possession of such suspended share after physically
demarcating the same as per law. This led the L&DO to claim that
such step would indirectly lead to subdivision of the suit plot, to which
the Review Petitioners submitted that there is even otherwise no legal
impediment to do so since Clause 1 (viii) of the government lease deed
of 1956 (Annexure RP-8) itself confines the prohibition against sub-
division to only the first five years of the lease in terms thereof. It is
settled law that the Government lease is governed by the Government
Grants Act, 1895, and that the combined effect of Sections 2 and 3 of
the said Act is that the rights and obligations of the parties to such
lease would be completely regulated by the terms of the lease, and
would prevail over the Master Plan or any rule of law, statute or
enactment to the contrary (Reference may be made to M/S. Hajee
S.V.M. Mohamed Vs. The Government Of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1997 SC
1368).”
25. The aforesaid averments also demonstrate that the question of
sub-division was very much part of the controversy raised by the
Review Petitioners. Their attempt to distinguish between a division of
rights amongst co-lessees inter se and a splitting of the tenancy does
not alter the position that the relief of mutation sought by them was
founded upon the allocation of specified portions under the Civil
Court decree. Such allocation, by itself, could not compel the lessor to
recognise a sub-division of the leasehold plot in the absence of its
permission. The fact that the Review Petitioners may not have
expressly sought alteration of the terms of the lease does not answer
the question whether the lessor could be required to recognise the
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separate portions claimed by them.
26. The Review Petitioners have also relied upon the judgment of
the Supreme Court in M/S. Hajee S.V.M. Mohamed v. The
5
Government of Tamil Nadu . The said judgment has been carefully
considered. The observations relied upon by the Review Petitioners
were made in the context of rescission of a contract granting rights to
collect chank shells. The Supreme Court interpreted the expression
“ grant ” in its etymological sense and, while considering Section 2 of
the Government Grants Act, 1895, which excludes the application of
the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, held that the
lease in question could not be cancelled in the manner sought to be
done in that case. The controversy in the present case is entirely
different. The question here is not whether a grant can be cancelled
contrary to its terms, but whether the allocation of portions of a
leasehold property under a decree passed between private parties, to
which the lessor was not a party, must be recognised by the lessor as
effecting sub-division of the leasehold plot and resulting in the
creation of two independent lease deeds. The aforesaid decision,
therefore, does not advance the Review Petitioners‟ case on this
aspect.
27. The findings in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the
distinction between an arrangement governing possession and
enjoyment of portions of the superstructure inter se the co-lessees and
the creation of separate and independently enforceable leasehold
estates vis-à-vis the lessor are, thus, not shown to suffer from an error
5
AIR 1997 SC 1368
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apparent on the face of the record. The submissions now advanced
essentially seek a reconsideration of the interpretation of the lease
conditions, the effect of the Master Plan and the legal consequences of
the Civil Court decree. Such reconsideration is beyond the permissible
scope of review. The findings returned on Issue (i), subject to the
consequential deletion indicated hereinbelow in relation to the order
dated 06.02.2006, do not warrant modification or recall.
GROUND III: MISUSE CHARGES:
28. The Review Petitioners have next contended that the judgment
dated 22.05.2026 proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the
findings recorded by the learned Single Judge concerning misuse
charges. According to them, the learned Single Judge did not
adjudicate the inter se civil liability of the parties, but merely took
note of the stand of the L&DO that its claim for Government dues was
against the Tahilramani parties. Reliance has also been placed upon
the subsequent orders dated 16.12.2021 and 21.04.2022, as well as the
demand letter dated 07.09.2021 issued by the L&DO.
29. Learned counsel representing the Review Petitioners have also
contended that it was the L&DO which had decided to recover misuse
charges only from the Tahilramanis. In this regard, it may be observed
that it would not be appropriate for the Court to adjudicate the inter se
rights and liabilities between joint lessees. The question as to which of
the joint lessees is liable, and to what extent, for the alleged misuse of
the property and the consequential charges, would require
consideration of the relevant facts and the respective obligations of the
parties. The Court cannot, in writ proceedings, conclusively determine
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such inter se liability merely on the basis of the stand taken by the
lessor in its pleadings or the demands raised by it against one set of
lessees.
30. The judgment dated 22.05.2026 examined the nature of the
finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and held that a
categorical exclusion of the Review Petitioners from liability towards
misuse charges for the period prior to their obtaining possession
amounted to a determination which could not appropriately be
undertaken in writ proceedings, particularly in the absence of a full-
fledged examination of the relevant facts and contractual obligations.
The direction in this regard has, accordingly, been modified, leaving
the parties to avail of such remedies as may be available to them in
accordance with law. The respective rights and liabilities of the joint
lessees have not been adjudicated by this Court.
31. The Review Petitioners‟ reliance upon the demand raised by the
L&DO against the Tahilramanis, or upon the stand taken by the
L&DO in its counter-affidavit, does not alter the aforesaid position.
The fact that the lessor may have raised a demand against one or more
of the joint lessees does not, by itself, require the Court to determine
the inter se liability of all persons claiming under the lease. The
submissions now advanced seek a fresh appreciation of the effect of
the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the subsequent
conduct of the L&DO. Such an exercise is beyond the permissible
scope of review.
GROUND IV: MAINTAINABILITY OF LPA NO. 596/2023:
32. The Review Petitioners have also questioned the maintainability
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of LPA No. 596/2023 preferred by the L&DO. Their submission is
that the said appeal was directed against the order dated 11.04.2022
passed by the learned Single Judge in the review proceedings and that
no appeal could have been maintained against an order passed in
review. Reliance has been placed upon the decision in Government of
6
NCT of Delhi & Ors. v. Mool Chand Sharma .
33. The aforesaid submission, however, overlooks the fact that the
other joint lessees had independently preferred various Letters Patent
Appeals against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the
proceedings arising out of W.P.(C) 7452/2019. The common
controversy concerning the rights claimed under the lease deed, the
effect of the partition decree and the directions issued by the learned
Single Judge was, therefore, also the subject matter of those appeals.
Consequently, even if the objection of the Review Petitioners with
respect to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the Union of
India against the order passed in the review proceedings were to be
examined in isolation, the common judgment was nevertheless
required to adjudicate the issues arising in the other Letters Patent
Appeals preferred by the joint lessees. The objection, therefore, does
not disclose an error apparent warranting review of the common
judgment.
GROUND V: ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE L&DO:
34. The Review Petitioners have further urged that the L&DO was
topped from challenging the orders passed by the learned Single Judge
in view of the statements made on its behalf in the contempt
6
2013 (135) DRJ 705 (DB)
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PASRICHA
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REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 17 of 55
proceedings. They rely upon the orders dated 09.09.2021, 26.09.2022
and 27.03.2023, as well as the communication dated 23.06.2022, and
contend that the L&DO had represented that the lease deed would be
executed in terms of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge.
35. The aforesaid circumstances and the effect of the statements
and communications relied upon were part of the controversy arising
in the appeals. The findings in the judgment dated 22.05.2026
concerning the nature of the leasehold rights, the restrictions
governing the property and the effect of the orders passed by the
learned Single Judge cannot be reopened merely because the Review
Petitioners seek a different conclusion on the basis of the subsequent
conduct of the L&DO. The Review Petitioners have not demonstrated
that the consideration of this aspect in the judgment under review
suffers from an error which is self-evident and apparent on the face of
the record. No ground for review is, therefore, made out on this count.
GROUND VI: RELIEF BEYOND THE SCOPE OF LPA NO.
596/2023:
36. The Review Petitioners have also contended that the L&DO had
challenged only the order dated 11.04.2022 and had not sought setting
aside of the orders dated 27.01.2021 and 16.12.2021. According to
them, the common judgment dated 22.05.2026, by setting aside the
orders passed by the learned Single Judge in their entirety, granted
relief beyond the scope of the appeal preferred by the L&DO.
37. The aforesaid contention does not furnish a ground for review.
The common judgment was rendered in a batch of connected Letters
Patent Appeals, including appeals preferred by the joint lessees
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against the orders passed in W.P.(C) 7452/2019 and the subsequent
proceedings. The judgment considered the common controversy
arising from those orders and adjudicated the issues raised in the
connected appeals. The relief granted by the common judgment was
not confined to the challenge raised by the L&DO in LPA No.
596/2023, but was also in the context of the other appeals which were
heard and decided together. The Review Petitioners‟ contention,
therefore, does not disclose an error apparent on the face of the record.
38. Thus, save and except the error identified in relation to the order
dated 03.03.2006 passed in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, the other grounds
urged by the Review Petitioners do not satisfy the requirements for
exercise of review jurisdiction. The findings returned in the judgment
dated 22.05.2026 on the remaining issues, including the effect of the
partition decree and the limits of writ jurisdiction in adjudicating
disputes concerning misuse charges, do not warrant interference.
CONCLUSION:
39. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Review Petitions
deserve to be allowed to the limited extent indicated hereinabove. The
original judgment dated 22.05.2026 is accordingly reviewed to the
extent that the findings and conclusions recorded in paragraph 1(ii),
paragraphs 44 to 60 and paragraph 79 thereof, along with the
consequential observations identified in the succeeding paragraph,
stand deleted. The question originally framed as Issue (ii), concerning
the maintainability of a writ petition seeking mutation of leasehold
rights without first challenging the order of cancellation of the lease
and re-entry passed by the lessor, shall stand deleted and shall not be
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REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 19 of 55
treated as having been adjudicated.
40. The consequential observations in paragraph 43 of the original
judgment, insofar as it proceeds on the premise that the consequences
of the cancellation and re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 operated
uniformly upon all co-lessees, shall stand deleted. The observation in
paragraph 63 of the original judgment concerning the lessor‟s right to
recover dues before revoking cancellation, and the clarification
contained in paragraph 79 concerning revocation of cancellation upon
receipt of misuse charges, shall likewise stand deleted. The scope,
operation and legal effect of the order dated 03.03.2006 passed in
W.P.(C) 3182/2006, including the question of the persons upon whom
it operates and the extent to which it binds them, are expressly left
open to be determined by the appropriate forum in accordance with
law.
41. It is clarified that the findings returned in the judgment dated
22.05.2026 on the remaining issues, particularly those concerning the
effect of the partition decree and the limits of writ jurisdiction in
adjudicating inter se disputes relating to misuse charges, shall remain
undisturbed, subject to the modifications expressly set out herein. The
deletion of the findings concerning Issue (ii) and the observations
relating to the order dated 06.02.2006 shall not have the effect of
altering the ultimate decision rendered in the Letters Patent Appeals.
The ultimate result of the Letters Patent Appeals, as recorded in the
judgment dated 22.05.2026, shall accordingly remain unchanged.
42. Keeping in view the fact that various paragraphs of the
judgment dated 22.05.2026 are being deleted and consequential
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REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 20 of 55
modifications are being made, the modified and renumbered judgment
is annexed herewith as Annexure-A , which shall be read as an
integral part of this order. For the avoidance of doubt, the paragraph
references in this order to the judgment dated 22.05.2026 are
references to the original judgment, and Annexure-A reflects the
judgment as modified pursuant to the present review order.
43. The present Review Petitions are, accordingly, partly allowed in
the above terms. The pending applications also stand closed.
44. The aforesaid conclusion is confined to the nature of the
leasehold interest and the effect of the partition decree upon the rights
of the parties vis-à-vis the lessor. It does not involve, or amount to,
any determination of the legal effect of the order dated 06.02.2006
passed by the L&DO or the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006 passed
by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006. Those questions are left open.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 17, 2026
s.godara/pal
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PASRICHA
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REV.PET.430/2026 in LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 21 of 55
ANNEXURE –A
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 24.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 22.05.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 22.05.2026
Revised on: 17.11.2026
+ LPA 522/2022, CM APPL. 40048/2022, CM APPL.
48246/2022, CM APPL. 54265/2022, CM APPL. 26407/2023,
CM APPL. 71572/2025, CM APPL. 27359/2026
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. R-11.
+ LPA 630/2022, CM APPL. 47325/2022, CM APPL.
47326/2022, CM APPL. 63753/2023, CM APPL. 21036/2024,
CM APPL. 71573/2025 and CM APPL. 27330/2026
SMT DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 631/2022, CM APPL. 47341/2022 and CM APPL.
47342/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS & ORS. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Yukta Chauhan, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 632/2022, CM APPL. 47346/2022 and CM APPL.
47347/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Yukta Chauhan, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 718/2022, CM APPL. 54380/2022, CM APPL.
54381/2022 and CM APPL.54382/2022
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. for R-11.
+ LPA 719/2022, CM APPL. 54384/2022, CM APPL.
54385/2022, CM APPL.54386/2022, CM APPL. 63984/2023 &
CM APPL. 20844/2024
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. for R-11.
+ LPA 596/2023, CM APPL. 42896/2023, CM APPL.
42897/2023, CM APPL.42898/2023, CM APPL.42899/2023,
CM APPL. 43626/2023, CM APPL. 57663/2023, CM APPL.
65301/2023, CM APPL. 27361/2026
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra,
CGSC with Ms. Mrinmayee
Sahu, Mr. Tribhuvan, Mr.
Abhimanyu, Ms. Anushka
Sarraf, Advs.
versus
VIKRAM HINGORANI AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-1 to R-6.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-7
and 8.
Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. S.R. Mehta and Mr.
Naseem Ahmed, Advs. for R-
10.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. :
(Note:- This revised judgment is being released along with the order
passed in the Review Petitions.)
1. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals raises the following
issues for consideration:
i. Whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property,
passed without impleading the lessor, can result in splitting of
tenancy or otherwise bind the lessor so as to effect an alteration
of the terms and conditions of the lease?
ii. Whether disputes inter se between co-lessees, particularly
with regard to liability for payment of misuse charges, are
amenable to adjudication in exercise of writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
2. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals arises out of a
common set of facts and impugns a series of orders passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7452/2019, including the principal
Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, as also the subsequent review and
corrigendum orders dated 16.12.2021 and 21.04.2022.
3. The controversy, though arising out of a dispute relating to
mutation and leasehold rights in respect of an immovable property, in
substance raises significant questions concerning the nature and
incidents of leasehold estates, the permissibility and legal effect of
partition thereof without impleading Lessor as a party to the partition
proceedings, the scope and limitations of writ jurisdiction in matters
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involving contractual and public law elements, as well as the extent to
which inter se disputes between co-lessees can be examined in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
batch of Appeals, it would be necessary to briefly notice the relevant
facts leading to the present proceedings.
5. The dispute pertains to property bearing No. 13, Main Road,
West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, admeasuring approximately 800 square
yards [hereinafter referred to as the „subject property‟]. The said
property was originally allotted by the Union of India in favour of Shri
Ramchand B. Tahilramani, pursuant to which a lease deed dated
06.09.1956 came to be executed in his favour for a term of ninety-nine
years, subject to the terms and conditions contained therein.
6. It is not in dispute that the original lessee, Shri Ramchand B.
Tahilramani, subsequently transferred the leasehold rights in favour of
his wife, Smt. Sati Tahilramani, by way of a gift deed dated
27.07.1959. Thus, Smt. Sati Tahilramani came to be recorded as the
lessee in respect of the subject property under the terms of the original
lease.
7. Disputes thereafter arose with respect to rights in the subject
property, culminating in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974, wherein Shri
Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani asserted claims against Smt. Sati
Tahilramani. The said suit came to be decreed, declaring both Shri
Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani and Smt. Sati Tahilramani as co-
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lessees, each holding 50% undivided share in the subject property.
8. It is the case of the Hingorani family that, subsequent to the
aforesaid declaration, the Tahilramani side inducted a contractor in or
around the year 1988 for redevelopment of the subject property. The
contractor, in turn, is stated to have inducted various
occupants/tenants, including a banking institution, namely Laxmi
Vysya Bank (subsequently succeeded by Kotak Mahindra Bank).
9. However, significantly, during the subsistence of the aforesaid
disputes and prior to culmination of the proceedings, the Union of
India, acting through the Land & Development Office (L&DO),
passed an order dated 06.02.2006 cancelling the lease of the subject
property on account of alleged misuse and exercising the right of re-
entry.
10. The Hingoranis contend that the re-entry order dated
06.02.2006 stood withdrawn in view of the order dated 03.03.2006
passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, wherein it was recorded
that the re-entry order stood withdrawn.
11. Thereafter, disputes inter se between the co-lessees escalated,
leading to the institution of Civil Suit No. 364/2004 seeking partition
and rendition of accounts. The said suit culminated in a final decree of
partition dated 24.04.2008, which was passed on the basis of a
settlement between the parties.
12. A perusal of the said decree, read with the terms of the
settlement (Ex. C-1), indicates that the partition effected between the
parties does not result in a vertical subdivision of the plot into
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PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
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independent sub-plots, nor it can be characterised as a purely
horizontal division or floor-wise division. The arrangement envisaged
under the decree is one whereby specific portions of the existing
superstructure, including basement, different floors, individual flats,
and terrace rights, have been allocated to the respective parties, while
the land beneath continues to remain undivided and no independent
division of the plot itself is affected by metes and bounds. The decree
also preserves various common areas and creates mutual rights of
access, user, and enjoyment.
13. In that view, the partition is essentially in the nature of an inter
se arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different
portions of the superstructure, without effecting any physical or legal
subdivision of the plot itself. However, the settlement forming part of
the decree does contemplate that the parties may apply for mutation
and/or freehold conversion of their respective portions in their
individual names, and for execution of separate lease deeds in respect
thereof. Paragraph 5(i) of the application filed under Order XXIII Rule
3 of the CPC, which formed part of the decree, reads as under:-
“That each plaintiff/defendant 1 to 3 will be entitled to apply and
obtain from the competent authorities mutation and /or freehold
conversion in their individual names of their respective portions of
the suit property so partitioned by metes and bounds. There will be
no requirement of obtaining NOC from each other for such
purpose.”
14. It is also a matter of record that subsequent proceedings ensued
for enforcement of rights flowing from the partition decree, including
proceedings for possession. Ultimately, by order dated 15.01.2013, a
decree for possession came to be passed, which was carried in
challenge up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and attained finality. The
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occupants, including the successor of Laxmi Vysya Bank, were
directed to vacate the premises by December, 2018.
15. Following the passing of the final decree of partition and
conclusion of possession proceedings, applications came to be
submitted by the parties before the L&DO seeking
mutation/substitution of their respective names in the records of the
lessor. The said applications were, however, rejected by the L&DO
vide communication dated 03.05.2019, inter alia , on the ground that
the lease of the subject property already stood cancelled and the
property had been re-entered by the Government.
16. Aggrieved by the rejection of their request for mutation, the
Hingorani parties instituted W.P.(C) 7452/2019 before this Court,
seeking, inter alia , the following:
“(a) issue appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting
aside/quashing the Rejection Letter for Mutation No.
L&DO/PS3/62952/389 dated 03.05.2019 issued by Deputy Land &
Development Officer rejecting the mutation application of the
Petitioners in respect of their share in Property No. 13, Main Road,
West Patel Nagar, New Delhi;
(b) issue an appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting
aside/quashing the Mutation-cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-
III/195 dated 02.02.2005 pertaining the lease hold rights in respect of
Property No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in the
names of the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4;
(c) issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1 to 2 to
mutate/substitute such lease hold rights in respect of Property No. 13,
Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in favour of the Petitioners
in terms of the final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008 with Exhibit
C 1 passed by the Court of Shri NK Sharma, A.D.J., Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi in Suit No. 364/2004;
(d) issue a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Respondent Nos. 3 and
4 and all persons claiming under them from acting on the Mutation-
cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-III/195 dated 02.02.2005;
(e) issue a Direction to the Respondent No. 5 to pay the misuse or
other charges for breach of lease deed terms, if any, levied by the
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PASRICHA
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Respondent No. 1 and 2;
(f) award costs of this Petition to the Petitioners; and”
17. The writ petition, as framed, was thus directed not only against
the rejection of the request for mutation vide communication dated
03.05.2019, but also sought to question the earlier
mutation/substitution effected in favour of certain co-lessees, while
simultaneously seeking a positive direction for mutation of the writ
petitioners‟ names in terms of the final decree of partition dated
24.04.2008.
18. The learned Single Judge, vide principal Impugned Order dated
27.01.2021, proceeded to dispose of the writ petition by granting, inter
alia , the following reliefs:
i. The writ petitioners were held entitled to seek
mutation/substitution of their names in respect of their share in
the subject property in terms of the partition decree;
ii. It was observed that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis
Family) could seek conversion of their share of the property from
leasehold to freehold without requiring any No Objection
Certificate from the other co-lessees;
iii. It was further observed that the writ petitioners
(Hingoranis) could deal with or alienate their respective shares in
the property;
iv. Significantly, it was also held that the writ petitioners,
having been put in possession only on 08.12.2018, could not be
saddled with liability towards misuse charges for any prior
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period.
19. The aforesaid findings, particularly those relating to (i)
permissibility of dealing with the property as if independently held,
and (ii) exclusion of liability towards misuse charges, form the core of
the present controversy.
20. Subsequent to the passing of the principal Impugned Order,
further proceedings were initiated by the parties, including review
petitions as well as proceedings in contempt. The record reveals that,
in the course of such proceedings, certain statements were made on
behalf of the L&DO indicating that steps would be taken for execution
of lease deeds.
21. The matter was thereafter considered by the learned Single
Judge in Review Petition No. 209/2021 and connected proceedings,
which came to be disposed of by order dated 14.12.2021, followed by
a corrigendum dated 16.12.2021 [hereinafter collectively referred to as
the „second set of Impugned Orders‟]. A perusal of the said orders
indicates that the learned Single Judge, while declining to interfere
with the operative directions contained in the principal Impugned
Order dated 27.01.2021, proceeded to clarify and, in certain respects,
reinforce the scope and effect thereof. The following clarifications
were issued:
i. The observations in the principal Impugned Order dated
27.01.2021 do not amount to an approval of the levy, quantum,
or recoverability of misuse charges by the L&DO, which was left
at liberty to proceed in accordance with law;
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PASRICHA
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ii. Any disputes between Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the
L&DO would not operate as an impediment to
mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the writ
petitioners;
iii. There existed no impediment to execution of lease
documentation in favour of the writ petitioners (Hingoranis) in
terms of the earlier directions; and
iv. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were left at liberty to avail of
appropriate remedies in accordance with law in respect of their
disputes with the L&DO.
22. Thereafter, further proceedings ensued at the instance of the
L&DO and other parties seeking modification/clarification of the
earlier orders. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 11.04.2022
in Review Petition Nos. 49/2022 and 66/2022, followed by a
corrigendum dated 21.04.2022 [hereinafter referred to as the „third set
of Impugned Orders‟], issued the following directions:
i. The Court took note of the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 (as corrected on 07.09.2021), whereby the L&DO
had already recorded mutation of the property in favour of the
parties as joint holders of undivided shares, on the terms of the
original lease deed dated 06.09.1956;
ii. The said memorandum specifically stipulated that sub-
division of the property would not be permitted at any stage;
iii. Notwithstanding the above, the Court held that there was
no impediment to execution of the lease deed, provided that the
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PASRICHA
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lease expressly reflects that the parties hold undivided shares in
the property;
iv. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the L&DO to
execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioners and other co-
lessees in terms of the said memorandum, within a stipulated
time;
v. It was further clarified that inter se disputes between the
co-lessees, including with Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, were outside
the scope of the writ proceedings.
23. All these three sets of orders, namely, (i) the principal
Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, (ii) the review and corrigendum
Orders dated 16.12.2021, and (iii) the review and corrigendum Orders
culminating on 21.04.2022, are the subject matter of challenge in the
present batch of Letters Patent Appeals.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
24. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties
have advanced elaborate submissions both assailing and supporting
the Impugned Orders passed by the learned Single Judge. For the sake
of convenience, the array of parties as reflected in LPA 522/2022 is
being followed.
25. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants (Tahilramani side)
25.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants assailed
the Impugned Orders on multiple grounds, both on maintainability as
well as on merits. At the outset, it was submitted that the learned
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Single Judge erred in granting substantive reliefs in a writ petition
which, in essence, arose out of a purely contractual relationship of
lease governed by the terms of the lease deed read with the provisions
of the Government Grants Act, 1895. It was contended that rights
flowing from such lease could not have been altered or expanded in
exercise of writ jurisdiction.
25.2 It was submitted that the lease in respect of the subject property
stood validly cancelled by the competent authority vide order dated
06.02.2006 on account of alleged misuse, and the right of re-entry had
been duly exercised by the lessor. In the absence of any challenge to
the said order, it was contended that no subsisting leasehold rights
survived in favour of any party, and consequently, no direction for
mutation or substitution could have been issued in respect of a lease
that had already been determined.
25.3 Elaborating on the issue of maintainability, it was submitted
that the writ petition was fundamentally defective, inasmuch as it
sought consequential reliefs without first assailing the primary order
of cancellation. It was urged that the writ petitioners could not have
bypassed the order dated 06.02.2006 and proceeded on the premise
that mutation could be directed notwithstanding the extinguishment of
leasehold rights. In this regard, it was submitted that any relief
flowing from the alleged partition decree could not be enforced in the
absence of revival or restoration of the lease.
25.4 It was further contended that a decree for partition between co-
lessees cannot result in splitting of tenancy or creation of independent
leasehold estates. It was submitted that the lessor was not a party to
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the partition proceedings, and therefore, the decree could operate only
inter se the parties and could not bind the Union of India. It was
emphasized that the terms of the original lease govern the relationship
between the lessor and lessees, and any arrangement between co-
lessees cannot override or modify those terms.
25.5 It was also argued that the learned Single Judge erred in
observing that the writ petitioners could deal with, alienate, or
otherwise transact with their respective shares independently.
According to the Appellants, such findings effectively recognize
severable and independent rights in a leasehold property, which is
impermissible in the absence of express consent of the lessor. It was
submitted that the leasehold interest remained joint and indivisible vis-
à-vis the lessor, and could not be treated as partitioned for the
purposes of alienation or conversion.
25.6 On the aspect of misuse charges, it was submitted that the
liability arises out of breach of lease conditions and attaches to the
lessee as well as to the property. It was contended that the learned
Single Judge erred in excluding Respondents No. 5 to 10 from liability
towards misuse charges, particularly when such determination
involves disputed questions of fact and inter se rights between co-
lessees. It was argued that such disputes are not amenable to
adjudication in writ jurisdiction and ought to have been relegated to
appropriate civil proceedings.
25.7 It was further submitted that the directions issued in the review
proceedings, particularly those relating to execution of lease deeds, go
beyond the scope of the original writ petition and amount to granting
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substantive reliefs in review jurisdiction. It was contended that the
power of review is limited and cannot be exercised to enlarge the
scope of the original order or to grant fresh reliefs which were neither
sought nor considered at the initial stage.
25.8 It was also urged that reliance placed on the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 and the corrigendum dated 07.09.2021 is misplaced,
inasmuch as the said documents cannot override the original lease
conditions or the effect of cancellation. It was submitted that the
learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that administrative
communications cannot confer substantive rights contrary to the
governing legal framework.
25.9 It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate the fundamental distinction between mutation and
execution of a lease deed. Mutation, it was urged, is a ministerial act
intended to record or recognize pre-existing rights in the revenue or
administrative records, whereas execution of a lease deed creates or
reconstitutes contractual rights and obligations between the lessor and
the lessee. It was contended that the directions contained in the
principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021 stood fully complied with
upon issuance of the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 (as corrected on
07.09.2021), whereby mutation/substitution was duly effected.
Consequently, the subsequent direction compelling execution of lease
deeds amounts to grant of a fresh and substantive relief, wholly dehors
the pleadings and beyond the scope of the writ proceedings.
25.10 It was also contended that at no stage in the writ petition had the
writ petitioners sought execution of any lease deed or creation of fresh
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leasehold rights. The reliefs claimed were confined to
mutation/substitution in terms of the partition decree. In such
circumstances, the directions issued in the review and contempt
proceedings travel far beyond the pleadings and effectively rewrite the
scope of the original writ petition by introducing a relief which was
never sought.
25.11 It was further submitted that the directions for execution of
separate lease deeds are, in effect, contrary to the prohibition on
subdivision of plots under the applicable planning norms and lease
conditions. Reliance was placed on the relevant provisions of the
Master Plan for Delhi, 2021, as well as the applicable municipal
policies, which prohibit subdivision of plots in such categories of
properties. It was urged that execution of separate lease deeds in
favour of different parties would, in substance, amount to recognition
of subdivision, which is impermissible in law and contrary to the
express stipulation that the property must remain undivided.
25.12 Learned counsel further submitted that the statement recorded
on 09.09.2021 in the contempt proceedings, to the effect that a lease
deed would be executed, was made without proper instructions and
under a mistaken understanding of the legal position. It was contended
that an inadvertent or erroneous concession by counsel cannot create
enforceable rights, particularly where such concession runs contrary to
the governing legal framework and the scope of the original judgment.
26. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 5-10 (Hingorani
side)
26.1 Per contra , learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
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Respondents No. 5 to 10, supported the Impugned Orders and
submitted that the same do not warrant interference in appellate
jurisdiction.
26.2 It was submitted that the title of Respondents No. 5 to 10 to
50% share in the subject property stands conclusively established and
has attained finality up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. It was pointed
out that the decree in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974 declared equal
ownership of the property, which position was subsequently affirmed
in appellate proceedings. The final decree of partition dated
24.04.2008 further crystallized the respective rights of the parties. It
was emphasized that the Respondents were put in actual physical
possession of their share only on 08.12.2018, pursuant to orders
passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
26.3 It was further submitted that Respondents No. 5 to 10 derive
title through a distinct and independent line of succession tracing back
to Shri H.B. Hingorani, and are not claiming through the Appellants.
It was argued that the rights of the Respondents cannot be prejudiced
by any alleged acts of misuse or breach attributable to the Appellants
or their predecessors.
26.4 On the issue of mutation, it was contended that mutation is a
ministerial act intended to reflect existing rights, and once the civil
court decree has attained finality, the L&DO was ought to give effect
to the same. It was submitted that the rejection of mutation by the
L&DO was arbitrary, particularly when the Respondents‟ title and
entitlement stood conclusively determined by a competent court.
26.5 With regard to the order of cancellation dated 06.02.2006, it
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was contended that the said order was issued only against the
Appellants and cannot operate to the prejudice of Respondents No. 5
to 10, particularly when the L&DO itself has confined its claim for
dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended that the Respondents‟
rights were never extinguished. It was further submitted that the
failure of the L&DO to take physical possession of the property
pursuant to re-entry is contrary to its own policy framework and
established legal position. It was argued that mere issuance of a re-
entry order without taking actual possession ought not to be used to
defeat the rights of lawful co-owners, and that the re-entry, in the
absence of actual resumption of possession, cannot defeat accrued
rights.
26.6 On the issue of misuse charges, it was submitted that
Respondents No. 5 to 10 cannot be held liable for any alleged misuse
for the period prior to 08.12.2018, when they were not in possession
of the property. It was emphasized that the misuse, if any, was
attributable exclusively to the Appellants and their inductees. It was
further pointed out that the L&DO itself, in its affidavit, confined its
claim for Government dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended
that no breach of lease conditions is attributable to the Respondents,
and that disputes relating to Government dues are essentially inter se
between the Appellants and the L&DO, falling outside the scope of
the present writ proceedings.
26.7 Learned Senior Counsel also supported the direction for
execution of lease deeds, submitting that the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 itself recognizes the parties as co-holders of undivided
shares. It was contended that execution of lease deeds reflecting
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undivided shares does not amount to subdivision of the property, and
therefore, the objection raised on the basis of planning norms is
misconceived.
26.8 It was further submitted that the rights of the parties are
governed by the terms of the original lease read with the Government
Grants Act, 1895, and any execution of lease deeds would necessarily
be subject to such terms. It was argued that there is no legal
impediment in recognizing co-lessees holding undivided shares under
a common lease; and that the continued refusal to effect substitution of
leasehold rights or permit dealing with the property has resulted in an
unreasonable restriction on the Respondents‟ right to enjoy their
property, thereby infringing Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
26.9 Learned Senior Counsel also raised preliminary objections as to
the maintainability of the Appeals, contending that certain Appeals are
barred by limitation and that no Appeal lies against an order
dismissing a review petition. It was further submitted that the
Appellants cannot be permitted to widen the scope of the original
proceedings by raising disputes which were never the subject matter
of the writ petition.
27. Submissions on behalf of Union of India / L& DO
27.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India and
the L&DO submitted that the rights of the parties are governed by the
terms of the lease and applicable policy framework. It was reiterated
that the lease stood cancelled vide order dated 06.02.2006 on account
of misuse, and that any further action would necessarily be subject to
clearance of outstanding dues and compliance with applicable
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conditions
27.2 It was submitted that, pursuant to the directions of this Court,
the L&DO issued the memorandum dated 24.08.2021, as corrected on
07.09.2021, recording mutation in favour of the parties as holders of
undivided shares. It was submitted that the said action was taken in
compliance with the directions of the Court.
27.3 However, it was contended that certain practical and legal
difficulties arise in relation to execution of separate lease deeds,
particularly in view of restrictions on subdivision of the property
under applicable norms. It was submitted that execution of multiple
lease deeds may be construed as recognition of subdivision, which is
not permissible.
27.4 It was further submitted that any observations or statements
recorded in prior proceedings, including contempt proceedings, cannot
be construed as binding admissions where the same were made
without proper instructions and were subsequently sought to be
recalled. It was emphasized that under the terms of the lease deed and
applicable municipal norms, subdivision of the property is
impermissible, and execution of separate lease deeds would amount to
recognizing such subdivision, which is legally untenable.
27.5 It was also contended that the impugned directions, particularly
those issued in review proceedings, effectively mandate a
restructuring of the leasehold arrangement contrary to the original
terms of the grant. At the same time, learned counsel fairly submitted
that the L&DO would abide by the directions issued by this Court and
take appropriate steps in accordance with law, subject to resolution of
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outstanding issues including recovery of dues.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
28. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced
on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.
Issue (i): Effect of Partition of Leasehold Property by the Civil Court
without Impleading the Lessor
29. The first and foremost issue that arises for consideration is
whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property, passed in
proceedings inter se between co-lessees where the lessor is not a
party, can result in a legal severance of the tenancy so as to create
independent and separately enforceable leasehold estates vis-à-vis the
lessor.
30. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the nature of a
leasehold interest created by the Government. A lease granted by the
Union of India is not merely a transfer of a limited interest in
immovable property, but is in the nature of a Government grant, the
terms whereof are governed primarily by the grant itself. In this
context, the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 assume
significance, particularly in view of Sections 2 and 3 thereof, which
mandate that the terms of the grant shall take effect according to their
tenor, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other
law.
31. The legal consequence of the aforesaid position is that the rights
and obligations of the lessee, as also the incidents of the leasehold
estate, must be gathered strictly from the terms of the lease deed. The
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relationship between the lessor and lessee is thus regulated not merely
by general principles of property law, but primarily by the stipulations
embodied in the Government grant.
32. At this stage, it becomes necessary to advert to the relevant
clauses of the lease deed governing the subject property. Clause 1(vi)
expressly prohibits construction of more than one building on the plot,
except outhouses and servant quarters. Similarly, Clause 1(vii)
mandates that the premises shall not be used for any purpose other
than that of a residential house, except with the express permission of
the competent authority. The relevant Clauses read as under-
“(vi) not to erect more than one building upon the said land and
except such outhouses and servants’ quarters as may be approved by
an officer appointed by the lessor in this behalf;
(vii) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected
thereon during the said term for any other purpose other than the
purpose of constructing a house without the previous consent in
writing of an officer appointed by the Lessor in this behalf; provided
that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose
other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose
subsequently approved by the said officer;”
These stipulations clearly indicate that the lease contemplates the
property as a single, indivisible residential unit, and not as a property
capable of fragmentation into independent units.
33. The above position stands reinforced by the planning regime
applicable to the property. Clause 4.4.3 of the Master Plan for Delhi,
2021, provides that subdivision of residential plots is not permissible.
The relevant stipulation reads as under:
“Master plan Delhi 2021 master plan for Delhi
Vide clause 4.4.3: Control for building/buildings within residential
premises
A. residential plot - plotted housing
Terms and conditions: vide condition number (iv):Subdivision of
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plots is not permitted...”
34. A conjoint reading of the lease conditions and the Master Plan
leaves no manner of doubt that subdivision of the plot into separate
and independent units is impermissible, unless permitted by the lessor,
namely, the concerned Government.
35. At this stage, it also becomes necessary to examine the concept
of subdivision of a leasehold plot in the context of the present
controversy. A distinction must be maintained between an inter se
arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different portions
of the superstructure, and a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate
itself. The former may regulate enjoyment amongst co-lessees,
whereas the latter would entail recognition of separate and
independently enforceable rights in distinct portions of the plot vis-à-
vis the lessor.
36. A perusal of the partition decree dated 24.04.2008 and the
settlement forming part thereof indicates that the arrangement between
the parties is confined to allocation of portions of the existing
superstructure and allied rights of enjoyment. The land underneath
continues to remain undivided and the parties continue to hold
undivided interests therein. The decree, therefore, does not effectuate
a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate.
37. It is true that the learned Single Judge has not expressly directed
subdivision of the subject property. However, the effect of the
directions permitting execution of separate lease documentation and
independent dealing with the respective portions would, in substance,
amount to recognition of severable and independently enforceable
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leasehold interests. Such a consequence would run contrary to the
terms of the original lease as well as the planning norms governing the
property, both of which proceed on the basis that the plot constitutes a
single indivisible unit.
38. The partition decree dated 24.04.2008 must, therefore, be
understood as an arrangement governing inter se possession and
enjoyment between the parties. Any delineation of portions for use
and occupation thereunder cannot be construed as creating
independent leasehold estates enforceable against the lessor.
39. It is well settled that a lease, particularly one granted by the
Government, is indivisible in nature, unless the terms of the grant
permit fragmentation with the permission of the lessor, which
permission can be granted only in accordance with the Master Plan,
the applicable Town Planning Scheme or the rules governing urban
planning in the area. The original lease in the present case was created
in favour of a single lessee. By virtue of judicial determination, the
parties came to be recognised as co-lessees; however, such recognition
does not alter the fundamental nature of the tenancy.
40. The status of the parties, therefore, is that of co-lessees under a
single indivisible lease, and not that of independent lessees holding
separate tenancies. The principle that splitting of tenancy is
impermissible without the consent of the lessor is well established and
admits of no exception in the facts of the present case. The partition
decree, admittedly passed in proceedings to which the lessor was not a
party, cannot bind the lessor or compel it to recognize multiple
tenancies. It operates only inter se the parties and remains subject to
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the overarching terms of the lease. The co-lessees, by any arrangement
inter se , cannot compel the lessor to recognise a fragmented tenancy
or impose altered obligations upon it
41. In the aforesaid backdrop, the directions issued by the learned
Single Judge permitting the writ petitioners to seek execution of lease
documentation in respect of their respective portions, and to
independently deal with or transact in relation thereto, cannot be
sustained. Though the Impugned Orders do not expressly direct
subdivision of the plot, the effect of the directions issued therein
would be to recognise separate and independently enforceable
leasehold interests in distinct portions of the property. Such
recognition would, in substance, operate as a fragmentation of the
original leasehold estate, which is contrary to the applicable planning
norms. It is well settled that a decree for partition operates only inter
se the parties to the proceedings and cannot enlarge, alter, or bind the
rights of the lessor, who was not a party thereto. Consequently, while
the partition decree may regulate possession and enjoyment between
the co-lessees, it cannot compel the lessor to recognise separate
leasehold estates or independent tenancies in respect of portions of the
leased property.
42. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
directions issued by the learned Single Judge proceed on a legal
assumption inconsistent with the indivisible nature of the leasehold
estate, in the absence of permission from the lessor, and could not
have resulted in the creation of independent rights enforceable against
the lessor.
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43. Accordingly, it is held that the partition decree does not result in
splitting of tenancy, nor does it bind the lessor to recognize separate
leasehold estates. The lease, as originally granted, remains a single
and indivisible grant. Consequently, rights flowing under such a
common lease cannot be asserted in a fragmented or independent
manner by one or more co-lessees to the exclusion of others.
Issue (ii): Scope of Writ Jurisdiction in Inter Se Disputes and Liability
Towards Misuse Charges
44. The second issue pertains to the permissible limits of the writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the
context of disputes arising inter se between co-lessees and the
determination of liability towards misuse charges levied by the lessor.
This issue assumes significance in light of the findings returned by the
learned Single Judge, whereby not only were certain rights recognised
in favour of the writ petitioners, but it was also held that they could
not be held liable for misuse charges for the period prior to their
obtaining possession.
45. At the outset, it must be noted that the writ jurisdiction is
primarily designed to enforce public law rights and to ensure that
statutory and constitutional authorities act within the bounds of law.
While the jurisdiction is wide and flexible, it is equally well settled
that it is not intended to serve as a forum for adjudication of purely
private disputes, particularly those requiring detailed examination of
disputed questions of fact or enforcement of contractual obligations
inter se private parties.
46. In the present case, the controversy relating to liability to
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deposit misuse charges amongst the co-lessees arises from alleged
breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease deed, which is a
contractual arrangement governed, in the case of government grants,
by the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895. The
determination of liability for such charges would ordinarily depend
upon a range of factors, including the nature of the breach, the identity
of the party responsible for such breach, the period during which such
misuse occurred, and the contractual stipulations governing the
consequences of such breach.
47. The Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 have contended that they cannot
be saddled with liability towards misuse charges, as they were neither
in possession of the property during the period of alleged misuse nor
responsible for the acts leading to such misuse. On the other hand, the
Appellants contend that the liability, if any, cannot be apportioned in
the manner suggested and that the issue involves complex questions
relating to the rights and obligations of the parties under the lease.
48. In the considered view of this Court, such a dispute, which
essentially concerns the allocation of liability arising out of alleged
contractual breaches and involves competing claims between co-
lessees, squarely falls within the realm of private law. The
adjudication of such disputes would necessarily require examination
of evidence, determination of factual responsibility, and interpretation
of contractual obligations; functions that are not ordinarily undertaken
in proceedings under Article 226.
49. The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to record a
categorical finding to the effect that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis-
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private respondents herein) could not be held liable for misuse charges
for the period prior to 08.12.2018, i.e., the date on which they were
put in possession of the property. While the reasoning appears to be
founded on considerations of equity, the question that arises is
whether such a determination was within the permissible scope of writ
jurisdiction.
50. It is well settled that even where a public authority is involved,
the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, ordinarily refrains
from adjudicating disputes that are essentially contractual in nature,
unless the action of the authority is shown to be arbitrary,
unreasonable, or in violation of statutory provisions. The writ court
does not sit as a court of plenary jurisdiction to decide all disputes that
may have some nexus with a public authority.
51. In the present case, the liability towards misuse charges is
intrinsically linked to the terms of the lease and the conduct of the
parties. The L&DO, as the lessor, is entitled to determine the liability
for such charges in accordance with the lease conditions and
applicable policies. Any dispute with regard to such determination,
including the question as to who is liable to pay such charges, would
ordinarily be amenable to challenge in appropriate proceedings where
evidence can be led after framing of the issues arising between the
parties.
52. Furthermore, the dispute between the Appellants and
Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 regarding apportionment or exclusion of
liability is clearly an inter se dispute between co-lessees or persons
claiming under them. The writ court, in such circumstances, ought to
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exercise restraint and leave the parties to avail of appropriate remedies
in civil proceedings, rather than rendering conclusive findings that
may prejudice the rights of parties without a full-fledged trial.
53. It is also relevant to note that the L&DO itself, as per the
record, issued a demand letter dated 07.09.2021 quantifying the dues
payable by the Appellants. The determination of liability by the lessor,
and any challenge thereto, would have to be examined in the context
of the relevant contractual and statutory framework. The writ court
could not have pre-emptively adjudicated upon such liability,
particularly in the absence of a direct challenge to the demand or a
comprehensive examination of the underlying facts.
54. The observations of the learned Single Judge, to the effect that
the writ petitioners cannot be made liable for misuse charges for the
prior period, effectively amount to a determination of civil liability
between the private parties. Such a determination, in the absence of a
proper evidentiary foundation and outside the framework of an
appropriate proceeding, cannot be sustained.
55. The effect of the findings returned by the learned Single Judge
is that the liability towards misuse charges for the prior period stands
confined to the Tahilramani parties. Such a determination, which
directly adjudicates liability between co-lessees, travels beyond the
permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.
56. Accordingly, Issue (ii) is answered by holding that the
adjudication of inter se disputes between co-lessees who are private
parties, including determination of liability towards misuse charges,
falls outside the limited scope of writ jurisdiction and must be left to
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be decided in appropriate civil or other competent proceedings.
57. The submission advanced on behalf of the Delhi Government
that the order dated 06.02.2006 continues to subsist and operate,
notwithstanding the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this
Court, cannot be accepted in the manner in which it has been urged.
The operative part of the order dated 03.03.2006 reads as under:-
“Learned counsel for the Respondent correctly states that a hearing
shall be granted to the Petitioner in respect of Notice dated
19.12.2005. Petitioner to appear before Mr. A. Bhattacharyya,
Deputy Land and Development Officer on 8.03.2006 at 11:00 A.M.
The Officer shall thereafter proceed at his convenience. Re-entry
Order stands withdrawn. Petition stands disposed of in these terms.”
It is evident that the order dated 03.03.2006 expressly records that the
re-entry order stood withdrawn. The legal consequences of that order,
however, raise questions which cannot appropriately be determined in
the present proceedings.
58. In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not
examining whether the order dated 03.03.2006 is binding upon all
persons claiming rights in the subject property or whether its operation
was confined to the proceedings instituted by the Bank in W.P.(C)
3182/2006. Equally, this Court is not examining the precise effect of
the said order upon the cancellation of the lease recorded in the order
dated 06.02.2006, or the rights and obligations of the respective
parties arising therefrom. The question as to the persons upon whom
the order dated 03.03.2006 operates, the extent of its binding effect
and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are not matters which
can be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings. This Court,
therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion thereon.
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59. In view of the aforesaid position, the contention of the Delhi
Government founded upon the continued subsistence of the order
dated 06.02.2006, without accounting for the subsequent order dated
03.03.2006, is rejected. It shall, however, be open to the parties to
avail of such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with
law before the appropriate forum for determination of the questions
concerning the effect and operation of the aforesaid orders. No
opinion is being expressed by this Court on those questions.
60. Equally, the further observations permitting the writ petitioners
to deal with, alienate, or otherwise transact with their respective shares
as if they held independent and severable interests, also trench upon
areas that are closely intertwined with the nature of the leasehold
rights and the contractual obligations governing the property. As
already noted while dealing with Issue (i), such matters cannot be
decided in isolation from the terms of the lease and the rights of the
lessor.
61. The Petitioners contend that Clause 1(viii) of the original lease
deed restricts the prohibition against sub-division to the initial period
of five years and that, in view of the provisions of the Government
Grants Act, 1895, the terms of the lease must prevail. They further
seek to contend that they had not asked for splitting of the tenancy, but
had only sought recognition of the rights flowing from the decree
passed by the Civil Court. This submission, however, does not
advance their case. Even assuming that the lease deed does not contain
an absolute prohibition against sub-division throughout the entire term
of the lease, it does not follow that the lessees acquire an unrestricted
right to sub-divide the leasehold plot or that such sub-division must be
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
recognised by the lessor. Any sub-division of the leasehold plot would
necessarily require the permission of the lessor or the competent
Government authority. The allocation of specified portions of the
property under a decree passed between private parties, to which the
Government was not a party, cannot by itself create an obligation
upon the lessor to recognise such sub-division. Clause 4.43 of the
Master Plan for Delhi prohibits sub-division of plots. The Petitioners
cannot, therefore, claim recognition of a sub-division of the leasehold
plot merely on the basis of the terms of the settlement recorded in the
Civil Court decree or on the ground that the restriction contained in
Clause 1(viii) of the lease deed was confined to the initial five years.
62. The Petitioners attempt to distinguish between a division of
rights amongst co-lessees inter se and a splitting of the tenancy does
not alter the position that the relief of mutation sought by them was
founded upon the allocation of specified portions under the Civil
Court decree. Such allocation, by itself, could not compel the lessor to
recognise creation of two independent leases.
CONCLUSION
63. In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on all the
issues, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned
Orders passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in their
entirety.
64. It is clarified that the rights and disputes inter se between the
co-lessees, including liability towards misuse charges, shall remain
open and may be agitated by the parties before the appropriate forum
in accordance with law.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25
65. Insofar as the objection regarding limitation in the appeal
preferred by the GNCTD/L&DO is concerned, this Court is of the
view that having regard to the fact that the Impugned Orders are under
challenge in the present batch of Appeals and are being examined on
merits, it would not be appropriate to non-suit the said appellant solely
on the ground of delay. The delay in filing the Appeal is, accordingly,
condoned in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
66. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals, along with all
pending applications, is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 17, 2026
s.godara/pal
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:27:25