SUMIT SINGH AND ANR vs NEMAI MANNA AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

BEFORE:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI

C.O. 1969 of 2025
With
CAN 1 of 2025
CAN 3 of 2025

Sumit Singh & Another
Vs.
Nemai Manna & Another


For the Petitioners : Ms. Writi De, Adv.
Ms. Riya De, Adv.

For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Anirban Roy, Adv.
Mr. Dipraj Chakraborty, Adv.

Heard on : 11.05.2026
Judgment on : 11.05.2026
OM NARAYAN RAI, J.:-
1. This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed
against an order dated April 08, 2025 passed by the learned Chief Judge,
Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 06 of 2025
whereby the petitioners’ applications under Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereafter “the Code”) have been rejected and the provisions
of Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereafter
“the 1997 Act”) have been invoked.
2. The opposite parties have instituted Ejectment Suit No. 06 of 2025 before
the Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta for eviction of the
petitioners, inter alia , on the ground of negligence and default. In the said
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suit summonses were served upon the petitioners on January 31, 2025 and
the petitioners entered appearance in the suit on February 27, 2025. On the
February 27, 2025 itself, the petitioners filed two applications - one under
Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act and the other under Section 7(2) thereof.
3. The application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act was allowed on the same
date i.e. on February 27, 2025 thereby permitting the petitioners to deposit
the current monthly rents and the application under Section 7(2) of the
1997 Act was posted for hearing on the next date in the suit.
4. The petitioners could not deposit the current rent within the period
prescribed under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act. Therefore, the petitioners filed
two applications under Section 151 of the Code. One of the said applications
was filed on March 19, 2025, whereby the learned trial Court was requested
to pass an order under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act. The subsequent
application under Section 151 of the Code had been filed on the immediately
following day i.e. March 20, 2025 whereby the petitioners prayed for
permission to deposit the rent for the month of February, 2025 and the
subsequent months along with a direction upon the department to accept
such deposit.
5. Both the said applications have been rejected by the order impugned. Hence
the present revisional application.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:
6. Ms. De, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that on the
date when the applications under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act were
moved i.e. on February 27, 2025 no order was passed by the learned trial
Court and the matters were only posted for hearing on the next date fixed in
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the suit. She further submits that the learned advocate for the petitioners
could not attend the Court on any day thereafter till March 19, 2025 due to
a bereavement in her family (i.e. the grandmother of the said learned
Advocate had passed away).
7. It is submitted that no order had been passed on the application under
Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act on February 27, 2025 when the matter was
moved and the matter was simply posted to the next date in the suit. She
submits that in such view of the matter, the petitioners had no occasion to
deposit the current monthly rent in terms of the provisions of Section 7(1) of
the 1997 Act.
8. It is further submitted that the learned Advocate appearing for the
petitioners came to learn about the order dated February 27, 2025 much
later i.e. only on March 19, 2025 - when the first application under Section
151 of the Code was filed and accordingly, the second application under
Section 151 of the Code was filed on the following day i.e. on March 20,
2025.
9. She further submits that the order dated February 27, 2025 whereby the
petitioners’ application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act had been
disposed of is still not there on the e-portal of the Courts. It is also
submitted that since the order was not uploaded on the e-portal therefore
the petitioners could not know about such order and as such the deposit of
current rent would not be made.
10. It is next submitted that the petitioners cannot be blamed for the delay in
deposit such rent as the petitioners were not aware about any order having
been passed on February 27, 2025 since on the said date no order was
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actually passed and the matter was only posted for hearing on the next day
fixed in the suit.
11. Ms. De submits that the first application made by the petitioners on March
19, 2025 requesting the learned Court to pass orders on the petitioners’
application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act would clearly indicate that no
order had actually been passed on February 27, 2025. It is next contended
that in such view of the matter, the second application under Section 151 of
the Code made on the following day seeking permission to deposit rent must
be treated as an application made well within time seeking permission to
deposit rent and the petitioners cannot be penalized for no fault of theirs.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
12. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties vehemently
opposes the submissions of the petitioners and submits that the petitioners
were well aware that the application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act that
had been filed by them had been allowed on the same day on which it was
moved. In support of his contention he relies on a certified copy of the
application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act filed by the petitioners before
the learned Trial Court and demonstrates that there is an endorsement
thereon by the learned Trial Court at the left hand side (bottom) thereof
indicating that the application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act stood
allowed on the same day and the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997
Act was posted for hearing to a later date.
13. He submits that on the next date fixed i.e. on March 03, 2025 an
adjournment was prayed for on behalf of the petitioners and the petition for
adjournment was signed and filed by the learned Advocate on record for the
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petitioners. He also submits that in such view of the matter it cannot be said
that the learned Advocate for the petitioners was unable to see the records
of the case on that day or only day prior to March 19, 2025 as contended by
Ms. De.
14. Mr. Roy then cites a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School vs. Ismat Ahmed &
1
Others and submits that the provision of Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act is
mandatory and the time indicated therein cannot be extended by the Court.
15. He further submits that by the order impugned while the learned Trial Court
has rightly invoked the provision of Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act, the said
learned Court has erroneously allowed the petitioners/defendants time to
file written statement.
ANALYSIS & DECISION:
16. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and
considered the materials on record.
17. In the present case, the petitioners contend that they were unaware of any
order that had been passed on their application under Section 7(1) of the
1997 Act. A copy of the certified copy of the order dated February 27, 2025
has been appended at page 44 of the revisional application. It is evident
therefrom that petitioners’ application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act
was allowed on the said day itself. The certified copy of the application
under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act that has been produced in the Court by
Mr. Roy, learned Advocate for the opposite parties also reveals that the

1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1696
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application under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act was allowed on the same
date.
18. The petitioners however contend that no order was passed on the said date
and the applications were postponed to the next date in the suit and further
that the order dated February 27, 2025 has not been uploaded on the e-
court’s website. Taking the petitioner’s contention at face value and giving
the benefit of doubt to the petitioners, even if it is assumed that the said
order was neither passed nor uploaded on the said date and the petitioners
therefore remained unaware of the same, this Court still does not find any
answer to the question as to why did the petitioners not approach the
learned Court earlier by way of another application seeking immediate
direction or permission for putting in the current monthly rent given the
mandatory non-extendable time lines under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act.
19. The assertion of the petitioners that they could not approach the learned
Court earlier (i.e. at any time after February 27, 2025 till March 19, 2025)
fails to inspire confidence of this Court. The grandmother of the learned
Advocate for the petitioners in the learned Trial Court passed away on
February 25, 2025, yet, the application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the
1997 Act were filed on February 27, 2025 which is a date just two days
subsequent to the passing away of the grandmother of the learned Advocate
for the petitioners and prior to the conclusion of the mourning rituals. The
applications were admittedly moved on that day itself since it is the
petitioners’ case that on that day no order was passed and verbally the
learned Trial Court directed the same to be heard on the next date fixed in
the suit i.e. on March 03, 2025. If such application could be filed and
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moved, there is no reason why an application urging the learned Court to
pass orders on the petitioners’ application under Section 7(1) could not have
been filed and moved prior to March 19, 2025.
20. Furthermore, the certified copy of the application for adjournment that was
filed on March 03, 2025 under the signature of the said learned Advocate on
March 03, 2025 reveals that inability of the learned Advocate for the
petitioners to attend the Court for observing mourning rituals on the demise
of her grandmother has not been cited as the ground for adjournment. In
fact, the petitioners have thereby simply sought for time to file written
statements.
21. It is noticed that on June 16, 2025 when this revisional application was
admitted by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the question that was framed
by this Court was as to whether in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble
2
Supreme Court in the case of Debasish Paul & Another vs. Amal Boral ,
the petitioners would be entitled to an extension of time to comply with the
requirements under Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act. However, the said question
has been answered in the negative by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School (supra) upon
considering Debasish Paul & Another (supra).
22. It has now been settled that the time limits specified in Section 7(1) of the
1997 Act are mandatory and the same cannot be extended by invoking the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The relevant paragraphs
of Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School (supra) are extracted
hereinbelow:-

2
(2024) 2 SCC 169
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“ 28. Hence, taking clue from the above referred judgments and principles of the
statutory interpretation, the intent of WBPT Act and the circumstances wherein, the
words 'shall' and 'may' have been used in the same Section at different places, is
required to be adverted. As referred above in paragraphs 22, 23 and 24, it is apparent
that whenever the words 'payment' or 'deposit' of rent (disputed or undisputed) have
been used, the tenant has been cast with an obligation to deposit such rent within the
specified time by using the word 'shall' therein. In case of disputed rent, the tenant is
also required to file an application along with such deposit. The legislative intent
behind using the word 'shall' is to ensure that in case the tenant who is in occupation
of premises defaults in payment of rent due to some inadvertence or fault, on ground
of which the eviction is sought by the landlord, then on service of the summons, to
prevent his defence from getting struck-off, the tenant must comply with the twin pre-
requisites. Section 7(1) provides that the tenant shall pay to landlord or deposit all
arrears of rent, while the textual setup of first part of sub-section (2) of Section 7 is
that the tenant shall within the time specified, 'pay' or 'deposit' the amount of rent as
admitted as due by him. Indeed, it is true that in the latter part of sub-section (2) of
Section 7, the word 'shall' has again been used in the context of deciding the
application for determination of the rent, stating therein that 'tenant shall within one
month of the date of such order, pay to the landlord the amount so specified in the
order'. Therefore, in the latter part, the word 'tenant shall' would be referable for
payment of the amount to the landlord so specified in the order, and in the said
interpretive context, the extension of time is based on the discretion of the Civil Judge
only once, which may not exceed beyond two months. Thus, the proviso appended
therein would apply only to a case where the amount specified in the order after
determination was not paid within the period as specified therein. Consequently, by
virtue of the proviso, in the latter part, the word 'shall' would intend only to the time
period prescribed in the order, and it would not include the time period for initial
period as specified under Section 7(1)(a) and (b) and the former part of Section 7(2).

30. In the case of Debasish Paul (supra), the suit was filed for eviction by landlord.
On entering appearance, applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the WBPT Act
were filed with a delay of 10 months without any application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The trial Court rejected the said applications because they were not
filed within the statutory time. In revision, the High Court set-aside the order of the
trial Court and granted liberty to the tenant for filing applications along with
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, explaining the sufficient cause.
When the matter reached this Court in appeal, this Court had specifically opined that if
lesser time period has been specified for limitation in the WBPT Act, then the
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provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be used to extend the same and set-
aside the order of High Court while sustaining the order of the trial Court.
31. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant made a strenuous
attempt relying upon the observations made in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the
judgment rendered in Debasish Paul (supra), wherein the Court has referred to the
judgment of Bijay Kumar (supra). In this regard, paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 are
relevant and are reproduced below as thus:-
"17. We are of the view that a combined reading of the two statutes would suggest
that while the Limitation Act may be generally applicable to the proceedings under the
Tenancy Act, the restricted proviso under Section 7 of the said Act, providing a time
period beyond which no extension can be granted, has to be applicable. The proviso is
after sub-section (2) of Section 7 but sub-section (2) of Section 7 in turn refers to sub-
section (1) implying the application of the proviso to sub-section (1) too.
18. There is also a larger context in this behalf as the Tenancy Acts provide for
certain protections to the tenants beyond the contractual rights. Thus, the provisions
must be strictly adhered to. The proceedings initiated on account of non-payment of
rent have to be dealt with in that manner as a tenant cannot occupy the premises and
then not pay for it. This is so even if there is a dispute about the rent. The tenant is,
thus, required to deposit all arrears of rent where there is no dispute on the admitted
amount of rent and even in case of a dispute. The needful has to be done within the
time stipulated and actually should accompany the application filed under sub-
sections (1) & (2) of Section 7 of the said Act. The proviso only gives liberty to
extend the time once by period not exceeding two months.
19. The respondent neither paid the rent, nor deposited the rent by moving the
application nor deposited it within the extended time as stipulated in the proviso. The
mere allegation of absence of correct legal advice cannot come to the aid of the
respondent as, if such a plea was to be accepted it would give a complete licence to a
tenant to occupy premises without payment of rent and then claim that he was not
correctly advised. If the tenant engages an advocate and abides by his advice, then
the legal consequences of not doing what is required to be done, must flow.”
32. In the said context, if we see the intent of legislature as discussed and relying
upon two cases of three-Judge Bench of this Court, we intend to explain that Section 7
of the WBPT Act prescribes when a tenant can get the benefit of protection against
eviction. The opening word of sub-section (1) i.e., ‘on a suit being instituted by the
landlord for eviction’ makes it clear that in case the tenant defaults in payment of rent
and the suit is brought as specified in the WBPT Act, then on deposit/payment of
admitted rent, an opportunity ought to be provided to get the benefit of protection
against eviction. Therefore, for availing such benefit, some pre-requisites are there,
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which is of deposit of the rent, either disputed or undisputed as admitted, within the
specified time. In case, the rent is disputed, the tenant has to mandatorily file an
application, by virtue of word ‘shall’ used to such extent either in Section 7(1)(a)(b)(c) or
first part of Section 7(2). However, in the latter part of Section 7(2), which is for
payment of amount on determination by the Civil Judge within the time as specified
after compliance of the pre-deposit and on filing an application for determination
within the specified time, such payment has to be made by the tenant within one
month of date of order passed by Civil Judge. The proviso refers to extension of time
with an intent to grant one more opportunity to the tenant after determination of rent
for deposit.
33. At this juncture, we also deem it relevant to refer sub-section (3) of Section 7,
wherein it is specified that if tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred in sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended
time as may be granted by the Court, his defence against delivery of possession shall
be struck out. So it deals with the following contingencies; first is of Section
7(1)(a)(b)(c), second is of former part of Section 7(2) and third is of latter part of Section
7(2) and in default of either of the situations, the Judge shall order the defence against
delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit
specifying the consequences of failure to do any of the three situations. While using
the word extended time in sub-section (3), the word shall has been used, therefore,
this would also be referable to the provision which leads to the conclusion that in case
the tenant fails to deposit the determined amount within the time specified or within
the extended time. In that contingency the order of striking out of defence be passed
and suit be proceeded for hearing. As explained from above discussion, we are
constrained to say that the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant relying upon the paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment in Debasish
Paul (supra) are not germane, hence repelled.”
23. For all the reasons aforesaid, no interference is called for with the order
impugned, excepting the clarification that upon the defense of the
petitioners having been struck out, the written statement filed by the
petitioners would become insignificant and the petitioners would only be
entitled to the right of cross examination and advancing arguments as held
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by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Modula India vs. Kamakshya
3
Singh Deo .
24. C.O. 1969 of 2025 stands dismissed. CAN 3 of 2025 is an application for
extension of interim order and CAN 1 of 2025 is an application for vacating
the interim order granted earlier. In view of the dismissal of the revisional
application being C.O. 1969 of 2025 itself, the said applications also stand
disposed of accordingly. No costs.
25. Urgent certified website copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the
parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Om Narayan Rai, J.)







Sl. No. 10
skg

3
( 1988) 4 SCC 619

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