State Of U.P. vs Vinod Singh And Others

[Reserved on 07.10.2026]
[Delivered on 02.11.2026]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 262 of 1998
[Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:78884-DB]
State of U.P.
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
Vinod Singh and others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : G.A.,
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Santosh Kumar, Dheerendra Singh
Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
[Dictated by Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.]
1. Heard learned Additional Government Advocate for the
State-appellant and Sri Rishad Murtaza, assisted by Ms.
Aishwarya Mishra, Sri Arnav Prakash Tikku and Sri
Dheerendra Singh, learned counsel for the accused-
respondents no. 1 and 3 to 6.
2. The present government appeal has been preferred against
the judgment and order dated 02.04.1990 passed by learned

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
Additional Sessions Judge-III, Raebareli in Sessions Trial No. 09 of
1989 (State vs. Vinod Singh & others), arising out of Case Crime
No. 59 of 1988, under Sections 147, 148, 302, 149 of the IPC,
Police Station Sareni, District Raebareli, whereby the accused-
respondents, namely, Vinod Singh, Jai Prakash Singh, Ram Pratap
Singh, Shiv Pratap Singh, Uday Bhan Singh, Vijay Pratap Singh
and Brij Mohan have been acquitted from the offences as
aforesaid.
3. During pendency of the instant government appeal, the accused-
respondents no. 2, namely, Jai Prakash Singh and accused-
respondent no. 7, namely, Brij Mohan Singh have died and this
appeal has been dismissed as abated against them vide order of
this Court dated 02.04.2024. Now this government appeal
survives only for accused-respondents no. 1 and 3 to 6.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, as adumbrated in the written tahrir
(Exhibit Ka-1) submitted by the complainant Rajesh Bahadur Singh
(PW-1), is that on 16.04.1988, he and his uncle Ram Nihor Singh
(who was serving in the RPF at Lucknow and had come home on
leave on 15.04.1988) had gone to Bhupganj market to collect
stitched clothes. Finding the clothes unready, they were returning
home. At about 05:30 p.m., near the culvert on the road adjacent to
Vishwanath's orchard, the accused persons Vinod, Jai Prakash,
Ram Pratap, Shiv Pratap, Uday Bhan and Vijay Pratap emerged
from hiding behind a mahua tree and the embankment of a nearby
pond. Jai Prakash was armed with an Axe ( kulhari ), Shiv Pratap
with an iron rod ( sariya ) and the remaining accused carried lathis.
Harboring prior enmity regarding abadi land, all the accused formed
an unlawful assembly with a common intention to kill Ram Nihor
Singh and launched a violent assault on him. Upon hearing the
cries of PW-1 Rajesh Bahadur Singh and the victim, witnesses
Santosh (PW-2), Pitamber and many other villagers arrived and
challenged the assailants. The accused beat Ram Nihor Singh,

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
dragged him into a roadside ditch (khanti), inflicted grave injuries,
and fled upon being challenged. While PW-1 Rajesh Bahadur
Singh was carrying his injured uncle to police station Sareni in a
bullock cart, Ram Nihor Singh succumbed to his injuries en route.
5. The written tahrir was presented at PS Sareni Raebareli (14 km
from the spot) on 16.04.1988 at 21:30 hours by PW-1, whereupon
Chik FIR No. 34 (Exhibit Ka-4) was registered under Case Crime
No. 59/88 under Sections 147, 148, and 302 IPC by CP Virendra
Bahadur Singh (PW-4) and entry was made in GD Entry No. 35
(Exhibit Ka-5).
6. Investigation was taken up by Station Officer Sugar Pal Diwakar
(PW-6). On 16.04.1988 he recorded the statements of complainant
PW-1 and accompanying persons at the police station. On
17.04.1988 SI Jagat Singh (PW-5) conducted inquest proceedings
( panchayatnama , Exhibit Ka-6) prepared Challan lash , photo lash ,
and letters to CMO/RI (Exhibits Ka-7 to Ka-12) and the dead body
was sent for post-mortem. On the same day, PW-6 Sugar Pal
Diwakar arrested accused Vinod and Uday Bhan. On the disclosure
of Uday Bhan, an axe (kulhari, Material Exhibit-1) was recovered
from the Jai Prakash's house and recovery memo (Exhibit Ka-13)
along with site map of recovery (Exhibit Ka-14) were prepared. On
18.04.1988 PW-6 Sugar Pal Diwakar visited the place of
occurrence and prepared the site map (Exhibit Ka-16), seized a
blood-stained towel ( angouchha , Material Exhibit-2) produced by
the deceased's wife via memo (Exhibit Ka-15) and recorded
statements of the victim's wife and father. The post-mortem
examination (Exhibit Ka-2) was conducted by Dr. Surya Bhan Singh
(PW-3) on 18.04.1988 at District Hospital, Raebareli, noting 24
ante-mortem injuries (lacerated wounds, incised/cut wounds,
bruises, abrasions, and fractures). Cause of death was determined
as coma and shock due to ante-mortem injuries and hemorrhage.

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
7. Upon completion of investigation, the investigating officer submitted
a Charge-sheet (Exhibit Ka-17) on 23.05.1988 against seven
accused persons Vinod Singh, Jai Prakash Singh, Ram Pratap
Singh, Shiv Pratap Singh, Uday Bhan Singh, Vijay Pratap Singh,
and Brij Mohan Singh under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 IPC.
8. The learned Additional Munsif Magistrate, Raebareli, took
cognizance of the offence. In compliance with Section 207 Cr.P.C.,
copies of the police report, FIR, statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C., inquest, post-mortem report, and other documents were
furnished to all accused persons. Finding the offence under Section
302 IPC exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the learned
Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Raebareli
vide committal order dated 04.01.1989. The learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Raebareli framed charges against the accused Jai
Prakash Singh under Section 148 IPC and Section 302/149 IPC.
Against accused Vinod, Ram Pratap, Shiv Pratap, Uday Bhan,
Vijay Pratap and Brij Mohan, charges under Section 147 IPC and
Section 302/149 IPC were framed on 15.02.1989. The charges
were read over and explained to all the accused persons in Hindi,
to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
9. To prove its case the prosecution examined PW-1 Rajesh Bahadur
Singh (Complainant/Eyewitness), PW-2 Santosh Kumar Singh,
PW-3 Dr. Surya Bhan Singh (Medical Officer), PW-4 Constable
Virendra Bahadur Singh, PW-5 SI Jagat Singh, PW-6 Sugar Pal
Diwakar (Investigating Officer).
10. PW-1 Rajesh Bahadur Singh stated that he was returning with his
uncle Ram Nihor Singh from Bhupganj market around 5:30 PM on
16.04.1988. The accused persons ambushed them near the culvert
near Vishwanath's orchard. Accused Jai Prakash had an axe, Shiv
Pratap an iron rod, and others, lathis. They assaulted his uncle,
dragging him to a roadside. On shouting, witnesses Santosh,

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
Pitamber and others arrived and challenged the accused, who then
fled. He then went home to get a bullock cart and transported his
uncle on it towards the police station, but his uncle died en route
near a temple. He wrote the tahrir (Exhibit Ka-1) and submitted it at
the police station. He stated that the motive behind killing his uncle
was an abadi land dispute. In his cross examination he stated that
he and the deceased were on different cycles on their way to
Bhupganj. He further stated that he suffered no injuries in the
incident and did not run away, but stood 20 steps away shouting.
The assailants did not attack or chase him. He further stated that
blood was present on the road and in the arhar field, but couldn't
explain why the IO did not find blood. He also admitted prior
litigation (u/s 354, 323, 324 IPC) involving prosecution witness
Santosh Kumar and the deceased. He further stated the deceased
wife and father insisted on taking him to home but they chose to
take him to the police station first and then to a hospital that was
near the police station but the deceased succumbed to his injuries
en route. He also stated that he informed about the incident to the
police personnel that were there at Bhupganj of which two
constables accompanied them to the police station.
11. PW-2 Santosh Kumar Singh in his examination-in-chief stated that
at around 5:30 PM, while going to Bhupganj market, he saw the
accused persons assaulting Ram Nihor Singh near Vishwanath's
orchard. Accused Jai Prakash had an axe, Shiv Pratap an iron rod,
and others lathis. He, along with Pitamber, challenged the accused,
who fled toward the village. He helped put the victim on a bullock
cart. The victim died near a temple before reaching the Police
station. In his cross examination he admitted that he is the maternal
cousin of the deceased and was a co-accused with the deceased in
a criminal case under Section 354, 323 and 324 IPC. He further
stated that he was going to buy the kerosene on the day of the
incident and he did not mention this to the IO as he did not consider
it to be of relevance. During the incident he was standing 40-50

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
paces from the place of incident whereas Rajesh was standing
about 5 paces away from the deceased and by the time that he
reached the victim the accused fled the scene. On hearing the
commotion a large number of people had gathered at the scene.
He further stated that as people from the deceased’s home had
also come, then they chose to straightaway take him to Sareni. He
also stated that inquest papers were prepared and the body was
sealed at night around 1:30 AM under electric light and that he
signed them and returned back home thereafter.
12. PW-3 Dr. Surya Bhan Singh (Medical Officer) in his examination-in-
chief stated that he conducted post-mortem on 18.04.1988. He
noted 24 ante-mortem injuries, including lacerated wounds on
forehead/scalp, cut wounds on occipital region and arm,
widespread bruises, and fractures of right forearm, right leg, frontal
skull bone, and 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th right ribs on the back side
were broken. Cause of death was ante-mortem injuries and
excessive blood loss due to them. He estimated the time since
death to be around 2 days prior (approx. 6:00 PM on 16.04.1988).
In his cross-examination he stated injuries could be caused by
lathis, iron rods, and sharp weapons like an axe. He further stated
that injury No. 3 (fracture/head injury) was fatal and most injuries
were on non-vital parts (limbs).
13. PW-4 Constable Virendra Bahadur Singh proved the registration of
Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-4) and GD entry (Exhibit Ka-5) on 16.04.1988
at 21:30 hours upon written report of PW-1. He denied the
suggestion that the FIR was anti-timed.
14. PW-5 S.I. Jagat Singh stated that he prepared the inquest report
(Exhibit Ka-6) and connected papers on 17.04.1988 outside PS
Sareni under a peepal tree. He further stated that he did not inform
the S.P. of the police station regarding the same.

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15. PW-6 Sugar Pal Diwakar, Investigating Officer proved steps of
investigation, recovery of axe (Exhibit Ka-13), site maps (Exhibits
Ka-14, Ka-16), and charge-sheet (Exhibit Ka-17). He further stated
that he reached the spot on 16.04.1988 at 9:00–9:30 PM but did
not inspect the site, rather he inspected it on 18.04.1988. He also
stated that no blood was found at the alleged spot of crime and he
did not send the recovered axe or blood-stained angouchha for
chemical/forensic examination. He also stated that neither any
police personnel were deployed on the day of the incident at
Bhupganj nor did any such personnel accompany the complainant
and deceased to the station.
16. In their statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. all the accused
persons denied the prosecution allegations, claiming complete
innocence. They stated that they were falsely implicated due to
existing village factionalism and prior land enmity with the
complainant party. They asserted that the witnesses (PW-1 and
PW-2) are closely related and interested witnesses who deposed
falsely against them out of malice.
17. The accused persons produced no oral or documentary defence
evidence in support of their plea.
18. The learned trial court, vide judgment and order dated 02.04.1990,
acquitted all seven accused persons on the basis of the unnatural
conduct and doubtful presence of eyewitness, absence of blood at
scene of crime, anti-timed FIR and unexplained delays, interested
and hostile witness testimony and defective and compromised
investigation, thus holding that the prosecution has not been able to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
19. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the trial court the
State has preferred the present government appeal before this
court.

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20. Learned AGA has submitted that the learned trial court did not
consider facts, evidences and circumstances in correct perspective
and passed the impugned judgment and order in a mechanical
manner, which is not in consonance with law. He has further
submitted that FIR of the case had been lodged by a person who
had witnessed the incident. He further submits that merely on the
basis that informant PW-1 and another eyewitness is the relative of
the deceased, their testimony cannot be discarded out-rightly. He
further submits that medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular
evidence. If there is faulty or defective investigation, then merely on
that basis, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be
disbelieved. He next submits that all the accused persons were
armed with deadly weapons and they had acted upon in
furtherance of common intention and killed the deceased. He
further submits that there was a dispute of the use of the abadi land
and due to this enmity, the accused-respondents caused the death
of the deceased. The weapon Axe, used in the commission of
offence, has been recovered on the pointing out of one of the
accused-respondents. Thus, the prosecution had established its
case beyond reasonable doubt. Despite that, the learned trial court
has acquitted the accused-respondents and findings and
observations given by the trial court are perverse. Therefore,
impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside, present
appeal is liable to be allowed and consequently accused-
respondents are liable to be convicted.
21. To fortify his submissions, learned AGA has placed reliance in the
case of Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol Vs. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala
and Others [AIR 2021 SC 3532] wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held
that ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there
are reasons to doubt it. It is only in a case where there is a gross
contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence and the
medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
out all possibility of ocular evidence being true that the ocular
evidence may be disbelieved.
22. Further, learned AGA has placed reliance on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Om Pal and Others Vs. State of
U.P. (Now State of Uttarakhand) [AIR 2025 SC 5300], wherein it
has been held that :
“To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of
the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are
whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to
believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in
such situations as would make it possible for them to
witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly,
whether there is anything inherently improbable or
circumstances either elicited from those witnesses
themselves or established by other evidence tending to
improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of
their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which
a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases
where the plea of the Accused is a mere denial, yet the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined
on its own merits, where the Accused raise a definite plea
or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with
that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and
the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken
into account while assessing the value of the prosecution
evidence.”
23. He further relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
rendered in the case of Baban Shankar Daphal and Others Vs.
The State of Maharashtra [AIR 2025 SC 599] , wherein Hon’ble
Apex Court held that though the eyewitnesses who have been
examined were closely related to the deceased, namely, his wife,
daughter and son, yet their testimonies are consistent with respect
to the accused persons being the assailants who inflicted wounds
on the deceased. In such circumstances, their testament cannot be
discarded solely on that ground. Learned court also emphasized
that when evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court
should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony.

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
Their evidence should not be discarded merely due to familial ties,
but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and
consistency with other evidence in the case.
SUBMISSION OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED-
RESPONDENTS NO. 1 AND 3 TO 6:
24. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents has
vehemently argued that the FIR of the case is anti-dated which had
been lodged after due consultation. He further submits that
presence of the Rajesh Bahadur Singh PW-1 and Santosh Singh
PW-2 is highly doubtful. Both PW-1 and PW-2 are relatives of the
deceased and PW-2 is also a chance witness, thus, their testimony
cannot be relied on. He further submits that the alleged weapon
had not been sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for its
examination. He next submits that as per the Investigating Officer,
at the alleged place of occurrence, no blood was found. He further
submits that to ascertain the place of occurrence, sample of soil
and blood-stained soil was neither collected nor it had been sent to
FSL for its examination. Thus, the place of occurrence had not
been ascertained, which indicates that assault on the deceased
had been caused in some other place by some other miscreants
and due to enmity, the accused/respondents had been implicated in
this case. He further submits that learned trial court thoroughly
scrutinized all the contentions raised by the parties in view of the
facts, evidence and circumstances of the case and concluded that
prosecution could not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Resultanly, respondents had been acquitted for all the charges
levelled against them and there is no illegality or perversity in the
impugned judgment and the present appeal is devoid of merits and
liable to be dismissed.
25. To substantiate his argument, learned counsel for the accused-
respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
Court rendered in the case of Mallappa & Others Vs. State of
Karnataka [2024 INSC 104] , wherein it is held that:
“Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All
the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal
law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The
principles which come into play while deciding an appeal
from acquittal could be summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal
trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive –
inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result
in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of
challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that
two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view,
mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the
reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal
in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must
specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court
for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”
26. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on the record as well as the law cited by the
parties.
27. On the basis of arguments of both the sides, following points are
formulated to determine this appeal:
(i) Whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt ?

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
(ii) Whether the findings and observation given by the trial
court are perverse and impugned judgment and order is
liable to be set aside?
28. Both the points are interlinked, therefore, they are being taken
together.
DISCUSSIONS, REASONS AND CONCLUSION THEREOF:
29. Firstly, we have to see as to whether the death of the deceased is
homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
30. On perusal of the record, it reveals that Dr. Surya Bhan Singh PW-3
had conducted the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased Ram
Nihor on 18.04.1988 and following injuries were found:
External Examination:
31. Muscular built Stiffness from upper limbs and legs had
disappeared. Blisters were present on the body. Skin was peeling
off. There was bluishness in the lower part of the abdomen. Eyes
were protruding. Tongue was protruding. Penis and scrotum were
swollen. Feces were present at the anal opening.
Ante-mortem injuries:
(1) Lacerated wound 3 cm x .5 cm x bone deep on the
forehead on the left side 7 cm. above the left eyebrow.
(2) Lacerated wound 2 cm x .5 cm x skin deep on the
forehead in the middle, 6.5 cm above the root of the nose.
(3) Lacerated wound 2.5 cm x 0.5 cm x skin deep on the
forehead on the right side, 7 cm above the right eyebrow.
(4) Lacerated wound 3.5 cm x 1 cm x skin deep on the
head in the middle, 15 cm above the root of the nose and
towards the back.
(5) Lacerated wound 2 cm x 1 cm x skin deep on the head
on the right side, 10 cm above the ear.
(6) Incised wound 4.5 cm x 0.8 cm x bone deep, on the
head on the right side, in the posterior part, 8 cm behind
the right ear.

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
(7) Lacerated wound 1 cm. X 0.5 cm x muscle deep, on
the outer surface of the left upper arm, 8 cm above the
elbow.
(8) Bluish 20 cm x 12 cm on the back and outer surface of
the left upper arm on the 3/4 portion.
(9) Lacerated wound 3 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep, on the
back surface of the left forearm in the 1/4 portion, 3 cm
above the left wrist.
(10) Bluish 10 cm x 3 cm on the back surface of the left
forearm on 1/3 portion.
(11) Incised wound 2.5 cm x 0.8 cm x muscle deep on the
outer surface of the right upper arm, 9 cm above the
elbow.
(12) Bluish with long length on the back and outer surface
of the right upper arm.
(13) Bluish 14 cm x 8 cm on the lower 1/3 of the right
forearm, on the back surface in the upper half of the right
hand.
(14) Lacerated wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep
between the thumb and index finger of the right hand.
(15) Bluish 10 cm x 6 cm on the chest on the front side in
the middle of the right part.
(16) Bluish 24 cm x 7 cm on the right thigh on the right
surface over the middle 2/3 portion.
(17) Lacerated wound 3 cm x 2 cm on the front surface of
the left leg, 10 cm below the knee.
(18) Lacerated wound 3.5 cm x 2 cm on the front surface
of the right leg, 16 cm below the knee.
(19) Lacerated wound 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm x skin deep on the
inner surface of the left heel.
(20) Abrasion 3 cm x 1 cm on the inner surface of the left
leg in the middle part.
(21) Bluish on the back in the upper half portion, covering
both scapular regions.
(22) Bluish 18 cm x 6 cm on the upper 1/3 portion of the
right thigh, on the outer surface.
(23) Lacerated wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep,
behind up to the right elbow joint.
(24) Bluish 13 cm x 7 cm on the right buttock, on the upper
and outer 1/4 portion.
32. There was a fracture of both bones in the lower 1/3 portion of the
right forearm. There was a fracture of both bones in the upper 1/3
portion of the right leg.
Internal Examination

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
33. There was a fracture in the frontal bone of the skull on the right side
across its full length. Blood was collected towards the front in the
membranes inside the head. The brain was in a liquidified state.
There was a fissured fracture in the base below the head, which
was connected to the frontal bone. The 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th
ribs on the right side were broken towards the back. The heart was
empty. The stomach was empty. Gas and fecal matter were present
in the intestines.
34. Cause of death was opined due to coma and shock as a result of
antemortem injury.
35. On being cross-examined, he had stated that incised wound may
be caused by sharp-edged weapons, from the small Axe such
injuries may also caused. Injuries no. 1 to 6 were on the non-vital
part, but the injuries which were caused on chest are on the vital
part. Injury no. 3 was fatal and dangerous to life.
36. As per prosecution witnesses, the death of deceased was caused
by sharp-edged weapons, namely, kulhari and deadly weapon of
iron and lathi. In the statement recorded under section 313 of the
Cr.P.C., the accused-respondents did not deny the fact that death
of the deceased-Ram Nihor was homicidal. Injuries found on the
body of the deceased were also not disputed by the respondents
side. Therefore, it is established that the death of the deceased
Ram Nohore was homicidal.
37. Now it has to be seen that whether accused-respondents are
responsible for the death of the Ram Nihor and they had been seen
by PW-1 and PW-2 at the time of causing death of the deceased.
38. To substantiate its case, from the appellant's side, two witnesses of
facts have been examined. One of them is informant Rajesh
Bahadur Singh PW-1, who is the nephew of the deceased, while

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
another witness Santosh Singh PW-2 is the maternal cousin of the
deceased. The question which arises is whether at the time of
causing death, they were present on the spot and witnessed the
whole of the incident through their naked eyes.
39. It is established principle that merely on the basis of related person,
their testimony can not be out-rightly rejected. The mode of
appreciation of testimony of eyewitness who claim to have seen the
incident is that the court should consider and look for the following
factors appearing in the entire testimony of the witness:
(i) Presence of the witness on the spot;
(ii) Witness having seen the incident;
(iii) Credibility of the witness.
40. This is also settled law that minor contradictions in the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses which could not corrode the core of
prosecution version have no significance. It is also settled that at
the time of incident, every witness reacts in his own manner, where
an eye witness did not come to rescue the deceased and merely
that reaction, conduct and behavior of the witnesses cannot be a
ground to discard their evidence.
41. In case in hand, Rajesh Bahadur Singh PW-1 deposed that his
uncle Ram Nihor, who was an employee in RPF, came to his village
on leave. On the fateful day, this witness alongwith his uncle Ram
Nihor had gone to Bhupganj market to bring clothes. In the evening
at about 05:30 p.m., they were returning home and when they
reached nearby the pulia where Vishwanath’s orchard is located,
then accused persons Jai Prakash armed with kulhari, Shiv Pratap
armed with iron rod and remaining accused Vinod, Ram Pratap,
Udaybhan, Vijay Pratap and Brij Mohan armed with lathis emerged
and they started to inflict blows from the weapons which they were
having in their hands.

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Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
42. Thus, from his evidence it emerged that on the place of occurrence,
he has claimed his presence alongwith his uncle deceased Ram
Nihor.
43. He further stated that when he and his deceased uncle made hue
and cry, then witness Santosh Singh and Pitamber Singh also
arrived there. He further stated that accused persons pursued his
deceased uncle and continuously assaulted him and then threw
him in the ditch.
44. On being cross-examined, he had admitted that the land in dispute
is of a Gram Samaj and he used that land for his own convenience,
where he ties his animals. He reiterated this fact that appurtenant
land is used for agricultural purposes, where he ties animals, but
accused persons wanted to usurp that land forcibly, although, the
accused-respondents denied the fact and stated that due to dispute
of the abadi land, there was enmity between them and witnesses
had adduced their evidence due to enmity. Thus, it has been
established that there was enmity with regard to possession of the
gram samaj land, where both the parties were claiming their title.
45. Enmity is a double-edged weapon, where it is possible that the
person who had not caused the incident may be implicated. On the
other side, it may also be possible that the person who had caused
the incident had been named rightly. From the evidence, it also
reveals that late Jagdev had three sons, namely, Ram Dutta, Ram
Kishore and Ram Nihor and the informant is a son of Ram Dutta. It
is an admitted case of the prosecution that Ram Nihor was an
employee in RPF, Lucknow. Thus, it transpires that the village land
was used by brothers and cousin of the deceased, therefore, it is
not a case of prosecution that accused had enmity only with Ram
Nihor. Therefore, it is surprising that if there was a dispute with
regard to an appurtenant land which belonged to Gram Samaj, then
as to why they spared Rajesh Bahadur Singh PW-1, who is the

17
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
nephew of the deceased and they only caused injury to the
deceased?
46. One thing is also important. After sustaining injuries, the informant
carried his injured uncle to the police station and not to the hospital,
although in this regard he has given explanation that doctors in
village Bhupganj had no special degree/specialization, therefore
they are not recognized. He had stated that at that place there was
no government hospital, which was located 5 to 6 kilometers away
from the police station. Although it is not a rule that he should not
be taken away to the police station first but the facts indicate that
23 injuries had been caused to the body of the deceased, which
were present on the vital parts also. Then in such condition, any
relative or family member first of all would endeavour to seek the
medical help to save the life of the injured. However, this witness
aimed to go to the police station first, although he had stated that
on the way his injured uncle had succumbed to the injuries.
Learned counsel contended that if the deceased was alive at that
time, then he must necessarily be carried to the hospital. It also
shows that when PW-1 reached on the place at that time the
deceased was not alive and this was the reason not to take him to
the hospital. In this regard, they referred to the statement of the
doctor who had stated that death of the deceased may also be
possible at 06:00 p.m. in the evening of 16.04.1988. This witness
also further stated that he had arrived in Bhupganj market at 04:00
p.m. He and the deceased uncle went there on two different
bicycles. When they were returning, at that time deceased Ram
Nihor was ahead of him. He had also stated that the place where
accused persons met him is the outskirt of the village. He also
deposed that when the deceased Ram Nihor was assaulted, at that
time, he did not flee away but he raised alarm but the accused
persons neither chased him nor assaulted him. He also stated that
when his deceased uncle sustained injury of lathi, he fell down from
the bicycle and as soon as he started to rush from there, then

18
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
accused persons pursued him while his bicycle was lying there.
When his deceased uncle was fleeing, accused persons continued
to assault him. The place where his uncle left the bicycle, blood
was scattered in large quantity. He further stated that when he saw
the witness Santosh Singh, at that time, his deceased uncle Ram
Nihor fell in the field of Arhar and accused persons fled away. When
all the accused persons fled away, then he and other witnesses
went near his deceased uncle and brought the bullock-cart and
carried him to police station. He further stated that when his family
members came alongwith him to see the deceased Ram Nihor, at
that time he was alive. Ram Nihor's father and his wife asked him
to carry the deceased home, but he decided to carry the deceased
to police station for lodging of the FIR. From this statement it
transpires that if this witness was returning in his deceased uncle's
company and the incident had taken place in his presence then
what was the occasion to go to see the deceased alongwith his
family members, which reveals that this witness came from some
other place. This witness did not verify as to how the other family
members arrived there and who called them. He had also admitted
in his cross-examination that the distance from the place where his
uncle was assaulted, village Abadi is 1.5 miles away.
47. At this juncture, the statement of Santosh Singh PW-2 is also
necessary to be scrutinized who is the maternal cousin of the
deceased. He has deposed that on fateful day he had gone to
Bhupganj market to bring the kerosene oil as he was told at 05:00
p.m. that kerosene oil has finished at home. When he was on the
way, this incident took place. He also stated that from 40 to 50
paces away, he had seen the whole incident. At that time, when he
went on the spot, the accused persons were assaulting the
deceased. Rajesh was standing at a distance of five paces from the
deceased-Ram Nihor. The accused persons pursued Ram Nihor till
ditch (Khanti) and were beating him continuously. He further stated
that his family members arrived at 05:30 p.m. Thereafter, deceased

19
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
was carried to Sareni, not to home. He had also stated that just one
kilometer prior to the police station, nearby a temple, Ram Nihor
died and they stopped there. He further stated that the deceased
was carried on bullock-cart. Rajesh was behind the bullock-cart and
he himself was riding on a bicycle. He also stated that he had taken
the paper from a shop to scribe the report and near the temple the
report was scribed. He also stated that Sareni is located 3 and ¼
kilometer away from Bhupganj and Bhupganj is 1 and ½ kilometer
away from the place of occurrence. In Saraini, he met an inspector
who came near the bullock-cart and looked at the deceased. Thus,
it is clear that he was not returning along with the deceased and
PW1. Due to the kerosene oil having finished at home, he was
going to Bhupganj market to bring it and on the way, this incident
took place. It is not the statement of this witness that when he was
going to Bhupganj market for bringing the kerosene oil then he met
with the deceased and PW1 Rajesh Bahadur Singh. As per the
statement, when he reached near Vishwanath orchard, then he
heard the alarm and that place was 40 to 50 paces/steps away
from the crossing (chauraha). As per his statement, he had seen
the whole incident from Vishwanath’s orchard, while as per
statement of Rajesh Bahadur Singh, PW-1, on his alarm, PW-2 had
arrived on the spot and at that time accused persons were inflicting
blows upon the deceased. It is surprising that two witnesses who
came from different direction and PW-1 who was just behind the
deceased, in his presence, deceased was beaten by the accused
persons and other accused persons were pursuing the deceased,
then as to how it was possible to see the occurrence by PW-2 from
40 to 50 paces away from the place of occurrence. As per his
statement, he had seen the whole incident from 40 to 50 steps
away.
48. Here it is also notable that on cross-examination Santosh Singh
PW-2 had admitted that one FIR under Sections 354, 323 of the
IPC had been lodged against him and deceased Ram Nihor by

20
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
Bachhu Lal with regard to outraging the modesty of Bachhu Lal's
daughter. In that case, occurrence happened on 16.03.1985 and
Ram Nihor and this witness were arrested and presently case is
pending before the Munsif court. Further, he had stated that on their
alarm 20 to 25 villagers arrived there. Thus, from their evidence it
transpires that it is not probable to see the incident by this witness
since some time was required to be present near the place of
occurrence, if he had heard the hue and cry. This witness did not
state that at the time of incident he could not respond due to fear or
he was perturbed or he was not in position to move from the place.
Therefore, the behavior, manner and conduct of those witnesses
are not found natural and it also indicates that after the death of the
deceased, they arrived on the spot, therefore sequence of their
evidences do not strengthen their statements.
49. In the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported in [(2012) 8 SCC 21], Hon’ble Apex Court has held as
under:
“A "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and
calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable.
The court considering the version of such witness should
be in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status
of the witness would be immaterial and what would be
relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such
a witness. What would be more relevant would be the
consistency of the statement right from the starting point till
the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the
initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should
be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution
qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in
the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the cross-examination of any length
and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no
circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the
factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, c as well
as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-
relation with each and every one of other supporting
material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used,
the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence
and the expert opinion. The said version should

21
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
consistently match with the version of every other witness.
It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test
applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there
should not be any missing link in the chain of
circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence
alleged d against him. Only if the version of such a witness
qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar
tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can
be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be
accepted by the court without any corroboration and based
on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise,
the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the
crime should remain intact while all other attendant
materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects
should match the said version in material particulars in
order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the
core version to sieve the other supporting materials for
holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
50. In the present case, the witnesses are relatives of the deceased.
Santosh Singh PW-2 is the maternal brother (Mausera bhai). Their
evidence is not free from shadow as they are not the sterling
witnesses. Their testimony is not wholly reliable, therefore,
corroboration is needed.
51. Now we proceed to consider the next contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant with regard to non-examination of the
independent witnesses by the prosecution.
52. As per FIR, on the screaming of the informant and the deceased,
the villager Pitamber and many other persons also arrived there
who had witnessed the incident. This fact has also been reiterated
by the informant-Rajesh Bahadur Singh PW-1 in his evidence.
Another witness Santosh Singh PW-2 has also deposed that on the
spot, he himself, Pitamber, Shri Pratap and others had witnessed
the incident.
53. Although there is no provision that all the persons who had
witnessed the incident must be examined by the prosecution to
prove it’s case but when the witnesses produced by the prosecution

22
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
are found related and one of them is chance witness and their
veracity is not coming out from the shadow of doubt, then it
becomes expedient that the core of prosecution version must be
corroborated by some independent witnesses and if such witnesses
have not been examined, then plausible explanation should be
given. Thus, the independent corroboration is lacking in the present
case.
54. We proceed to consider the next submission with regard to
absence of blood on the place of occurrence. Upon close scrutiny
of the material available on record, we find that Rajesh Bahadur
Singh PW-1 has deposed that at the spot where her deceased
uncle fell after sustaining injuries, blood was scattered. However,
the Investigating Officer Sugar Pal Diwakar PW-6 has clearly stated
that at the alleged place of occurrence, he had not seen blood and
any other thing which may have enabled him to ascertain the place
of crime. This witness did not state that he had collected blood-
stained and sample of soil to ascertain the place of occurrence.
55. Here it is notable that in the criminal trial, it is necessary to
ascertain the place of crime so that testimony of the witness, who
claims to himself as a eye witness, may be scrutinized. In the case
in hand, unfortunately, although the informant had stated that there
was blood scattered in large quantity but unfortunately same was
not found by the IO to ascertain the place of crime. In the absence
of the blood-stained soil and matching of the same with simple soil,
it creates doubt in the prosecution story with regard to place of
occurrence as contended by the counsel for the accused-
respondents and which gives strength to the contention of learned
counsel for the accused-respondents that it is very possible that the
deceased was assaulted somewhere else by some miscreants and
his body was found on the place from where the prosecution
witnesses carried him to the police station.

23
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
56. Now we consider the non-recovery of alleged weapon used in the
commission of crime. It is true that recovery of the alleged weapon
is not necessary to prove the prosecution case but it cannot be
forgotten that if a person who had been brutally killed by many
persons using different deadly weapons, then if the weapons are
recovered at the instance of the accused persons, it may also be
beneficial for prosecution as an additional link of the evidence to
prove its case. Unfortunately in this case, no weapon of the crime
has been recovered and explanation has also not been afforded in
this regard.
57. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka
and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790 , in paragraph 10, the Hon'ble Apex
Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court
while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26
it has been held that:
"the High Court should not have reappreciated the
evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no
grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There
exists no justification behind setting aside the order of
acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the
prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and
infirmities"
58. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213 , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations
of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal
against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the
following words:
"The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under
Section 378, Cr.P.C. should not be routinely invoked where
the view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The
judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely
because the High Court finds its own view more probable,
save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from
perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if
there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on

24
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that
there is complete misreading of the material evidence which
has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial
court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be
interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does
not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the
evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive
at a different firm finding of fact."
59. In a judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP
and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved
has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and
12 are quoted as under:
"10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC
189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the
appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record,
so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial
Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The
appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a
finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into
consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into
consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law.
Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as
under:-
"12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines
for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court
should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a
case where two views are possible, though the view of the
appellate court may be more, the probable one. While
dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has
to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a
finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were
perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is
entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible
evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of
burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by
the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR
1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR
1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR
2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10
SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC

25
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S.
Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR
2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206;
Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16
SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal
Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC
227, the Privy Council observed as under:
"...the High Court should and will always give proper weight
and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the
benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate
court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who
had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been
followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR
1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216;
M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200;
Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66;
Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412;
Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85;
and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC
755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4
SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate
and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling
reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes",
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of
language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court

26
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court
to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless
he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of
the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC
450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the
appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial
courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that
the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and
consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial
court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour
of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9
SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of
this Court and laid down that an "order of acquittal should not
be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there
is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the
accused."
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors.
(2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative
circumstances in which the Court would be justified in
interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The
circumstances includes:
i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous
view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and
documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of
justice;

27
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the
record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with
a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court
have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal
v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the
presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the
trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his
innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other
view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good
reasons for interference."
60. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs.
State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has
observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High
Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the
approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone
will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
61. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by
Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State
of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar
Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543."
62. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh
Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.

28
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
63. Learned trial court categorically observed that the FIR of the case is
ante-timed and no plausible explanation has been given. Witness
PW-1, Raj Bahadur Singh being cousin and Santosh Singh PW-2
being maternal cousin of the deceased, they are related witnesses.
Apart from this, PW-2 is a chance witness and their presence on
the spot and the manner in which they claimed to be witnesses of
the incident is not clinching and convincing, since they are not the
sterling witnesses. Learned trial court also observed that no
independent witness has been produced by the prosecution.
Although it is true that it is the discretion of the prosecution to
adduce evidence in its favour for which the prosecution cannot be
compelled but at the same time, it is also necessary that true facts
should not be prevented to come before the court. Witness
Pitamber and Shiv Pratap were not produced and no explanation
has been given in this regard.
64. Moreover, the Investigating Officer could not ascertain the place of
occurrence as he had not found the blood stains. He could not even
recover the alleged weapon(s) used in commission of the offence.
Presence of PW-1 and PW-2 on the spot has become doubtful as
there are many lapses and inconsistencies in their testimonies
which corrode the core of the prosecution case.
65. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that benefit of
doubt ensues to accused. If two views are possible, the benefit of
doubt must be granted to accused. It has been further held that if
two views are possible, the order of acquittal should not be set
aside by High Court because there is double presumption of
innocence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 39 in Dhanapal v.
State By Public Prosecutor, Madras, (2009) 10 SCC 401 while
dealing with scope of interference at appellate stage has held:

29
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
"39. The following principles emerge from the cases
above:
1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he
was before the trial court. The trial court acquittal bolsters
the presumption that he is innocent.
2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the
appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on
record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with
respect to both facts and law, but the appellate court must
give due weight and consideration to the decision of the
trial court.
3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the
trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the
demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is in a better
position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise
disturb the trial court acquittal if it has "very substantial and
compelling reasons" for doing so.
5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached-one
that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High
Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the
accused."
66. In the case in hand, the opinion expressed by the trial court is not
only a possible view, but also it is fair and reasonable and cannot
be termed as perverse in any manner, thus, it does not warrant
interference.
67. As noted above, there is always presumption of innocence and in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption. The burden lies
upon prosecution to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
learned trial Court has passed a detailed, reasoned and speaking
judgment and we find no infirmity in the said judgment. There is no
manifest error, illegality or non-application of mind or non-

30
Govt. Appeal No. 262 of 1998
appreciation of evidence which could compel us to form an opinion
different from the opinion formed by the learned trial court.
68. Finding no merit in the present appeal, we are of the considered
opinion that the present government appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
69. Accordingly, the present government appeal is hereby dismissed.
The judgment and order of the trial court dated 02.04.1990 is
affirmed.
70. The trial court record be returned back as per Rules.
[Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.] [Abdul Moin,J.]
November 02, 2026
kkv/

Digitally signed by :-
KRISHAN KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench