N.Sujatha, vs The Commissioner of M.C.H,
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
+ I.A.No.1 of 2023
in/and
APPEAL SUIT No. 16 OF 2023
%24-04-2026
Between
# N. Sujatha and 3 others
…Appellants
vs.
$ The Commissioner of M.C.H.
and 2 others
… Respondents
!Counsel for the appellant :Sri K.P.Anudeep Kumar, learned
counsel representing Sri S.S.R.
Murthy, learned counsel for
the appellants and perused the
record.
^Counsel for respondent : -
<Gist :
>Head Note :
? Cases referred
1. (2013) 14 SCALE 347
2. (1987) 2 SCR 387
3. (2000) 9 SCC 94
4. (2013) 12 SCC 649
5. (2013) 14 SCC 81
6. (2013) 14 SCC 81
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
I.A.No.1 of 2023
in/and
APPEAL SUIT No. 16 OF 2023
DATE: 24.04.2026
Between:
N. Sujatha and 3 others
….Appellants
And
The Commissioner of M.C.H.
and 2 others
….Respondents
JUDGMENT
Heard Sri K.P.Anudeep Kumar, learned counsel
representing Sri S.S.R.Murthy, learned counsel for the
appellants and perused the record.
2. I.A.No.1 of 2023 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 6918 days by the
appellants/petitioners in filing the present appeal against the
judgment and decree dated 22.10.2003 passed by the Family
Court Judge at Hyderabad in O.S.No.75 of 2001. The said suit
was instituted by the appellants seeking a declaration that
appellant No.1 is the legally wedded wife of late N. Yadagiri and
that appellant Nos.2 to 4 are his legal heirs, along with a
3
consequential permanent injunction restraining the
respondents from releasing the service benefits of the deceased
to respondent No.3, which came to be dismissed on 22.10.2003.
3. The appellants in A.S.No.16 of 2023; the petitioners in
I.A.No.1 of 2023 and plaintiffs in O.S.No.75 of 2001 are one and
the same.
4. The grounds of the appellants/petitioners as set out in
I.A.No.1 of 2023 seeking condonation of the inordinate delay, is
set forth as under:
i) The petitioner No.1 is an uneducated, illiterate, and
economically indigent woman belonging to a downtrodden
section of society, who had no awareness of legal
proceedings and was financially incapable of bearing legal
expenses or effectively prosecuting the matter.
ii) At the time of institution of the suit in the year 2001, the
petitioner No.1 had engaged a counsel to represent her
before the Family Court, Hyderabad. However, upon
dismissal of the suit on 22.10.2003, no intimation
whatsoever was received by her either from the engaged
counsel or from the Court, who thereby remained under
the bona fide impression that her counsel would duly
inform her of the status of the case or that petitioner No.1
would receive notice from the Court in due course.
4
iii) The petitioner No.1 averred that she made several visits to
the City Civil Court complex in an attempt to trace her
counsel and ascertain the status of the case. However,
owing to her illiteracy and inability to either identify or
recall the name of the counsel, coupled with severe
financial constraints, she could not effectively pursue the
matter any further.
iv) It is specifically pleaded that the petitioners came to know
about the dismissal of the suit only on 24.10.2022, when
the petitioner No.1 approached the concerned authorities
seeking release of the terminal/death benefits of her
deceased husband and was then informed that the suit
filed by her had already been dismissed.
v) Thereafter, the petitioners applied for a certified copy of
the judgment and decree on 25.10.2022, which was made
ready and delivered on 11.11.2022. Upon obtaining legal
advice thereafter, the present appeal came to be filed on
29.12.2022.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellants/petitioners in support of the condonation application
has advanced the following submissions:
i. That the provisions of the Limitation Act are procedural in
nature and are intended to advance, and not obstruct, the
5
cause of justice. The Courts have consistently adopted a
liberal approach in condoning delay, particularly where
the litigant is an illiterate, economically disadvantaged
widow with dependent children. It is urged that Section 5
of the Limitation Act must be construed in a manner that
subserves substantial justice rather than defeating it on
technicalities.
ii. That the petitioners have not derived any benefit from the
delay; on the contrary, they have been deprived of their
lawful entitlements for nearly two decades. There is
mala fide
neither intent nor deliberate inaction. The delay
is attributable to factors such as illiteracy, poverty, lack of
legal awareness, and absence of proper legal assistance,
all of which constitute “sufficient cause” within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
iii. That the trial Court dismissed the suit not upon a
comprehensive evaluation of the rival claims on merits,
but primarily on the ground that petitioner No.1 failed to
subject herself to cross-examination. It is pointed out
that even respondent No.3, who set up a rival claim as the
legally wedded wife, failed to substantiate her case by
adducing cogent evidence. Despite this, the trial Court
6
proceeded to dismiss the suit holding that the petitioners
failed to prove their status.
iv. That the trial Court failed to appreciate the documentary
material placed on record, including the legal heir
certificate, the cheque evidencing part payment of death
benefits to petitioner No.1 and other supporting
documents such as family-related records. It is thus
urged that the appeal raises substantial questions
warranting adjudication and has strong prospects of
success.
v. That the deceased employee was the sole breadwinner of
the family, and upon his demise, the petitioners were left
without any means of sustenance. The terminal benefits
of the deceased, which constitute their legitimate
entitlement, have remained withheld for nearly two
decades on account of the rival claim set up by
respondent No.3. It is contended that if the delay is
condoned and the appeal is allowed, the petitioners would
be in a position to secure the benefits lawfully due to
them.
vi. In support of the plea for condonation, reliance is placed
on the following decisions:
7
1
a) Manoharan v. Sivarajan , wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that refusal to condone
delay may result in a meritorious matter being
thrown out at the threshold, and that the
expression “every day’s delay must be explained”
should be applied in a rational, pragmatic, and
justice-oriented manner.
b) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v.
2
wherein it was held that the
Mst. Katiji ,
expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough to
enable Courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner so as to advance the cause of justice.
3
c) State of Bihar v. Kameswar Prasad Singh
wherein it was reiterated that the power to condone
delay is conferred upon Courts to enable them to do
substantial justice between the parties.
6. I have taken note of the aforesaid submissions urged and
the material placed on record.
Consideration by this Court
7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables the Court to
admit an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation
1
(2013) 14 SCALE 347
2
(1987) 2 SCR 387
3
(2000) 9 SCC 94
8
if the petitioner satisfies the Court that he/she had “sufficient
cause” for not preferring the appeal within such period. The
expression “sufficient cause” has been judicially interpreted to
mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party and
which prevented him from approaching the Court within time.
8. It is well settled that a party seeking condonation of delay
must set out specific, cogent and credible facts explaining the
delay. Mere vague, self-serving, or unsubstantiated averments
in an affidavit do not suffice to discharge this burden. The
Court is not bound to accept every explanation merely because
it is supported by an affidavit; the explanation must inspire
confidence and be supported by contemporaneous material.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
4
Nafar Academy , after examining a number of decisions on the
meaning of “sufficient cause”, the principles may be
summarised as follows:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be
culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
4
(2013) 12 SCC 649
9
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled
for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant
is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because
the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of
prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the
second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating
to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant
not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of
judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and
not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude…
(emphasis supplied)
Insofar as the period of limitation is concerned, an appeal
10.
under Section 96 of the CPC against a decree is required to be
filed within 90 days from the date of the decree, as prescribed
under Article 116 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, the
10
judgment and decree were passed on 22.10.2003, whereas the
appeal came to be presented only on 04.01.2023. Thus, the
delay is not marginal but amounts to 6918 days, i.e., nearly 19
years, which is ex facie inordinate and calls for a strict and
careful scrutiny of the explanation offered.
11. The explanation offered by the petitioners may broadly be
summarised as follows: illiteracy and poverty; lack of awareness
of Court proceedings; loss of contact with the engaged counsel;
and alleged knowledge of the dismissal of the suit only in
October, 2022; which are wholly unsatisfactory, lack credibility,
and do not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
12. It is no doubt true that Courts have, in appropriate cases,
adopted a liberal and sympathetic approach while dealing with
litigants who are illiterate or economically disadvantaged.
However, such considerations cannot be elevated to a position
where they override the statutory mandate of limitation.
Illiteracy and poverty, by themselves, cannot furnish a universal
or indefinite justification for prolonged inaction.
In the present case, the record discloses that the
13.
petitioners had actively prosecuted the suit at the trial stage.
The petitioner No.1 had engaged counsel, instituted the suit,
filed her chief-examination affidavit as P.W.1, and caused
11
documents to be marked. The judgment of the trial Court
further reveals that after the filing of the chief-examination
affidavit, the matter was adjourned on multiple occasions,
initially before an Advocate Commissioner and thereafter before
the Court, for cross-examination. Despite such opportunities,
petitioner No.1 failed to present herself for cross-examination.
The relevant portion of the said judgment of the trial Court is
extracted hereunder:
7….Having filed the suit for declaration and for other reliefs, the
burden is upon the plaintiffs only to prove that the first plaintiff is the
legally wedded wife of the deceased and that the plaintiffs 2 to 4
were born to the first plaintiff through him. But except ‘presenting
their case in such manner in the plaint, the plaintiffs have not placed
any cogent material before the Court so as to prove the same. Leave
alone, the placing of any such material, the first plaintiff did not even
choose to attend before the Court after she filed her chief examination
affidavit as Pw1 so as to face cross examination by the defendants.
Especially when the defendants have taken such contention with
regard to the status of the plaintiff as legal heirs of the deceased
coupled with the nature of the ‘controversy, it is the burden of the
plaintiffs to prove their case by way of offering the first plaintiff to the
defendants for cross examination. After the first plaintiff has filed her
chief examination affidavit as Pw-1, the Court has appointed one
Advocate/Commissioner for recording her cross examination and also
the evidence of other witnesses of the plaintiff if any on 24-4-2003.
After the matter underwent 8 (eight) adjournments from 8-5-2003 to 7-
8-2003, the Learned Advocate/Commissioner returned the warrant
with report that Pw-1 had not attended before her to face cross
examination by the defendants. Thereafter the Court has taken up the
job of recording cross examination of Pw-1 and granted 2 (two)
adjournments. But, the first plaintiff did not attend before the Court
due to which the Court has proceeded with the matter after treating
that she did not appear before it to face cross examination by the
defendants. The plaintiffs have not filed any petition thereafter for
reopening of the matter so as to offer Pw-1 for cross examination by
the defendants till the date when the arguments in the suit were
12
finally heard. So absolutely there is no material whatsoever on record
so as to accept the case of the plaintiffs.
(emphasis supplied)
14. This conduct of petitioner No.1 demonstrates lack of
diligence even during the pendency of the suit, as the petitioner
No.1 who was capable of engaging counsel, initiating
proceedings, and participating in the trial cannot, at a later
stage, seek to contend that she was wholly unaware of Court
proceedings. While illiteracy and economic disadvantage are
relevant factors, they cannot operate as a blanket licence to
bypass the law of limitation. The sympathy of the Court must
necessarily be balanced with the requirement of reasonable
diligence.
15. The plea that the petitioners lost contact with their
counsel cannot constitute sufficient cause, as they are expected
to exercise a minimum degree of diligence in following up the
proceedings. In the event of loss of contact, it is incumbent
upon the party to take reasonable steps to ascertain the status
of the case, including by approaching the Court Registry, the
Bar Association, or other legal practitioners.
In the present case, the assertion that the petitioners
16.
visited the Court “several times” is vague and unsupported by
any material, and no contemporaneous record has been placed
to demonstrate any attempt made between 2003 and 2023 to
13
ascertain the status of the suit. There is no application,
representation, or any other document evidencing such efforts.
Further, the plea that the petitioners could not even recall the
name of her counsel, and yet took no effective steps for nearly
two decades after an inordinate lapse of time, does not inspire
confidence and cannot be accepted as constituting sufficient
cause.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.Dohil Constructions
5
while interpreting the
Co. P. Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Limited
principle that law does not assist those who sleep over their
vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt
rights- has held as
under:
23. When we apply those principles to the case on hand, it has to be
stated that the failure of the Respondents in not showing due
diligence in filing of the appeals and the enormous time taken in the
refiling can only be construed, in the absence of any valid
explanation, as gross negligence and lacks in bonafides as displayed
on the part of the Respondents. Further, when the Respondents have
not come forward with proper details as regards the date when the
papers were returned for refiling, the non-furnishing of satisfactory
reasons for not refiling of papers in time and the failure to pay the
Court fee at the time of the filing of appeal papers on 06.09.2007, the
reasons which prevented the Respondents from not paying the Court
fee along with the appeal papers and the failure to furnish the details
as to who was their counsel who was previously entrusted with the
filing of the appeals cumulatively considered, disclose that there was
total lack of bonafides in its approach. It also requires to be stated
that in the case on hand, not refiling the appeal papers within the
time prescribed and by allowing the delay to the extent of nearly
1727 days, definitely calls for a stringent scrutiny and cannot be
accepted as having been explained without proper reasons. As has
been laid down by this Court, Courts are required to weigh the scale
5
(2013) 14 SCC 81
14
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the same principle
cannot be given a go-by under the guise of liberal approach even if it
pertains to refiling. The filing of an application for condoning the delay
of 1727 days in the matter of refiling without disclosing reasons,
much less satisfactory reasons only results in the Respondents not
deserving any indulgence by the Court in the matter of condonation of
delay. ...
(emphasis supplied)
18. The petitioners assert that they became aware of the
dismissal of the suit only on 24.10.2022 upon applying for
release of death benefits; however, the suit had already been
dismissed in 2003. It is an admitted position that petitioners
received part payment of Rs.6,945/- by cheque dated
17.07.2000 (Ex.A-1), indicating their awareness that the MCH
authorities were processing her claim. In this backdrop, the plea
that petitioners did not pursue the matter with the authorities
or seek legal recourse for nearly 19 years is difficult to accept.
The representations now relied upon, dated 2017, 2018,
19.
and 2022, made more than 14 years after dismissal do not
contain any assertion of lack of knowledge of the suit’s
dismissal. Notably, the representation dated 22.12.2017 merely
states that the matter was pending with the circle authority and
refers to the Court order dated 18.06.2002 in I.A.No.441 of
2002, thereby indicating awareness of the Court proceedings. In
the absence of any contemporaneous material supporting the
plea of ignorance, the claim of acquiring knowledge only in
15
October 2022 does not inspire confidence and appears to be an
afterthought.
20. Further, the concept of “sufficient cause” requires the
petitioner No.1 to demonstrate that she was prevented from
filing the appeal within the prescribed time on account of
circumstances beyond her control. In the present case, no such
circumstance is either pleaded or established. The petitioner
No.1 was neither hospitalised nor incapacitated, nor was she
under any legal disability that precluded her from pursuing the
remedy and was a major and an able-bodied person. The mere
failure to make any inquiry regarding the status of the case for
nearly 19 years cannot be construed as “prevention” within the
meaning of Section 5; rather, it reflects gross negligence and
complete indifference to her own rights.
21. The petitioners’ reliance on Manoharan (supra 1) and
Katiji (supra 2) that the doctrine “every day’s delay must be
explained” ought not to be applied in a pedantic manner, as the
principle does not dispense with the requirement that the
explanation for delay must be reasonable, specific, and
supported by material particulars. A liberal approach cannot be
equated with an uncritical acceptance of vague or
unsubstantiated pleas. The Apex Court has consistently held
that, while construing “sufficient cause” liberally, the Court
16
must nonetheless be satisfied that the delay was neither
occasioned by gross negligence nor by deliberate inaction.
6
22. In Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer , it
was held as under:
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.
(emphasis supplied)
23. It is pertinent to note that the explanation offered by the
petitioners is neither satisfactory nor supported by any
contemporaneous or corroborative material. No affidavit from
the erstwhile counsel or any third party has been produced to
substantiate the plea of loss of contact. No document evidencing
any effort to ascertain the status of the case between 2003 and
2017 has been placed on record. The first representation to the
employer seeking death benefits is of the year 2017 which more
than 14 years after the dismissal of the suit and even thereafter,
6
(2013) 14 SCC 81
17
no steps were taken to file an appeal until 2022. Thus, the
conduct of the petitioners discloses prolonged inaction and
indifference.
24. While the length of delay may not, by itself, be
determinative, it is undoubtedly a relevant factor in assessing
the sufficiency of the cause shown. An inordinate delay of nearly
two decades demands a cogent, credible, and continuous
explanation. The vague pleas of ignorance, loss of contact with
counsel, and belated knowledge of the decree, particularly in a
case where the petitioners had actively participated in the trial
up to the stage of evidence, fall short of this requirement.
25. The respondent No.3, who claims to be the legally wedded
wife of the deceased appear to have arranged their affairs on the
basis of the dismissal of the suit, and the decree dated
22.10.2003, though not granting any affirmative declaration in
her favour, effectively negated the petitioners’ claim and left the
position undisturbed; after an inordinate lapse of nearly two
decades, the petitioners now seek to reopen and unsettle that
position.
26. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent No.3,
stated to be about 66 years of age as per the plaint, has not
entered appearance despite substituted service; nevertheless,
the rights of parties cannot be kept in a state of perpetual
18
uncertainty, for the law of limitation is founded upon sound
public policy that there must be finality to litigation— interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium .
27. It is to be noted that the petitioners have sought to
emphasise the merits of the proposed appeal by contending that
the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit despite the alleged
failure of the respondent No.3 to substantiate her claim and
notwithstanding the documentary evidence said to have been
produced by the appellants. While this Court is conscious that,
at the stage of considering an application for condonation of
delay, a detailed examination of the merits is ordinarily
unwarranted, such considerations cannot override the statutory
requirement of establishing “sufficient cause” for the delay.
28. Even assuming that the appeal raises arguable issues,
the inordinate and unexplained delay, by itself, constitutes a
sufficient ground to decline condonation. It is well settled that a
strong case on merits cannot compensate for a complete failure
to satisfactorily explain the delay.
29. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that sufficient
cause has not been made out, the appeal remains barred by
limitation and cannot be entertained; consequently, the merits
of the matter do not fall for. The limited exception, where merits
may be glanced at, is confined to cases of marginal delay
19
coupled with a plausible explanation, and not to cases such as
the present one involving an inordinate delay of nearly two
decades without a cogent or continuous explanation. In this
regard, the principle of finality of litigation also assumes
significance. A decree, even if open to challenge, acquires a
degree of conclusiveness over time. With the passage of nearly
20 years, the position of parties is liable to undergo change;
evidence may no longer be available, and witnesses may become
inaccessible.
In the present case, the prolonged and unexplained
30.
inaction on the part of the petitioners, extending from 2003 to
at least 2017, without any contemporaneous material
evidencing efforts to pursue the matter, justifies an adverse
inference of gross negligence. When a party fails to take any
steps to challenge a decree for such an extended period, the
conduct assumes the character of abandonment of the remedy
of appeal rather than mere delay, which cannot be ignored.
Conclusion
31. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the appellants/petitioners have failed to establish
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of the delay of 6,918 days
in preferring the appeal. The explanation offered is vague,
20
unsubstantiated, and does not inspire confidence, and the
appellants/petitioners, having remained inactive for nearly two
decades, cannot now be permitted to revive a cause which has
long since attained finality.
32. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2023 seeking condonation of
delay stands dismissed. Consequently, the appeal in A.S.No.16
of 2023 is also dismissed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in
the appeal, shall stand closed. No costs.
_____________________
G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J
Date: 24.04.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
(B/o)
szt