Sheela Devi vs Ravi Kumar Singh

Court
Delhi High Court

$~11
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 04.05.2026
+ CONT.CAS(C) 124/2026, CM APPL. 29747/2026
SHEELA DEVI ....Petitioner
Through: Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, Dr. Ajay
Chaudhary, Mr. Bharat Chaudhary,
Ms. Vinita, Ms. Monika, Ms. Nikita
Chaudhary, Mr. Parambir Singh,
Advs.
Mr. Jai Sahai Endlaw, Ms.
Shambhavi Kala, Advs. for Applicant.
versus

RAVI KUMAR SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sandeep Tyagi (SPC) for R1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking initiation
of contempt proceedings against the respondent no. 1 for alleged willful
disobedience of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari
v. Govt. of U.P. & Ors . , (2014) 2 SCC 1. The relevant portion of the
judgment is reproduced as under –
“119. ……. But, if the information given clearly mentions the
commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to
register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the
stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is
falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the
information is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be
verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of
registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the
information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable
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offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be
false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing
a false FIR.

xxx xxx xxx
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the
Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence
and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

xxx xxx xxx
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if
cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him
discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or
otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether
the information reveals any cognizable offence.”

Nos. A-1, Greater Kailash-II and N-118, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. It is
the case of the petitioner that her sons, namely Romi Garg and Kapil Garg,
have been attempting to illegally usurp the aforesaid properties through
fraudulent and unlawful means.
3. It is submitted that the said persons are habitual offenders and have
been involved in numerous civil and criminal cases and several FIRs are
registered against them.
4. The said persons are stated to have forged and fabricated an
Agreement to Sell dated 15.05.2023, purportedly executed between the
petitioner and Romi Garg in respect of basement, ground floor and first floor
of property bearing No. A-1, Greater Kailash Enclave-II, New Delhi and
property bearing No. N-118, GK-I, New Delhi.
5. The petitioner categorically denies execution of any such document. It
is further alleged that on the basis of the said forged document, another
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fabricated Agreement to Sell dated 22.07.2024 was created between Romi
Garg and his company, White Paper Design Pvt. Ltd., with respect to the
property bearing No. A-1, Greater Kailash Enclave-II, New Delhi.
6. It is submitted that upon becoming aware of the aforesaid acts of
forgery and fraud, the petitioner lodged a complaint dated 21.07.2025 before
the DCP, Economic Offences Wing, seeking registration of an FIR for
multiple cognizable offences against the said persons.
7. It is contended by the petitioner that despite the complaint disclosing
commission of cognizable offences, no FIR was registered by the respondent
no. 1. It is submitted that in the Economic Offences Wing, the DCP
functions as the officer in charge, and is therefore obligated to act in
accordance with law.
8. It is further submitted that the accused Romi Garg filed a petition
being Crl. M.C. No. 7160/2025 before this Court seeking quashing of the
petitioner’s complaint. However, the said petition was dismissed vide order
dated 09.10.2025.
9. It is averred that in Lalita Kumari (supra), it has been held that upon
receipt of information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, the
officer in charge of a police station is duty bound to register an FIR, and
failure to do so invites action against the erring officials.
10. It is further submitted that the preliminary inquiry is to be completed
within a period of seven days. However, in the present case, after a delay of
about five months, the respondent, vide communication dated 13.12.2025,
concluded that no cognizable offence was made out. It is contended that
such a finding, without registration of an FIR and without conducting a
proper investigation, is ex facie illegal and in direct contravention of the law
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laid down by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra).
11. It is contended that a bare perusal of the complaint dated 21.07.2025
clearly discloses commission of several cognizable offences, and therefore
the respondent was under a mandatory obligation to register an FIR and
proceed with investigation. It is averred that the failure to do so, despite
settled legal position and binding judicial precedent, amounts to deliberate
and willful disobedience of the directions issued by the Supreme Court.
12. Being aggrieved of the same the petitioner has filed the present
petition.
13. The respondent no. 1 has strenuously objected to the maintainability
of the present petition and has placed reliance upon Vitusah Oberoi & Ors.
v. Court of Its Own Motion , (2017) 2 SCC 314 in support of the contention
that this Court cannot entertain a petition alleging contempt of an order
passed by the Supreme Court.
14. Further reliance has been placed on Hitarth Atulkumar Chag V.
Sunil Ishrani , Police Inspector , 2023:GUJHC:23766-DB, Fuliben
Ashokbhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat , 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 2343 and
Miss Reetu v. Dr. Sukhchain Singh, IPS and others , 2016 SCC OnLine
P&H 16146 to contend that the High Courts do not possess jurisdiction to
punish for alleged violation of the directions/guidelines issued by the
Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra).
15. Upon consideration of the submissions advanced, this Court finds
merit in the aforesaid objection raised by the respondent no. 1 regarding the
maintainability of the present proceedings.
16. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to Sections 10 and 11 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which read as under -
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“10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate
courts.—Every High Court shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same
procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate
to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it
where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
11. Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found
outside jurisdiction.—A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire
into or try a contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it,
whether the contempt is alleged to have been committed within or
outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person
alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or outside such limits.”
17. Reference must also be made to Articles 129 and 215 of the
Constitution of India. Article 129 is reproduced as under –
“129. Supreme Court to be a court of record.—The Supreme Court
shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.”

18. Article 215 is reproduced as under –
“215. High Courts to be courts of record.—Every High Court shall be
a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court
including the power to punish for contempt of itself.”

19. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid constitutional and statutory
provisions leaves no manner of doubt that the jurisdiction of a High Court in
contempt matters extends to contempt of itself and contempt of courts
subordinate to it.

20. Neither the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 nor Article 215 of the
Constitution confers jurisdiction upon a High Court to entertain or
adjudicate contempt proceedings alleging violation of orders or directions
issued by a superior constitutional court, the Supreme Court of India.
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21. In Vitusah Oberoi & Ors. v. Court of Its Own Motion (supra), the
Supreme Court has held as under –
“10. There is, from a plain reading of the above, nothing in the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or in Article 215 of the Constitution
which can be said to empower the High Court to initiate proceedings
suo motu or otherwise for the contempt of a superior court like the
Supreme Court of India. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court under
Article 129 and the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution
are both declared to be courts of record. One of the recognised
attributes of a court of record is the power to punish for its contempt
and the contempt of courts subordinate to it. That is precisely why
Articles 129 and 215, while declaring the Supreme Court and the High
Courts as courts of record, recognise the power vested in them to
punish for their own contempt. The use of the expression “including”
in the said provisions is explanatory in character. It signifies that the
Supreme Court and the High Courts shall, as courts of record,
exercise all such powers as are otherwise available to them including
the power to punish for their own contempt.

xxx xxx xxx
12. The power to punish for contempt vested in a court of record
under Article 215 does not, however, extend to punishing for the
contempt of a superior court. Such a power has never been recognised
as an attribute of a court of record nor has the same been specifically
conferred upon the High Courts under Article 215. A priori if the
power to punish under Article 215 is limited to the contempt of the
High Court or courts subordinate to the High Court as appears to us
to be the position, there was no way the High Court could justify
invoking that power to punish for the contempt of a superior court.
That is particularly so when the superior court's power to punish for
its contempt has been in no uncertain terms recognised by Article 129
of the Constitution. The availability of the power under Article 129
and its plenitude is yet another reason why Article 215 could never
have been intended to empower the High Courts to punish for the
contempt of the Supreme Court. The logic is simple. If the Supreme
Court does not, despite the availability of the power vested in it,
invoke the same to punish for its contempt, there is no question of a
court subordinate to the Supreme Court doing so. Viewed from any
angle, the order passed by the High Court appears to us to be without
jurisdiction, hence, liable to be set aside.”

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2023:GUJHC:23766-DB, the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court,
while dealing with a plea alleging wilful disobedience of the directions
issued in Lalita Kumari (supra), observed as under -
“12. In view of the aforesaid position, when we read Section 10 of the
Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution of
India, it gives a clear situation that for alleged violation of directions
of Hon’ble Supreme Court, High Court would not have any
jurisdiction to step in. Overstepping by the High Court would
tantamount not only to tinkering with language of statutory provision
but also would cross judicial discipline and as such we are of the
opinion that if directions contained in an order passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court if disobeyed, same can be taken care of by Hon’ble Apex
Court.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Now, reverting back to the case on hand, what has been alleged is
the conduct of respondent authority in not observing the directions
issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court and therefore, request for initiating
appropriate action under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act
and punish. A perusal of this entire judgment and order of Hon’ble
Apex Court indicates that it is no-doubt a direction issued in a specific
terms but then as has been clarified and explained in two previous
decisions of Arnesh Kumar (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra), no such
positive observations or directions are mentioned which would permit
the High Court to initiate action under the provisions of the Contempt
of Courts Act and therefore, even if if is alleged that there is a
violation of these directions issued by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of
Lalita Kumari (supra). It is not open for the High Court to overstep
and travel beyond its jurisdiction which has already been confined by
virtue of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article
215 of the Constitution of India. It is also quite settled proposition of
law that High Court cannot pass any order against the statutory
provision.
xxx xxx xxx
22. In light of the observations contained in the judgment of Allahabad
High Court in the case of Shabina v. Shogun Gautam and Another
reported in 2020 SCC OnLine All 1365, yet another decision of
Allahabad High Court dated 31.8.2020 rendered in the case of Anand
Dwivedi v. H.C. Awasthi and others and also the decisions of High
Court of Chhatttisgarh at Bilaspur dated 2.8.2021 in the case of Vijay
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Laxmi Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, we are also of the
opinion that entertaining this petition would tantamount to
overstepping the jurisdiction. Since the main relief is only to the extent
of framing of charge, trying the accused and punish the respondents
for committing contempt of Hon’ble Apex Court, as indicated above.
xxx xxx xxx
24. It is a trite law that contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in
the hands of the Courts of law, but that by itself operates as a string of
caution as well. Proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and as such,
said jurisdiction cannot be exercised on mere probabilities and it is
also a settled position of law that if two interpretations are possible,
jurisdiction may not be desirable to be exercised and this power to
punish for contempt is a special and rare power and this drastic
power if misdirected, would result into miscarriage of justice on either
way and Courts while exercising this jurisdiction must not travel
beyond four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted
or enter into, question that have not been dealt with or decided in the
judgment or the order failure of which is alleged. Only such directions
which are explicit in a judgment or the order or plainly self-evident
ought to have been taken into account for the purpose of consideration
as to whether there has been any violation and Courts while
exercising this jurisdiction must ensure that while considering a
contempt plea, jurisdiction available to the Court in other corrective
powers like review or appeal is not trenched upon and as such, with
this limits, which are well-defined, we are of the view that since
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Lalita Kumari (supra) having not
clarified or directed or explained as to what has been done in the case
of D.K. Basu (supra) and Arnesh Kumar (supra), we are of the
opinion that in the absence of such, to entertain the contempt petition
would be tinkering with jurisdictional limits which are well defined by
virtue of provisions as indicated above. Hence, present contempt
petition for want of jurisdiction is not entertainable.”

23. Similarly, in Fuliben Ashokbhai Rathod , (supra) the Gujarat High
Court while relying upon Hitarth Atulkumar Chag (supra), has observed as
under –
“6. Thus, the Division Bench, on an identical issue, has already
opined as stated hereinabove and hence, the present contempt petition
is not maintainable as powers can only be exercised by the Apex Court
under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has also
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an alternative remedy of challenging the action of the respondents by
filing appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum, more
particularly under Section 156(3) read with Section 190 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.”
24. In Miss Reetu v. Dr. Sukhchain Singh, IPS and others , 2016 SCC
OnLine P&H 16146, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held as under–
“16. Perusal of the provisions of the Act would show that the power to
punish for contempt of subordinate Courts by the High Court is
derived from Section 10 of the Act and it also has power to punish
contempt of itself under the provisions of the Act as also under Article
215 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the power to
punish for contempt of orders passed by the subordinate Courts is
derived under Article 215 but it is only under the Act. The High Court
has been conferred jurisdiction to the extent as provided under the Act
to punish for contempt of itself and the subordinate Courts. The intent
of the legislature is, therefore, clear that the jurisdiction of the High
Court to punish for contempt is limited to the subordinate Courts and
not to the superior Courts than the High Court. The expression ‘Court
subordinate to the High Court’ in Section 10 of the Act would lead to
only one conclusion that the High Court can exercise powers under
the Act to the Courts subordinate to it in the hierarchy of the Court
established for the purpose of administration of justice but it would
not include the Supreme Court which cannot be said to be a Court
subordinate to the High Court. Similarly the expression ‘Court’ in
Section 2(b) or expression ‘any Court’ mentioned in Section 2(c) of
the Act cannot include the power of the High Court to punish for the
civil contempt or criminal contempt of the Supreme Court unless there
are observations/directions in the order, contempt of Court whereof is
alleged to have been committed, indicating or specifically stating that
the High Court would monitor or seek compliance or violation of the
order would be contempt of Court which can be filed in the High
Court which has jurisdiction where such contempt is committed or
such other observations etc.
17. In view of the above and especially in the light of the fact that the
Supreme Court has not observed anything with regard to taking
cognizance of any violation by the officials/competent authority qua
the directions and conclusions recorded in para 111 of the judgment
in Lalita Kumari's case (supra), which would enable this Court to
initiate or take action against the alleged contemnor, this Court would
not like to exercise its jurisdiction in the present contempt petition.”
25. The dicta laid in the above judgments squarely applies in the present
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case as well. Consequently, a contempt petition alleging violation of
directions issued by the Supreme Court would not be maintainable before
this Court.
26. However, the aforesaid conclusion does not, in any manner, dilute the
binding force of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Lalita
Kumari (supra). The said directions continue to bind all concerned
authorities and officials, who are duty-bound to act in strict compliance
thereof.

27. If the petitioner is aggrieved by any alleged inaction or omission on
the part of the concerned officials, the petitioner is at liberty to avail other
appropriate legal remedies, including remedies under the criminal law
against the concerned officials, and/or take recourse to other proceedings as
may be maintainable in accordance with law.
28. The present petition is, consequently, dismissed with the aforesaid
liberty to the petitioner.

SACHIN DATTA, J
MAY 4, 2026/ at/sv
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