Gangacharan Yadav vs Madhya Paresh Eastkshetra Vitran Company Ltd

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:25991
1 WA-853-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
st
ON THE 31 OF AUGUST, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 853 of 2026
GANGACHARAN YADAV
Versus
MADHYA PARESH EASTKSHETRA VITRAN COMPANY LTD AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Siddharth Sharma, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Anil Sharma, Advocate for respondents.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal, under section 2(1) of the M.P.Uchcha Nyayalaya
(Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed against the
order dated 8/1/2026 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No.13576/2021
by which the petition filed by appellant has been dismissed on the ground of
delay and latches.
2. Undisputed fact is that appellant, as well as, respondent No.9 were
appointed on the post of Office Assistant Grade III as trainee on the same
date and further in the seniority list, as issued in the year 1990, appellant was
placed at S.No.181 whereas respondent No.9 was placed at S.No.182.
However, respondent No.9 was thereafter given promotion to the post of
Assistant Grade II in the year 1991 whereas appellant was promoted on the
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said post on 18/6/1997. Thereafter, respondent No.9 was given regular

promotions as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the impugned order.
3. The learned Single Judge has considered that appellant was
superseded by respondent No.9 for the first time in the year 1991 whereas
petition was filed in the year 2021 i.e. after 30 long years of first
supersession. Learned Single Judge has also relied upon judgment passed by
Supreme Court in the case of P.S.Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of T.N. reported
in (1975)1 SCC 152 pointing out the necessity of immediate approach to the
Court against any supersession and in case if an aggrieved person approaches
the Court after a considerable period, then the High Court can refuse to
exercise their extraordinary power under Article 226 of Constitution of India
on the ground of delay and latches.
4. The Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewarage Board and others Vs. T.T.Murali Babu reported in
(2014)4 SCC 108 has held as under:-
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has
forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest
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thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and
rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury
to the lis."

5. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon.Ltd. Vs.
K. Thangappan reported in (2006)4 SCC 322 has held as under :-
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion
has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239)
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir
Barnes had stated:
“ Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in
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which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of
the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards
that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed
in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given
to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation
approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It
was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it
does not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles
and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there
is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
6. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State
of T.N. reported in (2007)9 SCC 78 has held as under :
"11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case.
In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-
1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the
writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The
writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the
same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious.
A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable
reason, cannot be given any benefit."
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India
reported in (2007)9 SCC 274 has held as under :
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"6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to
be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in
mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes
had stated:
“ Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there
is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
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extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

8. The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School
Council Vs. Sristidhar Biswar reported in (2007)12 SCC 779 has held as
under :
"11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the

petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in
Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the
court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is
very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot
come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their
rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the
delay of nine years cannot be countenanced."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh
reported in (2006)11 SCC 464 has held as under :
"12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s
Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
“
In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to
laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant’s
part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the
violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has
done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver
of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would
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not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.”"

10. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana
reported in (1997)6 SCC 538 has held as under :
"18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay
disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or
Article 32 of the Constitution..."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported
in (2007)9 SCC 278 has held as under :
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost
sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years.
They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as
noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the
earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as
parties even in the reference made by the State before the
Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those
employees who were employed or who were recruited after the
cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a
long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are
relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.
(See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union
of India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 277,
paras 9-10)
“
9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of
cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to
take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah
Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can
be considered reasonable for making representations and if the
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Government had turned down one representation the making of
another representation on similar lines will not explain the
delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of
repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory
explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been
dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun
Kumar Patnaik.)

10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a
ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend
upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a
reasonable period say three years normally the Court would
reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a
reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not
examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits
it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it
would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.”"
12. Under these circumstances, it is clear that in case of supersession,
the aggrieved person must approach the Court within a reasonable time and
the aspect of delay and latches cannot be ignored while entertaining the writ
petition which is filed belatedly.
13. In the present case, appellant has approached this Court after 30
years of his first supersession. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said
that approach by appellant before the Court was expeditious. Accordingly,
this Court is of considered opinion that the learned Single Judge did not
commit any mistake by dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay
and latches.
14. Appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
(and)
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