PITARUS (Abated) vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010160882005
2026:CGHC:45322
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SANTOSH
KUMAR
SHARMA
CRA No. 418 of 2005
Judgment reserved on 14.08.2026
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH KUMAR
SHARMA
Date: 2026.10.27
23:39:01 +0530
Judgment delivered on 27.10.2026
1. Pitarus (Abated) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 19/02/2026
2. Anjulus Khalkho S/o S/o - Alvis Khalkho Aged About 40 Years
Occupation Cultivation, R/o - Haradand, P.S. - Kansabel, District -
Jashpur (C.G.)
... Appellant (s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, through the District Magistrate Jashpur (CG)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Shubham Tripathi, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Anant Bajpai, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
C A V Judgment
1. This appeal is preferred under Section 372(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 against judgment dated 19.04.2005 passed by
Additional Sessions Judge, Jashpur, District Jashpur (CG) in Sessions
Trial No. 129 of 2004, whereby the appellant has been convicted and
sentenced in the following manner:-

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Conviction Sentence
201 of the IPC RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.
1000/- in default of payment of
fine to further undergo additional
RI for six months.
2.
During pendency of the appeal, Appellant No.1 Pitarus died on
04.12.2007 which is reflected from the order sheet dated 19.02.2026,
therefore, the appeal so far as appellant No. 1 Pitarus is concerned, is
abated.
3.
Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim was aged about 13
years of age at the time of incident and studying in class 6 lodged
written complaint before Police Station alleging that on 27.01.2004, she
has gone to the house of her uncle Florance Kujur to attend the
marriage ceremony of her aunt’s son Virendra Ekka at Harridand. It is
also alleged that on 28.01.2004 at about 2.00 PM, Prakash Tirky told
her that her brother called her, therefore, she rushed the house of
Patrus Oraon where co-accused Prakash Tirky, Ajit Khalkho, Vipin
Kerketta and Vinod were already present there. Thereafter accused
Prakash took her inside the house and committed forceful sexual
intercourse with her and when she tried to shout then Ajit Khalkho tied
her face with handkerchief and thereafter the co-accused committed
forceful sexual intercourse with her one by one, subsequently she
became unconscious and thereafter someone else took her to her
house. It is also alleged that the victim due to fear did not inform the
incident to anyone and she remained silent there upto 29.01.2004.

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4. It is also case of the prosecution that on 30.01.2004, she went to her
house where she informed the incident to her grandmother that Prakash
Tirky, Ajit Khakho, Vipin Kerketta and Vinod Ram had committed rape
on her. On 01.02.2004 she along with her family went to village
Harridand where a Panchayat meeting was held and the Panchas told
them that since it is the matter of our village, therefore, pressurized the
father of the victim to compromise with the accused regarding the
offence committed by them, accordingly prepared a draft compromise
and provided some money to father of the victim. Ultimately, on the
complaint of the victim, FIR (Ex.P-1) was registered against the
appellant. The victim was sent for medical examination which was
conducted by Dr. R. Toppo (PW-9) who has prepared his report (Ex.P-
7).Memorandum statements of witnesses were recorded. Appellants
were arrested by arrest memo (Ex.P-17 to Ex.P-25).
5. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed before the
Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jashpur, who in turn committed
the case to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge Jashpur which was
registered as Sessions Case No. 129 of 2004. The learned trial Court
after hearing the parties has convicted the co-accused under Section
376(2)(g) of the IPC and the learned trial Court after considering the
evidence has convicted the present appellant under Section 201 of the
IPC for causing disappearance of the evidence with intention to
screening the offenders from legal punishment.

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6. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the appellant No.2
examined 14 witnesses victim(PW-1), Imil Kujur (PW-2), Naresh Ekka
(PW-3), Heeramani Sidar (PW-4), Maluram (PW-5),Hilariyus Kerketta
(PW-6), Martha Kujur (PW-7), Imil (PW-8), Dr. R. Toppo (PW-9), Dr. Y.K.
Toppo (PW-10), Folorance Kujur (PW-11), Nikolas Kerketta (PW-12),
R.C. Nisad (PW-13) and Shyam Lal Sharma (PW-14) and exhibited the
documents from (Ex.P-1) to (Ex.P-25).Statement of the
accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrPC in which he
denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the
prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. The
appellant in his support examined Jogitram (DW-1).
7. After hearing the parties, learned Additional Sessions Judge on the
basis of material on record and upon considering the statements of the
witnesses passed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
against the appellant as mentioned above. Being aggrieved with the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence, appellant preferred this
Criminal Appeal. During the trial, appellant remained in jail from
29.09.2004 to 24.01.2005. This Court vide order dated 09.05.2005
released the Appellant on bail, as such he remained incarceration for 7
months and 10 days.
8. Learned counsel for the Appellant would submit that the evidence of
father and brother of the victim is not at all established that the
appellant has caused disappearance of evidence of offence as it is quite
clear that due to some village rivalry the appellant has falsely been

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implicated in the aforesaid crime. He would further submit that the
prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt
and they are unable to produce legal evidence against the appellant. He
would further submit that the appellant never put any pressure on the
father as well as brother of the victim to disappear the evidence with an
intention of screening the offender. Thus from the appreciation of
evidence, it is established that the appellant has not committed any
offence under Section 201 of the IPC.
9. He would further submit that there is delay of 8 month in lodging the FIR
which creates doubt on the credibility of evidence of victim as well as
father and brother of the victim, looking to the fact that there is no legal
evidence regarding the act performed by the appellant, therefore, his
conviction under Section 201 of the IPC is not justifiable. He would
further submit that the other co-accused have already been acquitted
from the charges levelled against them for commission of offence under
Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC by this Court on 22.03.2025 by granting
benefit of doubt, as such when the main accused have already been
acquitted of the main charges then conviction of the present appellant
for commission of offence under Section 201 of the IPC stands wiped
out and would pray for setting aside the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence.
10. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgments of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel
vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2018 SC (Criminal) 451, The State of

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Assam vs. Moinul Haque @ Monu reported 2026 INSC 386 and the
judgments of High Courts in the case of Kajju Lal vs. State of
Rajasthan reported in 2006 CRILJ 4386, Dr. R. Jairam Iyer vs. State
of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Misc Petition NO. 765 of 2010, Vijay
Bahadur @ Monu vs. State in Criminal Appeal No. 1278 of 2011.
11. On the other hand learned State counsel opposes the submission made
by learned counsel for the appellant and would support that the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court is
legal and justified as the trial court after considering the evidence of
prosecution witnesses has recorded its finding that the prosecution is
able to successfully prove the charges under Section 201 of the IPC
against the appellant. He would further submit that the prosecution has
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and there is no material
available on record to set aside the well reasoned finding recorded by
the trial court and would pray for dismissal of appeal.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of
the trial Court.
13. From the submissions made by the parties the points emerged for
determination are;-
(I) Whether conviction of the appellant for commission of offence
under Section 201 of the IPC is sustainable irrespective of
acquittal of main accused for commission of offence under Section
376(2)(g) of the IPC?
(ii) Whether the prosecution is able to prove the offence under
Section 201 of the IPC against the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.

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Finding and discussion on point No.1.
14. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the main
accused are acquitted of the main offence under Section 376(2)(g) of
the IPC by this Court, therefore, conviction of the appellant for incidental
charges has lost its significance and on this count alone the accused
deserves to be acquitted of the charges, is misconceived and deserves
to be rejected as Section 201 of the IPC can be independently laid and
conviction can be maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that an offence under Section 201 of
the IPC had been committed by the person charged with the offence
knowingly or believing that he has caused disappearance of evidence
with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. The
view of this Court is fortified from the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v. State of
Gujarat reported in 2018(3) SCC 313 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in paragraph 11 and 14 has held as under:-
11. In Sukhram v. State of Maharastra 2007(7) SCC 502, this
Court discussed Kalawati AIR 1953 SC 131, Palvinder Kaur
AIR 1952 SC 354, Suleman Rehiman AIR 68, SC 829 and
V.L.Tresa 2001 (3) SCC 549 among others. The essential
ingredients for conviction under Section 201 of the IPC have
been discussed at paragraph-18:-
18. The first paragraph of the section contains the
postulates for constituting the offence while the
remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different
tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of
offence in each situation. To (2001) 3 SCC 549 (2007) 7
SCC 502 bring home an offence under Section 201 IPC,
the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an
offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under
Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to
believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person

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charged with the said offence should have caused
disappearance of evidence; and (iv) the act should have
been done with the intention of screening the offender
from legal punishment or with that intention he should
have given information respecting the offence, which he
knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to
screen the offender committing an offence must be the
primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs
any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence
undern Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion is not
sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to
prove that the accused knew or had information
sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had
been committed and that the accused has caused the
evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender,
known or unknown.”
15. In light of the above legal position, this Court is of the view that even if
the main accused is acquitted by this Court the offence under Section
201 of the IPC can be independently tried subject to prove the charges
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant.
Accordingly, the point No.1 is answered against the appellant and in
favour of the prosecution. Now, this Court is examining whether the
prosecution is able to prove the charges levelled against the appellant
for commission of offence under Section 201 of the IPC beyond
reasonable doubt or not.
Finding and discussion on point No.2.
16. To appreciate the point emerged for determination, it is expedient for
this Court to extract Section 201 of the IPC.
Section 201- Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or
giving false information to screen offender.—
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence
has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of
that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the
offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any

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infor-mation respecting the offence which he knows or believes
to be false; if a capital offence.— shall, if the offence which he
knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with
death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable
to fine;if punishable with imprisonment for life.— and if the
offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;if
punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment.— and if the
offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not
extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of
the description provided for the offence, for a term which may
extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the
imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide
the body with the intention of screening B from punishment. A is
liable to imprisonment of either description for seven years, and
also to fine.
17. From the provisions of Section 201 of the IPC, the essential ingredients
are required to be proved by the prosecution for sustaining the offence
under this Section (I) offence should be committed (II) person charged
with the offence under Section 201 of the IPC must have knowledge or
reason to be believed that the main offence has been committed (III)
person charge with the offence under Section 201 of the IPC should
have caused disappearance of the evidence or should have been given
false information regarding the main offence and the act should have
been done with intention of screening the offender from legal
punishment, therefore, now this Court is appreciating the evidence
brought on record whether these ingredients have been proved by the
prosecution or not beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, point No.2 is
answered in favour of the appellant and against the prosecution.

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18. Victim(PW-1) in paragraph-5 of her deposition, has deposed that a
Panchayat meeting was held at village Harridand and the said meeting
was attended by her father and mother only and she has not attended
the meeting. Appellants Pitarus Tirkey and Anjulus Khalkho have stated
that the case be buried here itself as it is a matter of concerning the
village and the family and thereafter Anjulus and Pitarus Tirkey have
compromised the dispute and prepared draft compromise. In para 19 of
cross-examination, this witness has admitted that neither her mother
nor herself has attended the panchayat meeting, as such she cannot
tell what happened in the meeting and which document was prepared in
the said meeting. She has also admitted that she cannot tell which
villagers were present in the meeting.
19. Father of the victim Imlis Kujur (PW-2) in examination-in-chief has
supported the case of the prosecution. But in the cross-examination, he
has admitted that about 50 persons were present in the panchayat
meeting and all the head of the villagers were present and also
admitted that all the persons of the panchayat have suggested for
settlement of the matter but no one has pressured for compromise. He
has also stated that if Rs 50,000/- is given then only compromise can
be done and also admitted that that if Rs. 15,000/- would have been
given then compromise cannot be executed. He has admitted that he
has done compromise after examining his interest. In the cross-
examination, this witness has stated that Pitarus and Anjulus have
prevented him from reporting the matter till 8 months.

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20. R.C. Nishad Sub Inspector (PW-12) is the investigating officer who has
duly supported the prosecution case.
21. Naresh Ekka (PW-3) is cousin brother of victim and nephew of father of
victim has stated in paragraph-16 that the accused Pitrour told him (who
has already died) that they will compromise the matter at Rs. 2000/-
only. It has also been stated that the complainant has taken money
therefore, they will expel them from the society and they have expelled
them. This witness has further stated that Piturus and Anjulus have
demanded Rs. 10,000/- from him again to join them in the society but
we have not given money, as such they have expelled him and because
of pressure built up by the accused, he has not lodged the report for 8
months. The witness was cross-examined and in paragraph -26
wherein he has admitted that Anjulus and Piturus have no relationship
with the accused and have also admitted that head of the society is
preacher whose advice is followed by the member of the society and in
paragraph -27 he has admitted that the appellant is not the President or
the Secretary of the society and even he is also not the office bearer of
the society.
22. Tersa Kujur (PW-8) mother of the victim. In the cross-examination, She
has admitted that the panchayat has prohibited them for lodging of the
report and they have done the compromise. She has also admitted in
paragraph-8, that she is not aware whether panchayat has been done
or not and what happened in the panchayat is not known to her till
today. She has also admitted in paragraph-10, she has never visited

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village Harridand and she does not know the appellant and also
admitted that their names have been informed to her at the time of
lodging of the report.
23. From the analysis of the evidence, it is quite vivid that the prosecution is
unable to prove the essential ingredients to attract the offence under
Section 201 of the IPC, as the victim (PW-1) who can throw the light on
the charges levelled against the appellants has categorically admitted
that she was not present in the panchayat meeting. Similarly the father
of the victim (PW-2) in paragraph-9 admitted that he has demanded Rs.
50,000/- from the accused. From further analyzing the evidence, it is
quite vivid, that no one has created pressure upon him and it remained
affirmed that if Rs. 50,000/- is given to him by the main accused then
compromise would have done by him with them. This clearly wiped out
the charges of disappearance of the evidence against the present
appellant.
24. Further it is quite vivid from the evidence mother of victim (PW-8)
wherein she has admitted that she has never visited the Panchayat
where the alleged offense was committed and she has not heard about
the appellant which clearly establishes that the prosecution has not
brought any cogent evidence against the appellants to prove that the
appellants have caused disappearance of evidence or should have
given false information regarding the main offence and the appellants
have knowledge or reason to believe that the main offence has been
committed. Knowing this the appellant did the act with intention of

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screening of the offender from legal punishment. In absence any cogent
evidence against the appellant for commission of offence, conviction of
the appellant under Section 201 of the IPC cannot be sustainable. The
view of this Court is fortified by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Sou. Vijaya Alias Baby vs State of Maharashtra
reported 2003 (8) SCC 296, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
6. Section 201 IPC presents a case of accusations after the fact.
"An accessory after the fact" said Lord Hale, "may be, where a
person knowing a felony to have been committed, receives
comforts, or assists the felon. (See 1 Dale 618). Therefore, to
make an accessory ex post facto it is in the first place requisite that
he should know of the felony committed. In the next place, he must
receive, relieve, comfort, or assist him. And, generally any
assistance whatever given to a felon to hinder his being
apprehended, tried or suffering punishment, makes the assister an
accessory. What Section 201 requires is that the accused must
have had the intention of screening the offender. To put it
differently, the intention to screen the offender, must be the primary
and sole object of the accused. The fact that the concealment was
likely to have that effect is not sufficient, for Section 201 speaks of
intention as distinct from a mere likelihood.
7. Section 201 punishes any person, who knowing that any offence
has been committed, destroys the evidence of that offence or
gives false information in order to screen the offender from legal
punishment. Section 201 is designed to penalize "attempts to
frustrate the course of justice".
8…………….
9…………….
10. On applying the aforesaid legal principles to the factual
scenario it is clear that the prosecution has not established the
essential ingredients. The decision relied upon i.e. V.L. Tresa
(supra) by the respondent-State is really of no assistance to it.
There is no quarrel with the legal principle that notwithstanding
acquittal with reference to offence under Section 302 IPC,
conviction under Section 201 is permissible, in a given case. In the
present case in addition to the fact that the appellant A-2 has been
acquitted of the charges relating to Section 302 IPC, there is no
material to bring in application of Section 201 by attributing

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knowledge of the commission of the offence to her. It is rightly
contended by Mr. Lalit that the charges framed were for causing
disappearance of evidence. Though in a given case defective
charge does not vitiate trial in terms of Section 464 of the Criminal
Procedure Code 1908, (for short 'the Code') where the omission is
vital and even the substance of accusations is totally different from
what is sought to be established by the prosecution, and there is
no evidence on record to attribute knowledge of commission of the
offence by the other accused that can be an additional factor for
acquitting the accused. Looked at from any angle conviction of the
appellant-accused A-2 cannot be maintained and is set aside. The
appeal is allowed. The bail bonds are cancelled.
[
25. As such finding of the learned trial Court at paragraph -65 of the
judgment that the appellant knowing the fact that the offence of rape
has been committed, has attempted to withhold the report by
conducting a panchayat is erroneous and perverse finding as PW-2
himself admitted in the cross-examination that 50 persons were present
in the Panchayat and he himself demanded money from the accused
and nowhere stated that the accused has prevented them to report the
matter for 8 months to the police. Thus the finding of the learned trial
Court in paragraph-65 is illegal, perverse and deserves to be set aside
by this court and accordingly it is set aside. The accused deserves to be
acquitted from the offence for which he was punished as the
prosecution is unable to prove the ingredients of offence under Section
201 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt.
26. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed by granting benefit of doubt. The
appellant is reported to be on bail, his bail bonds shall continue for
further period of six months in view of Section 481 of BSNN.

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27. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the
trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and
compliance.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
santosh