SRI THIMMESH PRABHU vs SRI B V SRINIVAS
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 30 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 902 OF 2025 (IO)
BETWEEN:
SRI. THIMMESH PRABHU
S/O LATE SRI. LAKKAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 43/1,
TH
12 CROSS ROAD,
AGRAHARA DASARAHALLI
BENGALURU -560 079
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SRINIDHI S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI B.V.SRINIVAS
S/O VENKATESHAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
BK HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
2. SRI. B.V.MUNINDRA,
S/O VENKATESHAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K.HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU- 562 122
Digitally
signed by
SUVARNA T
Location:
HIGH COURT
OF
KARNATAKA
3. SMT. ASHWATHAMMA,
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W/O LATE SRI. VENKATARAMANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K. HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
4. SRI. VENKATESHAPPA,
S/O LATE SRI. VENKATARAMANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K. HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
5. SMT. KUMARI,
W/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
BK HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
6. SMT. PALLAVI,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K. HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
7. SRI. ROSHAN,
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K. HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 562 122
8. SMT. PREETHI T.,
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D/O SRI. THIMMESH PRABHU,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K. HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU – 560 079
9. SRI. PREM T,
S/O SRI. THIMMESH PRABHU,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BEGURU VILLAGE,
B.K.HALLI POST, JALA HOBLI,
YELAHANKA TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 079
…RESPONDENTS
(R1 AND R2 ARE SERVED
NOTICE TO R3 TO R9 ARE DISPENSED WITH V/O/D:
06/01/2026)
THIS CRP FILED UNDER SEC.115 OF CPC., AGAINST THE
ORDER DATED 30.10.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.4 IN OS
NO.1197/2024 ON THE FILE OF I ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE AND JMFC, DEVANAHALLI, DISMISSING THE IA NO.4
FILED UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151 OF
CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
08.09.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
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CAV ORDER
The present Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by
the order dated 30.10.2025 passed on I.A.No.IV in
O.S.No.1197/2024 by the I Additional Senior Civil Judge &
JMFC, Devanahalli.
2. The respondents herein have filed a suit seeking
partition and declaration against petitioner/defendant No. 6
herein. In that suit, an application is filed seeking rejection of
the plaint. It is the case of the defendant that the sale deed for
the year 1997 is challenged. It was executed by defendant Nos.
1 and 2 in favour of defendant No. 6. It is also mentioned in
the plaint that the cause of action arose on 20.05.2024 and
that defendant No. 1 allegedly refused the request for partition
on subsequent occasions. The cause of action appears to be
wholly concocted. A plain reading of the plaint reveals that the
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any legal and enforceable
right. It is stated that no partition has taken place. The
plaintiffs have made a direct claim for specific shares in the suit
property without seeking partition of the entire estate, and that
is not permissible. The plaint does not disclose a cause of
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action. There is no actionable cause of action. The defendant is
a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and lawfully
acquired the property in the year 1997. Hence, the cause of
action is fabricated. The transaction has already been
concluded. The plaint has no merit. As per Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, the suit is barred by law. In the absence of clear
and definite averment on the date of knowledge, the suit is
prima facie barred by limitation. The plaint is cleverly drafted to
bring the suit within the period of limitation. The plaintiffs have
not sought the relief of cancellation of the sale deed as per
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. As per the proviso to
Section 34 of the Act, the suit is not maintainable. The sale
deed is binding on the plaintiffs. Consequential relief of
cancellation is not sought. Defendant No. 6 acquired the right
over the suit property. Defendant No. 2, who is the father of
the plaintiff, was one of the signatories to the sale deed.
Plaintiff No. 1 was a minor. Plaintiff No. 2 was not born at the
time of sale. Hence, the plaintiffs are not legally entitled to
question the transaction. The suit property is the self-acquired
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property of defendant No. 1. There is no triable issue. Hence,
they sought for rejection of the plaint.
3. The trial court by order impugned had rejected the
application. The trial Court while rejecting the application has
held that the limitation is a question of fact and law and if the
plaint is meritless, vexatious and does not disclose cause of
action, the plaint can be rejected. The Court observed that the
whole plaint averments give rise to cause of action. It is the
burden of the plaintiffs to prove the alleged plaint averments.
Hence, it requires trial. There are no grounds in the application.
In the objection also, it is clearly stated by the plaintiffs that
the Sale Deed is not binding on the plaintiffs. Allegations made
in the application of defendant No.6 are not true. Hence, on
perusal of the entire material on record, the Court is of the
opinion that the plaint discloses cause of action and accordingly
rejected the application filed by the defendant.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner/defendant submits that the order dated 30.10.2025
is bad in law. The trial Court gravely erred in concluding that
the mere averments in the plaint, stating that the cause of
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action allegedly arose in April 2024, are sufficient to sustain the
suit. The plaintiffs conspicuously failed to plead with specificity
as to when they first acquired knowledge of the execution of
the alleged Sale Deed dated 24.01.1997. In the absence of
such material pleadings, the plaint is deficient and fails to
disclose a clear cause of action. It is submitted that the trial
Court erred in holding that merely mentioning the name of the
plaintiff's grandfather in the RTC entries is sufficient to
establish his right in the suit schedule property. Such reference
in revenue records does not, by itself, prove that the property
was purchased by the said grandfather in the name of
defendant No.1, as incorrectly contended by the plaintiffs in
para No.5 of the plaint. Further, the trial Court has failed to
appreciate the fact in conjunction with the document produced
by the plaintiff along with the plaint. The sale deed dated
07.10.1974 produced along with the plaint, unequivocally
records the name of defendant No.1 alone and not the
plaintiff's grandfather. It is submitted that the plaintiff have
instituted the present suit seeking declaration that the sale
deed dated 24.01.1997 is not binding on their alleged share in
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the alienated suit schedule property. However, the plaintiffs
have conspicuously not sought the cancellation of the sale
deed. The Court has failed to appreciate that defendant No.6 is
a bona fide purchaser. It is submitted that the trial court has
erred in failing to appreciate that once the property stood in the
name of the grandmother and the registered sale deed of 1974,
she became the absolute owner under Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act,1956. The trial Court wrongly ignored her
absolute ownership and alienation rights. Further, the trial
court has failed to appreciate that under Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act, any property possessed by a female
Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of
the Act, became her absolute property. Consequently, the
plaintiff's grandmother's ownership was absolute and her
alienation by sale deed in 1997, is valid and binding. Any
challenge to her ownership or alienation is barred by law and
unsustainable. The trial court has failed to appreciate that
defendant No.1, together with her son defendant No.2 and late
Sri Muniyappa, executed a registered sale deed in 1997,
thereby lawfully and validly alienated the suit schedule
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property. Upon such alienation, the property ceased to form
part of her estate, and no succession right could arise
thereafter. The trial Court without applying the provisions of
Section 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 and
without appreciating that succession arises only in respect of
property that remains in the estate of female Hindu at the time
of her death. Since the suit schedule property stood alienated
under registered instrument in 1997, no property remained to
devolve upon the plaintiffs. This vital aspect was overlooked by
the Court. Learned counsel submits that the order impugned is
bereft of reasons.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied
on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution Vs. B.
1
Gunashekar and Another . He relied on paragraph Nos.14.1 and
17, which read as under:
“14.1
14.1. Thus, it is clear that the above provision
viz., Order VII Rule 11 CPC serves as a crucial
filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to
terminate proceedings at the threshold where
the plaintiff's case, even if accepted in its
1
2025 SCC Online SC 793
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entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or
is barred by law, either express or by
implication. The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC
and the authority of the courts is well settled in
law. There is a bounden duty on the Court to
discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the
face of it would be barred, but for the clever
pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is
surreal. Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are
stand alone grounds, that can be raised by the
defendant in a suit. However, it cannot be ruled
out that under certain circumstances, clauses
(a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive. For
instances, when clever drafting veils the
implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it
then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the
veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the
threshold. The power to reject a plaint under
this provision is not merely procedural but
substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the
judicial process and ensuring that court time is
not wasted on fictitious claims failing to
disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit
or barred by law. Therefore, the appeal before
us requires careful consideration of the scope
of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule
11 CPC, particularly, in the context of the suit
filed based on an agreement to sell against
third parties in possession.
17. At the same time, we are conscious of
principle that only averments in the plaint are
to be considered under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
While it is true that the defendant's defense is
not to be considered at this stage, this does not
mean that the court must accept patently
untenable claims or shut its eyes to settled
principles of law and put the parties to trial,
even in cases which are barred and the cause
of action is fictitious. In T. Arivandandam
(supra), this Court emphasized that where the
plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless,
courts should exercise their power under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC and not waste judicial time on
matters that are legally barred and frivolous.
The present case falls squarely within this
principle.”
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6. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in
2
Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali .
He relied on
paragraph Nos.23.1 to 24, which reads herein under:
“23. *
23.1. We will first briefly touch upon the law
applicable for deciding an application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be
rejected in the following cases—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued,
and the plaintiff, on being required by the court
to correct the valuation within a time to be
fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued
but the plaint is written upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the court to supply the
requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed
by the court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement
in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of Rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the court for
the correction of the valuation or supplying of
the requisite stamp-papers shall not be
extended unless the court, for reasons to be
recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was
prevented by any cause of an exceptional
2
(2020) 7 SCC 366
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nature from correcting the valuation or
supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the
case may be, within the time fixed by the court
and that refusal to extend such time would
cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the
court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit
at the threshold, without proceeding to record
evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of
the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the
action should be terminated on any of the
grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule
11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is
disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation
under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit
the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the
proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would
be necessary to put an end to the sham
litigation, so that further judicial time is not
wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar
Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315.
Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja
v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 :
(1998) 2 GLH 823] this Court held that the
whole purpose of conferment of powers under
this provision is to ensure that a litigation
which is meaningless, and bound to prove
abortive, should not be permitted to waste
judicial time of the court, in the following
words : (SCC p. 324, para 12)
“12. … The whole purpose of conferment of
such powers is to ensure that a litigation which
is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time of
the court, and exercise the mind of the
respondent. The sword of Damocles need not
be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily
without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary
civil litigation, the court readily exercises the
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power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose
any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to
terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic
one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7
Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on
the court to determine whether the plaint
discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the
averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London
S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004)
9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the
documents relied upon, or whether the suit is
barred by any law.
23.7. Order 7 Rule 14(1) provides for
production of documents, on which the plaintiff
places reliance in his suit, which reads as
under:
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff
sues or relies.—(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon
a document or relies upon document in his
possession or power in support of his claim, he
shall enter such documents in a list, and shall
produce it in court when the plaint is presented
by him and shall, at the same time deliver the
document and a copy thereof, to be filed with
the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the
possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall,
wherever possible, state in whose possession
or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in
court by the plaintiff when the plaint is
presented, or to be entered in the list to be
added or annexed to the plaint but is not
produced or entered accordingly, shall not,
without the leave of the court, be received in
evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the
suit.
(4) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to
document produced for the cross-examination
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of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a
witness merely to refresh his memory.”
23.8. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed along with the plaint, are
required to be taken into consideration for
deciding the application under Order 7 Rule
11(a). When a document referred to in the
plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should
be treated as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision,
the court would determine if the assertions
made in the plaint are contrary to statutory
law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a
case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is
made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the
defendant in the written statement and
application for rejection of the plaint on the
merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be
adverted to, or taken into consideration.
23.11. The test for exercising the power under
Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made
in the plaint are taken in entirety, in
conjunction with the documents relied upon,
would the same result in a decree being
passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool &
London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I
[Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.
Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads
as : (SCC p. 562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of
action or not is essentially a question of fact.
But whether it does or does not must be found
out from reading the plaint itself. For the said
purpose, the averments made in the plaint in
their entirety must be held to be correct. The
test is as to whether if the averments made in
the plaint are taken to be correct in their
entirety, a decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.
[Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5
SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not
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permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage,
and to read it in isolation. It is the substance,
and not merely the form, which has to be
looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it
stands, without addition or subtraction of
words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot
embark upon an enquiry whether the
allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v.
R.V. Janakiraman.
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint,
it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious
and without any merit, and does not disclose a
right to sue, the court would be justified in
exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
may be exercised by the court at any stage of
the suit, either before registering the plaint, or
after issuing summons to the defendant, or
before conclusion of the trial, as held by this
Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State
of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] . The plea that
once issues are framed, the matter must
necessarily go to trial was repelled by this
Court in Azhar Hussain case.
23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is
mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint
“shall” be rejected if any of the grounds
specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If
the court finds that the plaint does not disclose
a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by
any law, the court has no option, but to reject
the plaint.
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to
judgment. It consists of a bundle of material
facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to
prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs
claimed in the suit.
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24.1. In Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna
Tapovanam [Swamy Atmananda v. Sri
Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51]
this Court held : (SCC p. 60, para 24)
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact,
which, if traversed, it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove in order to support his
right to a judgment of the court. In other
words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with
the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a
right to relief against the defendant. It must
include some act done by the defendant since
in the absence of such an act, no cause of
action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to
the actual infringement of the right sued on but
includes all the material facts on which it is
founded.”
24.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC
467] this Court held that while considering an
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC what is
required to be decided is whether the plaint
discloses a real cause of action, or something
purely illusory, in the following words : (SCC p.
470, para 5)
“5. … The learned Munsif must remember that
if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless,
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
sue, he should exercise his power under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if
clever drafting has created the illusion of a
cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first
hearing.…”
24.3. Subsequently, in ITC Ltd. v. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70]
this Court held that law cannot permit clever
drafting which creates illusions of a cause of
action. What is required is that a clear right
must be made out in the plaint.
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24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the
plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of
action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Rama
Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [Madanuri Sri
Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13
SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] held that it
should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus
litigation will end at the earliest stage. The
Court must be vigilant against any camouflage
or suppression, and determine whether the
litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of
the process of the court.”
7. He relied on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench
3
of this Court in the case of Sri. P.A.Manjunath Vs. Mamtha . He
relied on paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15, which reads as under:
“13. The plea sought to be advanced by the
plaintiffs is, therefore, not a case of clever
drafting alone; it is an endeavour to create an
artificial cause of action where none exists. The
issuance of a legal notice cannot breathe life
into a claim that had long ago perished The
judgments of the Apex Court in UMA DEVI and
NIKHILA DIVYANG MEHTA further fortify this
position. Those decisions reiterate the settled
principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and
emphasize that the Court, while examining a
plaint, must ascertain whether a real and
subsisting cause of action is disclosed and
whether the action is barred by any law. The
provision is intended precisely to prevent the
judicial process from being burdened by
litigations, which are dead on arrival.
14. Turning to the judgments relied upon by
the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, this Court finds that the principles
3
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enunciated therein have little bearing on the
facts of the present case. There can indeed be
no dispute with the proposition that more than
one suit for partition may be maintainable
where joint family properties continue to
remain undivided and the rights of coparceners
have not crystallized. Such a principle,
however, has no application to properties that
already stand partitioned under a registered
instrument and whose title has been accepted,
acted upon, and perfected over the course of
decades.
15. The present suit is not the one seeking
division of undivided family property; it is an
attempt to reopen and unsettle a partition that
has stood unquestioned for over twenty years.
The rights of the parties have long since
crystallized. Possession has followed title.
Enjoyment has followed possession. Finality
has followed acceptance.”
8. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in
4
Shakuntala and Others Vs. Robert Anthony and Others . He relies
on para No.10, which reads as under:
“10. The documents appended to the record of
this case show that when MA bought the
property, he did so, squarely in the names of
his 2 wives. There is no dispute on that point.
Consequently, the application of Section 33
appears misplaced for the reason that, by its
application, what the High Court implies is that
the property that was legally bought in the
name of the 2 wives of MA is, in fact, in the
eyes of the law, his property, whereas that is
not the case. Since the property is in the name
of the 2 wives of MA, it is their property. Now,
since Filomena predeceased MA, by virtue of
4
2026 SCC Online SC 1447
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the application of Section 35 of the ISA, MA
would possess the same rights on Filomena’s
property as she would have in the scenario that
MA would have predeceased her. The section
runs thus:
“35. Rights of widower. -A husband surviving
his wife has the same rights in respect of her
property, if she dies intestate, as a widow has
in respect of her husband's property, if he dies
intestate.”
The effect thereof would be that with respect to
the part of the property in the name of
Filomena, one third would rest with MA and the
remaining two thirds would go to her
successors in interest, that is the Plaintiffs.
There would be no application of Section 33 on
the entirety of the property since never did the
whole property rest in the name of MA.
Therefore, there was never the case that MA
had died intestate and left behind a widow and
further descendants. The property always
rested (owned) with the 2 wives of MA. The
application of section 33 via section 35, would
only limit to the one half of the property that
belonged to Filomena.”
9. Though notices are served on respondent Nos.1 and
2, there is no representation. Notice to R3 to R9 was dispensed
with by order dated 06.01.2026.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner,
perused the entire material on record. The issues that fall for
consideration are:
“i. Whether on the averments contained in
the plaint, the plaint discloses the right to
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seek partition notwithstanding the
registered sale deed executed by their
grandmother?
ii. Whether the plaint is liable to be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC?”
At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish the ownership
of the property from the plaintiff's assertion regarding the
source of his acquisition. It is not disputed that the property
was purchased in the name of defendant No. 1 in the year
1975. The plaintiff does not claim that the property stood in the
name of the grandfather or devolved upon their grandmother
by inheritance. Their specific case is that the consideration for
the purchase of property was provided from joint family funds.
Therefore, the question is not merely whose name the sale
deed stands in, but whether the plaintiffs have established a
legally recognizable foundation for treating the property as
belonging to the joint family. Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act recognizes the female Hindu as the full owner of
the property acquired and held by her in her own right. The
provision places her ownership on the same footing as that of
any other absolute owner. A property purchased by a woman
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from independent funds is separate property, and her children
or grandchildren cannot claim partition of it merely on the basis
of their relationship. However, Section 14 does not create an
irrebuttable presumption that every property purchased in the
name of a female member of a Hindu joint family must
necessarily be her independent acquisition. Where the very
source of the consideration is disputed, the nature of the
acquisition must thus be determined.
11. In Marabasappa (D) by LRs. & Ors. Vs. Ningappa (D) by
5
LRs. & Ors , the Supreme Court held that there is no
presumption that a property in the name of a female member
belongs to the joint family. The burden is upon the person
asserting joint family ownership to establish the existence of a
joint family nucleus and that the nucleus was sufficient to
finance the acquisition. This principle applies directly to the
present case. The plaintiffs cannot succeed merely by asserting
that their grandmother purchased the property from joint
family funds. They must establish the existence of such funds
and their availability at the time of acquisition in 1974. The
5
2011 9 SCC 451
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plaint does not provide specific particulars of the properties or
income constituting the alleged joint family nucleus. This is a
family nucleus. Nevertheless, the plaint expressly asserts that
the consideration came from joint family funds. Whether that
assertion can be established is a question of proof and cannot
be answered by treating the registered sale deed in the
grandmother's name as conclusive of the source of acquisition.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Smt. Shaifali Gupta vs.
6
Smt. Vidya Devi Gupta & Ors considered this precise legal
distinction by examining the rejection of a plaint in a partition
suit. The properties were alleged to have been purchased from
the joint family funds. Although they stood in the names of
individual family members, the Supreme Court held that
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act does not, by itself, bar
the institution of a suit concerning such properties. Whether the
acquisitions were made from joint family funds or constituted
individual properties requires adjudication. The Court
accordingly declined to interfere with the rejection of the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Section 15 of
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2025 INSC 739
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the Hindu Succession Act prescribes the rules of succession to
the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. Section 16 of
the Hindu Succession Act regulates the order and manner of
distribution of her rights. These provisions do not determine
whether property purchased in the name of a female Hindu was
an independent acquisition or joint family property. Hence, this
Court need not go into Sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu
Succession Act. The circumstances that the grandmother
herself executed the sale deed along with defendant No.2, the
father of the plaintiff, undoubtedly strengthen the petitioner's
case. If the property was an independent acquisition, the
plaintiff would have no right by birth in it, and the alienation
would be binding upon them. The fact that plaintiff No. 1 was a
minor and plaintiff No. 2 was born in 1997 also bears upon the
nature of the rights they could have possessed at the time of
alienation. A person born after a valid and completed alienation
cannot subsequently acquire a right by birth in property that
had already ceased to belong to the family. However, whether
the transaction was an alienation of the grandmother's
separate property or an alienation affecting an existing joint
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family interest remains a matter in dispute. That question
cannot be resolved under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Then
the objection concerning limitation requires independent
consideration. The sale deed was executed on 24.01.1997,
whereas the suit was instituted in 2024. The plaintiffs have not
specifically stated when they first acquired knowledge; their
reliance on the refusal of partition on 20.05.2024 cannot, by
itself, revive a right to challenge a transaction that had already
become barred by limitation. A subsequent demand for
partition does not provide a fresh starting point for questioning
the validity of every earlier alienation.
7
13. In Smt. Uma Devi and Ors Vs. Anand Kumar and Ors ,
the Supreme Court rejected a plaint in a partition suit instituted
several decades after an earlier partition and subsequent
registered alienations. The difficulty in applying that decision to
the present case is that the plaint explicitly denies any earlier
partition and continued joint possession. Further, the property
was sold not by a stranger but by the plaintiff's grandmother
and father. Thus, the consequences of that alienation must be
7
2025 INSC 434
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examined in the light of the property's legal character and the
rights. If the claim concerns exclusion from joint family
property, Article 110 of the Limitation Act, may become
relevant. The declaratory reliefs must also be exercised with
reference to the provisions governing such claims. Article 59 of
the Limitation Act, cannot automatically be applied to the entire
suit merely because the registered sale deed is questioned. The
effect of the alienation, including the nature of possession
following the sale, is therefore material for determining the
limitation. The petitioner's contention that the plaintiff ought to
have sought the cancellation of the sale deed is also not
justified. The plaintiffs were not executants of the document.
They seek a declaration that it is not binding upon their alleged
shares and have sought partition and separate possession.
14. In Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh &
8
Ors , t
he Supreme Court distinguished between an executant
seeking cancellation of his own deed and a non-executant
seeking a declaration that the transaction does not bind the
parties. The prayer, as framed, is not inherently impermissible.
8
2010 12 SCC 112
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The trial court may not have specifically addressed Section 14
of the Hindu Succession Act. However, for the reasons stated
above, those provisions do not establish the statutory bar
apparent on the face of the plaintiff's case. The impugned order
therefore does not warrant interference by this Court. This
Court is of the view that the plaint cannot be rejected on the
grounds raised before this Court. Accordingly, this Court is
passing the following:
ORDER
i. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is
dismissed .
ii. All I.As. in this petition shall stand closed.
SD/-
(LALITHA KANNEGANTI)
JUDGE
PKN
R
*M