Gurpreet Singh vs State Of Punjab

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CRWP-11860-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

CRWP-11860-2026
JUDGMENT
RESERVED ON
JUDGMENT
PRONOUNCED ON
FULL/OPERATIVE
PART
UPLOADED ON
13.10.2026 30.10.2026 FULL 31.10.2026

GURPREET SINGH
...Petitioner
VS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
....Respondents

CORAM: JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA

Present: Mr. L.S. Sekhon, Advocate for the petitioner

Mr. Ajit Pal Singh Mander, Addl. A.G., Punjab.


ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
1. Challenging the denial of parole by the District Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib,
the convict, by way of this his fourth petition, has come up before this Court under
1 2 3
Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528 BNSS, 2023,
4
seeking the issuance of a Writ in the nature of Certiorari to set aside the impugned
order dated July 27, 2026 (Annexure P-12) passed by respondent No. 2, and a Writ in
the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to release him on parole for a period
of eight weeks.
2. The petitioner was arrested in FIR No. 175 dated Oct 3, 2022, registered under
Sections 15/22(c)/61/85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
at Police Station Amloh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab.
3. The case of the prosecution was that there was a recovery of 5040 intoxicating
pills and 15 kg of poppy husk. Vide judgment dated Nov 21, 2024, he was convicted
and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twelve years and to pay a fine of
Rs. 1,10,000. Against the judgment and sentence order passed by the trial Court, the

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226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—
2
227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.—
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§528. Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
4
The word certiorari comes from Law Latin, meaning "to be more fully informed." A writ of
certiorari orders a lower court to deliver its record in a case so that the higher court may review
it. The writ of certiorari is a common law writ, which may be abrogated or controlled entirely by
statute or rules of the court.
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CRWP-11860-2026
petitioner preferred a common appeal before this Hon’ble High Court, which was
registered as CRA-D 65 of 2025.
4. As per the custody certificate, the total custody undergone is 3 years, 5 months
and 11 days.
5. The petitioner had earlier approached this Court for parole. Vide order dated
July 6, 2026, this Court allowed the petition and directed the Superintendent, New
District Jail, Nabha, Punjab, to consider his application in accordance with the rules.
This Court noted that the reasoning that the family of the petitioner has been involved
in anti-social activities, due to which the drive of the Punjab Government, Yudh
Nashian Virudh, would be affected, could not be a ground for rejection unless
substantiated by investigation and other material.
6. The petitioner sought parole for a period of eight weeks under Section 3 of the
Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1962, as amended in 2015,
read with the Punjab Government Notification dated Dec 13, 2018.
7. It shall be relevant to refer to Section 3 of the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners
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(Temporary Release) Act,1962 ,
Section 3 Temporary release of prisoners on certain grounds
(1) The State Government may, in consultation with the District
Magistrate and subject to such conditions and in such manner as
may be prescribed, release temporarily for a period specified in
sub-section (2) any prisoner if the State Government is satisfied
that–
(a) [ a member of the prisoner's family has died; or [Substituted
by Punjab Act No. 1 of 2016, dated 7.1.2016.]
(aa) husband or wife or son or daughter or father or mother or
brother or sister or grand-father or grand-mother or grandson or
grand-daughter or father-in-law or mother-in-law of the prisoner
is seriously ill; or]
(b) the marriage of the prisoner's son or daughter is to be
celebrated; or
(c) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary for
ploughing, sowing or harvesting or carrying on any other
agricultural operation on his land and no friend of the prisoner or
a member of the prisoner's family is prepared to help him in this
behalf in his absence;
(cc) a lady prisoner is pregnant and is likely to deliver a child;
or] [Inserted by Punjab Act No. 1 of 2016, dated 7.1.2016.]

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The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act,1962 (Website; legitquest; English).
The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act ,1962 (Original Act in Punjabi).
The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act ,1962(Original Act in Punjabi).
The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Amendment Act,2015 .
The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Amendment Act,2018 .
The Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners(Temporary Release) Amendment Act,2020 .
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CRWP-11860-2026
(d) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient cause
[Explanation. [Added by Punjab Act No. 1 of 2016, dated
7.1.2016.] - The expression "sufficient cause" includes –
(1). serious damage to life or property of the member of the family
caused by any natural calamity; or
(2). critical condition of any member of the family on account of
accident; or
(1). delivery of child by the wife of the prisoner.]
(2) [The period for which a prisoner may be released shall be
determined by the State Government so as not to exceed –

(a) where the prisoner is to be released on the ground specified in
clause (a) of sub-section (1), fifteen days;
(b) where the prisoner is to be released on the ground specified in
clause (aa) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section
(1), [eight weeks]; and
(c) where the prisoner is to be released on the ground specified in
clause (cc) of sub-section (1), one hundred and twenty days (sixty
days prior to the date of delivery of child and sixty days after the
date of delivery of child).]

[(2-A) The total period of temporary release of the prisoner,
excluding the release availed of, -
(i). on the death of a family member of the prisoner; or
(ii). by a female prisoner on account of delivery of child, as the
case may be, shall not exceed sixteen weeks, during a calendar
year and shall be availed of on quarterly basis:
Provided that a prisoner, may avail such release for a continuous
period of sixteen weeks, during the period falling between the
23rd day of November, 2018 to the 23rd day of November, 2019,
as a onetime measure on pro-rata basis, however, subject to the
other provisions of the Act:

Provided further that any prisoner, who is on temporary release
for a specified period and wants to surrender before the expiry of
his temporary release period, he shall be allowed to do
so.] [Substituted by Punjab Act No. 2 of 2019, dated 16.1.2019.]

(3) The period of release under this section shall not count
towards the total period of the release of a prisoner.
(4) The State Government may by notification authorise any
officer to exercise its power under this section in respect of all or
any of the grounds specified therein.

8. Thus, Section 3 of the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release)
Act, 1962, empowers the State a prisoner’s release, and had they not been rendered
hugely beneficial, the State would have repealed the provisions.
9. However, vide order dated July 27, 2026 (Annexure P-12), the District
Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib, respondent No.2, again rejected the parole application of
the petitioner.
10. Perusal of the impugned order shows that parole was declined primarily on the
grounds that three cases were found registered against the mother of the petitioner, and
in one of those cases she was absconding.
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CRWP-11860-2026
11. The inquiry report further expressed the apprehension that, since the family of
the petitioner had shifted to an unknown address, he might proceed to another place,
concealing his identity and abscond.

12. Regarding the other objections, the concept behind the grant of parole needs an
overview, and the rejection or grant has to be within the legal parameters.
13. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, 1955 SCR 250, May 5, 1954, a
four-judge bench of the Supreme Court holds,
Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a Court has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may
arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding or from the
absence of some preliminary proceeding or the Court itself may not be
legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of
extraneous circumstances
(1). When the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the existence of
some collateral fact, it is well settled that the Court cannot by a wrong
decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise
possess
(2). A Tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in
making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of
procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may violate
the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be available in
such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent
on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance
or disregard of the provisions.
14. Judicial review of an order refusing parole is limited. This Court does not
substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority; it may intervene
where the decision is arbitrary, or perverse, or on irrelevant considerations, ignores
material evidence, or otherwise falls outside the governing statutory framework.

15. Regarding the other objections, the concept behind the grant of parole needs an
overview, and the rejection or grant has to be within the legal parameters.
16. The form of punishment evolved from its ancient forms to the model prisons,
and from the prisons to rehabilitation. Before prison became the principal instrument
of punishment, the penal system was dominated by the body of the condemned and by
the spectacle of its suffering. In ancient and pre-modern systems of torture, punishment
was a public event, staged in the open so that the community might see it, fear it, and
remember it.
17. Michel Foucault, in Discipline and Punish , traces the shift from that world to
the birth of the modern prison and argues that the spectacle of the scaffold was once an
accepted mode of punishment, and that public execution should be understood not
merely as a legal act but as an exercise of sovereign power. [T]he public execution…
has to be understood not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even
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CRWP-11860-2026
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in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which power is manifested. This display of power
did not last. In time, it came to be realized that the spectacle of the tortured body served
neither dignity nor justice, and that even the gravest offender retained some measure
of humanity which the State was bound to respect. As Foucault records, the call for a
penalty without torture was, at first, not a doctrine but a protest,
“The need for a punishment without torture was first formulated as a
cry from the heart or from an outraged nature: in the worst of murderers,
there is one thing, at least, to be respected when one punishes: his
‘humanity’. The day was to come, in the nineteenth century, when this
‘man’, discovered in the criminal, would become the target of penal
intervention, the object that it claimed to correct and transform, the
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domain of a whole series of ‘criminological’ sciences.”

18. Once the offender was seen as a person to be corrected, and no longer as a body
to be destroyed, the search began for a penalty suited to that purpose. The idea of the
prison emerged from this search, and, within a short span of time, detention became
the essential form of punishment, displacing the scaffold, the pillory and the gallows.
Yet the prison system did not emerge without criticism. The reformers who had
envisaged penalties that were visible, proportionate and publicly intelligible found the
new institution at odds with their design, and Foucault records their objection in the
following words:
“Prison as the universal penalty is incompatible with this whole
technique of penalty-effect, penalty-representation, penalty-general
function, penalty-sign and discourse. It is obscurity, violence and
suspicion. It is a place of darkness in which the citizen’s eye cannot
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count the victims.”
19. Foucault’s account of the prison is, at its core, an account of how incarceration
manufactures docile bodies. Inside the walls, the prisoner’s day is divided into rigid
timetables of waking, labor, meals, and silence; his movements are confined to the cell
and the corridor; and his conduct is recorded in files that rank him against a norm.
20. Through hierarchical observation and the permanent possibility of being seen,
as in Bentham’s Panopticon, the prisoners learn that they are always visible while the
watcher remains unseen and so begin to police themselves.
21. The foremost principle of a prison structure is isolation; the isolation of the
convict from the external world, from everything that motivated the offense, from the
complicities that facilitated it, and most importantly the isolation of prisoners from one
another. Power thus no longer rests on the spectacle of the suffering body; it works
through routine and constant surveillance. Freedom is curtailed not only physically but
psychologically; the prisoner becomes the principal of their own subjection, trained

6
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 47 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books, 1995).
7
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 74 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books, 1995).
8
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 114 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books, 1995).
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CRWP-11860-2026
into an obedient and predictable body whose will is gradually worn down. Not only is
the penalty to be individual, but it must also be individualizing.
22. It was this very rigidity, and the growing recognition that unbroken confinement
and under constant surveillance may produce obedience without reform, that gave rise
to the movement for reform of the prison system. If prisons were meant to correct, it
could not do so merely by isolating and disciplining the offender; it had to prepare him
for life beyond the walls. Reformers therefore sought to humanize confinement through
inmate classification, education, the imparting of ethics, values, and morals, and the
gradual relaxation of restrictions, so a sentence would end in a return to society rather
than permanent exclusion. Measures for the conditional and temporary release of
prisoners, of which parole is the most prominent, are the product of this reformative
impulse: they open the closed system of the prison, in a controlled manner, to the world
outside.
23. Parole emerged when the decline of capital punishment and transportation
brought a need for aftercare of prisoners related into the community, and the public
demanded protection against prisoners released without improved character―Parole
shortens his exposure to the possibly injurious effects of imprisonment; it is a device
for timing the prisoner’s release to coincide with the point in his prison career when he
is most likely to become an effective member of the free community―By providing
guidance, parole offers a partial answer to the readjustment problems of the released
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prisoner.
24. Parole developed from a number of independent measures: penal transportation
to America and Australia, the English and Irish experiences with the ticket-of -leave
th 10
system, and the work of 19 century American reformatories.
25. Under Zebulon Brockway, New York’s Elmira Reformatory combined several
known operating principles when it opened in 1876: the indeterminate sentence,
relating privileges granted the prisoner to his conduct, compulsory education and the
release of selected prisoners on parole―A reaction against the classical school’s
assumption that punishments should be standardized and equated to the basis of the
crime, these principles stem from the positive school’s thesis that crimes are acts of
men who differ in physical, psychological and social backgrounds―Parole was seen
as the culmination of a course of institutional training whereby the inmate’s capacity
for reform would be developed. Brockway also saw parole as a test period to determine
whether the offender had absorbed the training―Consequently, parole was perceived

9 th
Elmer H. Johnson, Crime, Correction and Society 375-376 (Robin M. Williams, Jr., 4 ed, The
Dorsey Press,1978).
10 th
Elmer H. Johnson, Crime, Correction and Society 377 (Robin M. Williams, Jr., 4 ed, The Dorsey
Press,1978).
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as part of the program of the correctional institution.
26. The consequence of every conviction is the imposition of sentences prescribed
in law for such a violation. All sentences are for a limited term, except the death penalty
and life imprisonment. Thus, in all cases, except for death sentences and where it is
specifically mentioned in the sentencing order that the sentence of imprisonment for
life shall run till the end of the natural life, the sentences are of indefinite period, and
even these sentences are subject to reduction by the President of India, in exercise of
12
their sovereign powers conferred under Article 72 of the Constitution of India; and
13
by the Governors, in exercise of their sovereign powers conferred under Article 161
of the Constitution of India. What follows is that, except in the rarest of rare cases,
extraordinary situations, and exceptional circumstances, all other sentences are for a
definite period, and the confinement lapses after a certain time. Its natural corollary is
that such convicts shall come out of the prison walls one day, and their return is not in
isolation but back to society.
27. The paramount question sociologists struggle with while undergoing their quest
to convince the Executive is ‘how to condition the prisoner’? Every prisoner must be
rehabilitated to ensure their dignified return to the community, with consistent behavior
that never puts them back under surveillance inside the Panopticon. A few relationships
are like a cactus and do not require frequent watering, but sufficiently long oblivion
brings about the ‘Out of sight, out of mind’ phenomenon, which can wither even a
resilient cactus.
28. Within this closed system of control, parole appears as a respite, where good
conduct is rewarded, so the prisoner is encouraged to reflect, to reform, and to rebuild
themselves as a person capable of living lawfully in society. Once released, they are
spared the full severity of confinement and are allowed to return to family, work, and
community. In this context, parole is the humane face of the reformative movement; it
softens the prison’s rigidity. It converts punishment into an opportunity for
reintegration into society.
29. Parole is a temporary release granted to a convict in the discretion of the
competent authority; it is not a matter of right, and it may be denied even when a case
is made out if the release is not in the interest of society.
30. In Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India and Others, [2000] 1 SCR 945; 2000-
INSC-74; Feb 16, 2000, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court holds,

11 th
Elmer H. Johnson, Crime, Correction and Society 378 (Robin M. Williams, Jr., 4 ed, The Dorsey
Press,1978).
12
72. Power of President to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain
cases.
13
161. Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in
certain cases.
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[7.] ‘Parole' is a form of “temporary release” from custody, which does
not suspend the sentence or the period of detention, but provides
conditional release from custody and changes the mode of undergoing
the sentence. In this country, there are no statutory provisions dealing
with the question of grant of paroie. The Code of Criminal Procedure
does not contain any provision for grant of parole. By administrative
instructions, however, rules have been framed in various States,
regulating the grant of parole. Thus, the action for grant of parole is
generally speaking an administrative action. [962-G; E]

31. In Smt. Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan and Others, [1987] 2 SCR 1123; 1987-
INSC-124, Apr 22, 1987, the Supreme Court holds,
[3.] Parole is the release of a prisoner from a penal or correctional
institution after he has served a part of his sentence under the
continuous custody of the State and under conditions that permit his
incarceration in the event of misbehaviour. It is a grant of partial liberty
or lessening of restrictions to a convict prisoner and does not change
the status of the prisoner.

32. In Maru Ram Etc. Etc. v Union of India and Anr., [1981] 1 SCR 1196; 1980-
INSC-212, Nov 11, 1980, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court holds,
[p.1250] [12.] In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative
desideratum warrant liberal paroles, subject to security safeguards, and
other humanizing strategies for inmates so that the dignity and worth of
the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid
zoos. Human rights awareness must infuse institutional reform and
search for alternatives.

33. In State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Lal Singh @ Manjit Singh & Ors.; [2016] 4 S.C.R.
816; 2016-INSC-463, June 29, 2016, the Supreme Court holds,
[p. 837] [33.] So far as direction for grant of parole is concerned, we
find that the learned Judge has directed parole to be granted for three
months forthwith. In Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India and others
[(2000) 3 SCC 409] the Constitution Bench while dealing with the grant
of temporary release or parole under Section 12( 1) and Section 12( 1-
A) of the Conversation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act) had observed that
the exercise of the said power is administrative in character but it does
not affect the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. However, the constitutional court before directing the
temporary release where the request is made to be released on parole
for a specified reason and for a specified period should form an opinion
that request has been unjustifiably refused or where the interest of
justice warranted for issue of such order of temporary release. The
Court further ruled that jurisdiction has to be sparingly exercised by the
Court and even when it is exercised, it is appropriate that the Court
should leave it to the administrative or jail authorities to prescribe the
conditions and terms on which parole is to be availed of by the detenu.
34. In Home Secretary (Prisons) and ors., v. H. Nilofer Nisha; [2020] 1 S.C.R. 456,
Jan 23, 2020, the Supreme Court holds,
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[p. 473] [27.] We would also like to point out that the grant of remission
or parole is not a right vested with the prisoner. It is a privilege available
to the prisoner on fulfilling certain conditions. This is a discretionary
power which has to be exercised by the authorities conferred with such
powers under the relevant rules/regulations. The court cannot exercise
these powers though once the powers are exercised, the Court may hold
that the exercise of powers is not in accordance with rules.
35. In Deepak Kumar v. State of Punjab and others, CRWP 7882 of 2022, Feb 27,
2023, Punjab and Haryana High Court observed,
[13.] Both 'Parole' and 'Furlough' are considered as reformative
processes. These provisions were introduced with a view to humanizing
the prison system. Parole is not a right, and is given to a prisoner for a
specific reason. It may be denied to a prisoner even when he makes out
a sufficient case, if the competent authority is satisfied that releasing the
convict would not be in the interest of society. Parole can only be
granted in event of some emergency and circumstances, such as the
death of a family member, the marriage of a family member, a family
member's major illness, or any other emergency situation. 'Furlough' is
similar to 'parole', but with some significant differences. It is given in
cases of long-term imprisonment. The period of furlough granted to a
prisoner is treated as remission of his sentence. Though, unlike parole,
furlough is seen as a matter of right for a prisoner, to be granted
periodically irrespective of any reason, and merely to enable the
prisoner to retain family and social ties, and to counter the ill-effects of
long time imprisonment but as a matter of fact, even 'furlough' is not an
absolute right and grant of furlough is subject to the conditions as
prescribed, the most significant being the period already spent in
custody and his conduct during such period.
36. In Rammanohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1966 SCR (1) 709, Sep 7, 1965, the
Supreme Court holds,
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents
the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public
order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy
to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as
an act may affect public order but not security of the State.
37. Parole is an important milestone in a convict’s journey, originating from
institutional scaffolding and culminating in lasting rehabilitation and reintegration into
the community.
38. Parole is a beneficial measure intended to serve reformative and humanitarian
purposes. It must therefore be interpreted and applied liberally in favor of the convict.
The benefit cannot be denied on mere surmises that release could cause local law-and-
order disturbances. To hold otherwise would erode the rights that the parole framework
is meant to protect.
39. The rejection of a parole application must be based on cogent and objective
reasons. The competent authority must explain how releasing the convict on parole
would actually affect the security of the State or public order, which are the identifiable
narrower circles. Mere conjecture or apprehension is not sufficient. An ordinary breach
of law and order, which falls within the outermost circle, does not by itself justify
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denying parole.
40. The impugned order rests entirely on the alleged conduct of the mother of the
petitioner and the apprehension that the family has moved to an unknown address. It
does not record any finding that the petitioner himself has ever misused any earlier
release, that he has been involved in any act of indiscipline in custody, or that any
specific material suggests that he will abscond or commit an offense while on parole.
The antecedents of a family member cannot, by themselves, be a ground to deny a
convict the benefit of the Act, and the apprehension of the petitioner absconding is a
conjecture, unsupported by any material on the record.
41. This Court, while allowing the earlier petition vide order dated July 6, 2026,
had already observed that allegations regarding the family being involved in anti-social
activities must be substantiated by investigation and other material. The concern that
the petitioner may abscond can be addressed by imposing appropriate conditions,
including furnishing his residential address and keeping the local police informed, and
by taking a personal bond and surety bond from him; it does not warrant outright
rejection.
42. For these reasons, the criminal writ petition is allowed, and the impugned order
dated July 27, 2026 (Annexure P-12) is quashed. The petitioner is granted parole for
eight weeks from the date of his release. The concerned Superintendent of the Jail shall
release him upon his furnishing a personal bond and one surety bond, each in an amount
fixed by and to the satisfaction of the Superintendent. The release shall remain subject
to the following conditions:
43. Before release, the petitioner shall, through a family member or any other
person authorized by him, deposit all firearms [if any] and ammunition in his name or
in his possession, whether licensed or unlicensed, with the nearest police station or with
the licensing authority, and furnish the deposit receipt to the Superintendent of the Jail.
The petitioner shall file an affidavit before the Superintendent of the Jail that he has no
firearm in his possession other than those so deposited. The licensing authority is at
liberty to suspend the arms license (s) for the period of parole. The firearms shall
remain deposited until the petitioner surrenders after the parole.
44. The petitioner shall not possess, carry or use any firearm or other weapon during
the period of parole.
45. The petitioner shall not commit any offense and shall not partake in any activity
relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and he shall not directly or
indirectly threaten or contact any witness or any other person connected with the
present FIR or any other case in which he is involved.
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46. Before release, the petitioner shall furnish to the Superintendent of the Jail his
complete residential address where he will stay during the period of parole and shall
not change the same without informing the Superintendent of the Jail and the Station
House Officer of the police station concerned. The Superintendent of the Jail shall
communicate the said address to the Station House Officer of the police station
concerned and to the District Magistrate.

47. The petitioner shall return to prison within the scheduled time without further
notice.
48. If the petitioner breaches any of these conditions, or fails to surrender on the
due date, the State is at liberty to cancel the parole, to take him into custody, and to
proceed against him in accordance with law. The petitioner shall also be liable for
action under the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1962 and
the rules thereunder.
49. Nothing in this order shall affect the merits of any appeal, revision or other
proceedings arising from the conviction in FIR No. 175 of 2022.
50. It is clarified that this order shall not be considered as a blanket bail order/
Suspension of Sentence order in any other matter and is only limited to parole in the
matter arising from the FIR captioned in this order.
51. Petition allowed on the aforesaid terms. All pending miscellaneous
applications, if any, are disposed of.

(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE


(SUBHAS MEHLA)
JUDGE
30.10.2026
Anju Rani


Whether speaking/reasoned YES
Whether reportable YES

JYOTI
2026.10.31 12:31
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this order/judgment.