Wapcos Limited vs M P Khaitan & Anr.

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 03.11.2026
Judgment delivered on: 18.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010220082026

+ ARB. A. (COMM.) 39/2026 & I.A. 13700/2026

WAPCOS LIMITED .....Petitioner

versus

M P KHAITAN & ANR. .....Respondents


Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Tushar Sannu, Standing Counsel alongwith
Ms. Ankita Bhadouria, Mr. Hardik Saxena and
Ms. Shafun Bhadana, Advocates and Mr. A.
Majumder Reddy, Engineer.

For the Respondents : Mr. Rajat Joneja, Mr. Anmol Kumar, Mr.
Yatharth Chugh, Mr. Aakshat Khetarpal and Ms.
Cheshta Dalal, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Chiranjiv Kumar, Mr. Mukesh Sachdeva, Mr.
Durgesh Bharti and Mr. Jitesh, Advocates for
UOI/R-2.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
J U D G E M E N T
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 37(2)(b) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act” ) assailing the interim order dated 16.04.2026 passed by the learned
Sole Arbitrator, whereby the application filed on behalf of the respondent
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no.1 under Section 17 of the Act has been allowed.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Ministry of Tourism, i.e. respondent no.2 appointed WAPCOS,
i.e., the appellant as the executing agency for the work, “Development of
Convention Centre and other associated Infrastructure at Aizwal,
Mizoram”, by issuing a Letter dated 31.03.2021.
3. Pursuant to the Letter dated 31.03.2021, the appellant issued a Notice
Inviting Tender (hereinafter referred to as “the NIT” ) on 26.11.2021, with
a Corrigendum dated 05.01.2022, for the ‘C onstruction of Convention
Centre and associated structures in Aizwal, Mizoram ’ (hereinafter referred
to as “ the Project” ). Respondent no.1 emerged as the successful bidder
with a bid value of Rs.29,99,99,501, with the appellant issuing a Letter of
Award dated 10.03.2022 in favour of respondent no.1. The appellant and
respondent no.1 entered into an Agreement dated 13.04.2022 for the
Project which included, inter alia, the General conditions of Contract
(hereinafter referred to as “the GCC” ) and Special Conditions of Contract
(hereinafter referred to as “the SCC” ), with the deadline for completion of
the Project being 15 months from 24.03.2022, i.e. 24.06.2023.
4. About ninety percent of the Project was completed by respondent
no.1 after grant of three extensions of times, with the final extension being
till 31.08.2024. During the currency of the works, disputes arose between
the appellant and respondent no.1 with respect to, inter alia, payments
against running account bills. Despite exchange of several
correspondences, the disputes persisted and respondent no.1 suspended
work on the Project from 27.08.2024.
5. The respondent no.1 moved this Court under Section 9 of the Act in

O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 538/2025, arraying respondent no.1 herein as the sole
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respondent, seeking, inter alia, issuance of foreclosure certificate from the
appellant herein, taking over possession of the Project site from respondent
no.1 herein and joint measurement of the Project. The said petition was
disposed of vide order dated 24.12.2025, whereby: (i) the parties were
referred to arbitration; (ii) the learned Arbitral Tribunal was directed to
consider the said petition as an application under Section 17 of the Act; (iii)
the respondent no.2 was impleaded as a party on oral request and; (iv) the
appellant herein and WAPCOS/respondent no.1 were directed to take joint
measurement of the Project.
6. The appellant and respondent no.1 conducted joint measurement of
the Project from 10.01.2026 to 12.01.2026.
7. After the constitution of the learned Arbitral Tribunal and
completion of pleadings in the application under Section 17, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal allowed the said application vide the impugned order
dated 16.04.2026 whereby: (i) the respondent no.2 was deleted from the
array of parties as it was not a necessary party; (ii) the reply of respondent
no.2 was only to be considered qua prayer (a) and (b); (iii) respondent no.2
was to issue a foreclosure certificate for the Project to respondent no.1 and
take over possession of the Project site and; (iv) the respondent no.1 was
permitted to remove its plant and machinery lying at the Project site.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant has preferred the
present appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
9. Mr. Tushar Sannu, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant
adumbrated the background facts leading to the present appeal.
10. Principally, the appellant is aggrieved by the direction of the learned

Arbitral Tribunal to the appellant to issue a Foreclosure Certificate and
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simultaneously to take over the project. Mr Sannu would vociferously
contend that there is no provision enabling the respondent no.1/contractor
to either Foreclose the Project/contract or even to the appellant to take over
the Project.
11. He would invite attention to para 12 of the impugned interim award
to submit that there is no reason or justification provided by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal to support such direction. By inviting attention to Clause
13 of the GCC, learned counsel would forcefully submit that it is the
appellant alone which has the right and authority to foreclose the contract
on events specified in the said clause. There is, according to learned
counsel, no clause which enables the respondent no.1/contractor to exercise
any such option. As per him, the impugned award needs to be set aside for
ignoring and overlooking the contractual clause.
12. In the aforesaid context, learned counsel would also contend that the

reliance of respondent no.1/contractor on sections 51, 53, 54 and 55 of the
Contract Act, 1872 is concerned, the need to consider the same would arise
only if the contract was silent on this issue. According to him, when there
is a specific clause provided in the GCC vesting and conferring the
authority of foreclosure only upon the appellant, by necessary implication,
the respondent no.1 is proscribed from exercising any such option. Thus, he
would contend that not only is the learned Arbitral Tribunal completely
wrong in its opinion but has also committed an error in directing the
appellant to issue a Foreclosure Certificate as there is no such provision in
the NIT, GCC or even the SCC. Thus, under what provision of the contract
is the appellant required to furnish a foreclosure certificate is not referred
to. In such circumstances, according to him, the interim award is
unsustainable in passing such directions.
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13. One of the grievances of Mr Sannu is that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal had deleted the respondent no.2/Ministry of Tourism, Union of
India (hereinafter referred to as ‘MoT’ ) from the array of parties on the
incorrect premise that it being a non signatory neither had any privity with
the claimant of the appellant nor was a necessary or proper party.
14. He invited attention to order dated 24.12.2025, passed by this Court
in a petition under section 9 filed by the respondent no.1, whereby on the
consent of both parties, i.e. , the respondent no.1, who was the claimant and
the appellant which was the respondent before the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, the respondent no.2/MoT was impleaded as party which was
required to be included in the arbitral proceedings. In such circumstances,
according to him, there was neither any occasion nor any justifiable reason
why respondent no.2 was deleted. According to him, this deletion is
required to be set aside as MoT is a necessary party.
15. Learned counsel read relevant paragraphs of the impugned interim
award to submit that the analysis and conclusion reached by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal to direct deletion of respondent no.2/MoT from the array
of parties is erroneous and by ignoring the contractual clauses. He would
invite attention to various clauses of the SCC regarding the payments to be
released to respondent no.1. He would submit that as per the NIT the
“Principal Employer”/“Owner” of the Project is the respondent no.2/MoT;
it is the respondent no.2 alone on whose behalf the appellant is executing
the Project; the ultimate beneficiary is the Department of Tourism, Aizwal;
the contractual amounts to be disbursed to the respondent no.1 are, and
have been released by respondent no.2 alone, while the appellant is only
the disbursing agency; clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the SCC
require handing over of the completed Project by respondent no.1 to
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respondent no.2 directly without any reference to the appellant. He would
also contend that in case any direction or award for payment of monies is
passed, necessarily it is the respondent no.2 alone which is required to
comply with such execution since the appellant is only a Consultant. In this
background, learned counsel would stoutly contend that respondent no.2 is
not only a proper party but also a necessary party.
16. It is contended by learned counsel that despite referring to clause
2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the SCC, learned Arbitral Tribunal
misinterpreted the said clause and proceeded to delete respondent no.2
from the array of parties, albeit, erroneously. He would pray that the said
observation and conclusion be set aside.
17. Apart from the above, learned counsel also argued that the direction
to the appellant to take over the Project from the respondent no.1 directly,
is contrary to the contractual terms which cannot be sustained. He would
refer to Clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the SCC and contend
that there is neither any provision nor any contractual condition providing
or requiring the appellant to take over the project directly from the
respondent no.1/contractor. According to him, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
ought to have considered the said clause in the correct perspective and
rejected such prayer of the respondent no.1/contractor. Thus, according to
him, this direction being clearly beyond the scope and ambit of the
contract, no such direction could have been passed or is sustainable.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1:
18. Mr. Rajat Joneja, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1
draws attention of this Court to the order dated 24.12.2025 passed by this
Court in the petition under Section 9 of the Act preferred by the petitioner,
wherein the respondent no.2 was impleaded as party. He submitted that this
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Court may only note that when the Ministry of Tourism was impleaded as
the respondent no.2, it was not represented by any counsel in the Section 9
petition. Thus, according to him, it was the prerogative of the learned
Tribunal to decide the issue afresh.
19. Mr. Joneja, learned counsel for the respondent no.1, at the outset,
submitted that so far as the objections/ contentions raised by the appellant
in respect of deletion of respondent no.2 as party-respondent to the
arbitration proceeding is concerned, the respondent no.1 would have no
particular response to the same. He would submit that the said issue may be
decided by the Court after hearing the appellant and the respondent no.2.
20. So far as the main contention of the appellant on foreclosure for the
project directed by learned Arbitral Tribunal is concerned, he would submit
that there are a variety of reasons as to why foreclosure was required to be
sought. He submitted that the respondent no.1 had completed the project
work and only 4% of the work was left. He would submit that payments for
almost two years were pending and not released by the appellant. In
support thereof, learned counsel refers to documents filed by the
respondent no.1, particularly to the letter dated 20.07.2024, wherein the
respondent no.1, apart from demanding the outstanding dues of
Rs.2,65,72,565.06/-, intimated that the respondent no.1 is considering
foreclosure of the contract/ work with immediate effect.
21. He would submit that in response to the said communication, the
appellant, by its communication dated 26.07.2024 admitted its liability,
however, stated that the outstanding amount is not being released as the
Ministry of Tourism/ respondent no.2 has not released any funds. The said
letter, according to the learned counsel, not only admitted its dues and its
failure to pay, however, also simultaneously requested for one month to
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address the situation failing which the appellant assured that it would, by
itself, issue foreclosure. Similarly, he referred to communication dated
09.05.2025 and 23.05.2025, whereby similar assurances were extended,
however, no payments were cleared at all. He submitted that it is only on
such failure that the respondent no.1 had preferred the arbitration.
22. The arguments of the appellant that the right and authority to
foreclosure the project is solely with the appellant in terms of the Clause 13
of the GCC, is yet again untenable. He would contend that though the said
clause is an enabling clause in favour of the appellant, however, does not
bar or prohibit the respondent no.1 from foreclosing the project in the
situation which has arisen in the present case. Thus, he emphasised that the
impugned Award while directing foreclosure of the project has considered
the various facts which have been submitted above as also Sections 51, 53,
54 and 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
23. In the context of Clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the
SCC, he would contend that the respondent no.2 is not a party to the
contract and thus the submission of the appellant that the project cannot be
directed to be taken over by appellant instead of the respondent no.2 cannot
be countenanced being contrary to the contractual provisions, is erroneous.
He would contend that so far as the respondent no.1 is concerned, the
handing over of the project to the appellant, particularly having regard to
the fact that partial handing over of works is not considered as handing
over in terms of Clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the SCC, is the
only logical corollary to foreclosure of the project.
24. He would submit that since the project undoubtedly is incomplete,
coupled with the fact that the appellant is the consultant for the said project,
the handing over of the project to the appellant as sought by the respondent
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no.1 and directed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal under the interim Award
is the only recourse, which is justifiable in the facts which arise in the
present case. He, thus, submits that the present appeal be dismissed.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2:
25. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2 submitted that it
is an admitted case of the parties that the contract agreement has been
executed between the appellant and the respondent no.1, and the respondent
no.2 is not a signatory to the said contract. He would submit that the
respondent no.2 has no privity contract with the appellant or the respondent
no.1.
26. Inviting attention to the reply filed by the respondent no.2 to the
application under Section 17 of the Act, learned counsel would submit that
it was the emphasis of the respondent no.2 to demonstrate before the
learned Tribunal that the inter se disputes between the appellant and the
respondent no.1 do not require presence of the respondent no.2 for
adjudication. He would submit that the respondent no.1 is neither an
appropriate nor a necessary party to the arbitration proceedings.
27. So far as the issue of handing over or taking over of the project by
the respondent no.2 is concerned, he would contend that the respondent
no.2 not being a signatory to the contract, Clause 2(6) of the Additional
Conditions appended to the SCC are clearly not binding upon the
respondent no.2.
28. Additionally, he would submit that in the reply itself, the respondent
no.2 clearly and categorically requested, in view of the background facts,
the learned Tribunal to delete the respondent no.2 as a party respondent. He
would submit that in the given circumstances and having regard to the
background facts as stated in its reply, the reasons and analysis as to why
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learned Arbitral Tribunal has deleted respondent no.2 from the array of
parties is clearly justifiable and sustainable.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
29. This Court has heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties
and perused the records.
30. Since the present appeal is preferred under section 37(2)(b) of the
Act, it would be apposite to appreciate the scope and width of such
examination. In this context the recent judgement of this Court in Nikhil
Kumar Anand vs. Hridey Vikram Bhatia & Ors. , 2026 SCC Online Del
1089, delivered on 24.02.2026 needs to be considered. The relevant
paragraphs of Nikhil Kumar Anand ( supra ) are extracted hereunder:
“39. This Court in Perfect Diesel Sales and Service v. Power HF
India (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 916 while dealing with the power
of the Court under Section 37(2)(b) placed reliance on the judgment of
the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in World Window Infrastructure
(P) Ltd. v. Central Warehousing Corporation, (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 731
and observed as under:

“66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against orders
passed by arbitrators on applications under Section 17 of the
1996 Act is limited. This Court has already opined in Dinesh
Gupta v. Anand Gupta [Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta, 2020
SCC OnLine Del 2099], Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97
Communication Ltd. [Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97
Communication Ltd., (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and Sanjay
Arora v. Rajan Chadha [Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha, (2021)
3 HCC (Del) 654] that the restraints which apply on the court
while examining a challenge to a final award under Section 34
equally apply to a challenge to an interlocutory order under
Section 37(ii)(b). In either case, the court has to be alive to the
fact that, by its very nature, the 1996 Act frowns upon
interference, by courts, with the arbitral process or decisions
taken by the arbitrator. This restraint, if anything, operates
more strictly at an interlocutory stage than at the final stage, as
interference with interlocutory orders could interference with
the arbitral process while it is ongoing, which may frustrate, or
impede, the arbitral proceedings.

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67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding
applications under Section 17 are interlocutory views. They are
not final expressions of opinion on the merits of the case
between the parties. They are always subject to modification or
review at the stage of final award. They do not, therefore, in
most cases, irreparably prejudice either party to the arbitration.
Section 17 like Section 9 is intended to be a protective measure,
to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral process. The pre-eminent
consideration, which should weigh with the arbitrator while
examining a Section 17 application, is the necessity to preserve
the arbitral process and ensure that the parties before it are
placed on an equitable scale. The interlocutory nature of the
order passed under Section 17, therefore, must necessarily
inform the court seized with an appeal against such a decision,
under Section 37. Additionally, the considerations which apply
to Section 34 would also apply to Section 37(ii)(b).”

40. Another Co-ordinate Bench in Lava International Limited v.
Mintellectuals LLP, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6908 has laid the law with
regards to scope of interference under Section 37(2)(b) and has
observed as under:

“(i) Scope of interference under Section 37(2)(b)

12. Before dealing with these contentions, it may be noticed
that the scope of interference with orders passed under Section
17 of the Act is limited. This Court has had occasion to examine
the width of the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of
the Act, and held that a discretionary interim order of an
Arbitral Tribunal ought to be interdicted only if it is perverse or
manifestly arbitrary. These conclusions rest both on the
overarching principles of party autonomy and minimal curial
intervention, which inform interpretation of the Act, and upon
general principles governing the exercise of appellate power
against discretionary orders, as explained by the Supreme
Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.

13. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in
Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta, wherein this Court considered
the matter with reference to Section 5 of the Act, and the
generally limited nature of the Court's power in relation to
arbitration proceedings, to conclude as follows:

“60. In the opinion of this Court, another important,
and peculiar, feature of the 1996 Act, which must
necessarily inform the approach of the High Court, is
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that the 1996 Act provides for an appeal against
interlocutory orders, whereas the final award is not
amenable to any appeal, but only to objections under
Section 34. If the submission of Mr Nayar, as advanced,
were to be accepted, it would imply that the jurisdiction
of the Court, over the interlocutory decision of the
arbitrator, would be much wider than the jurisdiction
against the final award. Though, jurisprudential,
perhaps, such a position may not be objectionable, it
does appear incongruous, and opposed to the well
settled principle that the scope of interference with
interim orders, is, ordinarily much more restricted than
the scope of interference with the final judgment.

xxx

64. There can be no gainsaying the proposition,
therefore, that, while exercising any kind of jurisdiction,
over arbitral orders, or arbitral awards, whether interim
or final, or with the arbitral process itself, the Court is
required to maintain an extremely circumspect
approach. It is always required to be borne, in mind,
that arbitration is intended to be an avenue for
“alternative dispute resolution”, and not a means to
multiply, or foster, further disputes. Where, therefore,
the arbitrator resolves the dispute, that resolution is
entitled to due respect and, save and except for the
reasons explicitly set out in the body of the 1996 Act, is,
ordinarily immune from judicial interference.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

66. In my opinion, this principle has to guide,
strongly, the approach of this Court, while dealing with
a challenge such as the present, which is directed
against an order which, at an interlocutory stage,
merely directing furnishing of security, by one of the
parties to the dispute. The power, of the learned Sole
arbitrator, to direct furnishing of security, is not under
question; indeed, in view of sub-clause (b) of Section
17(1)(ii) of the 1996 Act, it cannot. The arbitrator is,
under the said sub-clause, entirely within his
jurisdiction in securing the amount in dispute in the
arbitration. Whether, in exercising such jurisdiction, the
arbitrator has acted in accordance with law, or not, can,
of course, always be questioned. While examining such
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a challenge, however, the Court has to be mindful of its
limitations, in interfering with the decision of the
arbitrator, especially a decision taken at the
discretionary level, and at an interlocutory stage.

14. In Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha, the Court went on to
hold as follows:

“19. This Court has already opined, in Dinesh Gupta
v. Anand Gupta (Supra) and Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v.
One97 Communication Ltd. (Supra). that the
considerations guiding exercise of appellate jurisdiction
under Section 37(2)(b) are, fundamentally, not really
different from those which govern exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

20. It is only, therefore, where the order suffers from
patent illegality or perversity that the court would
interfere with the order of the learned Arbitral Tribunal,
under Section 37(2)(b). This is because, unlike appeals
under other statutes or under the CPC, appeals against
orders of Arbitral Tribunal are subject to the
overarching limitations contained in Section 5 of the
1996 Act, read with the Preamble thereto, which
proscribes interference, by courts, with the arbitral
process, or with orders passed by learned Arbitral
Tribunal, save and except on the limited grounds
envisaged in the 1996 Act itself.”

41. Further reliance can be placed on a judgment of the Co-
ordinate Bench in R.K. Associates and Hoteliers Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian
Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Limited (IRCTC), 2026
SCC OnLine Del 212 which observed as under:

“6. At the outset, this Court notes the settled position of law
that in case the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is plausible
and free from perversity, interference under Section 37(2)(b) of
the Arbitration Act, is not warranted. The scheme of the
Arbitration Act emphasizes minimal judicial intervention and
Courts do not substitute their opinions for that of the Arbitral
Tribunal, limiting the interference of the Court only in cases
where the impugned order is perverse, patently illegal or suffers
from jurisdictional infirmity. Thus, this Court in the case of
Databit Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Red Fort Finance Company
Pvt. Ltd., ARB. A. (COMM.) No. 1 of 2026, order dated 6-1-
2026 (Del), held as follows:
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“xxx xxx xxx

7. It is well settled that the scope of interference
under Section 37 is limited. The appellate court does
not act as a court of first instance and cannot re-
appreciate evidence or substitute its own discretion
over that of the Arbitral Tribunal. Interference is
warranted only where the impugned order is perverse,
patently illegal, or suffers from a jurisdictional
infirmity. Mere disagreement with the view taken by
the Tribunal or the possibility of an alternative view is
not a ground for interference. The power exercised by
the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 is discretionary
and is guided by settled principles governing grant of
interim measures, namely, the existence of a prima
facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of
irreparable prejudice.

8. It is equally well settled that interlocutory
orders are, by their very nature, discretionary and the
scope of interference, in judicial review, with
discretionary orders is limited. Where the discretion
exercised is towards direction for a deposit, the court
has to be additionally circumspect, as the issue of
whether a deposit ought, or ought not, to be directed, so
as to secure the sanctity of the arbitral proceedings and
ensure that they proceed to fruition, is essentially a
matter to be assessed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
Unless such assessment is perverse or suffers from
manifest illegality, the approach of the court, ordinarily,
should be one of restraint [refer: Dinesh Gupta v. Bechu
Singh, (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 763 : 2021 DHC 4400].

xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)

7. Likewise, holding that scope of interference in appeal
against orders passed by arbitrators on applications under
Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, is limited and the restraints
which apply on the Court while examining the challenge to a
final award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, equally
apply to a challenge under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration
Act, this Court in the case of World Window Infrastructure (P)
Ltd. v. Central Warehousing Corporation, (2021) 3 HCC (Del)
731, held as follows:
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“xxx xxx xxx

66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against
orders passed by arbitrators on applications under
Section 17 of the 1996 Act is limited. This Court has
already opined in Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta
[Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta, 2020 SCC OnLine Del
2099], Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97 Communication
Ltd. [Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97 Communication
Ltd., (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and Sanjay Arora v.
Rajan Chadha [Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha, (2021) 3
HCC (Del) 654] that the restraints which apply on the
court while examining a challenge to a final award
under Section 34 equally apply to a challenge to an
interlocutory order under Section 37(ii)(b). In either
case, the court has to be alive to the fact that, by its
very nature, the 1996 Act frowns upon interference, by
courts, with the arbitral process or decisions taken by
the arbitrator. This restraint, if anything, operates
more strictly at an interlocutory stage than at the final
stage, as interference with interlocutory orders could
interference with the arbitral process while it is
ongoing, which may frustrate, or impede, the arbitral
proceedings.

67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding
applications under Section 17 are interlocutory views.
They are not final expressions of opinion on the merits
of the case between the parties. They are always
subject to modification or review at the stage of final
award. They do not, therefore, in most cases,
irreparably prejudice either party to the arbitration.
Section 17 like Section 9 is intended to be a protective
measure, to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral
process. The preeminent consideration, which should
weigh with the arbitrator while examining a Section 17
application, is the necessity to preserve the arbitral
process and ensure that the parties before it are placed
on an equitable scale. The interlocutory nature of the
order passed under Section 17, therefore, must
necessarily inform the court seized with an appeal
against such a decision, under Section 37.
Additionally, the considerations which apply to Section
34 would also apply to Section 37(ii)(b).

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xxx xxx xxx

82. That the province of Section 9 jurisdiction of the
court, and of Section 17 jurisdiction of the arbitrator,
are co-equal, stands settled by the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd.
v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. [Arcelor Mittal Nippon
Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., (2022) 1
SCC 712 : AIR 2021 SC 4350]

xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)

8. Similar view has been taken by this Court in the cases of
GLS Foils Products Pvt. Ltd. v. FWS Turnit Logistic Park LLP,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 3904 and Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta,
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099.

9. Thus, the position of law is clear that the Court is
possessed with the power of only limited interference under
Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, only in cases where the
impugned order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal suffers from
patent illegality or perversity.”

31. Ex facie , it is abundantly clear that the Court exercising jurisdiction
under section 37(2)(b) of the Act may interfere with interlocutory orders
only when it is found to be (i) perverse, (ii) patently illegal or (iii) suffering
from jurisdictional infirmity. It is on this touchstone that the appellant’s
contentions have to be tested and examined.
32. Learned counsel for the appellant had vociferously argued that the

right and authority to foreclose the contract/Project lay solely with the
appellant in terms of Clause 13 of the GCC. And that no such right or
authority having been contractually conferred upon the respondent no.1,
foreclosure at its instance or behest was fundamentally contrary to the
contractual provisions and thus, the impugned interim award to that extent
has to be eschewed or expunged.
33. Though the said argument appears to be attractive, however, does not
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appeal to this Court. This is for the reason that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
has clearly examined the correspondences and communications exchanged
between the parties before concluding that the foreclosure sought by the
respondent no.1 was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Such communications were also brought to the notice of this Court. For
clarity the correspondences referred to are extracted hereunder:
i) Letter dated 20.07.2024 from respondent no.1 to the appellant:

“ By mail

MPK/KOL/24-25/136A/0188

th
Dated 20 July 2024

To Chairman Cum Managing Director
Wapcos Limited,
Sector-18
Guru gram-122 015 (Haryana)





Dear Sir,

Name of work : Construction of Convention Centre and associated
Infrastructure at Aizwal, Mizoram
LOA No. : WAP/ropeways/LOA/2021-22/03-03 dt. 10.03.2022.
1) Please refer the following correspondence entered into between
us and Wapcos in respect of above referred subject work:

th
a) Our letter No.MPK/KOL/24-25/ 136A/0124 dated 20 Jun '
24 addressed to The Chief Scientist, Wapcos Limited (Copy
attached Annexure-1) under which we have requested
Wapcos for granting financial approval of the deviations/
extra works executed by us at site as per the directions of
Wapcos.

b) Our letter No.MPK/KOL/24-25/ 136A/0153 dated 3 rct Jul'
24 addressed to The Chief Scientist, Wapcos Limited and
copy endorsed to your good-self and The Chief Engineer,
Wapcos Limited (Copy attached Annexure-II ) . In our letter
under reference, we have again requested Wapcos for
clearing our long outstanding dues to the tune of
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Rs.2,65,72,565/60 (The amount under reference is due to us
on account of balance payment against RA bills, on
account of reimbursement of GST and towards release of
retention withheld by Wapcos against submission of BGB
of equivalent amount strictly in compliance with contract
provisions).

c) Our letter No.MPK/KOL/24-25/ 136A/0159 dt.Sth July 24
addressed to your good-self and copy endorsed to The Chief
Scientist, Wapcos Limited and the Chief Engineer, Wapcos
Limited (Copy attached Annexure-III ) under which we have
again requested Wapcos for granting financial approval of
the deviations / extra works executed by us on ground as per
the directions of Wapcos.

2) We are very sorry and feeling extremely regretful to inform you
that till date NO financial approval of the extra works/
deviations already executed at site by us could be accorded by
Wapcos Limited yet . As a result, we are not in a position to
claim the amount due to us on account of deviations/extra
works already executed by us at site in our RA Bills. In addition
to above, Wapcos have also failed to clear our long outstanding
dues to the tune of Rs.2,65,72,565/60 for the reasons best
known to Wapcos as elaborated in our letter annexed to our
present letter i.e. Annexure II .

3) Considering the factual situation narrated above, we don't find
any option at present but to seek "FORECLOSURE" of this
contract I work with immediate effect in terms of Section 51, 53,
54 and 55 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.

4) In view of the above, it may please be considered a Notice to
Wapcos from our end under the legal powers/ authority vested
in us in terms of Section 51, 53, 54 and 55 of Indian Contract
Act, 1872 to consider FORECLOSURE OF ABOVE
REFERRED CONTRACT with immediate effect after lapse of
15 (fifteen days) from the receipt of this letter without any
further notice by us to Wapcos in case our outstanding dues are
not cleared and the financial approvals with respect of
deviations/ extra items of works are accorded by Wapcos within
next fifteen days from the date of receipt of the letter.

5) Please also note in case eventuality as per Para 3 and 4 above
arises, we shall be stopping all ongoing construction activities
in connection with above work at the site and would demobilize
all our labor and the resources deployed by us at the site. In
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addition, we would be submitting our final bill for this work to
Wapcos along with all our claims arising in this contract as per
prevailing law of the land. Further, we would not hesitate to
revoke Arbitration clause forming part of our contract in case
amount due to us in the final bill submitted by us including our
claims are not finalized and paid to us by Wapcos within six
months from the date of submission of the final bill by us.

6) It is without any prejudice.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,
For M/s M.P. Khaitan

(Sanjay Khaitan)

Encl: As stated above”

ii) Letter dated 26.07.2024 from the appellant to respondent no.1:

“No: WAP/Ropeways/Mimzoram/2024-25,07/07 Dated:
26/07/2024

To,
M/s M.P. Khaitan,
15, Ganesh chandra Avenue 7 Floor,
Kolkata-700013

Subject: Construction of Convention Centre and associated infra-
structure at Aizawl, Mizoram. - Regarding withdrawal
of"FORECLOSURE" Notice.

LOA No.: WAP/ropeways/LOA/2021-22/03-03 dated 10th March 2022
& Agreement dated 13.0 4 .2022
Ref: 1 . Your letter No: MPK/24--25/136A/0188 dated 20/07/2024

Sir,

In reference to your above-mentioned letter, we appreciate your issues
and assure you that WAPCOS is working on them. The issue related to
deviation is already being communicated with higher competent
authorities, and we are confident that it will be resolved very soon
within Contract provisions, as applicable.

Secondly, regarding payment clearance, WAPCOS has already
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approved your bill, which is currently with the accounts section.
However, due to a lack of funds to be received from the Ministry of
Tourism, Government of India, we are not in a position to clear your
payments.

We have requested Ministry of Tourism, Government of India, to
release the balance funds, which is delayed inordinately, however as
soon as funds are received in the WAPCOS account, we assure that
your payments will be cleared immediately. A meeting with Ministry of
Tourism, Government of India, in this regard is also scheduled on
30.07.2024.

Regarding your request of foreclosure of the contract (letter referred at
S.No.1), we kindly request your trust and patience as we work to
resolve these issues. We require at least one month from the date of
issuance of this letter to address the situation. If we fail to meet your
requirements within this timeframe, we will issue the foreclosure
recommendation ourselves. You are therefore requested to bear with us
as per provisions of Clause No New Clause 7A, page no 86, SECTION
IV, SPECIAL CONDITION OF CONTRACT of the contract. We also
would like to apprise you that, in view of the new clause 7A, the
provisions of section 51, 53-55 are not applicable in the present
contract.

Considering the overall progress, which is nearly 90%, you are
fervently requested to proceed with the completion of balance work as
per the Contract Provisions without any further delays and withdraw
the "FORECLOSURE" Notice.

As you may be aware that, any delay in completion of the work will
adversely affect the project timeline and budget. You are therefore
requested to work with full dedication to ensure immediate completion
of the work.

Thanks and regards

Sincerely Yours
Prabhakar Sati
Chief Scientist-II
WAPCOS Limited, Gurugram”
[emphasis supplied]


34. Apart from the above letters, there are other similar
letters/communications dated 09.05.2025 and 23.05.2025 emanating from
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the appellant to the respondent no.1 following the above correspondences.
For the sake of brevity, the letters are not extracted herein. Suffice it to note
that the subsequent communications are also in the same vein. It is manifest
that the appellant had admitted to the outstanding payment to the tune of
Rs.2,65,72,565.06 payable to respondent no.1. It had also categorically
admitted that it did not have any funds on account of funds not having been
released to it by respondent no.2. In fact, it was the appellant which had
categorically sought for some time to release the outstanding dues, failing
which it had assured the respondent no.1 of foreclosing the Project/contract
by itself. It is also not denied that till date no outstanding amounts have
been released. It was in these peculiar and onerous financial deprivation of
requisite funds that the learned Arbitral Tribunal took a plausible view and
passed the interim award.
35. Moreover, Clause 13 of GCC does empower the appellant to

foreclose the contract/project, however there is no clause which specifically
proscribes the respondent no.1 to take recourse to such action.
Undoubtedly, the said clause is an enabling clause in favour of the
appellant, however, having regard to sections 51, 53, 54 and 55 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, in the background of the peculiar facts as noted
above admitted in the correspondences, it can be construed that respondent
no.1 was not completely precluded or disentitled from requiring foreclosure
of the contract/Project.
36. From the records it is discernible that Clause 13 was neither referred
to in the reply filed by the appellant to the application under section 17 of
respondent no.1 nor was the attention of the learned Arbitral Tribunal
invited. Thus, it appears that the said issue is being raised for the first time
before this Court.
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37. Having regard to the above opinion, the direction to issue
Foreclosure Certificate, appears to be in consonance with and consequence
of the direction to foreclose the Project/contract.
38. In any case, the view taken by the learned Arbitral Tribunal is
plausible and clearly, this Court under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act, would
surely not substitute its view for the one taken by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal.
39. Another aspect which was hotly contested was the direction to the
appellant to take over the project being contrary to the conditions of the
contract. Learned counsel for the appellant had drawn attention to Clause
2(6) of the Additional Conditions of the SCC to submit that the condition
prescribed handing over only to the “owner”/ “client”. The appellant being
neither, and only a Consultant, was contractually under no obligation or
any mandate to take over the Project. In such circumstances, it was urged
that the direction of the learned Arbitral Tribunal is clearly erroneous and
beyond the contractual terms. Even otherwise, learned counsel contended
that, the undeniable position under the contract is that the MoT/respondent
no.2 is the “owner” and the “beneficiary” is the Department of Tourism,
Aizwal, Mizoram. Thus, according to him, if at all the direction has to be
implemented, it can only be qua the respondent no.2. Therefore, the
appellant urged that the learned Arbitral Tribunal misdirected itself while
requiring the appellant to take over possession of the project from
respondent no.1.
40. Learned Arbitral Tribunal had considered the Clause 2(6) referred to
above and rendered its prima facie opinion as under:
“5. Respondent no.2 was arrayed as a party to these proceedings at R1
Wapcos’s insistence. The latter states that, in terms of Additional
Conditions (p. 125 of its reply) that the claimant had agreed with R1
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that the completed project shall be handed over to Respondent no.2 -
which is, the owner of the project. The said clause reads as under:

“6. Handing Over of the Project: Contractor will hand over the
project to Owner /Client after successful completion of each
component of the project along with submission of all the
required documents i.e. As- built drawings, Inventory list,
guarantee / warranty bonds, certificates & invoices of
equipment, lock and key of each room and NoCs form various
Departments with complete satisfaction and acceptance by
WAPCOS/MoT. Contractor shall provide necessary Completion
Certificate/NOC from all local Government/ Statuary
Authorities including Fire, Forest, Electrical, Environment, Lift,
DG Set, Complete inventory list, duly signed as-build drawings,
required before handing over the project to the WAPCOS. The
partial handing over of works components shall not be
considered. Defect Liability period of Three (3) years will start
from the date of successful completion of each component of the
project and handing over to MoT/WAPCOS with all satisfaction
& acceptance along with submission of all the required
documents i.e. Asbuilt drawings, Inventory list, guarantee /
warranty bonds, certificates & invoices of equipment, lock and
key of each room and NoCs form various Departments.

6. This clause is in an Agreement between only the Claimant and
Wapcos/R1. R2 is not a party to it. Respondent no.1 has not been able
to show as to how it can bind the Respondent no.2 to these conditions.
Indeed, R2-Ministry of Tourism states that it is neither a necessary nor
a relevant party to these proceedings because R1 was engaged as an
specialized agency, for executing the project in terms of their letter
dated 31.03.2021 which detailed the construction, completion and
management aspects. It, inter alia requires Respondent no.1 / Wapcos
to:

“3.WAPCOS shall setup a Monitoring Committee with a
member from the Ministry of Tourism to monitor physical and
financial progress of the sanctioned project and submit the
progress report to the Government of India on quarterly basis.

4. The second installment of 30% of CFA will be released based
on tender cost of the project or the sanctioned cost, whichever
is less and after considering the progress of the project and on
receipt of utilization certificate for the amount already released
to them. The final/third installments will be released after
completion of the project and on receipt of Utilization
Certificate, Completion Certificate, Management Agreement
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and Undertaking as per scheme guidelines.

5. WAPCOS shall make land for the project available free of
cost and. also render all possible assistance for completion of
the project on time i.e. within 24 months. No portion of the
sanctioned project should be executed/implemented in
land/property owned by private individual or trust.

6. WAPCOS would execute the project and shall have the work
started immediately to ensure timely utilization of funds 45and
to avoid escalation of cost. The project should be commissioned
within 24 months and any cost escalation on account of delay
etc. would be met by the WAPCOS/State Government.

7. The grants-in-aid will be utilized for the purpose for which
the funds are released.

8. The WAPCOS would undertake the responsibility for
operational and maintenance of facilities for which the funds
are released and no reimbursement on account of losses
incurred, if any, would be made to the WAPCOS The executing
agency shall put in place the mandatory facilities for barrier
free access physically disabled persons.

9. The WAPCOS has to put up a signage of the. Ministry of
Tourism with the logo 'Incredible India' stating that the project
has been funded by the Ministry of Tourism as per the
guidelines para No:5 1 (vi).

10. The WAPCOS would take all necessary clearances from the
concerned agencies, which are required as per prevailing rules
and regulations before undertaking this project.”

7. Nowhere in the said letter has R2 extended itself to overseeing the
day to day progress or management of the project or that it would
accept the completed project directly from a third party/the Claimant.
The learned counsel for R2 rightly contends that the whole purpose of
engaging an agency like Wapcos/R1 was that R2 would get a
Convention Centre at Aizawl, duly completed in terms of the grant-in-
aid provided for the project. R2 did not wish to be burdened regular
monitoring or the minute details of the project, otherwise the very
purpose of engaging R1 would be defeated.

8. R2’s letter dated 31.03.2021 shows that Wapcos was to receive
about 8% (Rs.2.959 crores) of the contract cost for its advisory services
for construction/completion of the project, administrative charges and
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agency charges. The objective and understanding being that the
Government of India would be delivered the completed project.

9. Evidently, each of the aforementioned clauses specifically requires
Wapcos to deliver and not any contractor that Wapcos may engage.
Direct contract or contact between R12 and a contractor has been
specifically obviated and avoided. There is no privity of contract of R2
apropos the document containing the above referred clause 6. It cannot
bind R2. Not as single document is shown whereby Respondent no.2
has extended itself, ratified, signed or has otherwise agreed to any of
the contractual terms or understating between the Claimant and R1.
Therefore, Respondent no.1 seeking to implead Government of India is
misdirected. R2 is not a necessary party and is deleted from the array
of parties.

10. R2 has made some reply/comments on the merits of the case. The
same cannot be taken cognizance of. Reply of only a party to the
proceeding can be considered. The learned counsel for R2 states that
the comments were the prejudice and abundant caution, just in case the
impleadment of R2 was allowed. He submits that the reply the
considered only with respect to prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the section
17 application. Accordingly, its reply/comments -- beyond it not being
a necessary party, will be deemed non-est.

11. In view of the above, insofar as the Claimant has made out a prima
facie case for handing over of the project to the Respondent in terms of
the measurement.”

41. Having regard to the sound reasoning and justification, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the said reasons are neither perverse nor
patently illegal or beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
This Court is satisfied of the justiciability of the direction which calls for
no interference.
42. The only issue left for consideration as to whether the learned
Tribunal was justified in deleting respondent no.2 from the array of parties
before it.
43. In this context and to appreciate as to why the learned Tribunal
formed an opinion that the respondent no.2 is neither a proper nor a
necessary party to the proceedings, it is necessary to extract hereunder the
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relevant paragraphs disclosing the consideration of facts as also the
justifiable reasoning of the learned Tribunal :-
“7. Nowhere in the said letter has R2 extended itself to overseeing the
day to day progress or management of the project or that it would
accept the completed project directly from a third party/the Claimant.
The learned counsel for R2 rightly contends that the whole purpose of
engaging an agency like Wapcos/R1 was that R2 would get a
Convention Centre at Aizawl, duly completed in terms of the grant-in-
aid provided for the project. R2 did not wish to be burdened regular
monitoring or the minute details of the project, otherwise the very
purpose of engaging R1 would be defeated.

8. R2’s letter dated 31.03.2021 shows that Wapcos was to receive
about 8% (Rs.2.959 crores) of the contract cost for its advisory services
for construction/completion of the project, administrative charges and
agency charges. The objective and understanding being that the
Government of India would be delivered the completed project.

9. Evidently, each of the aforementioned clauses specifically requires
Wapcos to deliver and not any contractor that Wapcos may engage.
Direct contract or contact between R2 and a contractor has been
specifically obviated and avoided. There is no privity of contract of R2
apropos the document containing the above referred clause 6. It cannot
bind R2. Not as single document is shown whereby Respondent no.2
has extended itself, ratified, signed or has otherwise agreed to any of
the contractual terms or understating between the Claimant and R1.
Therefore, Respondent no.1 seeking to implead Government of India is
misdirected. R2 is not a necessary party and is deleted from the array
of parties.”

[emphasis supplied]

44. The reasoning of the learned Tribunal encapsulated in para 9 clearly
demonstrates that the Tribunal found as a fact that there is no privity of
contract of the respondent no.2 with the respondent no.1 so far as the
contractual document before it is concerned. Undeniably, respondent no.2
is not a signatory to the contract executed between the respondent no.1 and
the appellant. Except for Clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions
appended to the SCC, there is no responsibility, obligation or any
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contractual term which would involve respondent no.2 with the contract.
Whether Clause 2(6) of the Additional Conditions appended to SCC would
bind a non-signatory like respondent no.2, prima facie , is doubtful.
45. The Learned Tribunal has given explicit reasons predicated on facts
obtained before it. This Court does not find the said reasoning and findings
on facts either perverse or patently illegal. It is not even the case of the
appellant that the learned Tribunal while deleting the respondent no.2 from
array of parties has exercised any jurisdiction not vested upon it. In that
view of the matter, the argument of the appellant in regard to the deletion
of respondent no.2 is unpersuasive and unmerited.
46. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that
there is no merit in the appeal which is dismissed, however, without any
costs.



TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Kct/rl
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