Murrjee Nathoobhoy And Company Pvt. Limited vs Reserve Bank Of India And Anr.
- Court
- Bombay High Court
CNR No : HCBM010081052014
2026:BHC-AS:43529
Neeta Sawant WP-2271-2014 & 2272 COLLABAWALA & TULZAPURKAR (2).docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 2271 OF 2014
Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company Pvt.
...Petitioner
Ltd.
: Versus :
1. Reserve Bank of India
...Respondents
2. The Estate Officer, Reserve Bank of
India
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2272 OF 2014
Reunion Private Limited ...Petitioner
: Versus :
1. Reserve Bank of India
...Respondents
2. The Estate Officer, Reserve Bank of
India
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2273 OF 2014
Reunion Engineering Company
Private Limited ...Petitioner
: Versus :
1. Reserve Bank of India
2. The Estate Officer, Reserve Bank
of India ....Respondents
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Mr. P.S. Colabawala with Mr. Samkit Shah and Mr. Farhad Vakil i/b
Mulla & Mulla & Craigie Blunt & Caroe, for the Petitioners.
Mr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Parag Sharma,
Ms. Aditi Pathak, Ms. Megha More, Ms. Twinkle Kalla and Ms. Juhi
Bhayani i/b BLAC Co., for Respondents.
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
JUDGMENT RESD. ON : 7 OCTOBER 2026.
JUDGMENT PRON. ON : 26 OCTOBER 2026
JUDGMENT:
1) These Petitions are filed challenging the judgments and
orders dated 23 January 2014 passed by the Principal Judge, City Civil
Court at Bombay in Misc. Appeal Nos. 52 of 2013, 53 of 2013 and 54 of
2013. The learned Principal Judge has dismissed the Appeals preferred by
the Petitioners and has confirmed the order of eviction dated 15 April
2013 passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5(1) of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Public
Premises Act) directing eviction of the Petitioners from the public
premises.
2) Brief facts of the case are that ‘Amar Building’ was
constructed at P.M. Road, Fort, Mumbai-400 001 in the year 1930. M/s.
Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. was inducted as a tenant in respect of the
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premises located in a portion on the fourth floor of Amar Building. Later,
a company named M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated and the same
started occupying the premises. RBI purchased Amar Building and
acquired its ownership sometime in the year 1947. In the year 1949,
Petitioner-M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company (India) Pvt. Ltd. took
over as a going concern of the Firm- M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. M/s.
Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. is another group company and this is
how the three group companies started occupying the premises in Amar
Building. RBI was nationalized in the year 1949.
3) In the year 1959, RBI initiated proceedings against M/s.
Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company (India) Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd.
and M/s. Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( Reunion Group ) under the
provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) in the Small Causes Court at Mumbai. On
12 January 1961, consent terms were entered into between the RBI and
Reunion Group, under which the Reunion Group companies surrendered
certain portion of the premises in their occupation and continued to
occupy the balance portion. RBI agreed not to institute any suit for
eviction under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act on bonafide
requirement ground and the Reunion group agreed to find alternate
accommodation. However, it appears that Petitioners continued to
occupy the premises and did not find alternate premises.
4) On 17 July 2009, RBI issued termination notice terminating
the tenancy of M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. On 22 July 2009, notice
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was responded to and the termination was disputed. RBI filed application
before the Estate Officer seeking eviction of the Reunion Group under
the provisions of the Public Premises Act by referring to the security
reports dated 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005. On 16 September
2009, an opinion was formed by the Estate Officer based on the two
security reports to the effect that RBI required the premises for its
bonafide use.
5) RBI issued notices to the three Reunion Group companies
( Petitioners) under the Public Premises Act on the ground of security
threats and bonafide requirements of RBI. Petitioners filed their
respective replies on 24 November 2009. On 5 August 2011, Application
was filed by RBI for withdrawal of eviction proceedings initiated against
M/s. Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd and the
same was allowed 13 October 2011. Thereafter, notices for termination
were issued by RBI to M/s. Reunion Engineering Pvt. Ltd and M/s.
Reunion Pvt. Ltd on 28 November 2011, which were disputed by the
noticees. RBI pressed for eviction of those two companies under the
Public Premises Act. The Estate Officer passed order dated 18 November
2011 allowing the security reports to be marked in evidence and rejecting
the objections raised by the Petitioners. Parties led evidence in support
of their respective pleas. On 15 April 2013, the Estate Officer passed
orders for eviction of all the three Petitioners from the public premises
under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises Act.
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6) Petitioners filed Appeals before the City Civil Court
challenging the orders of eviction. By separate judgments and orders
dated 23 January 2014, the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court
has dismissed the Appeals preferred by the Petitioners. Aggrieved by
judgments and orders dated 23 January 2014 passed by the City Civil
Court in Misc. Appeal Nos. 52 of 2013, 53 of 2013 and 54 of 2013,
Petitioners have filed the present Petitions. By order dated 6 March 2014,
this Court has granted interim stay on eviction order in favour of the
Petitioners.
7) Mr. Colabawala, the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioners submits that the learned Judge has grossly erred in
dismissing the Appeals preferred by the Petitioners and confirming the
eviction orders. That the impugned eviction orders are premised entirely
on an opinion formed by the Estate Officer on the basis of two security
reports of 2002 and 2005. At that time, there was no material to record
an opinion that RBI required premises for its own bonafide use. That the
security reports of 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005 were made by
external agencies and RBI did not have its own security assessment. That
the security reports were submitted in 2002 and 2005, whereas the
opinion was formed thereafter in the year 2009. Since the opinion
formed on the basis of stale security reports of 2002 and 2005 is itself
erroneous, the show-cause notice dated 22 September 2009 premised
thereon is also rendered void. That if foundation for seeking eviction
itself is baseless, the eviction order has to be set aside. In support, he
relies on judgment of this Court in Mine Manager, Manganese Ore
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1
(India) Ltd. Versus. Shyam s/o. Kunjilal Yadav
. That the Estate Officer,
as well as the learned Judge have not decided the issue of the flaw in the
show cause notice and the said point has remained undecided.
8) Mr. Colabawala further submits that the Estate Officer has
grossly erred in relying on the security reports without examining its
authors. That the objections raised to admissibility of security reports in
evidence are ignored by the Estate Officer and the same are erroneously
marked for being read in evidence. That RBI did not even disclose as to
the exact persons who made the concerned security reports. That since
security reports are wholly inadmissible in evidence, the impugned
eviction orders premised squarely on the security reports will have to be
necessarily set aside. He submits that the learned Judge of the City Civil
Court has erroneously upheld the action of the Estate Officer by relying
on the security reports erroneously marked in evidence. That Petitioners
did not cross-examine RBI's witness on the security reports. That the
learned Judge has totally misread the evidence for recording a finding
about Petitioners examining RBI's witness on the security report. He
relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Sait Tarajee Khimchand & Ors.
2
Versus. Yelamarti Satyam alias Satteya & Ors. in support of his
contention that mere marking of a document does not mean that the
same can be read in evidence in absence of proof thereof. He submits
that the learned Judge has erroneously relied on the aspect of non-
applicability of provisions of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 for upholding the
directions of the Estate Officer for admitting the security reports in
1 2002 SCC Onlline Bom 518
2 (1972) 4 SCC 562
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M/s. Bareilly
evidence. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in
3
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Versus. The Workmen & Ors. in support of
his contention that even if Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply to
quasi-judicial proceedings, the principles of natural justice would still
continue to apply. He relies on judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in Nandini J. Shah & anr. Versus. Life Insurance Corporation of
4
India & Ors. in support of his contention that the primary onus lies on
the RBI to establish its claim by leading documentary and oral evidence.
9) Mr. Colabawala further submits that when Petitioners
highlighted impermissibility to rely upon stale security reports, RBI
produced the third security report of 2010. He submits that RBI
selectively relied upon security reports for ensuring eviction of the
Petitioners. Without reiterating the various recommendations contained
in the security reports, he takes me through the testimonies of the
witnesses to demonstrate that most of the recommendations in the said
reports remained unimplemented. He submits that the security reports
were deliberately procured solely with the aim of ensuring eviction of
the Petitioners. He takes me through the evidence recorded by the Estate
Officer in support of his plea that what is sought to be projected under
the security reports is mere general risk and that no steps were taken by
RBI to implement various suggestions made in the security reports. He
submits that since RBI is an instrumentality of State, it cannot act
arbitrarily. That there has to be a valid reason for seeking eviction of the
occupant under the Public Premises Act. He relies on judgment of the
3 1971 (2) SCC 617
4 2008(4) Mh.L.J. 106
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Jiwan Dass Versus. Life Insurance Corporation of India &
Apex Court in
5
Anr. in support of his contention that there has to be a valid reason and
such reason has to be specified for terminating the tenancy under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
10) Mr. Colabawala relies on the guidelines published by the
Government of India on 30 May 2002 in support of his contention that
eviction action cannot be initiated with the commercial motive or for
securing vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate its
own staff. That the guidelines provide that occupation of the premises
could not be treated as unauthorised merely upon service of a notice of
termination; rather, the question of unauthorised occupation had to be
determined by following due process of law. He submits that the
guidelines do not have binding effect and need to be necessarily
followed. That the Apex Court has held in Banatwala & Co., Versus. Life
6
Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. that the guidelines dated 30
May 2002 are required to be followed and that they expressly recognise
the relevance of certain provisions of the Rent Control Act to properties
covered under the Public Premises Act. In support of his contention that
security aspect does not fall outside court’s power of judicial review, he
relies on a judgment of this Court in Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL &
7
Ors. Versus. Union of India & Ors. . He submits that the Courts need not
blindly accept the security perception projected before it and can go into
the validity of the perception of real threat.
5 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694
6 (2011) 13 SCC 446
7 WP No. 3013-2018 decided on 27.2.2019
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11) Mr. Colabawala further submits that so far as the ground of
bonafide requirement is concerned, no material is produced. That there
was specific agreement between the parties under the Consent Terms
that eviction of Petitioner was not to be sought on the ground of
bonafide requirement. That RBI's witness also admitted that bonafide
requirement was not a ground available for eviction. He accordingly
prays for setting aside of the impugned orders.
12) Dr. Tulzapurkar the learned Senior Advocate appearing for
the Respondents opposes the petitions submitting that the Petitioners
have suffered two concurrent findings recorded by the Estate Officer and
the learned Principal Judge. That factual findings are recorded
concurrently regarding the security threat as well as the bonafide
requirement. That this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of
India. That the Petition is argued as if it is an appeal in disguise. That
there is due application of mind to all the factors both by the Estate
Officer as well as by the Appellate Court. That therefore no ground is
made out by the Petitioner to interfere in the findings recorded by the
Estate Officer and by the Appeal Court.
13) Dr. Tulzapurkar further submits that the Petitioner cannot
question RBI's perception of security. That once security threat is
perceived by the RBI, it is justified in terminating the tenancy. He
submits that the guidelines relied upon by the Petitioner do not have
statutory force. That, in any case, the guidelines prevented State
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instrumentalities from seeking eviction for commercial motives or for
the purpose of making the premises available to their own employees.
That in this case, the Petitioner does not have any commercial motive.
RBI is not proposing to rent out the premises after recovering possession
thereof from the Petitioners.
14) Dr. Tulzapurkar further submits that the Respondent need
not even establish any ground for eviction since rent control protection
is withdrawn by virtue of declaration of law by the Apex Court in the
8
judgment in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. Versus. Vita .
That tenancy can be terminated by issuance of notice under Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act,1882. That the moment the tenancy is
terminated, occupation automatically becomes unauthorised. In support
of his contention that bonafide requirement need not be established nor
any ground needs to be demonstrated for seeking eviction of
unauthorised occupant, Dr. Tulzapurkar relies on judgment of this Court
in Bank of Maharashtra Versus. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar &
9
Ors . He prays for dismissal of the Petition.
15) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
16) Petitioners are aggrieved by dismissal of Appeals filed by
them before the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court in which
they had challenged the orders dated 15 April 2013 passed by the Estate
8 Civil Appeal No.(s). 2638 of 2023 dated 11.12.2025
9 WP-10765/2012 decided on 16 September 2026.
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Officer under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises Act. By those orders,
Petitioners have been directed to handover possession of the premises in
their occupation. As observed above, Petitioners are group companies of
Reunion Group. The premises were occupied initially by M/s. Munjee
Nathoobhoy & Co. since the year 1930 long before RBI arrived at the
scene. RBI purchased the building in the year 1947. M/s. Munjee
Nathoobhoy & Co. was taken over as a going concern by M/s. Munjee
Nathoobhoy & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. ( Petitioner in WP No. 2271 of 2014).
The other two Petitioners are part of the same group and all the three
Petitioners occupy the premises as Reunion Group Companies.
17) Earlier RBI had sought eviction of the Petitioners under
Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act by filing Suit No. 766 of 4261 of
1959. Consent Terms were tendered in the said suit on 12 January 1961
under which Petitioners surrendered some portion of the premises to the
RBI. Reciprocal promises were made by RBI and the Petitioners under
which RBI agreed not to seek eviction of the Petitioners on the ground of
bonafide requirement under the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) of the
Bombay Rent Act and Petitioners agreed to make an endeavour to find
alternate premises. It appears that Petitioners did not act on their
promise and continued to occupy the premises for the next 48 long years
when RBI was required to terminate the tenancy. After issuance of
notices for termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, eviction proceedings were initiated against the
Petitioners before the Estate Officer. It appears that, on 16 September
2009, the RBI filed an application before the Estate Officer, contending
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that there was a security threat to the RBI and that the presence of the
Petitioners on the Bank’s premises increased its exposure and
vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The Petitioners’ presence in the
premises was identified as a security threat. RBI relied on reports of
Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs) dated 28 February 2002
and of Additional Commissioner of Police, Mumbai dated 20 January
2005, both recommending inter-alia removal of non-RBI entities from
Amar Building. The Bank also stated that it had bonafide requirement in
respect of the premises in possession of the Petitioners.
18) On the basis of application made by RBI, it appears that the
Estate Officer formed an opinion on 16 September 2009 that it was
necessary to adopt proceedings under the Public Premises Act by
issuance of show cause notice for eviction of the Petitioners. Accordingly,
the Estate Officer issued show cause notice dated 22 September 2009
under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act.
19) According to the Petitioners, issuance of show cause notice
was itself faulty and the same was premised entirely on the opinion
dated 16 September 2009, which in turn was based only on the security
reports dated 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005. Petitioners believe
that the reports of 2002 and 2005 could not have been the basis for
formation of opinion in the year 2009 for issuance of show cause notice
by the Estate Officer. It is therefore sought to be contended that the very
foundation for issuance of show cause notice was faulty. I am unable to
agree. There is no separate step/stage provided for in the Public Premises
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Act of ‘formation of opinion’ by the Estate Officer. Under Section 4 of the
Act, the Estate Officer can issues show cause notice if he has
‘information’ that a person is in unauthorised occupation of public
premises and that he should be evicted. Thus, before issuance of show
cause notice, the Estate Officer is not required to ‘record satisfaction’ on
the basis of any material that a person is in unauthorised occupation of
the public premises. He is empowered to act merely on ‘information’.
Section 4 of the Public Premises Act provided thus:
4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction.—
(1) If the estate officer has information that any person is in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises and that he should be evicted, the estate
officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing within
seven working days from the date of receipt of the information regarding the
unauthorised occupation calling upon the person concerned to show cause why
an order of eviction should not be made.
(1A)If the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any person is in
unauthorised occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the
provisions of sub-section (1), he shall forthwith issue a notice in writing calling
upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not
be made.(1B)Any delay in issuing a notice referred to in sub-sections (1) and
(1A) shall not vitiate the proceedings under this Act.
(2)The notice shall—(a)specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is
proposed to be made; and(b)require all persons concerned, that is to say, all
persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public
premises,—(i)to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before
such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not later than seven days
from the date of issue thereof, and(ii)to appear before the estate officer on the
date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to
produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such
hearing is desired.
(3)The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on
the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in
such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be
deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned.
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20) Thus it was not even necessary for the Estate Officer to
record an opinion in writing before issuance of show cause notice nor
correctness of that opinion can be questioned in appeal filed against
eviction order. What can be challenged is only the findings recorded in
the final eviction order.
21) I therefore do not find that the very premise on which the
show cause notice was issued was faulty as sought to be suggested by the
Petitioners. Mr. Colabawala’s reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Mine Manager, Manganese Ore (India) Pvt. Ltd. is also inapposite. In
that case, the foundation for initiating eviction proceedings was the
cessation of the Respondent’s service, which was found to be incorrect,
as it was ultimately established that the Respondent had never been in
service of the establishment. Since the basis for issuing the show-cause
notice was held to be erroneous, the eviction order was set aside. This
Court held in Para 7 of the judgment thus:
7. Having said this, it is equally clear to my mind from a perusal of the notice
to show cause that was issued under the Act, that the entire basis of the
proceeding was that the respondent had ceased to be in the employment
of the appellant 25 years ago and was therefore in unauthorised
occupation. The respondent denied that he was at any time in the service
of the undertaking or that his father was at any time employed with the
appellant or its predecessor. Now it is a common ground between the
parties that neither the respondent, his father nor any member of the
family has been in the service either of the appellant or the predecessor
in interest of the appellant. Therefore, the basis of the show cause notice
which was that the respondent was in unauthorised occupation, after the
period of his service had come to an end, is completely flawed. The
proceedings before the Estate Officer ought to have been quashed on this
limited ground. Once it is an accepted position that neither the respondent
nor his predecessor was an employee of the appellant or the erstwhile British
Company, the basis of eviction proposed in the show cause notice, cannot be
sustained. Under the provisions of the Act an order of eviction has to be
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preceded by the notice to show cause which specifies the grounds on the basis
of which the Estate Officer determines that the occupant is in unauthorised
occupation and as to why he should be evicted. The issuance of a proper notice
to show cause is a mandatory requirement of the statute. The show cause
notice is fundamentally flawed in the present case and the eviction proceeding,
is, therefore liable to be quashed and set aside on the aforesaid ground. In
these circumstances, I am of the view that this civil revision application is
liable to be dismissed. However, it is expressly clarified that the observations
contained in the impugned order in regard to the plea of adverse possession,
are overruled and the eviction proceedings are quashed only on the ground
that, as stated earlier, the basis and the foundation of the show cause notice
issued under section 4(1) of the Act is vitiated. This was a matter of prejudice
to the respondent because what he was required to meet was whether he had
or had not been in the service of the applicant or the erstwhile British
Company and whether upon the expiry of the period of service, he should be
regarded as a person in unauthorised occupation. However, while disposing of
this civil revision application, it would be appropriate to direct that the
applicant would be at liberty to pursue such remedies as are open to it in law
for the purpose of securing the possession of the premises in question. All the
rights and contentions of the parties are expressly kept open.
(emphasis added)
22) Thus, in the judgment in Mine Manager , it was found that
neither the Respondent therein nor his predecessor was an employee of
the Appellant or of the erstwhile British Company and that therefore the
basis of eviction proposed in the show cause notice was held to be
unsustainable. The basis of loss of employment for initiation of eviction
proceedings cannot be compared with the basis of security perception
forming the basis for issuance of show cause notice. In the present case,
there is no foundational error in issuance of show cause notice for
eviction and therefore the judgment in Mine Manager has no
application to the facts of the present case.
23) Also, in the present case, merely passage of some time for
seeking eviction of Petitioners on the basis of security reports, does not
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mean that the proposal becomes ab-initio void on account of delay. It
must be appreciated that the security reports were not confined only to
Amar Building or only to occupation of premises by the Petitioner. The
Ministry of Home Affairs, Intelligence Bureau, had conducted a security
inspection of RBI buildings and submitted its report dated 28 February
2002. A report was provided to RBI in respect of 26 storey New Central
Office Building, 3 storey Main Building and 6 storey Amar Building.
Various security aspects were highlighted and several recommendations
were made in respect of the three buildings. Of the 14 recommendations
made by the Intelligence Bureau, the last one directed that the feasibility
of shifting non-RBI offices from Amar Building be explored. Thus,
shifting of Petitioners from Amar Building was actually one of the
several recommendations made by the Intelligence Bureau. While RBI
could have immediately proceeded to initiate eviction proceedings
against the Petitioners after 28 February 2002, it possibly permitted
Petitioners to occupy the premises since the report had recommended
exploration of possibility of shifting of new RBI offices at Amar Building.
Another report was received by RBI from the office of Addl.
Commissioner of Police, Mumbai in respect of its three buildings. In
respect of Amar Building, it was once again highlighted that entries to
non-RBI offices were not regulated and their visitors could access Amar
Building. May be there was error in the report in describing the location
of Petitioners’ premises on the ground floor when in fact the entire
premises are situated on the fourth floor of Amar Building. However,
what needs to be borne in mind is the fact that the Additional
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Commissioner of Police highlighted security threat on account of visitors
of non-RBI offices having access to the entire Amar Building.
24) RBI decided to act on the two reports in the year 2009 and
initiated process for eviction of the Petitioners. It cannot be contended
that the delay on the part of the RBI in acting on the two security reports
would enure to the benefit of the Petitioners in any manner. Such delay
enabled the Petitioners to occupy the premises though the process for
their eviction could have been initiated in the year 2002 itself. In any
case, during pendency of the eviction proceedings, one more security
report of 31 July 2010 was prepared by the Protection and Security
Branch of RBI again recommending eviction of the Petitioner from Amar
Building. It was noted in that report that there were about 650
employees working in non-RBI premises and about 150 visitors were
visiting the premises everyday.
25) It appears that apart from the Petitioners, the premises in
Amar Building were also in occupation of MTNL, David & Co. etc. Those
occupants have already shifted out of Amar Building. Thus, there are as
many as 3 security reports which clearly recommended shifting of non-
RBI occupants from Amar Building from security perspective. The
security aspect needs to be considered from the perception of RBI and
not from the perception of the Petitioners. In my view, the Estate Officer
was justified in issuing the show cause notice to the Petitioners and the
foundation in the show cause notice cannot be treated as erroneous in
any manner.
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26) Petitioners have also raised objection about admission of
the security reports in evidence without examination of their authors.
The learned Principal Judge has recorded elaborate reasons to justify
Estate Officer’s action in marking the security reports in evidence. In this
regard findings recorded by the learned Judge in paragraphs 13 to 19 of
the judgment are relevant, which read thus:
13. In his cross-examination he was asked some questions as to the
security reports submitted by other two agencies namely Intelligence
Bureau and Mumbai Police who have conducted independent
inspection of the said premises. Hence, those two reports are marked
exhibits by Estate Officer on the threefold grounds- Firstly as original
reports are produced on record. Secondly, the questions were asked
about the contents of those reports in cross-examination of
Respondent's witness Girdharilal and lastly as provisions of Evidence
Act are not strictly applicable to proceedings before him as they are
summary in nature.
14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has however seriously assailed
the reasoning of the Estate Officer. According to him, unless the authors
of the documents are examined, contents thereof cannot be proved. To
substantiate his contentions, he has relied on Sait Tarajee Khimchand
& Ors. Yelamati Satyam alias Satteyya & Ors. (1972) 4 SCC 562 wherein
it was held that "mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the
proof of documents".
15. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also relied on M/s. Bareilly
Electricity Supply Co.Ltd. V/s.The Workmen & Ors 1971 (2) SCC 617 and
Nandini J.Shah & Anr. V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India 2008(4)
Mh L.J. 106 to submit that though in proceedings under The Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, the provisions of
Indian Evidence Act or the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable,
even then, the Estate Officer is required to hold summary proceedings
in the manner which is in consonance with the basic rule of law and the
principles of natural justice. Herein the case, according to him, though
original security reports are produced on record, the Appellant did not
get an opportunity to cross examine the authors of these reports to
prove that contents thereof are not true or correct and in that way the
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principles of natural justice are not followed by the Estate Officer while
relying on these security reports.
16. There may be some substance in the contention of the Learned
Counsel for the Appellant that contents of the said report cannot be
considered as strictly proved as their authors are not examined, but in
my considered opinion, at the same time by production of those
documents it is proved on record that R.B.I. has, in addition to its own
assessment about perception of threat to the security of the said
building, has also got assessed security of the said building from two
independent agencies which are authenticate and experts in the field.
This fact is brought on record through examination in chief of the
witness Shri Girdhari Lal. A specific question was asked to him that
whether other than Reserve Bank's Security Department, any other
professional agency had made the security study of the R.B.I.'s Security
concern? and he has answered 'Yes' Intelligence Bureau of India and
Mumbai Police have made study and they had also submitted reports.
He has further stated that there is mention about Amar Building
Security in the said reports. Thus, the fact is brought on record that it is
not only the assessment of RBI itself about perception of threat to the
security of Amar Building but it is also backed by reports of two
independent agencies like Intelligence Bureau and Mumbai Police.
17. Therefore, even if the contents of these reports are for the sake of
argument not taken into consideration being not strictly proved by
examining the authors of the documents, it can be held as proved that
assessment of the security arrangement of Amar Building was done by
two independent agencies in addition to the own security agency of
R.B.I. and relying on this assessment, the opinion about perception of
threat to the security of R.B.I. was arrived at and on the basis thereof,
the eviction proceedings were initiated. Hence, it cannot be said that it
is mere whim, fancy or illusory perception of threat projected by the
R.B.I. to evict the Non-R.B.I. entities from the said building but that
threat perception is also backed by the reports of two independent
agencies.
18. This factual aspect is proved independent of proof of those reports.
It is not the case of the Appellant also that no such security assessment
of Amar Building was done by these two independent agencies. As a
matter of fact, cross-examination of Shri Girdhari Lal categorically goes
to reveal that several questions were put to him, may be without
directly referring to those reports, to bring on record that
recommendations made in the security reports were not implemented.
Though there is no direct reference to the security reports, the contents
thereof were put to this witness indirectly to point out that R.B.I. has
not acted on those security reports. Therefore, in any way, it cannot be
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said that those security reports were totally alien documents and Estate
Officer has committed grave illegality by relying on those security
reports. The copies of those security reports were very much made
available to the Appellant though they were secret reports. The
Appellant was given full opportunity not only to cross-examine the
witness Shri Girdhari Lal on those reports but even in the Written
Submissions submitted before the Estate Officer contents of those
reports were elaborately dealt with by Learned Counsel for the
Appellant by pointing out that those reports are flawed as they proceed
on assumption that enquiry premises are situate on ground floor.
Therefore, in that way, it cannot be said that there is violation of
principles of natural justice by the Estate Officer when he relied on
those reports, even if in the strict sense they were not proved by
examining the authors of those documents.
19. Moreover, the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Civil
Procedure are not made strictly applicable to the proceedings before
the Estate Officer which are of a summary nature, the very object being
to decide such cases expeditiously without being entangled with the
technicalities of the proof of the documents and strict evidence as such.
What is contemplated, is the observance of principles of natural justice
and herein the case principles of natural justice were observed because
the Appellant was given the copy of those reports and also sufficient
opportunity to cross-examine the witness of the Respondent No.1 on
the contents of those reports and then also allowed sufficient
opportunity to advance submissions to challenge the contents of those
reports and to show how they were not correct and not implemented.
The Estate Officer has also dealt with all these aspects in detail.
Therefore, there appears no substance in the submission of the Learned
Counsel for the Appellant that as these reports were taken into
consideration though strictly not proved, there is violation of principles
of natural justice.
27) I am in agreement with the findings recorded by the learned
Judge for upholding the admissibility of security reports in evidence. It
must be borne in mind that when the RBI assessed the security threat on
the basis of confidential reports received from the Intelligence Bureau
and the Additional Commissioner of Police, it was not expected to
examine authors of those reports. The security reports were outcome of
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observations by a team of officials, who visited the premises from
security perception. Even if the officers who have signed the reports were
to be examined, Petitioners would have insisted on examination of all
the officers who visited the premises and made their observations. This
is not a criminal trial to apply strict rules of evidence. Petitioner is an
occupant of public premises, who does not enjoy protection of rent
control legislation. They cannot enjoy possession of public premises for
eternity. The Public Promises Act is enacted to ensure swifter recovery
of possession of public premises by the public authorities who do not
have to file complex legal proceedings for recovery of public property.
This aspect is dealt with in greater details in the latter part of the
judgment. Seen from this perspective, can it be said that the RBI or the
Estate Officer are prohibited to rely on confidential information received
from the IB and Police only for establishing the security perception in
the mind of RBI? The answer, to my mind, appears to be in the negative.
When security concerns are highlighted by the security agencies, the
public authority is justified in entertaining a threat perception and the
affected party cannot question the correctness of the opinion of security
agencies in quasi-judicial proceedings by seeking to cross examine the
officers of security agencies. It must also be borne in mind that what is
sought to be established by production of security reports is the factum
of receipt of those reports and perception of RBI about the threats. In
such circumstances, the entity in possession of public premises cannot
seek to question findings and recommendations made by security
agencies and seek to establish that there is actually no security threat.
The whole objective behind cross examining the officials of IB and Police
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is to establish that presence of Petitioners in the building does not pose
any security threat. That exercise would be impermissible. Petitioners
could only cross examine RBI’s official to establish that the security
reports do not make out any security threat due to presence of
Petitioners in the building. Recommendations made by the security
agencies is one concept and perception of threat due to presence of an
occupier in the public premises by the public authority is a different
concept. There can be no cross examination on the former aspect while
the cross examination can be conducted on the latter aspect.
28) Reliance by Mr. Colabawala on judgment of the Apex Court
in Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra) is inapposite. The judgment is an
authority on the principle that mere marking of a document as exhibit
does not dispense with the requirement to prove the document. This
principle has no application in the facts of the case in view of the
discussion above. Evidence about the reports is given by the officer of
RBI, who has received those reports and therefore it cannot be contended
that there is absolutely no evidence qua those reports.
29) Reliance by the Petitioner on the judgment of the Apex
Court in M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. does not assist its case.
The judgment is an authority for the principle that, although the
Evidence Act does not apply to the Industrial Tribunal, it must follow
natural justice, and cannot reply upon unproven documents or copies
without proper formal proof or testimony. In that case, the Apex Court
has held that that mere production of a balance sheet and profit-and-
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loss account by the management is not enough when the entries and
financial claims were seriously contested by the workmen. In the present
case, the principles of natural justice were duly adhered to. The RBI
placed the security reports on record, and copies thereof were supplied
to the Petitioners even though the same concerned security and were
confidential documents. The security reports contained
recommendations made by security agencies, which were made available
to the Petitioners. Petitioners have conducted in-depth cross
examination of the witness on the security reports. Independent of the
security reports, the RBI’s witnesses also led evidence. In my view,
therefore, it cannot be contended that the Estate Officer’s reliance on
security reports violates the principles of natural justice or that there is
no evidence in support thereof.
30) In a quasi-judicial inquiry, where strict rules of evidence do
not apply, it is permissible for officer of the organisation, which has
received a report, to give evidence in relation to that report. There is no
absolute allegory to even hearsay evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in domestic inquiries and quasi-judicial
proceedings provided it is logically probative, credible, and possesses a
reasonable nexus to the issue at hand. [SEE: State of Haryana and Anr.
10
Versus. Rattan Singh ]. Here the evidence is not hearsay in strict sense.
The security officer of the organisation, which has received the security
reports from security agencies has led evidence about the same.
Ultimately, the evidence is intended to establish the threat perception
10 (1977) 2 SCC 491
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and the necessity for evicting the occupants on security grounds. In such
circumstances, the evidence of an RBI witness may be sufficient to prove
the security report, even in the absence of examination of its authors.
31) Reliance by the Petitioner on the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Nandini J. Shah is also inapposite as this Court
has dealt with a case involving breach of condition of lease by subletting
the premises without authority/consent and change of user. The Division
Bench held that the onus lied on the LIC to establish subletting and
change of user. The Division Bench highlighted the need for Estate
Officer to hold summary proceedings in a manner which is in consonance
with the basic rule of law. In that case, a presumption was raised by the
Estate Officer about unauthorised occupancy in absence of any concrete
proof of unauthorized subtenancy and change of user. This Court
therefore remanded the proceedings for fresh adjudication before the
Estate Officer. The ratio of the judgment has no application to the facts
of the present case where eviction is directed primarily on the ground of
security requirements of RBI. The security requirement is fully
established by production of cogent evidence. The findings recorded by
the Estate Officer in the present case are not presumptive, but there is
direct evidence on record to support the same. The findings cannot be
said to be perverse by any stretch of imagination.
Tirandaz
32) Petitioners’ reliance on judgment of this Court in
Subha Niketan CHSL (supra) is inapposite. In that case, this Court has
dealt with the issue of legality of a stop-work notice issued near a
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defence establishment and has ruled that the Central Government's
executive guidelines or circulars requiring a mandatory No Objection
Certificate from naval/defence authorities cannot have retrospective
effect or can override the lawfully granted municipal permissions, where
no statutory backing under the Works of Defence Act, 1903 was validly
notified for the land. Relying on the judgment of Division Bench in
Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL , Mr. Colabawala has contended that
security perspective put forth by defence establishments cannot fall
outside the scope of judicial review. The Division Bench has upheld the
cardinal principle that the security of nation must be accorded
supremacy over individual commercial interests. The observations made
in Para 21 of the judgment about scope of judicial review are in the
context of naval establishment being a mere residential colony and
presence of higher buildings in the vicinity. This Court went through the
communication of Senior Police Inspector about security issues and held
that the letter did not cite any security threat for construction of a
building of a particular height. In the present case however, there are
specific recommendations for removal of non-RBI establishments from
Amar Building by the security agencies. The judgment of this Court in
Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL , rendered in the facts of that case,
therefore cannot be cited in support of an abstract proposition that in
every case, the scope of judicial review would extend over security
matters.
33) I am also not able to accept the allegation of arbitrariness
sought to be leveled by the Petitioners. The RBI has not acted on mere
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whims and caprices in the present case and initiated the eviction
proceedings based on concrete material. The eviction action is also not
motivated by commercial considerations.
34) Mr. Colabawala has submitted that the definition of the term
'unauthorised occupation’ under Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act
talks of determination of tenancy ‘for any reason whatsoever’ and that
therefore there has to be a cogent reason for determination of the
authority to occupy the premises. Section 2(g) of the Act defines the term
'unauthorised occupation' thus:
“unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means
the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority
for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any
person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of
grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to
occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any
reason whatsoever.
(emphasis and underlining added)
35) Thus, occupation of the premises becomes unauthorised
either when a person occupies the premises without any authority or
when the authority, under which the person was permitted to occupy the
premises, expires or is determined. The expression “for any reason
whatsoever” used in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act in relation to
the determination of authority essentially refers to a case where the
authority to occupy the premises is determined during the subsistence of
such authority. For example, if the premises are leased for a tenure of 30
th
years and the lease is terminated in the 28 year, the reason for such
determination of authority must be justified. To illustrate, if it is alleged
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that the lessee has unauthorisedly sublet the premises or changed the
user of the premises, and the authority to occupy the premises is
determined during subsistence of such authority, the specific ground of
unauthorised subletting or change of user must be stated in the notice
and must also be duly proved in the eviction proceedings. Another
example can be where an employee is permitted to occupy service
quarters and the condition of service permits him to occupy the same
while being in service. Suppose he breaches the condition of authority to
occupy by subletting the quarters, the authority can be determined by
assigning that reason. However when he/she reties from service, the
authority to occupy the public premises expires and no reasons are
required to be recorded or established for his/her eviction.
36) There is no necessity to record or establish a reason for
determination of authority where there is no specific tenure of lease and
the occupant occupies the public premises under a misnomer that his
tenancy is protected by Rent Act. Once it is clear that there is no
protection of Rent Act to the premises or to the tenancy, the same
becomes simple monthly tenancy, terminable under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, without assigning any reason.
37) In the present case, Petitioners have continued to occupy
the premises on a misconception that they are statutory tenants and are
entitled to protection of Rent Control legislation. They otherwise did not
have any authority to occupy the premises. Once it got clarified that they
are not entitled to protection of their tenancy under the rent control
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legislation, their occupancy becomes that of a simple monthly tenancy,
terminable by giving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act. In such situation, neither any reason is required to be specified for
termination of tenancy nor such reason needs to be established before
the Estate Officer.
38) Therefore, it was not really necessary for the RBI to prove
any grounds such as security threat or bonafide requirement for seeking
eviction of the Petitioners. The expression 'for any reason whatsoever'
appearing in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act has to be
understood in the context of the reason for determination of the
authority. In cases involving leases in absence of tenure under Section
106 the Transfer of Property Act, no reasons are required to be cited for
termination of tenancy and the only requirement is service of notice of 6
months where the tenancy is annual ( agricultural or manufacturing
purposes ) or 15 days where the tenancy is monthly ( for all other
purposes ). Therefore, when tenancy is a simple monthly tenancy
determinable under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, use of
the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' cannot be interpreted to mean
that even for terminating a monthly tenancy under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, reasons are required to be recorded or that such
reasons are required to be established before the Estate Officer. This is
settled position by the judgment of the Apex court in Jiwan Dass (supra),
ratio of which is discussed in the latter part of the judgment.
39) Once rent control protection to the premises is withdrawn,
the occupation gets converted into a normal monthly tenancy
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terminable by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
without assigning reasons. Illustration in this regard can be considered
under Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (MRC
Act). After advent of the MRC Act, certain entities enumerated in Section
3(1)(b) thereof, are excluded from the application of the MRC Act. One of
the excluded entities is where the share capital of the tenant company
exceeds Rs.1 crore. Thus, a corporate entity whose share capital exceeds
Rs.1 crore loses protection from eviction and rent escalation under the
MRC Act. Similar is the case with regard to Banks, PSUs, etc. Since
provisions of MRC Act are inapplicable to the premises occupied by such
excluded entities, their tenancy can be terminated by issuance of notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. No reasons are
required to be cited or established for termination of tenancy of such
excluded entities. The landlord in such cases can filed ejectment action
under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act 1882. On
similar lines, once the judgment of the Apex Court in Life Insurance
Corporation of India V/s. Vita has clarified that protection of rent
control legislation is no longer available to premises governed by the
provisions of the Public Premises Act, the authority to occupy public
premises can be withdrawn by issuance of notice without citing any
reason.
40) If Mr. Colabawala’s contention that valid reasons must be
cited and established for the determination of the authority to occupy
public premises is accepted, it would place public premises on a higher
pedestal than the private premises occupied by an excluded entities
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under Section 3(1)(b) of the MRC Act. Thus, in the case of a private
landlord, a tenancy in respect of premises which earlier enjoyed rent
control protection under the Bombay Rent Act, but which is now
excluded under Section 3 (1)(b) of MRC Act, can be terminated without
citing any reason. However, Petitioner contends that the public authority
would be required to justify the reasons for withdrawing the authority to
occupy public premises that no longer enjoy the protection of rent
control legislation. Such a position is wholly incongruous, absurd and is
incapable of being countenanced. This principle is also accepted by the
Apex Court in Jiwan Dass (supra) which is discussed in latter part of the
judgment.
41) In my view therefore when premises are occupied on the
assumption of protection of rent control legislation, on account of
declaration of law by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of
India V/s. Vita about non-applicability of rent laws, the authority to
occupy the public premises can be withdrawn without citing any reason
and it is not necessary for the public authority to establish any valid
reason for withdrawal of such authority. An entity occupying public
premises in respect of which rent control protection is inapplicable and
in respect of which authority to occupy has expired or has been
determined, cannot remain in occupation of public premises and must
vacate the same. While a private landlord may have to file a suit for
eviction under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts
Act,1882 for eviction of excluded entities under Section 3(1)(b) of the
MRC Act, for government authority swifter mechanism in the form of
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Public Premises Act is created for ensuring faster eviction from public
premises.
42) Reliance by Petitioners on judgment of the Apex Court in
Jiwan Dass (supra), far from assisting their case, actually militates
against them. The Apex Court has held in the judgment that public
statutory corporations under the Act can terminate tenancies and seek
eviction under the Public Premises Act without any need to justify the
action or disclose specific reasons. The Apex Court has held thus:
4. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does indicate that the landlord is entitled to
terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice, if it is a premises occupied on
monthly tenancy and by giving 6 months' notice if the premises are occupied
for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, and on expiry thereof proceedings
could be initiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does not contemplate of
giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the definition of
the public premises ‘unauthorised occupation’ under Section 2(g) of the
Act postulates that the tenancy “has been determined for any reason
whatsoever”. When the statute has advisedly given wide powers to the
public authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not
permissible to cut down the width of the powers by reading into it the
reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating
the tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. If it is so read Section 106
of T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The
statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and
determine the tenancy or leave or licence before taking action under Section 5
of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would
be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act.
Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the
present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market
rent, tenant became liable to ejectment.
(emphasis and underlining added)
43) The principle of absence of necessity to cite and establish
reasons/grounds for eviction from public premises, not enjoying rent
control protection, is discussed by this Court in Bank of Maharashtra
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Versus. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar
in which it is held in
paragraph 23 as under:
23. As a matter of fact, the inquiry into existence of any bonafide
requirement is not even required in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. The PP Act does not envisage any protection to the
occupants of public premises unlike the provisions of Section 13 of the
Bombay Rent Act or Section 16 of the MRC Act. It is not necessary for
the owner of the premises to establish any ground for seeking
eviction of the occupant from the public premises. Occupation of
public premises can only be under express authority and only for
so long as such authority continues to subsist. The moment the
authority comes to an end, the occupation is automatically
rendered unauthorised. In that sense, it was not even required for
the Petitioner to establish any bonafide requirement. The authority
to occupy the premises is terminated by issuance of notices by the Bank.
The moment the authority is terminated, the occupation becomes
unauthorised. In my view, therefore an inquiry into the aspect of
bonafide requirement was quite unnecessary and it is not necessary to
delve any further into that aspect.
(emphasis added)
44) In my view therefore, it was not necessary for the
Respondents to establish any specific ground for seeking eviction of
premises in occupation of the Petitioners. Nonetheless, the ground of
security threat is properly established in the facts of the present case.
45) Mr. Colabawala had relied on the Guidelines published by
the Government of India on 30 May 2002 in support of his contention
that eviction action cannot be initiated with the commercial motive or
for securing vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate
its own staff. According to him, the guidelines provide that occupation
of the premises could not be treated as unauthorised merely upon
service of a notice of termination; rather, the question of unauthorised
occupation needs to be determined by following due process of law. In
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my view the guidelines, apart from not having any statutory force,
otherwise does not assist the case of the Petitioners. Here, RBI is not
seeking eviction of Petitioners for commercial motives. There is nothing
on record to show that RBI would rent out the premises or would offer
the same to its employees for residence after recovering possession
thereof from Petitioner.
46) Reliance by Mr. Colabawala on judgment of the Apex Court
in Banatwala & Company (supra) is inapposite. That judgment is an
authority on the principle that state rent control laws continue to apply
to public premises for matters not covered by the Public Premises Act,
specifically regarding the fixation of standard rent and the maintenance
of essential services. Here the issue of determination of standard rent or
provision of essential services is not involved. Also, in view of the law
subsequently declared by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation
of India V/s. Vita it would be too adventurous on the part of the
Petitioners to suggest that they can still enjoy the protection of MRC Act
qua eviction aspect. Mr. Colabawala has fairly not travelled to that
extreme proposition. Therefore the judgment in Banatwala & Company
cannot be relied on to suggest that the grounds akin to Section 16 of the
MRC Act must be established even for eviction under the provisions of
the Public Premises Act.
47) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the
view that no palpable error can be traced in the judgments and orders
passed by the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court. Even otherwise
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exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 by this Court for
protecting possession of premises by the Petitioners is not at all
warranted. This Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court over the findings
recorded by the Estate Officer and by the Principal Judge by re-
appreciating the evidence. I find no perversity in the findings recorded by
the Estate Officer and by the Principal Judge. Though not required, RBI
has established its requirement of the public premises for security
purposes. Petitioner has not been able to make out a case that the threat
perception and security concerns perceived by RBI, based on material on
record, is totally unfounded. Thus, no case is made out for interference in
the impugned orders.
48) Petitioners have been occupying the premises for the last 13
long years after passing of the impugned eviction order on 15 April 2013.
Pendency of litigation has enabled them to remain in occupation of the
premises for a considerable period of time. As a matter of fact,
Petitioners had undertaken to scout for alternate premises on 12 January
1961. However, for the last 65 long years, they are still occupying the
public premises. Time has come for them to vacate the possession of
public premises.
49) The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed . However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, there shall
be no order as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
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50) After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. Colabbawala, the
learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner prays for continuation of
interim order for a period of four weeks. Request is opposed by Mr.
Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Respondennt-RBI. Considering the fact that interim protection is
running in favour of the Petitioners since 6 March 2014, the same shall
continue to operate for a period of four weeks.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Digitally
signed by
NEETA
SHAILESH
SAWANT
Date:
2026.10.26
20:11:22
+0530
NEETA
SHAILESH
SAWANT
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