THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX vs KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 30 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO. 6 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
1. THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX
BENGALURU NORTH COMMISSIONERATE
NO.59, HMT BHAWAN
GROUND FLOOR
BELLARY ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 032
KARNATAKA
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASGI A/W
SRI JEEVAN J. NEERALGI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
ND
NO.14/3, 2 FLOOR
R.P. BUILDING
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 001
…RESPONDENT
Digitally
signed by K
P SWETHA
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
(BY SRI V. RAGHURAMAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W
SRI BHANU MURTHY J.S., ADVOCATE &
SRI C.R. RAGHAVENDRA, ADVOCATE)
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THIS CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
35G OF THE CENTRAL EXCISE ACT, 1944 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE IMPUGNED FINAL ORDER NO. 20357/2020 IN STA NO.1681/2012
DATED 09/06/2020 PASSED BY THE CESTAT, SOUTH ZONAL
BENCH, BENGALURU & ETC.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. The Revenue has filed the present appeal under Section 35G
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 [ Excise Act ] impugning the order
dated 09.06.2020 passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax
Appellate Tribunal [ Tribunal ] in Service Tax Appeal No.1681/2012.
2. The respondent – Karnataka Industrial Areas Development
Board [ KIADB ] – had filed the aforesaid appeal against the Order-
in-Original No.13/2012 dated 30.01.2012 passed by the
Commissioner of Service Tax, Bengaluru [ Commissioner ].
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3. KIADB is established under the Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Act, 1966 [ KIAD Act ]. The functions of KIADB include
establishing industrial areas and promoting rapid and orderly
development of industries in the State of Karnataka.
4. KIADB has not obtained registration under the Finance Act,
1994 [ Finance Act ] in respect of the activities performed in
discharge of its functions. The Directorate General of Central Excise
Intelligence, Bangalore Zonal Unit [ DGCEI ] had gathered
information which according to the Revenue indicated that KIADB
had rendered taxable services but, had not discharged the service
tax liability.
5. The Additional Director General, DGCEI issued a show cause
notice dated 06.04.2011. KIADB responded to the said show cause
notice and the proceedings culminated in the Order-in-Original,
whereby the Commissioner held that KIADB had rendered services
which were chargeable to tax under the Finance Act. The
Commissioner assessed KIABD's service tax liability at
` 1295,14,21,404/- (Rupees One thousand two hundred ninety five
crores fourteen lacs twenty one thousand four hundred and four
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only) and also levied a penalty of an equivalent amount under
Section 78 of the Finance Act.
6. Aggrieved by the Order-in-Original, KIADB preferred an
appeal before the Tribunal. The said appeal was allowed by the
impugned order.
7. The learned Tribunal held that the activities were undertaken
by KIADB, which is a statutory body, in discharge of its statutory
functions in the State of Karnataka under the KIAD Act. Hence, its
activities “cannot be considered as taxable service and no service
tax can be levied for these activities”.
8. The Revenue contends that KIADB is engaged in providing
taxable services including services under the categories of Renting
of Immovable Property Service; Construction of Commercial
Complex Service; Construction of Residential Complex Service;
Business Support Service; Management, Maintenance or Repair
Service; Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service and Works
Contract Service.
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9. It is contended on behalf of KIADB that the present appeal is
not maintainable as it involves the issue of taxability of the services.
The learned counsel referred to a recent decision of the Supreme
Court in M/s.Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner
1
of Central Excise, Bangalore-II and on the strength of the said
decision, contended that an appeal against the order of the Tribunal
would lie before the Supreme Court. The Finance Act does not
expressly provide for an appeal to the High Court or the Supreme
Court against an order of the Tribunal. However, Section 83 of the
Finance Act stipulates that certain provisions of the Excise Act
including Sections 35F to 35O of the Excise Act would be applicable
in relation to the service tax levied under the Finance Act.
10. Section 35G of the Excise Act provides for an appeal to the
High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate
st
Tribunal on or after the 1 day of July, 2003 (not being an order
relating, among other things, to the determination of any question
having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of
goods for the purpose of assessment). Section 35L of the Excise
1
2026 167 GSTR 249, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 986
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Act provides for an appeal before the Supreme Court. The said
sections are set out below:
"35G. Appeal to High Court. - (1) An appeal shall lie
to the High Court from every order passed in
appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st
day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating,
among other things, to the determination of any
question having a relation to the rate of duty of
excise or to the value of goods for purposes of
assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the
case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) The Principal Commissioner of Central
Excise or Commissioner of Central Excise the other
party aggrieved by any order passed by the
Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High
Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall
be -
(a) filed within one hundred and eighty days from
the date on which the order appealed against is
received by the Principal Commissioner of
Central Excise or Commissioner of Central
Excise or the other party;
(b) accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees
where such appeal is filed by the other party;
(c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal
precisely stating therein the substantial
question of law involved.
*
[(2A) The High Court may admit an appeal after
the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty
days referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if it
is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
filing the same within that period.]
Section 35L. Appeal to the Supreme Court -
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(1)An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from-
( a) any judgment of the High Court delivered -
( i ) in an appeal made under section 35G; or
(ii) on a reference made under section 35G by the
st
Appellate Tribunal before the 1 day of July, 2003;
(iii) on a reference made under section 35H, in any
case which, on its own motion or on an oral
application made by or on behalf of the party
aggrieved, immediately after passing of the
judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for
appeal to the Supreme Court; or.
(b) any order passed before the establishment of
the National Tax Tribunal by the Appellate
Tribunal relating, among other things, to the
determination of any question having a relation to
the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods
for purposes of assessment.
(2)For the purposes of this Chapter, the
determination of any question having a relation to
the rate of duty shall include the determination of
taxability or excisability of goods for the purpose of
assessment.
11. The learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for
the Revenue submitted that the dispute involved in the present case
is whether KIADB is liable to pay service tax on the services
rendered by it and this did not involve any question of rate of service
tax or the valuation of the services. Thus, the present appeal would
be maintainable.
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12. The learned counsel appearing for KIADB countered the said
contention. He submitted that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
High Court was not confined to determination of rate of duty or
valuation of goods. He submitted that the exclusionary clause was
to be read expansively and in conjunction with sub-section (2) of
Section 35L of the Excise Act.
13. The question as to the interpretation of the expression
"determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of
excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment" was
considered by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Service
Tax v. Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd. : 2014 SCC Online Del. 7605.
The court held that an appeal against an order of the Tribunal
involving the question whether any service is chargeable to tax
would fall outside the jurisdiction conferred under Section 35G of the
Excise Act. The court referred to various decisions and answered
the questions of law as projected in various connected appeals. It is
apposite to refer to the following extract of the said decision which
sets out the question of law in the main appeal and the decision
regarding the same:
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“ 25. The substantial questions of law raised by
the Commissioner read as under :
“Whether providing assistance required for
complying with regulation of services like RBI, FIB,
IEC fling and taxation compliance like filing of
Income-tax returns, filing of returns with the office
of Registrar of Companies, filing of sales tax
returns and other returns under Sales Tax/Central
Sales tax Act and providing compliance, assistance
under various laws will fall within the ambit of
‘management consultancy services’ which are
taxable under section 65(105)(r) of the Finance Act,
1994 as applicable during the period from 2001-02
to 2004-05 ?
Whether extended period of five years can be
invoked in the present case under the provisions of
section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 as amended
?”
26. The respondent-assessee is registered and
rendering “management consultancy/manpower
recruitment/consultancy engineering services and
management consultancy services” under the ambit
of service tax. During the course of audit, the
Revenue claims that it was observed that the
respondent-assessee had not paid service tax on
some of the services rendered, which should be
classified under “management consultancy
services”. Adjudication proceedings were initiated.
27. The respondent-assessee contested the
adjudication proceedings on the ground that it had
provided “regulatory services” like compliance in
filing of Income-tax, sales tax returns, returns with
the office of the registrar of companies and
compliance and providing assistance under various
laws. The assessee claims that these services
were non-taxable and not “management
consultancy services” as defined in section
65(105)(r) of the Finance Act, 1994 as the said
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provision only applied to services in connection with
the management of any organisation. Further, the
notice/demand was time barred as the assessee
had not intentionally or wilfully suppressed facts.
Therefore, the extended period under section 73(a)
or 73(1) was not applicable. Thus, the primary
issue and question is whether section 65(105)(r)
was applicable in respect of the said activities and
in case it was not applicable, no service tax was
payable. The rate of tax would be “nil”. As held
above, section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 read
section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is not
applicable and, therefore, the present appeal is not
maintainable before the High Court.”
14. In M/s. Alupro ( supra ), the Supreme Court considered the
scope of Sections 35G and 35L of the Excise Act. The Court
approved the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in Ernst
and Young Pvt. Ltd. ( supra ) and observed as under:
"21. The essentials of Section 35G can be
better understood in the following manner:-
i. The order in appeal came to be passed by
the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of
July, 2003;
ii. The order is not an order relating, among
other things, to -
a. The determination of “any” question;
b. Having a relation to –
i) the rate of duty of excise, or
ii) the value of goods
c. For the purpose of assessment
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iii. The High Court is satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law.
22. The conditions (i) and (iii) respectively
are positive conditions. In other words, they must
be satisfied for the appeal to be maintainable
before the High Court. Whereas, condition (ii) is a
negative condition. If the order passed by the
Appellate Tribunal falls within this condition, the
appeal does not lie, regardless of whether (i) and
(iii) are met.
23. The expression that we are concerned in
the case at hand is the bracketed portion in Section
35G, which reads, “(not being an order relating,
among other things, to the determination of any
question having a relation to the rate of duty of
excise or to the value of goods for purposes of
assessment)”.
24. A plain yet careful reading of Section
35G leaves very little to imagine. The word “any” in
the aforesaid expression gives the exclusion as
regards the jurisdiction a wide sweep, indicating
that the question referred to therein is not limited to
a specific question of rate of excise duty or value of
goods. In other words, even peripheral questions
touching a question pertaining to rate or valuation
can attract such exclusion. Further, the conscious
use of the prefatory phrase “among other things”
also serves to communicate that these are not the
only exclusions and are merely illustrative of a
broader category of rate of duty and valuation.
These words or phrases in the provision cannot be
assumed to be surplusage.
25. The expression “for purposes of
assessment” also deserves some attention. It
qualifies and governs both the preceding limbs of
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the exclusion i.e., the rate of excise duty and the
value of goods. In other words, the exclusion is not
triggered by every question touching rate of duty or
value of goods in the abstract. The question must
have a relation to rate or value specifically in the
context of assessment. It is not the mere mention of
rate or value in an order that triggers the exclusion
but the fact that the question goes to the root of the
assessment itself.
26. The argument that the question of
excisability is distinct from the question of “rate of
duty” deserves to be rejected at the threshold. The
two questions are not merely related, they are
sequentially and logically interdependent. An issue
on excisability of goods would be intrinsically
connected with the “rate of the duty” for the
“purpose of assessment”. The decision on
excisability of goods is a precursor to the
determination of any question having a relation to
the rate of excise duty or to the value of goods for
the purpose of assessment. Afterall, the levy of
excise duty presupposes that the goods upon
which such assessment is to be made, are
downstream consequences of determination of
excisability. To hold otherwise would be to sever
what is inherently a continuous chain of fiscal
adjudication into fragments, which the legislature
could never have intended.
27. One another good reason to hold the
aforesaid is that decision on such an issue would
not only have ramifications in personam but also in
rem. The consequences thereof would be
applicable on all the assessees dealing in the
particular goods. The provision intends uniformity in
the determination of fiscal questions having wide
ramifications.
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28. It is pertinent to note that the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Section 35G is not a matter
of absolute right but is a creature of statute, and
therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise
of such jurisdiction must be strictly construed. The
legislature has expressed its intention by employing
clear and deliberate language in the bracketed
portion of sub-section (1) of Section 35G to exclude
a category of orders from appellate jurisdiction of
the High Court."
15. Additionally, the Supreme Court observed that the exclusion
carved out under the parenthesis under Section 35G(1) of the
Excise Act was required to be read in conjunction with Section 35L
of the Excise Act. Thus, what was expressly included under Section
35L(1)(b) of the Excise Act is excluded from Section 35G of the said
Act. The Court also referred to sub-section (2) of Section 35L of the
Excise Act and held that sub-section (2) which was inserted by the
Finance (No.2) Act, 2014, was clarificatory in nature.
16. The Supreme Court also noted the Memorandum on Finance
(No.2) Bill 2014 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which
clarified that:
“Section 35 L is being amended so as to clarify that
determination of disputes relating to taxability or
excisability of goods is covered under the term
‘determination of any question having a relation to
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rate of duty’ and hence, appeal against Tribunal
orders in such matters would lie before the
Supreme Court.”
17. The controversy in M/s. Alupro ( supra ) revolved around the
question whether the excise duty was payable on the activity
undertaken by the assessee in that case, which involved the
process of cutting, routing or grooving of the aluminium composite
panels. The Supreme Court held that the question whether such
activities were chargeable to excise duty was excluded from the
High Court's appellate jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Excise
Act.
18. In the present case, the principal question involved is whether
the activities undertaken by KIADB would attract the levy of service
tax. According to KIADB, the activities undertaken by it in discharge
of its statutory functions under the KIAD Act are not chargeable to
service tax.
19. Considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.
Alupro ( supra ), the said question would fall outside the jurisdiction
of this court conferred under Section 35G of the Excise Act.
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20. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended
that liberty be granted to the appellant to file an appeal before the
Supreme Court. However, this would be a matter to be canvassed
before the Supreme Court as and when the Revenue prefers an
appeal under Section 35L of the Excise Act against the impugned
order. This order will not preclude the Revenue from availing its
remedies under the law, as advised.
21. The appeal is accordingly dismissed on the ground of
maintainability.
22. In view of the disposal of the present appeal, the pending
interlocutory applications stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE
KPS
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 2