MRS SHUBHA M vs MAAGEMENT OF
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
R
AND 2 OTHERS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 15 DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
WRIT APPEAL NO. 25 OF 2026 (L-RES)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO. 20 OF 2026 (L-RES)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 29 OF 2026 (L-RES)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2026 (L-RES)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2026 (L-RES)
IN WA No. 25/2026:
BETWEEN:
MRS. SHUBHA M
AGE ABOUT 48 YEARS,
TH
D/O MUKUNDA, NO.59, AECS LAYOUT, 16 CROSS,
TH
4 MAIN ROAD, GEDDALHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 094.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. S.B.MUKKANNAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MANAGEMENT OF
M/S SURETEX PROPHYLACTICS (INDIA)
LIMITED & ANOTHER,
PLOT NO.74 KIADB INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
ND
JIGANI 2 PHASE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BENGALURU -560 105.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SENIOR MANAGER HR
2. THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR
VIKASA SOUDHA, DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560 001. .. RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ROOPA SRI.S.,ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. B.RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2)
Digitally
signed by
MALA K N
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
- 2 -
WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 03/12/2025
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP NO.7675/2022 AND
ST
CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE 1
RESPONDENT.
IN WA NO. 20/2026:
BETWEEN:
SRI. NAGARAJU
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
S/O SIDDEGOWDA,
NO.285, MARUTHI NAGAR,
SONNENAHALLI, ULLALA UPANAGAR POST,
BANGALORE-560 056.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. S.B.MUKKANNAPPA.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MANAGEMENT OF
M/S SURETEX PROPHYLACTICS
INDIA PVT.LTD. AND ANR
PLOT NO.74,KIADB INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
ND
JIGANI 2 PHASE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER-HR
2. THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKASA SOUDHA, DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ROOPA SRI.S., ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. B.RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
03/12/2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP
NO.7893/2022 AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE WRIT
ST
PETITION FILED BY THE 1 RESPONDENT.
- 3 -
WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
IN WA NO. 29/2026:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. BHIMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
S/O. LATE SRI.MARIYAPPA,
RESIDING AT. NO.264, GULBARGA COLONY,
ST
1 BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE – 560 011.
2. SRI. V.CHANDRASHEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
S/O. LATE. L.VENKATARAMAIAH,
RESIDING AT NO.17, NEW NO.97,
TH TH
8 MAIN, 13 CROSS, MALLESHWARAM,
BANGALORE - 560 003.
3. SRI. NAGARAJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
S/O. NILAGIRIYAPPA,
RESIDING AT SRIRAMAGONDANAHALLI,
DAVANGERE DISTRICT. -577 005.
4. SRI.SHIVAMADEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
S/O HONNEGOWDA,
RESIDING AT NO. MUTHUNILAYA,
ND
2 CROSS, NEAR SHANTHI COLLEGE,
MYSORE MAIN ROAD, MALAVALLI,
MANDYA DISTRICT 571 430.
5. SRI. RAMESH. K.S.
S/O. LATE. SIDDAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
C/O SRI VENUGOPALAREDDY,
RESIDING AT NO.40, KEMPANAYAKANA HALLI,
BANNERGHATTA,BANGALORE 560 083.
6. SMT. SEETHALAKSHMI,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
W/O SRI. RAVIKUMAR P PATIL,
RESIDING AT NO.237, SRINANDHI,
ST
1 MAIN, SRI DWARAKA NAGARA,
CHIKKABANAWARA POST,
- 4 -
WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
HESARAGHATTA MAIN ROAD,
BANGALORE 560 090.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. S.B.MUKKANNAPPA.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MANAGEMENT OF
M/S SURETEX PROPHYLACTICS INDIA PVT.LTD.
PLOT NO.74, KIADB INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
ND
JIGANI 2 PHASE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SENIOR MANAGER-HR
2. THE ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER
DIVISION IV, LABOUR DEPARTMENT,
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 029,
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ROOPA SRI.S.,ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. B.RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
03.12.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT
PETITION No. 2459/2023 AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE
ST
WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE 1 RESPONDENT WITH A
ND
FURTHER DIRECTION TO THE 2 RESPONDENT TO HOLD THE
CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION
12 OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947, TO MEET THE
ENDS OF JUSTICE.
IN WA NO. 30/2026:
BETWEEN:
SRI. R. LOKESH
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
S/O RAMAKRISHNASHETTY,
TH
RESIDING AT NO.61, 7 CROSS,
MALLESHWARAM, BENGALURU 560 003.
...APPELLANT
- 5 -
WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
(BY SRI. S.B.MUKKANNAPPA.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MANAGEMENT OF
M/S SURETEX PROPHYLACTICS INDIA
PVT.LTD. AND ANR
PLOT NO.74, KIADB INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
ND
JIGANI 2 PHASE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SENIOR MANAGER-HR
2. THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560 001. …RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ROOPA SRI.S.,ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. B.RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
03.12.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT
PETITION No. 7803/2022 AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE
ST
WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE 1 RESPONDENT, TO MEET THE
ENDS OF JUSTICE.
IN WA NO. 56/2026:
BETWEEN:
SRI. RAMAKRISHNAIAH
S/O LATE VEERABHADRAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
R/A DODDABOOLI, MANCHANABELE POST,
MAGADI TALUK,
RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562 159.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. S.B. MUKKANNAPPA.,ADVOCATE)
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
AND:
1. MANAGEMENT OF
M/S SURETEX PROPHYLACTICS (INDIA)
PVT LTD & ANR.
PLOT NO.74, KIADB INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
ND
JIGANI 2 PHASE, ANEKAL TALUK,
BENGALURU-560 105.
REPRESENTED BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER – HR
2. THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. ROOPA SRI.S.,ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. B.RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED 03.12.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION No. 18958/2021 AND
CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY
ST
THE 1 RESPONDENT, TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 07.09.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
A “golden handshake”, as a voluntary retirement scheme
is commonly described, is intended to bring the
employer–employee relationship to an end on the terms
mutually accepted by the parties. Having opted for
voluntary retirement, acknowledged the terms of the
scheme in writing and received the benefits thereunder,
the petitioner’s subsequent challenge must be examined
in the light of her earlier conduct and the material
available on record. Such an arrangement cannot
ordinarily be repudiated merely by a subsequent
assertion of coercion, in the absence of sufficient
material substantiating the allegation. The acceptance of
retirement benefits and the unexplained delay in raising
the dispute are relevant circumstances in determining
whether the concluded employment arrangement
warrants reconsideration.
All these intra-court appeals have been preferred by the
petitioner/Management of M/s.Suretex Prophylactics (India)
Limited, against the order dated 03.12.2025, passed by the
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.7675/2022 (L-
RES), W.P.No.7893/2022 (L-RES), W.P.No.2459/2023 (L-RES),
W.P.No.7803/2022 (L-RES) and W.P.No.18958/2021 (L-RES),
wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court had allowed the
Writ Petitions by quashing the notice/reference impugned
therein.
2. These connected writ appeals though arising out of
the separate orders passed by the learned Single Judge, but
emanate from substantially similar facts and circumstances and
involve common questions of law and fact, we have, therefore,
considered the matters together and dispose of them by this
common order. W.A.No.25 of 2026 is treated as the lead
appeal for the purpose of reference and disposal.
3. For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion,
the parties are referred to by their respective rankings before
the writ court.
Facts of the Writ petitioner:
4. The writ petitioner, Management of M/s. Suretex
Prophylactics (India) Limited, is engaged in the manufacture of
rubber contraceptives at its factory situated at Plot No.74,
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
KIADB Industrial Estate, Jigani, Second Phase, Anekal Taluk,
Bengaluru. Respondent No.1, Smt.Shubha M., joined the
services of the petitioner-company as a Trainee on 11.09.1999.
According to the petitioner, with a view to reducing surplus
manpower, the management introduced a Voluntary Retirement
Scheme in October 2009 after holding discussions with the
permanent workmen. Under the scheme, a sum of
Rs.1,56,160/- was payable towards voluntary retirement, apart
from the other admissible dues and incentives.
5. The petitioner contended that 86 workmen
submitted applications under the scheme between 05.10.2009
and 10.10.2009. The applications were accepted by the
management, and the workmen were relieved from service
after their accounts were settled. The payments included the
voluntary retirement amount, gratuity, early-bird incentive,
seniority incentive, leave encashment and bonus, as applicable.
In the case of respondent No.1, the petitioner asserted that she
received a total sum of Rs.3,31,528/-, comprising
Rs.1,56,160/- towards voluntary retirement and Rs.1,75,368/-
towards other benefits. The amounts were paid through
individual account-payee cheques. Following the acceptance of
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
voluntary retirement and settlement of accounts, the
management and the concerned workmen entered into
settlements under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 ( ‘the ID Act’ ).
6. The petitioner further pleaded that respondent No.1
had submitted her application for voluntary retirement on
10.10.2009 and was relieved after the settlement of her dues.
However, by a petition dated 12.07.2017, registered as
PTN/CR/84/2017-18, she approached the Labour and
Conciliation Officer, Division VI, Bengaluru, alleging that her
resignation had been obtained by force and that her cessation
from service was, in substance, a termination of employment.
According to the petitioner, respondent No.1 had accepted the
entire settlement and encashed the cheque before raising the
dispute, and no satisfactory explanation had been furnished for
the intervening delay of nearly eight years.
7. The management appeared before the conciliation
officer and filed its objections, specifically relying upon the
voluntary retirement application, the settlement executed
under Section 18(1) of the ID Act and the payment of the
entire amount due under the scheme. It maintained that the
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
dispute was stale and that the allegation of forced resignation
had been raised only after respondent No.1 had accepted the
benefits of voluntary retirement.
8. Upon failure of conciliation, the Government, by
order bearing No.LD-IDM/197/2021/LD.DO.6.L.S dated
19.04.2021, referred the dispute for adjudication. The
reference was registered as Reference No.30/2021 before the I
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural,
Bengaluru. Aggrieved by the reference, the management
instituted Writ Petition No.7675/2022 under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the
order dated 19.04.2021.
Defence of the respondents:
9. Respondent No.1 opposed the writ petition,
contending that the voluntary retirement was not the result of a
free and voluntary decision on her part. Her specific case was
that the management had insisted upon her accepting the
scheme and had obtained the retirement application by
coercion, thereafter relieving her from service and transferring
the compensation amount without her genuine consent. She
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
relied upon the terms of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, the
dates appearing on the applications and the documents
produced by the management to dispute the contention that
the retirement was voluntary.
10. It was contended that the scheme was stated to
remain in force from 05.10.2009 to 09.10.2009, whereas
certain applications, including the application relied upon in her
case, bore dates falling outside that period. Respondent
No.1also questioned the manner in which the applications had
been processed and contended that Clause VII of the scheme
had not been given effect to. According to her, these
circumstances required examination in the industrial
adjudication proceedings and could not be brushed aside
merely because monetary benefits had been paid.
11. The respondents further submitted that the dispute
had arisen out of an allegation of forced resignation, which, if
established, would amount to an involuntary termination of
service. They contended that the management's denial of
coercion and the workwoman's allegation to the contrary
disclosed a disputed question of fact requiring adjudication on
evidence. It was argued that the ID Act did not prescribe a
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
specific period of limitation for raising such a dispute and that
the mere lapse of time could not, by itself, justify quashing the
reference at the threshold. The learned Additional Government
Advocate supported the action of the Government in referring
the dispute for adjudication and sought dismissal of the writ
petition.
Consideration of the writ court:
12. The writ court, by order dated 03.12.2025 in Writ
Petition No.7675/2022, considered the rival submissions and
the records placed before it. The principal question addressed
was whether the Government was justified in referring the
dispute for adjudication despite the considerable lapse of time
between the alleged forced resignation and the raising of the
industrial dispute, considering that the relevant payments
pursuant to voluntary retirement had already been made.
13. The writ court noticed that respondent No.1 had
joined the petitioner-company on 11.09.1999 and that the
management had introduced the voluntary retirement scheme
in 2009. It took note of the petitioner's case that the
workwoman had received Rs.3,31,528/- towards the voluntary
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
retirement package and other admissible benefits, that her
accounts had been settled and that a settlement had been
executed under Section 18(1) of the ID Act. It also noticed that
the allegation of forced resignation had been raised before the
conciliation officer only after a lapse of nearly eight years.
14. The writ court observed that voluntary retirement
ordinarily brings the employer–employee relationship to an end
upon acceptance of the scheme and the associated benefits. It
invoked the principle of approbate and reprobate, holding that
a person who accepts the benefits flowing from a transaction
cannot ordinarily turn around at a later stage and challenge the
very transaction or assert a position inconsistent with the
acceptance of those benefits.
15. On the question of delay, the writ court relied upon
the principle that, although the ID Act does not prescribe a
fixed period of limitation for making a reference under Section
10, the appropriate Government must nevertheless consider
whether a live and existing industrial dispute survives. In its
view, a claim raised after a long and unexplained interval,
particularly after acceptance of a full and final settlement under
a voluntary retirement scheme, cannot be treated as an
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
existing industrial dispute warranting reference. The court also
considered the need to avoid unsettling an employer's financial
arrangements and disturbing industrial peace by entertaining
stale claims without satisfactory explanation for the delay.
16. The writ court rejected the contention that the
proceedings were premature merely because the Government
had already made a reference and the question of delay could
be examined by the adjudicating forum. It held that the
administrative authority was required, at the stage of making
the reference, to examine whether a bona fide industrial
dispute continued to exist or whether the claim had become
stale with the passage of time. The court concluded that the
Government had failed to have regard to the relevant
considerations before making the reference and that the
reference, in the circumstances of the case, was unsustainable.
17. Accordingly, by its order dated 03.12.2025, the writ
court allowed the writ petition, issued a writ of certiorari and
quashed the order of reference dated 19.04.2021 bearing No.
LD-IDM/197/2021/LD.DO.6.L.S.
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WA No. 25 of 2026
C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
Writ appeal by respondent No. 1:
18. Aggrieved by the order dated 03.12.2025 passed in
Writ Petition No.7675/2022, respondent No.1 has preferred
Writ Appeal No.25.2026 seeking to set aside the order of the
writ court and consequently dismiss the writ petition instituted
by the petitioner.
19. Respondent No.1 contends that the writ court failed
to properly appreciate the factual circumstances surrounding
the introduction and implementation of the voluntary
retirement scheme and erroneously proceeded on the footing
that receipt of monetary benefits necessarily established
voluntary retirement. She asserts that her specific allegation
was that the application had been obtained by coercion and
that the circumstances attending the submission and
acceptance of the application required examination in the
industrial adjudication proceedings.
20. It is urged that the writ court failed to give due
consideration to the objections and materials relied upon by
respondent No.1, particularly the dates of the voluntary
retirement applications, the period during which the scheme
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C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
was stated to remain in force and the alleged non-compliance
with Clause VII of the scheme. According to respondent No.1,
these matters could not have been conclusively determined
against her merely on the basis of the payment of the
retirement benefits.
21. Respondent No.1 further contends that the
Government's power under Section 10 of the ID Act is
exercisable where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended
and that the absence of a prescribed limitation period does not
permit the High Court to interfere with a reference solely on the
ground of delay, without due consideration of the nature of the
dispute and the circumstances in which it was raised. It is her
case that the allegation of coercion, having been disputed by
the management, ought to have been examined by the
competent adjudicating forum on the basis of the evidence
adduced by the parties.
22. Respondent No.1 also relies upon the following
decisions:
(i) Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v.
1
Industrial Tribunal, Haryana ,
1
(1979) 1 SCC 1.
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C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
(ii) Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh v. State of
2
Bihar ,
(iii) S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager,
3
Karnataka ,
(iv) Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana
4
Roadways ,
(v) Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture
5
Department ,
6
(vi) M/s. Bata India Limited v. State of Karnataka ,
7
(vii) M/s. Bata India Limited v. State of Karnataka.
She contends that the principles emerging from the said
decisions were not properly applied by the writ court to the
facts of the present case.
23. A further ground urged in the appeal is that the
order of reference itself had identified the delay as a matter
requiring consideration in the industrial dispute. According to
respondent No.1, once the dispute had been referred for
adjudication, the parties ought to have been afforded an
opportunity to place their respective evidence on record,
including evidence concerning the alleged coercion and the
circumstances surrounding the voluntary retirement.
2
(1989) 3 SCC 271.
3
(2003) 4 SCC 27.
4
(2014) 10 SCC 301.
5
(2015) 15 SCC 1.
6
W.P. No.47002/2015, disposed of on 22.02.2021
7
W.A. No.504/2021, disposed of on 29.07.2021
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C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
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AND 2 OTHERS
Respondent No.1 therefore maintains that the writ court erred
in quashing the reference at the threshold instead of permitting
the dispute to be adjudicated in accordance with law.
24. On these grounds, respondent No.1 seeks setting
aside of the order dated 03.12.2025 and dismissal of Writ
Petition No.7675/2022, thereby restoring the reference for
adjudication.
25. We have carefully considered the submissions
advanced on behalf of respondent No.1, the grounds urged in
the memorandum of appeal, the records placed before us and
the order dated 03.12.2025.
26. Having heard Sri S.B.Mukkannappa, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant/respondent No.1,
Smt.Roopasri. S, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.1, and Sri.B.Ravindranath, learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for respondent No.2, and having
considered the decisions cited and the submissions advanced,
the principal question that arises for our consideration is,
“Whether the appropriate Government was
justified in making the reference dated 19.04.2021,
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C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
notwithstanding respondent No.1’s acceptance of
voluntary retirement and receipt of the benefits
payable under the scheme in October 2009, and the
delay of nearly eight years in raising the dispute
alleging forced retirement?”
We answer the above point in the negative for the reasons
hereinbelow:
Reasons for dismissal of the writ appeal:
27. Respondent No.1 joined the services of the
petitioner-management on 11.09.1999. Upon introduction of
the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in October 2009, respondent
No.1 submitted her application dated 08.10.2009, stating that
she had gone through the scheme dated 05.10.2009,
understood its implications and accepted its terms. She further
requested the management to accept her application and settle
her accounts, acknowledging that she had read and signed
each page of the scheme as a token of her acceptance. The
management’s case is that the application was accepted,
respondent No.1 was relieved from service and a sum of
Rs.3,31,528/- was paid to her, comprising Rs.1,56,160/-
towards voluntary retirement and Rs.1,75,368/- towards other
benefits, including gratuity and incentives. The management
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C/W WA No. 20 of 2026
WA No. 29 of 2026
AND 2 OTHERS
also contended that the settlement was concluded under
Section 18(1) of the ID Act. The dispute alleging that
respondent No.1 had been compelled to opt for voluntary
retirement was raised only on 12.07.2017. The relevant portion
of the aforementioned letter dated 08.10.2009 whereby
respondent No.1 accepted voluntary retirement under the
scheme is produced hereinbelow:
“08/10/2009
From,
Emp. Name: SHUBHA M.
Emp. Code:
To,
M/s. Suretex Prophylactics (I) Ltd.,
Plot No. 74 to 91, KIADB Industrial Estate,
Jigani II Phase, Anekal Taluk,
Bangalore – 560 105.
Dear Sirs,
I have gone through the Voluntary Retirement Scheme,
dated 5th October 2009 announced by the company. I
have also gone through the benefits that I would be
entitled to in case of my opting to retire under the
Scheme. After fully understanding the implications of
retiring under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, I
hereby opt for retirement under the scheme. Kindly
accept my application for retirement and settle my
accounts.
I have also gone through a copy of the Voluntary
Retirement Scheme furnished to me by the
management, and after going through the Scheme, I
have signed on each page of the Scheme in token of my
acceptance of the terms of the Scheme. Along with this
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application, I am forwarding the said copy for your
records.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully “
28. The question requires examination not merely of
whether respondent No.1was a workman during the
subsistence of her employment, but also of the legal
consequences flowing from the cessation of the employer–
employee relationship pursuant to the accepted voluntary
retirement scheme. Section 2(s) of the ID Act defines a
‘workman’ and includes, for the purposes of proceedings under
the Act, persons who have been dismissed, discharged or
retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, an
industrial dispute. Section 2(oo) of the ID Act defines
‘retrenchment’ and expressly excludes voluntary retirement of
a workman. The cessation of employment pursuant to an
accepted voluntary retirement scheme therefore raises a
question as to whether respondent No.1 continued to fall within
the definition of ‘workman’ at the time of reference.
29. However, even assuming that respondent No.1
continued to qualify as a ‘workman’, such status would not, by
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itself, establish that a live industrial dispute continued to
subsist after her retirement. The existence of an industrial
dispute, or one which is apprehended, must be examined in the
light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
30. At this juncture, we may place reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Bindal v. Union of
8
India , wherein the court observed:
“34. This shows that a considerable amount is to be paid
to an employee ex-gratia besides the terminal benefits in
case he opts for voluntary retirement under the Scheme
and his option is accepted. The amount is paid not for
doing any work or rendering any service. It is paid in lieu
of the employee himself leaving the services of the
company or the industrial establishment and forgoing all
his claims or rights in the same. It is a package deal of
give and take. That is why in business world it is known
as ‘Golden Handshake’. The main purpose of paying this
amount is to bring about a complete cessation of the
jural relationship between the employer and the
employee. After the amount is paid and the employee
ceases to be under the employment of the company or
the undertaking, he leaves with all his rights and there is
no question of his again agitating for any kind of his past
rights, with his erstwhile employer including making any
claim with regard to enhancement of pay scale for an
8
AIR 2003 SC 2189.
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earlier period. If the employee is still permitted to raise a
grievance regarding enhancement of pay scale from a
retrospective date, even after he has opted for Voluntary
Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid
to him, the whole purpose of introducing the Scheme
would be totally frustrated.”
31. The Supreme Court explained that a voluntary
retirement scheme constitutes an arrangement intended to
bring about the cessation of the legal relationship between the
employer and employee upon fulfillment of the stipulated
terms. The principle underlying such a scheme cannot be
defeated by permitting an employee to accept the benefits
thereunder and subsequently reopen the concluded
arrangement without sufficient grounds.
32. The Supreme Court in Gyanendra Sahay v. M/s.
9
Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. has observed as under:
“14. We have also perused the Memo of Appeal and
other representation made by the 1st respondent. The 1st
respondent has made a vague allegation that he was
forced to take retirement. Neither he has made it specific
nor had given the name of any officer who compelled him
to write the letter dt.1st April, 1995 or exercised undue
and excessive pressure to sign the letter of
9
AIR 2006 SC 2795.
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premature/voluntary retirement. Though the Labour
Court has come to the conclusion that the 1st respondent
was compelled to submit the letter of resignation, the
same is not supported by any acceptable evidence. It is
settled law that suspicion and doubt cannot take the place
of evidence. No finding of fact can be given on mere
doubt and suspicion or on the basis of baseless
allegations. The 1st respondent having written letter of
voluntary retirement and after having accepted the retiral
benefits without any protest cannot now turn round and
say that he was compelled to submit his
premature/voluntary retirement. The appeal has
absolutely no merits and we, therefore, have no
hesitation to dismiss the same and to affirm the order
passed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the
High Court. No order as to costs.”
33. Further, the principle emerging from the above
judgment requires the circumstances surrounding the
employee’s departure from service to be examined to
determine whether the retirement was voluntary or whether
the employer had, in substance, dispensed with the employee’s
services without authority. Thus, the allegation of coercion
must be assessed on the basis of the material on record and
cannot be accepted merely because it is subsequently asserted.
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34. In the present case, respondent No.1’s application
acknowledging her understanding and acceptance of the
voluntary retirement scheme, the payment and receipt of
Rs.3,31,528/- towards retirement and other benefits, and the
absence of any contemporaneous protest assume considerable
significance. The allegation that respondent No.1 was
compelled to opt for retirement cannot be accepted as
established merely because it was subsequently raised. The
material placed before us does not disclose specific particulars
identifying the person who allegedly exerted pressure, the
nature of the alleged coercion or any contemporaneous
circumstance sufficient to prima facie substantiate the assertion
that the application was not submitted of her free will. Equally,
the mere submission of an application for voluntary retirement
would not, by itself, foreclose an inquiry into a properly
substantiated allegation of coercion. The relevant
circumstances must be considered cumulatively.
35. The delay in raising the dispute is, in this context, a
material consideration. Respondent No.1 accepted voluntary
retirement in October 2009, whereas the allegation of forced
retirement was raised only on 12.07.2017, after nearly eight
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years. No satisfactory explanation for this prolonged interval is
forthcoming from the material placed before us. The absence of
a contemporaneous protest, when considered alongside the
acceptance of the retirement benefits, assumes particular
importance in determining whether the claim disclosed a
subsisting industrial grievance warranting reference. Although
the ID Act does not prescribe a fixed period of limitation for a
reference under Section 10, the absence of a prescribed
limitation period does not relieve the appropriate Government
of its obligation to consider whether a live industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended. The power of reference cannot be
exercised mechanically merely because a claim has been
raised, irrespective of the circumstances in which it is made or
the unexplained delay in pursuing it.
36. The contention that all questions relating to delay
and coercion ought to have been left entirely to the industrial
adjudicating forum cannot be accepted in the facts of the
present case. While the appropriate Government is not
expected to conduct a full-fledged adjudication of disputed
questions of fact, it is nevertheless required to apply its mind to
the relevant material and determine whether the proposed
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reference concerns an existing or apprehended industrial
dispute. The Government was, therefore, required to consider
the terms of respondent No.1’s retirement application, the
acceptance of the scheme, the receipt of the benefits, the
absence of contemporaneous protest and the unexplained delay
in raising the dispute. Respondent No.1’s reliance on alleged
irregularities in the implementation of the scheme, including
discrepancies in the dates appearing on certain applications and
alleged non-compliance with Clause VII, does not alter this
conclusion, in the absence of sufficient material demonstrating
how those alleged irregularities established coercion in her
individual case or explained the delay in raising the grievance.
37. The writ court, by its order dated 03.12.2025,
examined the relevant circumstances and concluded that the
appropriate Government had failed to address the staleness of
the claim and the essential question as to whether a live
industrial dispute existed or was apprehended before making
the reference dated 19.04.2021. We find no perversity or error
in the writ court’s conclusion warranting interference in the
present appeal. Respondent No.1 has failed to demonstrate any
sufficient ground for restoring the reference or for holding that
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the writ court exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review.
In the circumstances, permitting the reference to proceed
would have the effect of reopening a concluded employment
arrangement after an unexplained lapse of nearly eight years,
notwithstanding the acceptance of the retirement benefits and
the absence of adequate material supporting the allegation of
coercion.
38. It is a settled principle of law that a litigant who
approaches the Court must do so with clean hands and make
full disclosure of all material facts. This principle applies not
only to proceedings under Articles 226 of the Constitution of
India, but also to proceedings before other Courts and judicial
forums. Every Court is duty-bound to protect its process from
abuse by litigants who seek to secure relief by suppressing
material particulars, making misleading statements or
withholding facts having a bearing on the adjudication. The
judicial process cannot be permitted to become an instrument
for reopening concluded transactions through belated and
unsubstantiated assertions. The equitable jurisdiction of the
Court cannot be invoked by a party who seeks to approbate
and reprobate, thereby gaining an advantage contrary to the
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position previously accepted by such party. The sanctity of
judicial proceedings demands fairness and candour and no
litigant can claim equitable relief as a matter of right while
abusing the very process through which such relief is sought .
39. In view of the decisions discussed hereinabove, the
decisions relied upon by the petitioner do not advance her case
or assist in sustaining the grounds urged in the present appeal.
40. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the
writ appeal.
41. The grounds urged by respondent No.1 do not
disclose any error warranting interference with the order dated
03.12.2025 passed by the writ court in W.P. No.7675/2022.
Accordingly, Writ Appeal No.25/2026 is dismissed .
In view of the dismissal of W.A.No.25/2026 and for the
reasons stated herein, we find no ground warranting a different
conclusion in the connected appeals. Accordingly, all other
connected appeals are also dismissed.
The impugned orders dated 03.12.2025, passed by the
learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.7675/2022 (L-
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RES), W.P.No.7893/2022 (L-RES), W.P.No.2459/2023 (L-RES),
W.P.No.7803/2022 (L-RES) and W.P.No.18958/2021 (L-RES)
are hereby confirmed.
While we are inclined to impose exemplary costs on
respondent No.1, having regard to the circumstances of the
case, we are mindful of the fact that respondent No.1 had
opted for voluntary retirement. We, therefore, refrain from
imposing exemplary costs and direct the parties to bear their
own costs.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
JUDGE
KNM