MADHAV PRASAD vs KAILASH MAHATO

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CGHC010308562026 2026:CGHC:38807
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRR No. 1126 of 2026
Madhav Prasad S/o Kailash Mahato Aged About 21 Years R/o Chota
Bazar, Chirmiri, P.S. And Tahsil Chirmiri, Distt. M.C.B., Chhattisgarh.
... Applicant(s)
versus
Kailash Mahato S/o Babulal Mahato Aged About 53 Years R/o Village
Charcha Calary, Nepal Gate, P.S. Charcha, Tahsil Baikunthpur, Distt.
Digitally
signed by
AKHILESH
KUMAR
DEWANGAN
M.C.B., Chhattisgarh.
AKHILESH
KUMAR
DEWANGAN
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s) : Mr. Sunil Verma, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : None.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Order on Board
02.09.2026
1. Heard Mr. Sunil Verma, learned counsel for the applicant on I.A.
No. 02 of 2026, which is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act for condonation of delay of 813 days in preferring the instant
criminal revision.

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2. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the
impugned order dated 07.02.2024 has been assailed by way of the
present revision. It is contended that the applicant could not approach
this Court within the period of limitation and that there is a delay of
about 813 days in filing the revision. Explaining the delay, it was urged
that order dated 07.02.2024 was interlocutory in nature and that his
substantive claim under Section 127 Cr.P.C. would be adjudicated on
merits after recording of evidence, continued to pursue the proceedings
before the learned Family Court and did not immediately challenge the
said order before the High Court. Subsequently, upon obtaining legal
advice and realizing the necessity of challenging the said order, he took
steps for obtaining the relevant record and preparing the present
revision, resulting in the aforesaid delay, which was neither intentional
nor deliberate. Accordingly, he prays for condoning the delay in the
interest of justice and proceed to hear the revision on merits.
3. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicant and also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant
criminal revision.
4. The primary question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether the delay of about 813 days in preferring the present
revision petition deserves to be condoned or not.
5. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-

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“5. The legal position is that where a case
has been presented in the Court beyond
limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it
was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour
when prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to

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have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us

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(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue,
it was in unequivocal terms observed by
this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross
delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant
chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in
1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery
of justice if we condone the delay of 12
years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of

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the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From
the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed
to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for
the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public

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policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court,
it has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no

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sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer.
The present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the
lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of
cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the
value of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by all
the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter

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which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of
delay be it at the instance of a private litigant
or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if
there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4
years till the end of the same. For example if
the period of limitation is 90 days then the
party seeking condonation has to explain why
it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party
that it was unable to file it between the 1st
day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file
the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of

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limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
6. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the
discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and
only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.”
The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves,
do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing
substantial justice.
7. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
813 days in filing the present revision is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the applicant that order dated 07.02.2024 was
interlocutory in nature and that his substantive claim under Section 127
Cr.P.C. would be adjudicated on merits after recording of evidence,
continued to pursue the proceedings before the learned Family Court
and did not immediately challenge the said order before the High Court.
Subsequently, upon obtaining legal advice and realizing the necessity of
challenging the said order, he took steps for obtaining the relevant
record and preparing the present revision, resulting in the aforesaid
delay, which was neither intentional nor deliberate, cannot be treated as
“sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or

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ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification
for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the
opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away.
8. The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks
to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period
has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show
diligence and bona fides , and must explain satisfactorily the
circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the
applicant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within
the period of limitation which disabled the applicant from approaching
this Court and the explanation given by the applicant cannot be
construed as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when
the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a substantial period.
9. Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant criminal
revision petition, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/-
(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Akhil