Jai Prakash Jain & Ors vs Ajay Sharma
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~5
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC013431642017
+ RC.REV. 374/2017, CM APPL. 29585/2017 (Stay), CM APPL.
35879/2019 (Dir.), CM APPL. 6060/2020 (For release of the
amount deposited by the respondent), CM APPL. 42167/2022
(Dir.), CM APPL. 19042/2023 (Dir.) & CM APPL. 20406/2026
(Dir.)
JAI PRAKASH JAIN & ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Dhananjai Jain, Ms. Omita
Unnarkar, Mr. Bhoop Singh
and Mr. Anurag Mishra,
Advocates.
versus
AJAY SHARMA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Kamran Malik and Mr.
Uma Shankar, Advocates for
Respondent.
Mr. Manish Kumar Sharma,
Mr. Vatsal Sharma and Ms.
Kritika Gupta, Advocates for
Applicants.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
1
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Order dated
1
DRC Act
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BHATIA
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2
22.02.2017 passed by the learned Pilot Court, Central District, Tis
3 4
Hazari Courts, Delhi , in Eviction Petition No. 46/2017 , whereby
the Eviction Petition filed by the Respondent herein was allowed and
the Petitioners herein were directed to vacate one shop situated on
the ground floor of property bearing Municipal No. 2106, Chah
5
Indara, Dr. H.C. Sen Road, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 .
2. The present Petition also seeks to impugn the Order dated
6 7
01.08.2017 passed in Review Petition No. M-03/2017 , whereby the
review sought of the Impugned Order was rejected.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners confines
his submissions to the contention that the Respondent is not the owner
of the subject property. He submits that the Respondent has taken
shifting stands in different proceedings, claiming ownership of the
property in certain proceedings while asserting that he is a tenant in
others. In this regard, he relies upon proceedings between the
Respondent and certain persons claiming to be co-owners of the
subject property.
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that, in the aforesaid
proceedings, the Respondent himself claimed to be a tenant in the
subject property, which, according to him, contradicts his assertion of
ownership in the present proceedings. He further submits that the
Petitioners had specifically raised the issue of the Respondent’s
ownership in their application for leave to defend, but the same was
2
Impugned Order
3
learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
5
subject property
6
Review Order
7
Review Petition
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BHATIA
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not considered by the learned ARC.
5. Learned counsel further submits that the Petitioners had also
brought the aforesaid discrepancy in the Respondent’s stand to the
notice of the learned ARC by way of a Review Petition, specifically
contending that the Respondent had himself claimed to be a tenant in
the subject property and, therefore, could not assert ownership thereof
in the present proceedings. However, according to learned counsel,
this aspect was not considered by the learned ARC while passing the
Review Order.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the
ground of availability of alternative suitable accommodation, as raised
in the application for leave to defend, was also not appropriately
considered by the learned ARC.
7. He, therefore, submits that the Impugned Order and the Review
Order warrant interference on the aforesaid grounds.
8. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners.
9. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submits that the learned ARC has duly considered the
grounds raised by the Petitioners in their application for leave to
defend and that the Impugned Order and the Review Order do not
suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.
10. Learned counsel submits that the contentions now advanced on
behalf of the Petitioners are merely a reiteration of the grounds already
raised before the learned ARC and do not disclose any ground
warranting the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court.
11. On the question of ownership, learned counsel submits that the
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BHATIA
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Respondent was not required to establish absolute ownership over the
subject premises. He submits that the Petitioners have themselves
been paying rent to the Respondent, and the Respondent has also
placed the rent receipts on record in support of the landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties.
12. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the Petitioners cannot
be permitted to dispute the Respondent’s entitlement to maintain the
Eviction Petition, particularly when the rent was paid to the
Respondent and the corresponding rent receipts were relied upon
before the learned ARC.
13. He further submits that, in view of the limited scope of
revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, no case
for interference with the Impugned Order and the Review Order is
made out.
CM APPL. 50121/2018 (U/O 1 Rule 10)
14. The present Application has been filed under Order I Rule 10
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking
impleadment of the Applicants as Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the
present proceedings. The Applicants claim to be co-owners of the
subject property and contend that impleadment is necessary to protect
their interests in the property, particularly in view of their
apprehension that the Respondent may sell or otherwise deal with the
subject property.
15. It is, however, candidly stated by the learned counsel for the
Applicants that an order of restraint is presently operating against
Respondent No. 1 in respect of dealing with the subject property.
16. It is pointed out that, vide Order dated 04.12.2018, passed in
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BHATIA
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RFA No. 777/2018, pending before a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
the issue concerning the Applicants’ apprehension in relation to the
subject property already stands addressed.
17. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that, since
the concerns expressed by the Applicants stand appropriately
addressed in the proceedings pending in RFA No. 777/2018, no
further purpose would be served by impleading them in the present
Petition.
18. Accordingly, the present Application, CM APPL. 50121/2018,
stands disposed of.
19. It is, however, clarified that, in the event the Applicants succeed
in establishing their claim of co-ownership, they shall be at liberty to
avail such remedies as may be permissible in law for asserting their
entitlement to their respective shares in the rental receipts from the
subject property.
20. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties, and with their able assistance, perused the material on record,
including the Impugned Order and the Review Order.
21. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
22. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
8
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
8
(1998) 8 SCC 119
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9 10
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
23. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
11
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
12
Grover .
24. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
9
(2014) 9 SCC 78
10
(2022) 6 SCC 30
11
2024:DHC:9322
12
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.
”
25. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
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BHATIA
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jurisdiction may be warranted.
27. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioners against the Impugned Order and the Review Order are
required to be examined.
28. At the outset, it would be apposite to extract the relevant
portions of the Impugned Order, wherein the learned ARC dealt with
the objections raised by the Petitioners concerning the ownership of
the subject premises and the availability of alternative suitable
accommodation. The relevant findings are reproduced hereinbelow:
“Ownership as well as existence of landlord-tenant relationship:-
10. The respondents have disputed the ownership of the petitioner
over the premises in question by stating that the petitioner is only a
rent collector and hence, does not have any right, title and interest
over the premises in question. Per contra, the petitioner has filed on
record the rent receipts wherein, the name of the petitioner is stated
to be that of owner and the name of the respondent is stated to be
that of tenant. These rent receipt are duly signed by the respondent
as a tenant and hence, the respondent being a tenant, is estopped u/s
116 of the Indian Evidence Act, from disputing the ownership of
the petitioner over the premises in question. Further, in case law;
Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & others, 155
(2008) DLT 383 , “it was laid down that a landlord is not required
to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property
Act and he is required to show only that he is more than a tenant”.
Thus, in view of the above cited judgment, the ownership of the
petitioner over the premises in question as well as existence of
landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the
respondents stands duly proved.
*
Availability of alternative suitable accommodation:-
12. It is averred by the respondents that the petitioner has in his
occupation several other shops on the ground, first, second and
third floor of the premises in question, totalling to 28 in number
which can be used by the petitioner for the alleged bonafide
requirement. Per contra. It is submitted by the petitioner that the
first floor portion and second floor portion v/ere already sold off by
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BHATIA
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the petitioner for the purchase of his residential house where the
petitioner is presently residing along with his family members.
Further, any of the shops on the first floor, second or third floor
cannot be termed as an alternative suitable accommodation
available with the petitioner for opening a showroom as compared
to a big shop on the ground floor which would definitely attract
much more customers in comparison of any other shop on any
other floor.
13. It is also averred by the respondent that the petitioner has in his
occupation shop no. 1 on the ground floor, which can be used by
him for bonafide requirement. Perusal of the site plan filed by the
petitioner shows that the measurement of shop no. 1 which is in
possession of the petitioner is 13’4”X 4’7”, whereas, the
measurement of the shop in occupation of the respondent is 13’8”
X 47’0” and thus, the measurement of shop no. 1 is only 1/4th of
the shop under occupation of the respondent. Thus, shop no. l
which is l/4th in size as compared to the shop in occupation of the
respondent cannot be termed as an alternative suitable
accommodation as compared to a large shop measuring 13’8’ x
47’0” in occupation of the respondent which would be ideal for the
petitioner and his sons to open their showroom of electrical
equipment. By any stretch of imagination, a small shop measuring
13’4” x 4’7” cannot be termed as an alternative suitable
accommodation in comparison to a large shop in occupation of the
respondent.
14. Further, all other shops on the ground floor of the premises in
question are admitted by the respondents to be under tenancy of
different tenants and therefore, the respondents being the tenants,
cannot dictate terms upon the petitioner/landlord as to which shop
the petitioner should use for the alleged bonafide requirement, it is
also averred by the respondent that the petitioner had recently
purchased a shop bearing no. 46, Bapu Market, H.C. Sen Marg.
Delhi. However, no document or photograph to substantiate the
same has been filed by the respondent. The petitioner has
specifically denied to have purchased or to be in possession of any
such shop and thus, this averment of the respondent is also a bald
averment without 'any substance. Further, the shop in occupation of
the respondents is a large shop situated on the ground floor which
would be ideal for opening a showroom of electrical equipment in
comparison to shop no. 1 on the ground floor which is in
possession of the petitioner or any other shop on upper floors of the
property in question. Thus, being an ideally located shop and not
ideal size, the shop under the occupation of the respondent is most
suitable accommodation available with the petitioner for starting
business of electrical equipment.”
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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29. The Petitioners thereafter preferred a Review Petition,
contending, inter alia , that the Respondent’s claim of ownership over
the subject premises was inconsistent with his alleged position in other
proceedings. The learned ARC considered the said contention while
passing the Review Order. The relevant observations made in the
Review Order are extracted hereinbelow:
“In the present case, the first argument advanced by counsel for the
petitioner is that the petitioner Mr. Ajay Sharma is not the owner of
the suit property, since Sh. Sunil Mohan is the actual owner and the
petitioner is merely acting as an attorney holder of Sh. Sunil
Mohan. Be it as it may be, it is not denied by the
respondent/applicant that rent is being paid by the respondent to the
petitioner only, i.e., Sh. Ajay Sharma. Moreover, the petitioner had
filed on record rent receipts wherein, the name of the petitioner is
stated to be that of the owner and name of the respondent is stated
to be that of the tenant. Thus, in view of Section 116 of the Indian
Evidence Act, the respondent, being a tenant, is estopped from
disputing the title of the landlord over the premises In question. In
the present case, since the rent was always paid by the respondent
to the petitioner in the name of the petitioner, thus, it stands proved
that the respondent had admitted the petitioner to be his landlord
and thus, estopped from disputing title of the petitioner over the
premises in question. Even if the petitioner was the tenant of the
original owner of the premises in question, then also, the
respondent was inducted as a tenant by the petitioner and was
paying rent to the petitioner only, i.e., for the respondent, the
petitioner alone is the landlord and therefore, his title cannot be
disputed by the respondent. Further, in “ Rajender Kumar Sharma
& Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & others, 155 (2008) DLT 383 ”, it was
laid down by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court that “A landlord is not
required to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of
Property Act and he is required to show only that he is more than a
tenant”.”
30. A perusal of the aforesaid extracts reveals that the objection
concerning the Respondent’s ownership of the subject premises was
considered by the learned ARC in both the Impugned Order and the
Review Order. In the Impugned Order, the learned ARC took note of
the rent receipts placed on record, bearing the name of the Respondent
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BHATIA
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as the owner and the Petitioners as tenants, and held that the landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties stood established. The learned
ARC further relied upon the principle that a landlord is not required to
establish absolute ownership in the same manner as would be required
in proceedings under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but is
required to demonstrate a title superior to that of the tenant.
31. The aforesaid issue was again specifically considered by the
learned ARC in the Review Order. The learned ARC noted that the
Petitioners had not disputed that rent was being paid to the
Respondent and that the rent receipts also reflected the Respondent as
the owner of the subject premises. On this basis, the learned ARC held
that the Petitioners, having acknowledged the Respondent as their
landlord, were precluded from disputing his title to the subject
premises by virtue of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
32. The learned ARC further observed that even if the Respondent
were himself a tenant under the original owner, the Petitioners had
been inducted into the subject premises by the Respondent and had
been paying rent to him, thereby acknowledging him as their landlord.
33. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court is unable to accept
the contention of the Petitioners that their objection concerning the
Respondent’s ownership was not considered by the learned ARC. The
record, as reflected in the extracts reproduced hereinabove,
demonstrates that the objection was considered in the Impugned Order
and was also specifically addressed in the Review Order. The mere
fact that the Petitioners seek to rely upon proceedings in which the
Respondent is alleged to have taken a different position does not, by
itself, establish that the findings returned by the learned ARC suffer
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BHATIA
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from an error warranting interference in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction.
34. It is also well settled that, for the purpose of maintaining an
eviction petition under the DRC Act, a landlord is not required to
establish absolute ownership of the subject premises. The relevant
inquiry is whether the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties stands established and whether the landlord has a title superior
to that of the tenant.
35. In the present case, the learned ARC relied upon the rent
receipts placed on record and the admitted position that rent had been
paid by the Petitioners to the Respondent. The Petitioners have not
demonstrated any error apparent on the face of the record in the
learned ARC’s consideration of these circumstances. Consequently,
no ground for interference is made out on this aspect.
36. Coming to the contention concerning the availability of
alternative suitable accommodation, the relevant portion of the
Impugned Order demonstrates that the learned ARC considered the
objections raised by the Petitioners in this regard.
37. The learned ARC examined the alleged availability of other
shops situated on the ground, first, second and third floors of the
property, the size of the shop already in the Respondent’s possession
on the ground floor, and the allegation concerning the Respondent’s
alleged ownership or possession of another shop at Bapu Market.
38. Upon considering these aspects, the learned ARC concluded
that the other premises referred to by the Petitioners could not be
regarded as alternative suitable accommodation comparable to the
subject premises, having regard to their size, location and suitability
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BHATIA
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for the proposed business of the Respondent and his sons.
39. The findings of the learned ARC on the question of alternative
suitable accommodation are based upon an examination of the
material placed on record, including the site plan and the respective
dimensions of the shops in question. The Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the learned ARC omitted to consider any material
circumstance or that the findings suffer from such perversity or
illegality as would warrant interference under the proviso to Section
25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
40. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, in
substance, seek a reconsideration of the comparative suitability of the
premises and a reappreciation of the material already considered by
the learned ARC. Such an exercise would fall beyond the limited
scope of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court.
41. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
infirmity in the Impugned Order or the Review Order warranting
interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act.
42. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with the pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed.
43. Since the present Petition stands disposed of, the rent deposited
in Court in respect to the present Petition, if any, shall be released in
favour of the Respondent by the learned Registrar within a period of
four (04) weeks from today.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/nd/jk
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BHATIA
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