ASHISH AWASTHI vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010034702025 2026:CGHC:45195

NAFR
Digitally
signed by
RAGHVENDRA
JAT
RAGHVENDRA
JAT
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 530 of 2025
Order Reserved on: 18.8.2026
Order Delivered on: 27.10.2026
Ashish Awasthi S/o. Late Durga Sahay Awasthi Aged About 29
•
Years R/o. Village- Masturi, Tehsil- Masturi, Distt- Bilaspur (C.G.).
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Distt- Bilaspur
(C.G.).
2. Commissioner Bilaspur Division, Distt- Bilaspur (C.G.).
3. Tehsildar Masturi, Distt- Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ali Asgar, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Panel Lawyer.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order

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1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following
reliefs:-
“(A) That the respondent authorities be directed to provide
the alternate land to the petitioner and quash the order
dated 27/11/24 (ΑΝΝEXURE P-1) passed by the
Additional Collector.
(B) That any other relief which this court thinks fit in the
interest of justice & equity.”
2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner is the recorded owner
of land bearing Khasra No. 66/14, admeasuring 85 dismil, situated
at Gram Masturi, Tehsil Masturi, Patwari Halka No. 31, District
Bilaspur, which was transferred in his name on 21.01.2021. On
the adjoining Government land, a Boys Primary School is situated,
and for providing better facilities to the students and staff, a shed,
kitchen shed and toilets were constructed, in the process of which
an area admeasuring approximately 0.15 acre belonging to the
petitioner was encroached upon and utilized for the said facilities.
The petitioner approached the competent authority seeking
restoration of possession over the encroached portion, and the
Tahsildar, vide order dated 29.12.2022, allowed his application
and directed restoration of possession. However, considering that
implementation of the said order would result in demolition of the
facilities being used by the school students, the villagers
requested the Petitioner to seek allotment of suitable alternative
Government land of equivalent value instead. Accordingly, the
petitioner submitted a representation dated 16.01.2023, but the
same was not decided, compelling him to approach this Court in

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W.P.(C) No. 1087/2023. Vide order dated 13.07.2023, this Court
has directed the authorities to decide the representation. Despite
subsequent representations and repeated directions of this Court,
including orders passed in Contempt Case Nos. 998/2023 and
429/2024, no effective decision was taken for a considerable
period. Ultimately, during the pendency of the third contempt
proceeding, being Contempt Case No. 1275/2024, the Additional
Collector passed the impugned order dated 27.11.2024 rejecting
the petitioner's representation on the ground that the
encroachment had taken place in the presence of his father, who
was allegedly the Sarpanch at the relevant time. The said finding
is factually incorrect, as the petitioner's father was not the
Sarpanch at the relevant point of time, which is evident from the
documents relating to the site inspection, approval and sanction of
the construction in the year 2013. It is, therefore, submitted that
the impugned order has been passed without properly considering
the relevant documents and factual circumstances and appears to
have been passed in haste, merely to bring the pending contempt
proceedings to an end.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the
recorded owner of land bearing Khasra No. 66/14, admeasuring
85 dismil, situated at Gram Masturi, Tehsil Masturi, District
Bilaspur, which was transferred in his name on 21.01.2021. It is
submitted that, for construction of a shed, kitchen shed and toilets
for the Boys Primary School situated on Government land, an

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area of approximately 0.15 acre belonging to the petitioner was
encroached upon. The petitioner approached the competent
authority for restoration of possession, and the Tahsildar, vide
order dated 29.12.2022, directed restoration of the said land to the
petitioner. However, in the larger interest of the students and staff
of the school, the petitioner requested the authorities to allot
suitable alternative land of equivalent value instead of disturbing
the existing school facilities. Though the petitioner submitted
representations and this Court issued directions for their
consideration, no effective decision was taken, compelling him to
initiate successive contempt proceedings. Ultimately, the
Additional Collector, vide impugned order dated 27.11.2024,
rejected the petitioner's claim on the ground that the
encroachment had taken place in the presence of his father, who
was allegedly the Sarpanch at the relevant time. Learned counsel
submits that the said finding is factually incorrect, as the
petitioner's father was not the Sarpanch at the relevant time,
which is evident from the documents relating to the site inspection
and construction proceedings of the year 2013. It is further
submitted that the impugned order has been passed without
properly considering the relevant material and appears to have
been issued in haste to bring the pending contempt proceedings
to an end. The petitioner, being the lawful owner of the land,
cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with law,
and even otherwise, in view of Article 300-A of the Constitution of

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India, his right to property cannot be defeated without lawful
authority. Learned counsel therefore submits that, particularly
when the petitioner has agreed to allow the school facilities to
continue in the larger interest of the students, the authorities ought
to provide suitable alternative land of equivalent value, and the
impugned order dated 27.11.2024 is liable to be quashed.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that, in
compliance with the directions issued by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.
(C) No. 420/2024, the petitioner's case was duly examined by the
respondent authorities. It is submitted that the Tahsildar, Masturi,
conducted an inquiry and survey of the land in question, pursuant
to which it was found that the petitioner's father, Shri Durga Sahay
Awasthi, had not raised any objection at the time of construction
of the school and its compound wall. It is further submitted that, as
per the official records, the petitioner's father was the Sarpanch of
Gram Panchayat Masturi during the relevant period from 2005 to
2010 and the school construction was undertaken during his
tenure with his knowledge and consent. Learned counsel,
therefore, submits that the petitioner cannot subsequently claim
allotment of alternative Government land in lieu of the land utilized
for construction of the school, and the authorities have rightly
rejected his representation after due inquiry. Hence, the impugned
order does not warrant any interference by this Court.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused
the material available on record.

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6. From a perusal of the record, it is quite evident that the land
belonging to the petitioner has admittedly been utilized and taken
over by the concerned authorities for the purposes of the
Government school. It is also an admitted position that, in
proceedings under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue
Code, 1959, the concerned Tahsildar, vide order dated
29.12.2022, directed the respondent authorities to restore vacant
possession of the portion of land which had been encroached
upon and utilized by the Government school. In view of the
aforesaid undisputed facts, the contention advanced by the
respondent/State that, on account of the alleged consent,
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the petitioner's father, the
petitioner is not entitled to restoration of possession or allotment
of suitable alternative land in lieu of the land utilized by the school,
cannot be accepted as a sound proposition of law. No consent,
agreement or other legally admissible material has been placed
on record to establish that the Petitioner's father had voluntarily
consented to the taking over or utilization of his land by the
authorities. On the contrary, the petitioner, immediately after
obtaining the order dated 29.12.2022, has been continuously
pursuing his grievance before the competent authorities as well as
this Court. The petitioner's consistent stand has not been to
disturb the existing possession of the school or seek demolition of
the school facilities, as such a course would cause unnecessary
hardship and inconvenience to the school administration and,

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more importantly, to the students studying therein. Rather, taking
into consideration the larger interest of the students and the
functioning of the school, the petitioner has made a bona fide and
reasonable request to the authorities to allot suitable alternative
land of equivalent value in exchange for the portion of his land
which has been utilized by the school. Such a request, in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, cannot be construed as a
waiver of the Petitioner's lawful right over his property or as a
relinquishment of his claim for appropriate redressal in
accordance with law.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vidya Devi vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 has
observed as under:-
“12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her
predecessors had "orally” consented to the6 acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on
the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
MIDCS wherein it was held that the State must comply
with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other
permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare

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State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself
a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of
individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health,
employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-
faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised7 in a
case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.

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Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the
facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the
breach of fundamental 9 rights, and the remedy claimed,
and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of
limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their
constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.”
8. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,
and having regard to the findings recorded by the concerned
Tahsildar regarding the encroachment over the petitioner's land,
this Court directs the respondent authorities to provide suitable
alternative land equivalent to an area of 0.15 acres to the
petitioner, after obtaining his consent, and to pass necessary
orders in this regard within a period of 90 days from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order.
9. With this observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed
of.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Raghu Jat