Har Parsad Gaur vs State(Nct Of Delhi)
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1230
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 571 OF 2015
HAR PARSAD GAUR …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) ....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
UJJAL BHUYAN, J.
We have heard Mr. Parthiv K Goswami, learned
senior counsel for the appellant and Dr. Nachiketa Joshi,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and
order dated 19.12.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at
New Delhi (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) in Criminal
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ABHINAV KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.17
13:33:02 IST
Reason:
Appeal No. 782 of 2008 ( Har Parsad Gaur Vs. State).
1
3. Appellant was prosecuted in CC No. 40 of 2003
before the Court of Special Judge, Delhi under Sections 7 and
13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC
Act’ hereinafter). Vide the judgment and order dated
28.08.2008, learned Special Judge convicted the appellant for
committing the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)
punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. By a separate
order dated 29.08.2008, appellant was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a period of two years and to pay
fine of Rs. 10,000.00 with a default stipulation for the offence
under Section 7 of the PC Act; he was also sentenced to undergo
RI for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000.00 with
a default stipulation for the offence under Section 13(2) of the
PC Act; with the declaration that both the sentences would run
concurrently.
4. Appellant assailed his conviction and sentence before
the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 782 of 2008. Vide the
judgment and order dated 19.12.2014, the High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. However, the sentence
2
awarded to the appellant by the trial court was reduced from
two years of RI to one year of RI for each of the offences with no
alteration of the fine amounts or the default sentences.
5. Aggrieved thereby, appellant approached this Court
by filing Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1335 of 2015. By
order dated 09.02.2015, the learned Chamber Judge rejected
the application of the appellant seeking exemption from
surrendering. Vide order dated 20.02.2015, this Court issued
notice on the special leave petition as well as on the prayer for suspension
of sentence. Thereafter, vide order dated 06.04.2015, leave was granted
and the sentence imposed on the appellant was suspended.
Consequently, appellant was directed to be enlarged from
custody. That is how Criminal Appeal No. 571 of 2015 came to
be registered.
6. At the outset, it would be apposite to note down the
relevant facts.
7. The complainant is Puran Chand. He was employed
with M/s. Pooja Printers. He had filed a case before the Labour
Court against M/s. Pooja Printers alleging non-payment of his
3
wages. By award dated 25.05.2001, the Labour Court directed
Mr. Ashok Bansal, Proprietor of M/s. Pooja Printers (PW-3), to
pay the wages to Puran Chand which was quantified at Rs.
41,425.00.
8. Puran Chand filed an execution application before
the Court of Labour Commissioner. On 19.07.2002, the Labour
Commissioner sent a letter to the District Collector for recovery
of the aforesaid amount from M/s. Pooja Printers. The matter
regarding recovery was marked to the appellant Har Parsad
Gaur who at that point of time was working as Tehsildar,
Kotwali having his office at the old civil supply building.
9. On 23.09.2002, the complainant Puran Chand went
to the office of the appellant and requested him to expedite the
recovery proceedings. According to the complainant, when he
made the request, appellant demanded Rs. 3,000.00 as bribe.
Being out of work and without wages, the complainant could
not meet such a demand. He, therefore, met the appellant a
number of times thereafter but on every occasion, the appellant
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demanded the said bribe amount of Rs. 3,000.00. Ultimately,
the complainant had to pay the bribe amount to the appellant.
10. According to the complainant, even thereafter the
cheque(s) had not been sent to the office of the Labour
Commissioner. When he met the appellant after about 10 days
i.e. on 07.12.2002, the appellant demanded a further amount
of Rs. 1,000.00 as bribe from the complainant. In this
connection, appellant had called him at his residence on
telephone in the morning of 06.01.2003 and asked him to come
with the bribe amount of Rs. 1,000.00 on that day between
01:00 pm to 01:30 pm to the State Bank of India (SBI) building
at Tis Hazari court complex.
11. At this stage, complainant went to the office of the
Anti-Corruption Bureau and got his complaint recorded by
Inspector S.S. Sandhu (PW-10). The complaint was recorded in
the presence of one panch witness Ramesh Chand, who was
working as a Peon in the Department of Animal Husbandry,
Delhi Government. The complaint was signed by the
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complainant Puran Chand and by the panch witness Ramesh
Chand whereafter it was signed by PW-10.
12. Complainant Puran Chand produced two currency
notes of Rs. 500 denomination, details of which were noted
down by PW-10 in his pre-raid report. Thereafter, he treated
those two currency notes with phenolphthalein powder and
demonstration as to its effect was given. The two currency
notes of Rs. 500 denomination which were treated with phenolphthalein
powder were handed over to the complainant for being given to the
appellant on demand. It is stated that on completion of the aforesaid
procedure, complainant, the panch witness and PW-10 washed
their hands with clean water and soap. Instructions were given
to the panch witness to remain close to the complainant and to
overhear the conversation between him and the appellant. He
was further instructed to give a pre-determined signal once the
transaction was complete.
13. On that day i.e. 06.01.2003, at around 12:30 pm,
PW-10 alongwith the complainant, the panch witness, Inspector
H.N. Meena (PW-9) and other members of the raiding party left
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the office of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in a government Maruti
van vehicle for the SBI building, Tis Hazari court complex. The
raid party reached there within 15-20 minutes. The vehicle was
left at some distance away from the SBI building. PW-9
Inspector H.L. Meena and the driver stayed back in the vehicle.
The complainant and the panch witness went towards the SBI,
Tis Hazari Branch. They were followed by PW-10 and other
members of the raiding party.
14. According to PW-10, at about 12:55 pm, the complainant and
the panch witness stood near an STD booth situated outside the SBI
branch at the Tis Hazari court complex. At around 01:05 pm,
PW-10 saw that one person, who was medium built and wearing
blue coat, came near the complainant and the panch witness
and kept his hand on the back of the complainant.
15. Thereafter, the complainant shook hands with that
person and started a conversation. At about 01:10 pm, PW-10
received the pre-determined signal from the panch witness
whereafter he alongwith the raiding team rushed towards the
spot where the three were having the conversation. PW-10
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stated that the panch witness had informed him that the
appellant had specifically demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.
1000.00 from the complainant with his right hand and had kept
the same in the right side inner pocket of his coat. PW-10
disclosed his identity as Inspector of the Anti-Corruption
Bureau and challenged the appellant that he had accepted bribe
of Rs. 1,000.00 from the complainant. PW-10 offered his search
as well as the search of the raiding team personnel which was
refused by the appellant. Thereafter, on his instructions, the
panch witness recovered the two treated currency notes of Rs.
500 denomination from the right side inner pocket of the coat
of the appellant. PW-10 took the left hand wash of the appellant
and also wash of the right side inner pocket of the coat, both of
which turned pink. The treated water was then transferred into
four small empty clean bottles and were sealed.
16. Thereafter PW-9 was called to the spot and was
handed over custody of the appellant, case property as well as
the documents. On completion of investigation, chargesheet
was submitted before the Court of the Special Judge and
charges were framed. As the appellant pleaded not guilty and
8
claimed to be tried, the trial commenced. Prosecution examined
10 witnesses whereafter the statement of the appellant under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was
recorded.
17. It may be mentioned that during the trial, before their
evidence could be recorded, the complainant as well as the
panch witness passed away. However, on conclusion of the trial,
the trial court on an analysis of the documents and the evidence
of PW-10, together with the fact that the hand wash and the
wash of the right side inner pocket of the coat of the appellant
had turned pink, opined that it was sufficient to draw the
presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. Since the
appellant failed to give a reliable explanation by way of rebuttal,
the trial court vide the judgment and order dated 28.08.2008
held the appellant to be guilty under Section 7 and Section
13(1)(d) punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act and by a
separate order dated 29.08.2008 imposed the sentence as
above.
9
18. As noted supra, appellant assailed his conviction and
sentence before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and
order dated 19.12.2014, the High Court relied upon Section 20
of the PC Act and held that the appellant could not dislodge the
statutory presumption against him. Accordingly, the appeal
preferred by the appellant was dismissed. However, the
sentence was reduced from two years to one year.
19. This then is the case summary.
20. Mr. Parthiv Goswami, learned senior counsel for the
appellant, at the outset submits that both the trial court and
the High Court fell in error in convicting the appellant under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act in as much as the
foundational facts comprising demand of illegal gratification
and voluntary acceptance thereof by the appellant remained
entirely unproved on record.
20.1. Mr. Goswami submits that both the complainant and
the panch witness having passed away prior to the trial, no
primary evidence was brought forth to substantiate the
accusation that the appellant had ever demanded any
10
gratification. Thus, demand of illegal gratification and
acceptance thereof by the appellant remained unproved.
Therefore, reliance placed on Section 20 of the PC Act is not
justified. Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act will only
come into play once the above foundational facts are held to
have been proved.
20.2. According to Mr. Goswami, PW-10 had arrived at the
scene of occurrence only after the alleged transaction was over.
He had no personal knowledge of the prior exchange or
conversation between the complainant and the appellant, thus
rendering his testimony regarding what the panch witness had
purportedly communicated to him wholly inadmissible in
evidence on the ground of hearsay.
20.3 Learned senior counsel for the appellant has referred
to the additional documents, more particularly, the depositions
of PW-4 and PW-7 to contend that there was no occasion for the
appellant to demand any bribe from the complainant. PW-4 was
serving as Lower Division Clerk in the office of the Deputy
Labour Commissioner. In compliance with the instructions of
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the Deputy Labour Commissioner addressed to the Assistant
Commissioner, two cheques were received by him from the
Assistant Collector, Kotwali for a total sum of Rs. 41,452.00 on
01.01.2003. Similar is the deposition of PW-7 who stated that
there were two cheques being dated 28.11.2002 and
28.12.2002. Both the cheques were received in the office of the
Deputy Labour Commissioner on the same day i.e. 01.01.2003.
According to Mr. Goswami, when both the cheques were already
transmitted to the office of the Deputy Labour Commissioner on
01.01.2003, question of demanding bribe by the appellant on
06.01.2003 did not arise at all. He submits that the High Court
fell into grave error by drawing a presumption under Section 20
of the PC Act merely on the basis of recovery of the tainted
currency notes and chemical wash tests ignoring the fact that
proof of demand is a sine qua non for an offence under Section
7 or Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, which remained unproved.
20.4. Learned senior counsel for the appellant in support
of his submissions has placed reliance on the following
decisions:
12
1
(i) Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) ;
2
(ii) Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) ;
and
3
(iii) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. A.K. Gaba .
20.5. Summing up his submissions, learned senior
counsel contends that the conviction and sentence of the
appellant are wholly unsustainable in law and those are liable
to be set aside. Appeal should accordingly be allowed.
21. Per contra, Dr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court and seeks
dismissal of the appeal.
21.1. Dr. Joshi submits that prosecution had proved its
case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable circumstantial
and corroborative evidence. He submits that the complaint Ex.
P-10/A contained detailed particulars of the illegal demand.
This together with the recovery of the tainted currency notes
from the right side inner pocket of the appellant’s coat remained
1
(2023) 4 SCC 731
2
(2023) 18 SCC 251
3
(2026) SCC Online SC 967
13
undisputed. He also submits that both the left hand wash
and the pocket wash of the appellant reacted positively to
the and tests, thereby establishing
phenolphthalein sodium carbonate
conscious physical handling of the tainted money.
21.2. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has
argued that once recovery of the marked money from the
possession of the public servant is established, the statutory
presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act automatically kicks
in placing the burden upon the accused to rebut the same by
offering credible explanation which the appellant failed to
discharge.
21.3. In support of his submissions Dr. Joshi has placed
reliance on the following decisions:
4
(i) Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration) ;
5
(ii) M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ;
(iii) State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. C. Uma Maheshwari
6
Rao ;
4
(1980) 2 SCC 390
5
(2001) 1 SCC 691
6
(2004) 4 SCC 399
14
7
(iv) State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. R. Jeevaratnam ;
8
(v) P. Sarangapani Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ; and
9
(vi) State of Karnataka Vs. Chandrasha .
22. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties
have received the due consideration of the Court.
23. Section 2 of the PC Act provides various definitions
of the words and expressions used in the PC Act. Section 2(c)
defines the expression ‘public servant’ to mean and include any
person in the service or pay of the government or remunerated
by the government by fees or commission for the performance
of any public duty; any person in the service or pay of a local
authority etc.
24. There is no doubt, therefore, that appellant Har
Parsad Gaur, who was serving as Tahsildar, Kotwali, was a
public servant within the meaning of the PC Act.
7
(2004) 6 SCC 488
8
(2024) 19 SCC 550
9
(2024) SCC Online SC 3469
15
25. As noticed supra, appellant was prosecuted and
convicted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
Occurrence had taken place on 06.01.2003.
26. Section 7 of the PC Act, as it stood at the relevant
point of time, dealt with public servant taking gratification other
than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. Section 7,
at the relevant point of time, stood as under:
7 . Public servant taking gratification other than legal
remuneration in respect of an official act.- Whoever,
being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or
obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from
any person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration,
as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any
official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the
exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to
any person or for rendering or attempting to render any
service or disservice to any person, with the Central
Government or any State Government or Parliament or
the Legislature of any State or with any local authority,
corporation or Government company referred to in
clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant,
whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with
imprisonment which shall be not less than three years
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but which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanations. - (a) ‘Expecting to be a public
servant’. If a person not expecting to be in office obtains
a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he
is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them,
he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the
offence defined in this section.
(b) ‘Gratification’. The word ‘gratification’ is not
restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications
estimable in money.
(c) ‘Legal remuneration’. The words ‘legal remuneration’
are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant
can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which
he is permitted by the Government or the organization,
which he serves, to accept.
(d) ‘A motive or reward for doing’. A person who receives
a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he
does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not
done, comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously
to believe that his influence with the Government has
obtained a title for that person and thus induces that
person to give the public servant, money or any other
gratification as a reward for this service, the public
servant has committed an offence under this section.
17
10
27. In Jaswinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab , this Court
has analyzed Section 7 in the following manner:
10. As per Section 7, whoever being or expecting to be
a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept
or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for
any other person, any gratification other than legal
remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or not
doing any official act or for showing or not showing in
the exercise of his official function(s) favour or disfavour
to any person etc. with the Central Government or State
Government or any authority mentioned in the said
section or with any public servant, shall be punishable
with imprisonment which shall be not less than three
years but which may extend to seven years and shall
also be liable to fine.
10.1. There are five explanations to Section 7. As per
Explanation (a), the expression ‘expecting to be a public
servant’ refers to and is in respect of a person not
expecting to be in office, who obtains a gratification by
deceiving others into believing that he is about to be in
office and that he would then serve them, may be guilty
of the offence of cheating but would not be guilty of the
offence defined in Section 7. Explanation (b) clarifies
that ‘gratification’ is not restricted to pecuniary
gratification or a gratification which is estimable in
10
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1952
18
terms of money. Explanation (c) clarifies that the words
‘legal remuneration’ are not restricted to remuneration
which a public servant can lawfully demand but will
include all remuneration which a public servant is
permitted to accept. The expression ‘a motive or reward
for doing’ has been explained in Explanation (d). It says
that a person who receives a gratification as a motive or
reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a
position to do or has not done, comes within the ambit
of this expression. In terms of Explanation (e), where a
public servant induces a person erroneously to believe
that his influence with the Government has obtained
the title for that person and thus induces that person
to give the public servant, money or other gratification
as a reward for this service, the public servant has
committed an offence under this section.
28. Appellant has also been convicted under Section
13(1)(d) of the PC Act for committing the offence of criminal
misconduct. Section 13(1)(d), as it stood at the relevant time,
read as under:
13 . Criminal misconduct by a public servant. - (1) A
public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct, -
(d) if he, -
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(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for
any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest; or
29. For committing the offence of criminal misconduct in
the aforesaid manner, appellant was also punished under sub-
section (2) of Section 13 which is extracted hereunder:
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not
less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall
also be liable to fine.
30. Section 13(1)(d), as it stood at the relevant point of
time, declared that a public servant would commit the offence
of criminal misconduct if he by corrupt or illegal means, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or, by abusing his position as a public
servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable
20
thing or pecuniary advantage; or, while holding office as a public
servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest. For committing the offence of criminal
misconduct as aforesaid, a public servant would be liable to be
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than one year (four years with effect from 16.01.2014) but
which may extend to seven years (ten years with effect from
16.01.2014) and shall also be liable to fine.
31. It would also be necessary to advert to Section 20 of
the PC Act, inasmuch as, the High Court relied upon the
aforesaid provision to draw the presumption against the
appellant that he had committed the offence under Sections 7
and 13 of the PC Act. Section 20 was substituted with effect
from 26.07.2018. Prior to its substitution, Section 20 stood as
under:
20 . Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other
than legal remuneration.— (1) Where, in any trial of an offence
punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a)
or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved
that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has
agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or
21
for any other person, any gratification (other than legal
remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it
shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that
he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable
thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such
as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be,
without consideration or for a consideration which he
knows to be inadequate.
(2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under
section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved
that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or
any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given
or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall
be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he
gave or offered to give or attempted to give that
gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be,
as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section
7, or as the case may be, without consideration or for a
consideration which he knows to be inadequate.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the
presumption referred to in either of the said sub-
sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its
opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may
fairly be drawn.
22
31.1. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 is relevant for our
present purpose. It says that where in any trial of an offence
punishable under Section 7 or Section 13 or clause (a) or clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused
person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain for himself or for any other person, any
gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable
thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary
is proved that the accused public servant accepted or obtained
or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or
that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward
as mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without
consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be
inadequate.
11
32. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of A.P. , this
Court held that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the
sine qua non for the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by
11
(2015) 10 SCC 152
23
way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof without the proof
of demand would not be sufficient to record a conviction under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. This Court held
that failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal
gratification would be fatal; mere recovery of the amount from
the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the
PC Act would not result in his conviction thereunder. Paragraph
23 of the said decision is relevant and is extracted hereunder:
23 . The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is
the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof,
unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere
acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal
gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of
demand, ipso facto , would thus not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As
a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the
demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere
recovery of the amount from the person accused of the
offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not
entail his conviction thereunder.
33. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta-1
considered the following question for determination:
24
Whether, in the absence of evidence of the complainant, direct or
primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/ guilt of
a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)( d ) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act based on other evidence adduced by
the prosecution?
33.1. It is not necessary to delve into a detailed analysis of
the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench. Suffice it to
say that the question referred was answered in the following
manner:
In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/
primary, oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible
to draw an inferential deduction of the culpability/guilt
of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act based on other
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
33.2. Thus, the Constitution Bench held that in the
absence of evidence of the complainant, it is permissible to draw
an inferential deduction of culpability of a public servant under
Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC
Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.
33.3. The conclusions reached by the Constitution Bench
are as under:
25
88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
88.1 . ( a ) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ) of the Act.
88.2 . ( b ) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter
of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct
evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
88.3 . ( c ) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4 . ( d ) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne
in mind:
( i ) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without
there being any demand from the public servant and the
latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7
of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
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( ii ) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and
tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment .
In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal
gratification emanates from the public servant. This is
an offence under Sections 13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ) of the Act.
( iii ) In both cases of ( i ) and ( ii ) above, the offer by the
bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a
fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt
of an illegal gratification without anything more would
not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections
13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ), respectively of the Act. Therefore,
under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the
offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the
bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant
which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior
demand by the public servant when accepted by the
bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which
is received by the public servant, would be an offence of
obtainment under Sections 13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ) of the Act.
88.5. ( e ) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of
an inference only when the foundational facts have been
proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and
not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material
27
on record, the court has the discretion to raise a
presumption of fact while considering whether the fact
of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not.
Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal
by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal
presumption stands.
88.6. ( f ) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can
again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary
evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by
circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor
does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
88.7. ( g ) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the
court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification
was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned
in the said Section. The said presumption has to be
raised by the court as a legal presumption or a
presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is
also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to
Sections 13(1)( d )( i ) and ( ii ) of the Act.
33.4. Thus what the Constitution Bench held is that proof
of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public
28
servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in
order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The above fact in
issue can be proved by direct evidence as well as by
circumstantial evidence. Demand must precede acceptance.
Mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without
anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or
Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The presumption of fact
with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of
illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an
inference under Section 20 only when the foundational facts
have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence
and not in the absence thereof. Section 20 does not apply to
Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. In the event, the
complainant turns hostile or has died or becomes unavailable
to let in evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can
be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness. For the
aforesaid eventualities, the trial does not abate nor does it result
in the acquittal of the accused public servant.
29
34. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta-2
examined the conviction of the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the PC Act following the declaration of law by the Constitution
Bench in Neeraj Dutta-1 . The Bench referred to earlier decisions
of this Court dealing with the presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act and held that the presumption under Section 20 can
be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved
under Section 7 are proved. The two basic facts are ‘demand’
and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. Unless the above two basic
facts are proved, the presumption under Section 20 would not
be available. The demand for gratification and its acceptance
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In this regard,
reference was made to the decision of the Constitution Bench
in Neeraj Dutta-1 which held that only on proof of the facts in
issue, Section 20 would mandate the court to raise a
presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of
motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7. That apart, the
demand within the meaning of Section 7 cannot be a simplicitor
30
demand for money but it has to be a demand of gratification
other than legal remuneration. This Court held thus:
16. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked
only when the two basic facts required to be proved
under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts
are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. The
presumption under Section 20 is that unless the
contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall
be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as
contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic
facts of the demand of illegal gratification and
acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are
proved, the court will have to presume that the
gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or
reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this
presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the
preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the
presumption.
12
35. Aman Bhatia Vs. State is a two Judge Bench
decision of this Court where it has been held that mere recovery
of tainted money, by itself, would be insufficient to establish the
charge against an accused under the PC Act. The Bench held
that to sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the
12
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013
31
PC Act, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be
a bribe. It has been held as under:
52 . It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted
money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges
against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a
conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act
respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money,
knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently
reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non
for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC
Act.
36. Similar view has been taken by another two-Judge
Bench of this Court in A.K. Gaba where it has been held as
follows:
16. The proof of demand of illegal gratification is the
gravamen of the offence and in absence thereof, the
presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act would not
arise. Where prosecution evidence is inconsistent and
material witnesses turn hostile, benefit of doubt must
necessarily enure to the accused.
37. At this stage, let us briefly examine the judgments
cited by the respondent. Ofcourse, four of the judgments relied
32
upon by learned senior counsel for the respondent were
delivered much before the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Even in those cases also where
Neeraj Dutta-1.
reliance was placed on Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1882,
the conclusion reached by this Court is that the presumption
under Section 20(1) of the PC Act is contingent upon the fact
that during trial it should be proved that the accused had
accepted or agreed to accept any gratification, though this
condition need not be satisfied only through direct evidence. Let
us therefore analyze the two judgments relied upon by the
respondent which were rendered post Neeraj Dutta-1.
38. In P. Sarangapani, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Neeraj Dutta-1
and held that death of the complainant or non-availability of the
complainant at the time of trial could not be said to be fatal to
the case of the prosecution nor could it be said to be a ground
to acquit the accused. In the absence of the complainant, it is
open to the prosecution to prove the contents of the complaint
and other facts in issue by leading other oral or documentary
evidence. Referring to Section 20 of the PC Act, the Bench held
33
that once the undue advantage i.e. any gratification whatsoever
other than the legal remuneration is proved to have been
accepted by the accused public servant, the court is entitled to
raise the presumption under Section 20 that he had accepted
the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for
performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly
or dishonestly. The Bench however clarified that such
presumption is rebuttable.
38.1. In the facts of that case, the Bench held that the pre-
trap and post-trap proceedings were duly proved by the
prosecution. Both the courts below had recorded the findings
that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the
conscious acceptance of the tainted currency by the accused
and also the recovery of tainted currency from the accused-
appellant. Therefore, the burden had shifted onto the appellant
to dispel the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC
Act. The explanation offered by the appellant was not sufficient
to rebut the presumption. In the circumstances, the Bench
while dismissing the appeal, confirmed the conviction and
sentence of the accused-appellant.
34
39. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chandrasha also
examined the operation and application of the presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act. Referring to various decisions of this Court
including the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta-1, the
three-Judge Bench held that the presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of
illegal gratification is proved. Section 20 does not apply to Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. After a thorough analysis, the Bench
held that the two basic facts of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of
gratification stood proved; thus, the presumption under Section 20
could be invoked to the effect that the gratification was demanded
and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under Section
7 of the PC Act. While clarifying that such presumption is rebuttable,
the Bench opined that even on the basis of pre-ponderance of
probability, the accused public servant can rebut such presumption.
In the facts of that case, the Bench held that prosecution had proved
its case beyond reasonable doubt in respect of the demand and
acceptance of the bribe amount from the complainant by the
accused-appellant and recovery of tainted currency notes from the
possession of the accused-appellant. Therefore, this Court held that
35
the trial court had rightly drawn the presumption under Section 20
of the PC Act.
40. Having surveyed the statutory provisions and the relevant
judgments, we may now revert back to the evidence tendered in this
case. As noticed above, prosecution examined 10 witnesses.
However, it is a fact that neither the complainant Puran Chand nor
the panch (shadow) witness Ramesh Chand could enter the witness
box as both of them passed away before their depositions could be
recorded by the trial court. As a result, there is no direct or primary
oral evidence of:
(i) any prior demand of bribe allegedly made by the appellant
to the complainant on 23.09.2002 or on 07.12.2002;
(ii) any telephonic conversation or demand allegedly made by
the appellant to the complainant on the morning of
06.01.2003; and
(iii) the exchange of words, demand of bribe and/or conscious
voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification by and
between the complainant and the appellant at the spot
outside the SBI building on the afternoon of 06.01.2003.
36
41. Thus, the prosecution case regarding the trap rests
entirely on the testimony of the trap officer i.e. Inspector S.S. Sandhu
(PW-10). In his examination-in-chief, he stated that at the relevant
point of time, he was posted as Inspector in the Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Government of NCT of Delhi. On 06.01.2003, at about 11:00
am, the complainant had come to the office where his complaint was
recorded in the presence of the panch witness Ramesh Chand. The
complaint was regarding demand of bribe of Rs. 1,000.00 by the
appellant from the complainant. Appellant was serving as Tehsildar,
Kotwali and he had demanded the bribe from the complainant for
forwarding the two cheques received from M/s. Pooja Printers to the
office of the Labour Commissioner. He then narrated the steps taken
including chemical treatment of the two currency notes of Rs. 500
denomination furnished by the complainant. He stated that the
complainant was instructed to do the transaction in such a manner
that the panch witness should be able to see the transaction and also
hear the conversation. Likewise, the panch witness was instructed to
remain close to the complainant and to overhear the conversation
between the complainant and the appellant and to see the
transaction whereafter he was instructed to give the signal by hurling
his hand over his head.
37
41.1. PW-10 stated that at around 12:30 pm of 06.01.2003, he
alongwith the complainant, panch witness, Inspector H.N. Meena and
other members of the raiding party left the office in a government
Maruti van for the SBI building. On reaching the place, the
government vehicle was left at some distance away with Inspector
H.N. Meena and the driver staying behind. While the complainant
and the panch witness went ahead, PW-10 and other members of the
raiding party followed them whereafter they took suitable position.
41.2. While the complainant and the panch witness stood near
a STD booth outside the SBI Branch, at around 01:05 pm, PW-10
saw one person, who was medium built and was wearing blue coat,
coming near the complainant. He kept his hand on the back of the
complainant. PW-10 saw the complainant shaking hands with that
person and starting a conversation. He stated that at about 01:10
pm, he received the pre-determined signal from the panch witness
whereafter he alongwith the raiding team rushed towards the spot
where the panch witness told him that the appellant had specifically
demanded and accepted bribe of Rs. 1,000.00. While the bribe was
received by his right hand, appellant kept the same in the right side
inner pocket of his coat.
38
41.3. In his cross examination, PW-10 stated that the panch
witness had told him that the accused (appellant) had accepted the
bribe money with his left hand and had kept the same in the inner
right side pocket of his coat.
42. Notwithstanding the right hand left hand discrepancy, it
is evident that the above statement of PW-10 regarding what was
narrated to him by the panch witness is nothing but hearsay
evidence. PW-10 himself had not seen or heard any demand for illegal
bribe being made by the appellant or acceptance of the same. It was
entirety relayed to him by the panch witness. In the absence of the
panch (shadow) witness testifying as to the correctness of the said
statement, such hearsay statement of PW-10 would be inadmissible
in evidence and cannot establish the fact in issue viz. the demand for
and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant.
43. What remains on record is the recovery of the tainted
currency notes from the right side inner pocket of the coat worn by
the appellant and the fact that the left hand wash as well as the coat
pocket wash had turned pink.
44. We have already discussed supra, buttressed by various
decisions of this Court, that mere recovery of tainted currency notes,
39
absent proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
45. In the absence of any primary evidence of demand,
prosecution was under an obligation to prove the circumstances
leading to an irresistible inference of guilt of the appellant.
46. An examination of the official record would belie the
prosecution case regarding motive and demand. The crux of the
complaint Ex P-10/A was that the appellant was withholding two
recovery cheques received from M/s. Pooja Printers and was
demanding a bribe of Rs. 1,000.00 as a condition precedent to
forward the two cheques to the office of the Labour Commissioner.
However, contemporaneous official record seized by the investigating
agency belie this assertion. The original order sheet Ex. P-7/A and
the forwarding letter Ex. P-7/F established that the appellant’s office
had already dispatched both the cheques to the office of the Deputy
Labour Commissioner on 28.12.2002. This fact is corroborated by
PW-4 Sudhir Kumar who was serving as LDC in the office of
the Deputy Labour Commissioner and PW-7 Suresh Kumar Verma
who was also serving as LDC in the office of the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate/Tehsildar. Both the witnesses deposed that the two
cheques were dispatched on 28.12.2002 and were received in
40
the office of the Deputy Labour Commissioner on 01.01.2003.
Furthermore, the proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated
07.01.2003 (Ex. P-14) revealed that the complainant Puran Chand had
appeared before the Labour Department on 07.01.2003 and collected
both the cheques which were lying deposited there since 01.01.2003.
Therefore, no official work or proceeding in relation to the
complainant was pending before the appellant on 06.01.2003. The
official act of recovering the amount and transmitting the cheques to
the Labour Department stood executed by the appellant on
28.12.2002 and had reached the Labour Department on 01.01.2003.
In the above backdrop, the charge that appellant had telephoned the
complainant in the morning of 06.01.2003 threatening that the
cheques would be with-held unless Rs. 1,000.00 was paid to him as
bribe, is contrary to the official record.
47. In the circumstances, the explanation offered by the
appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that the
complainant had met him near the SBI Branch to convey gratitude
for forwarding the two cheques and while shaking hands, tried to
thrust the currency notes into his coat pocket, cannot be discarded
altogether. While the prosecution must prove its case beyond all
reasonable doubt, the accused is only required to establish his
41
defence on the touchstone of pre-ponderance of probabilities to rebut
the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In view of the official
records showing prior completion of work, the defence version was
plausible and satisfied the test of pre-ponderance of probabilities.
48. Thus, it is evident that neither the demand for bribe by
the appellant nor the conscious acceptance of the bribe by the
appellant can be said to have been proved. In the absence of such
proof, drawing of presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act was
impermissible.
49. That being the position, the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court dated 19.12.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal
No. 782 of 2008 and the judgment and order of the learned Special
Judge, Delhi dated 28.08.2008 passed in CC No. 40 of 2003 are
hereby set aside. Appellant Har Parsad Gaur is acquitted of the
charges framed against him under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Since the appellant is on bail,
his bail bonds would stand discharged.
42
50. Consequently, the criminal appeal is allowed. All pending
applications stand disposed of.
…………………………J.
[UJJAL BHUYAN]
….………………………J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 17, 2026.
43