SUMAN KUMAR vs M/S CH AISHI RAM BATRA AND SONS TH ITS MANAGER
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
h475
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CR No.17/2025
R eserved on: 01.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.09.2026
Uploaded on : 03.09.2026
Madhu Suri, Age 75 years
W/o Late Sh. Suman Kumar
R/o H.No.177, Exchange Road, Jammu ...Petitioner(s)
Through:-Mr. Sudesh Sharma, Advocate
V/s
M/s Ch. Aishi Ram Batra & Sons
B.C.Road, Jammu
Near Dental College through its Manager.
...Respondent(s)
Through:- Mr. Rahul Raina, Advocate
Coram: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. This Civil Revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
st
Procedure is directed against order dated 31 May, 2025 passed by the
Sub-Judge, Jammu (hereinafter to be referred as “the trial Court”) in
Civil suit bearing File No.19191/2017 titled Suman Kumar v. M/s Ch.
Aishi Ram Batra and Sons, whereby petitioner’s application under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC came to be rejected
Factual Matrix
2. The husband of the petitioner, namely, Suman Kumar, instituted a suit
for ejectment of the respondent from the shop situated at Exchange
Road, Jammu, on the ground that the suit shop was required by him
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for commencing a business in association with his unemployed son. It
was pleaded that the personal requirement of the plaintiff was greater
than that of the defendant/respondent. According to the plaintiff, the
respondent was not carrying on any business activity from the suit
premises.
3. It was further pleaded in the plaint that a notice dated 11.05.2017 was
served upon the respondent, calling upon it to hand over vacant
possession of the suit shop to the plaintiff within 30 days from the
date of receipt of the said notice. The respondent, instead of vacating
the premises, submitted a reply to the notice. Since the respondent,
despite receipt of the notice and termination of the tenancy, failed to
hand over possession of the suit shop, the plaintiff was constrained to
institute the suit seeking a decree of ejectment against the respondent.
4. In the written statement, the respondent opposed the relief sought in
the suit. It was stated that the shop in question was a licensed premises
from which the respondent was carrying on the business of wholesale
kerosene dealership, pursuant to a licence granted by the Department
of Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution. Thus, the respondent
refuted the plaintiff's assertion that no business or other activity was
being carried on from the suit premises.
5. It was further contended that the son of the plaintiff was a B.Sc.
(Computer Science) and was pursuing his M.A. and, being a student,
had no immediate requirement for the suit shop for carrying on any
business. The respondent asserted that its requirement of the premises
was greater and more pressing than that of the plaintiff. It was also
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pleaded that the respondent was in lawful possession of the suit
premises and that, in view of the premises being licensed for carrying
on its business, there was no occasion for the respondent to hand over
possession thereof to the plaintiff.
6. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an application under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC for decreeing the suit on the ground that the respondent
has admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
petitioner and respondent and receipt of notice issued under Transfer
of Property Act. It has been stated that since both these facts, which
are required to be proved by the petitioner in a suit filed under
Transfer of Property Act, have been admitted by the respondent in its
written statement, suit is required to be decreed in terms of Order XII
Rule 6 CPC.
7. The application of the petitioner was opposed by the respondent by
filing objections. It has been stated that mere receipt of notice does
not constitute an admission of all the pleadings, the petitioner has not
established clear admission by the respondent justifying a decree
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It has further been stated that the
respondent in his defence has challenged the validity of the notice,
relationship between the parties and the grounds of eviction.
8. Trial Court, after considering the pleadings of the both the sides,
keeping in view the facts and circumstances, provisions of Order XII
Rule 6 CPC and Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, rejected
the application. The trial Court has placed reliance on the judgments
of the Supreme Court viz. Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar,
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(2022) 10 SCC 496, S.M.Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9
SCC 287 and Bhuvneshwar Prasad and another v. United
Commercial Bank and others, AIR 2000 SC 2796 . Aggrieved by
the rejection of petitioner’s application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC,
petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court on the
grounds, the trial Court has failed to appreciate that in a suit for
eviction under Transfer of Property Act, only two facts regarding
existence of tenancy and issuance of notice under Section 106 of
Transfer of Property Act need to be proved. Since both these facts
have been admitted by the respondent in the written statement and the
suit is required to be decreed under the provisions of XII Rule 6 CPC,
findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse and that necessity of
the petitioner and non-usage of the suit shop need not to be proved by
the petitioner.
Arguments
9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that in a suit
for eviction under the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff is
required to prove only existence of tenancy between the landlord and
the tenant and issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act and since both these facts have been admitted by the
respondent in its written statement, decree as prayed for by the
petitioner should have been passed in favour of the petitioner in view
of clear admission of relationship of tenant and landlord and receipt of
notice by the respondent. Placing reliance on a judgment of the
Supreme Court in M/s Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary,
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(2012) 11 SCC 405 , learned counsel would submit that all that is
required to be established by the landlord is the existence of jural
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the
termination of tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
10. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the respondent would
submit that the alleged admission was neither categorical nor
unequivocal, which would justify a decree under Order XII Rule 6
CPC. He further argues that the controversy involved substantial
disputed questions of facts which require adjudication upon evidence.
11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
ANALYSIS
12. The controversy that falls for consideration in the present revision
petition is as to whether, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties,
the petitioner was entitled to a decree of eviction under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC merely on account of the alleged admission of the
relationship of landlord and tenant and receipt of notice of termination
of tenancy.
13. Before considering the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to
notice the scope and ambit of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The provision
enables the Court, at any stage of the suit, either on its own motion or
on the application of any party, to pronounce judgment on admissions
of fact made in the pleadings or otherwise, where such admissions are
CR No.17/2025 6
sufficient to entitle the party to a judgment. The object underlying the
provision is to enable the Court to pronounce judgment without
requiring the parties to undergo a full-fledged trial in cases where
there is no real controversy on material facts. However, the power is
discretionary and is to be exercised only where the admission is clear,
unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional. A party cannot claim a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC as a matter of right merely by
pointing out some admission in the pleadings.
14. The Supreme Court in Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar , (2022) 10
SCC 496 , while considering the scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, has
reiterated that the power to pass judgment on admissions is
discretionary and that the Court must be satisfied that the admission is
specific, clear and categorical. Where the defence raised by the
defendant is plausible and requires adjudication, the Court ought not
to bypass the trial by passing a decree merely on the basis of an
isolated admission. The Supreme Court, in the said case, also relied
upon its earlier judgment in S.M. Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj ,
(2015) 9 SCC 287. It is equally true that in a suit for recovery of
possession from a tenant whose tenancy is not protected by the Rent
Control legislation, the landlord ordinarily has to establish the jural
relationship of landlord and tenant and the termination of such
tenancy by efflux of time or by a valid notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act. In M/s Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika
Choudhary , (2012) 11 SCC 405 , the Supreme Court found that the
pleadings in that case contained clear and unequivocal admissions
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regarding both the landlord-tenant relationship and termination of
tenancy and, therefore, upheld the decree passed under Order XII Rule
6 CPC.
15. There can, therefore, be no dispute with the proposition canvassed by
learned counsel for the petitioner that, in an appropriate case, a suit for
possession can be decreed on admissions under Order XII Rule 6
CPC. However, the question in the present case is not as to what is the
requirement of law for obtaining a decree for possession in a simple
landlord-tenant dispute; the question is whether the pleadings of the
respondent contain such clear and unconditional admissions as would
leave no issue requiring adjudication.
16. On a careful consideration of the pleadings placed on record, this
Court is of the view that the answer has to be in the negative. The
respondent has not merely admitted the receipt of the notice dated
11.05.2017. The defence set up by the respondent is that the suit
premises were licensed premises from which it was carrying on the
business of wholesale kerosene dealership pursuant to a licence
granted by the competent Department. The respondent has specifically
denied the assertion of the plaintiff that no business or activity was
being carried on from the suit premises. The respondent has further
disputed the alleged requirement of the plaintiff by asserting that the
son of the plaintiff was pursuing his studies and had no immediate
requirement of the premises for carrying on business. The respondent
has also pleaded that its requirement of the premises was greater and
more pressing.
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17. Thus, the pleadings disclose that the respondent has raised a
substantive defence to the claim for eviction. The mere fact that the
respondent has acknowledged receipt of the notice cannot, by itself,
be treated as an admission that the tenancy stood validly and lawfully
terminated in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Receipt of a notice and admission of the legal efficacy of such notice
are two different things. Where the validity, effect and consequences
of the notice are disputed, the Court cannot, at the stage of
consideration of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, proceed
on the assumption that all requirements for a decree of possession
stand admitted. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner in M/s Payal Vision Ltd. does not advance the case of the
petitioner. In the said case, the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis
that the pleadings of the parties clearly established the jural
relationship of landlord and tenant as also termination of the tenancy.
18. In the case at hand, however, the respondent has not confined its
defence to a bare denial of the plaintiff's claim. It has pleaded a
specific factual defence regarding the nature and use of the premises
and has disputed the plaintiff's assertion concerning non-use of the
premises. It has also challenged the necessity pleaded by the plaintiff
and asserted its own requirement. These pleas cannot be brushed aside
as sham at the stage of consideration of an application under Order
XII Rule 6 CPC.
19. In the present case, the trial Court has considered the pleadings of the
parties and has found that the alleged admissions do not constitute
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such unequivocal admissions as would justify passing a decree under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The trial Court has also considered the
judgments cited before it, including Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri
Kumar , S.M. Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj and Bhuvneshwar
Prasad and another v. United Commercial Bank and others .
20. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is also limited. Unless the
order passed by the subordinate Court suffers from jurisdictional
error, material irregularity, perversity or is based upon an approach
contrary to the settled principles of law, interference in revision is not
warranted. Merely because another view may be possible on the
pleadings would not furnish sufficient ground for interference in
revisional jurisdiction.
21. In the facts of the present case, the conclusion arrived at by the trial
Court that the alleged admissions were not sufficiently clear and
categorical to warrant a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is a view
which is legally sustainable on the pleadings placed before the Court.
The existence of disputed questions concerning the nature and use of
the premises, the validity and effect of the notice and the defence
raised by the respondent makes it inappropriate to bring the litigation
to an end without affording the parties an opportunity to lead
evidence.
22. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of
personal necessity or non-use of the premises is wholly irrelevant also
does not require consideration at this stage. The petitioner has chosen
to plead these facts in the plaint and the respondent has specifically
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controverted them. Whether such pleas are material or legally relevant
to the ultimate relief claimed is a matter which can appropriately be
considered by the trial Court while adjudicating the suit on merits. At
the stage of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Court is concerned only with
whether there is an admission sufficient to warrant an immediate
decree. In Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal, 2025 INSC 467 ,
while interpreting the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 has observed
that the provisions of Rule 6 are enabling and discretionary but not
mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. It has also been observed by the
Supreme Court that if the Court is of the opinion that it is not safe to
pass a judgment on admissions or that a case involves questions which
cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of
admission, it may refuse to pass a judgment and insist upon clear
proof of even admitted facts. The relevant extract of the judgment
reads thus:-
As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending
Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to
enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted
claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a
speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which
according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is
entitled.”
The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and
permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory.
This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule.
The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled
and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal
application. They can be exercised keeping in view and having
regard to the facts and varying circumstances of each case.
If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment
on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be
appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it
may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and
may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.”
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23. Recently, in Pushpa and others v. Dayawati and others, 2026 INSC
603 , Supreme Court has held that the High Court could not have
substituted its own interpretation in exercise of revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 CPC. Relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced hereunder:-
“44. However, the High Court, while exercising revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 the CPC, could not have substituted
its own interpretation merely because another view was possible as
the scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited. This Court in several
decisions, namely, Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari
Jadhav (supra), DLF Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup
Singh (supra) and Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation
(supra), held that the revisional court cannot act as an appellate
court and reassess findings of fact or substitute conclusions unless
jurisdictional error or material irregularity is demonstrated. In the
present case, the High Court reassessed the factual matrix and
proceeded to substitute its own interpretation of the pleadings and
such an exercise travelled beyond the permissible limits of Section
115 of the CPC.
45. We are also unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of
respondent No.1 that inconsistent pleadings taken by defendant No.3
in another suit conclusively establish liability, because such
inconsistencies may constitute material for cross-examination and
appreciation during trial, however, such disputed factual
circumstances of such nature cannot form the sole basis for passing
a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. It is a well settled law
that a judgment on admission is an exception to the ordinary rule
that civil disputes must be adjudicated after parties are afforded full
opportunity to lead evidence because a decree under Order XII Rule
6 of the CPC results in denial of a trial and thus the provision must
be applied with caution and only in cases where the admission is
absolutely clear, categorical and unconditional.”
CONCLUSION
24. Viewed from this perspective, the impugned order dated 31.05.2025
does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or material irregularity
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warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction. The trial Court has rightly declined to pass a decree on
admissions and has left the disputed questions to be adjudicated after
the parties would lead their evidence.
25. Consequently, the present revision petition is found to be devoid of
merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. It is, however, made clear that
the observations made herein shall not be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the respective claims and defences of the
parties in the main suit. The learned trial Court shall decide the suit
strictly in accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence
brought on record, uninfluenced by any observation made in this
order.
(Moksha Khajuria Kazmi)
Judge
Jammu
03.09.2026
Vinod, Secy
Whether the judgment is reportable: No
Vinod Kumar
2026.09.03 17:09
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document