SMT. BHANWARI DEVI vs THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

[2026:RJ-JD:27065-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 282/2026
Smt. Bhanwari Devi W/o Shri Ghamandnath, Aged About 66
Years, Resident Of Village Nayagoan, Tehsil Deh, District Nagaur
(Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Home Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Superintendent Of Police, Nagaur.
3. The Station House Officer, Police Station Surpalia, District
Nagaur (Rajasthan).
4. Tehsildar, Deh, District Nagaur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Jogendra Singh
Mr. Moti Singh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Choudhary, GA-cum-AAG
assisted by Mr. Kuldeep Singh
Mr. Tejpal Pareek, Tehsildar Deh,P.S.
Surpaliya
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI (VACATION JUDGE)
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL (VACATION JUDGE)
Order
Reportable-
Date of Conclusion of Arguments : 10/06/2026
Date on which Order is Reserved : 10/06/2026
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Full Order or Operative Part : Full Order
Date of Pronouncement : 12/06/2026
By the Court- (Per Hon’ble MR. FARJAND ALI,J.)
Grievance of the Case
1. By way of the present proceedings, the petitioner seeks
redressal against the illegal and continued detention of her
husband, Shri Ghamandnath, despite the suspension of the
order of civil imprisonment by the competent Appellate
Authority vide order dated 15.04.2026. The grievance of the
petitioner is that notwithstanding the subsistence of the
appellate order directing suspension of sentence and
consequent release of the detenue, the respondent
authorities, particularly respondent No.4, failed to act in
accordance with law and continued to confine the detenue
for approximately 53 days, compelling the petitioner to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by filing a
Habeas Corpus Petition. Though the detenue ultimately came
to be released pursuant to the order dated 08.06.2026
passed by this Court, the petitioner further seeks
adjudication upon the issue of illegal deprivation of personal
liberty, fixation of accountability upon the erring officials, and
grant of appropriate compensation for violation of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India.
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Facts
2. The present matter arises out of proceedings initiated under
Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 in
relation to alleged encroachment upon Government land
bearing Khasra No. 28/208, measuring 0.1660 hectare,
recorded as Gair Mumkin Rasta in Village Nayagaon, Tehsil
Deh, District Nagaur. Upon reports submitted by the Patwari
and Land Records Inspector alleging unauthorized cultivation
and obstruction of the public pathway by Shri Ghamandnath,
proceedings under Section 91 of the Act of 1956 were
initiated. After considering the material placed on record, the
learned Naib Tehsildar, Deh, vide order dated 05.03.2026,
held Shri Ghamandnath guilty of unauthorized encroachment
over Government land and, in exercise of powers under
Section 91(3) of the Act of 1956, sentenced him to undergo
three months' civil imprisonment besides imposing a
monetary penalty and issuing consequential directions
regarding removal of encroachment and execution of the
sentence. The appeal preferred against the said order before
the District Collector, Nagaur came to be dismissed on
09.04.2026.
3. Aggrieved thereby, Shri Ghamandnath preferred a further
appeal before the learned Additional Divisional
Commissioner, Ajmer, registered as
Appeal/LR-75/No.103/2026. During pendency of the appeal,
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he submitted an affidavit dated 15.04.2026 relinquishing
possession over the disputed land and expressing willingness
to remove the alleged encroachment. Taking note thereof,
the learned Additional Divisional Commissioner, vide order
dated 15.04.2026, suspended the operation of the sentence
of civil imprisonment awarded by the learned Naib Tehsildar
till the next date of hearing i.e. 12.06.2026. According to the
petitioner, despite the suspension order having been
obtained and repeatedly brought to the notice of respondent
No.4, including by personally approaching the authorities
with a certified copy thereof, the detenue was not released
and continued to remain in confinement. Left with no
alternative efficacious remedy and alleging that the
continued detention was wholly without authority of law and
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the
petitioner-wife approached this Court by filing the present
Habeas Corpus Petition seeking immediate production and
release of her husband from illegal custody.
4. That upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court was pleased to
pass a detailed order dated 08.06.2026. Since the
observations recorded therein have a direct bearing upon the
issues of illegal detention, continued deprivation of personal
liberty despite suspension of sentence and the conduct of the
concerned authorities, the relevant observations and
directions contained in the order dated 08.06.2026 deserve
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reproduction and are reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference:
“1. The instant habeas corpus petition has been
filed on behalf of the wife of the detenue,
alleging that though her husband was convicted
by the learned Naib Tehsildar, Deh, District
Nagaur vide order dated 05.03.2026 and
sentenced to undergo civil imprisonment for a
period of 90 days, he preferred an appeal before
the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Ajmer
(hereinafter referred to as "Appellate Authority")
registered as LR-75/No.103/2026 along with an
application seeking suspension of sentence. The
said application was allowed and vide order
dated 15.04.2026, the order of sentence passed
by the respondent Naib Tehsildar, Deh was
suspended and the detenue was directed to be
released. A copy of the order dated 15.04.2026
(Annexure-4) suspending the sentence till
12.06.2026 is very much available on record.
2. It is the grief of the petitioner that she
herself appeared before the Tehsildar along
with a copy of the order dated 15.04.2026 but
the respondent was so obstinate that he denied
from taking on record the certified copy of the
order suspending the sentence. His
stubbornness did not end up here and despite
repeated requests made by the petitioner for
releasing her husband, the Tehsildar did not
pay any heed rather flouted the order of the
Appellate Authority. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, such conduct
amounts to a brazen defiance of the order
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passed by the Appellate Authority and direct
infringement of the fundamental right to life
and personal liberty guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India.
3. Shri Moti Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioner, drew the attention of this Court to
the fact that the present writ petition was
instituted on 14.05.2026 and a copy thereof
was supplied to the learned counsel appearing
for the State. He further referred to the order
dated 15.05.2026 passed by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court issuing notice to the
respondent in the presence of the learned
Public Prosecutor, Shri C.S. Ojha. It is,
therefore, urged that the factum of suspension
of the sentence was well within the knowledge
of the respondent No.4 - Tehsildar, yet the
detenue was not released from custody.
4. Learned Additional Advocate General
informed this Court that pursuant to the
issuance of notice by the Co-ordinate Bench on
15.05.2026, the Superintendent of Police was
also apprised of the institution of the present
writ petition.
5. We pondered over the issue and are prima
facie of the considered opinion that the order of
sentence dated 05.03.2026 passed by the
respondent No.4, who is present in person
before this Court today, was suspended by the
Appellate Authority on 15.04.2026. The
assertion made by the petitioner is that soon
after getting the certified copy of the order of
the Appellate Authority, the same was made
available to the learned Tehsildar, but of no
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avail does not seem untrue since we feel that
no person detained in custody would keep the
copy in his hand and would not be keen, eager
or excited to produce the same before the
competent authority for getting released as that
ordinarily happens in the normal course of
nature.
6. Shri Tejpal Pareek, learned Tehsildar,
present in person, vehemently and fervently
urges that he was not aware about the order of
suspension of sentence passed by the Appellate
Authority. Upon being asked as to why the
petitioner would not serve a copy on him, he is
not in a position to convince this Court. The
judicially noticeable fact remains that on
15.05.2026, the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court had issued notices to the learned Public
Prosecutor. It is not comprehensible as to why
a person detained and in whose favour an order
of release has been passed would not
communicate the order to the competent
authority.
7. Despite the above, we are of the considered
opinion that before condemning any person, a
reasonable opportunity of hearing must be
afforded to him. Though we have heard him
orally, we still grant him further time to file his
response in writing.
8. Since no material has been placed on record
to controvert the fact that the order of sentence
remains in currency and the husband of the
petitioner is not detained in connection with any
other matter, therefore, prima facie there
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appears to be no doubt that as on date, his
detention is not in accordance with law.
9. In the peculiar circumstances of the case,
when prima facie it appears that the husband of
the petitioner has been detained not in
accordance with law, his detention cannot be
continued even for a single day. Thus, it is
ordered that he be released forthwith in
accordance with the order passed by the
learned Appellate Authority.
10. Shri Tejpal Pareek, learned Tehsildar, shall
ensure that the husband of the petitioner is
released before 5:00 PM today.
11. List the matter on 10.06.2026 to see the
compliance and response of the errant
respondent No.4.”
5. Accordingly, respondent No.4 was directed to ensure his
immediate release, which ultimately took place on the
evening of 08.06.2026.
6. Before proceeding further, and merely for the sake of clarity
of facts, it deserves to be noted that it is not the case of any
of the respondents that the husband of the petitioner was
required to be detained in connection with any other
criminal, civil or revenue proceeding. On the contrary, the
material available on record unequivocally indicates that the
detention of the detenue was solely referable to the order of
civil imprisonment passed in the proceedings under Section
91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. Thus, there is
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no dispute that the confinement continued exclusively on
account of the sentence which had already been suspended
by the competent Appellate Authority vide order dated
15.04.2026.
6.1 Thus after the order dated 08.06.2026, the petitioner
filed an additional affidavit bringing on record that the
detenue, who is suffering from HIV and requires continuous
medical treatment, had remained unlawfully confined for
approximately 53 days despite the suspension order, causing
serious prejudice to his health and liberty. It was further
asserted that the petitioner herself is a cancer patient and
was deprived of necessary care and support during the
period of illegal detention. The petitioner also sought
compensation for violation of fundamental rights and an
independent inquiry for fixation of responsibility upon the
officials concerned. During the hearing held on 10.06.2026,
while the Tehsildar denied prior knowledge of the suspension
order, he admitted having received knowledge thereof on
01.06.2026. This Court observed that even according to the
officer's own stand, the detenue ought to have been released
immediately upon such knowledge and, since the release
was effected only after intervention of this Court on
08.06.2026, the matter required serious consideration.
Consequently, after taking the affidavit of the Tehsildar on
record and noting the aforesaid circumstances, this Court
reserved order on 10.06.2026.
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6.2 Before proceeding further, this Court deems it
appropriate to observe that it is a settled and fundamental
principle governing the exercise of judicial power that no
person ought to be condemned unheard and that before
passing any order carrying adverse civil consequences or
otherwise affecting the rights, reputation or position of a
party, a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing must be
afforded. It was for this reason that, despite the prima facie
observations recorded in the order dated 08.06.2026, this
Court considered it necessary to grant respondent No.4
adequate opportunity to explain his conduct. Accordingly,
respondent No.4-Tehsildar was heard at considerable length
and was further permitted to place his explanation on record
by way of a written response. Pursuant thereto, he
submitted his affidavit/response, which was taken on record
and duly considered. As per the stand taken therein, the
respondent himself admits that he acquired knowledge of the
order dated 15.04.2026 suspending the sentence on
01.06.2026.
6.3 During the course of hearing, learned Additional
Advocate General Shri Deepak Choudhary also addressed
submissions on behalf of the State. In his capacity as a
responsible officer of the Court, he submitted that pursuant
to the order dated 15.05.2026 passed by the Coordinate
Bench, he had personally spoken to the Superintendent of
Police and apprised him of the pendency of the present
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proceedings and the grievance regarding the continued
detention of the detenue. Learned Additional Advocate
General further submitted that he was informed by the
Superintendent of Police that the requisite information had
thereafter been duly forwarded to the District Collector and
the concerned authorities for necessary action.
6.4 It is also noteworthy that there is no dispute inter se the
parties on the foundational fact that the order dated
15.04.2026 passed by the learned Additional Divisional
Commissioner suspending the sentence of civil imprisonment
was validly passed and remained operative. Indeed, both
respondent No.4 as well as learned Additional Advocate
General fairly conceded that the sentence imposed upon the
detenue stood suspended under the aforesaid order. It is
further not disputed that the said order of suspension
continued to remain in force throughout the relevant period
and was subsisting on the date when this Court passed the
order directing the release of the detenue.
7. Having considered the material available on record, the
affidavit placed by the petitioner, the response submitted on
behalf of respondent No.4 and the submissions advanced by
the respective parties, this Court finds that certain aspects
arising out of the continued detention of the detenue despite
suspension of sentence require close scrutiny. Since the
detenue has already been released pursuant to the directions
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issued by this Court, the principal issues which now fall for
consideration relate to the legality of the detention already
undergone, the adequacy of the explanation furnished by the
concerned authorities, the impact of such detention upon the
constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the
consequential relief, if any, to which the petitioner and the
detenue may be held entitled.
8. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned
Additional Advocate General Shri Deepak Choudhary on
behalf of the State, and respondent No.4-Tehsildar, who was
personally heard by this Court. The matters available on
record have been carefully perused and considered.
OBSERVATIONS & ORDER
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
BACKDROP
9. The present petition, filed invoking the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, raises questions of grave constitutional import
touching upon the inviolability of personal liberty, the
supremacy of judicial and quasi-judicial orders, and the
accountability of public functionaries who, cloaked in the
mantle of State authority, dare to defy the mandate of law.
The writ of habeas corpus that ancient and most celebrated
safeguard of human freedom has been invoked by the
petitioner-wife on behalf of her husband, Shri Ghamandnath,
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who was made to languish in illegal detention for
approximately 53 days, notwithstanding the existence of a
valid and operative order of suspension of sentence passed
by the competent Appellate Authority.
10.The sanctity of the writ of habeas corpus transcends the
boundaries of any single legal system. Lord Halsbury,
delivering the judgment of the House of Lords in Cox v.
Hakes (1890) LR 15 AC 506 (HL) , declared that 'for a
period extending as far back as our legal history, the writ of
habeas corpus has been regarded as one of the most
important safeguards of the liberty of the subject.' The
lineage of this writ stretches from the Magna Carta of 1215,
whose celebrated Clause 39 proclaimed that 'No free man is
to be arrested, or imprisoned... except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land,' through the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 in England, and thence to the
shores of India through the Regulating Act of 1773, ultimately
finding its most exalted expression in the fundamental rights
chapter of the Constitution of India, 1950.
11.It was P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), speaking for a
Constitution Bench in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate,
(1973) 2 SCC 674, who observed that the writ of habeas
corpus 'is essentially a procedural writ. It deals with the
machinery of justice, not the substantive law. The object of
the writ is to secure release of a person who is illegally
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restrained of his liberty.' H.R. Khanna, J., in his immortal
dissent in ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2
SCC 521 a dissent that history has vindicated with full
honour , described the writ as 'a process for securing the
liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of
immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention,
whether in prison or in private custody.' V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.,
in his inimitable prose in Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of
Delhi), (1980) 3 SCC 488, sounded the constitutional
imperative in memorable terms: 'The rule of law meets with
its Waterloo when the State's minions become law-breakers
and so the court, as the sentinel of the nation and the voice
of the Constitution, runs down the violators with its writ and
secures compliance with human rights even behind iron bars.'
12.The power to issue writs under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution has been declared to be a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution. It represents an inalienable and
indispensable constituent of the constitutional fabric. When
this Court is moved in the exercise of this jurisdiction, it does
not merely adjudicate upon an individual dispute , it affirms,
in the most solemn terms, the promise that the Constitution
makes to every citizen: that no arm of the State, however
powerful, however entrenched in bureaucratic inertia,
however blinded by personal obstinacy, shall deprive any
person of liberty save in strict accordance with the procedure
established by law. The present case has compelled this Court
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to confront a situation where that promise was brazenly
dishonoured by a functionary of the State in a manner that
this Court finds shocking, reprehensible, and wholly unworthy
of anyone sworn to serve the constitutional order.
II. THE MEANING AND CONTENT OF ILLEGAL
DETENTION
13.Before proceeding to examine the conduct of respondent No.
4, it is imperative that this Court set out, with precision, what
constitutes 'illegal detention' in the constitutional sense. The
expression admits of no single statutory definition, but its
contours have been illuminated by a long line of judicial
pronouncements, both domestic and international, which
converge upon the irresistible conclusion that the deprivation
of personal liberty, without lawful authority or in violation of
the procedure established by law, constitutes a wrong of the
gravest order against both the individual and the
constitutional order.
14.The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the recent judgment
of Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2026 INSC
599 , decided on 29th May 2026, has articulated the concept
of illegal detention in the following comprehensive terms:
'The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful
authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is
illegal detention.'
15.The Court further elaborated that illegal detention involves
actual custody from which the individual is not free to leave;
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that it lacks a valid legal basis, including where any purported
authority is void or expired; that even where a law permits
detention, it becomes illegal if the procedure followed is not
just, fair, and reasonable; and that it covers situations where
the power to detain is exercised arbitrarily, for an improper
purpose, or in bad faith.
16.The concept of personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India is not a mere textual guarantee. It
represents the distilled wisdom of centuries of civilizational
struggle against arbitrary power. The framers of the
Constitution, having witnessed the horrors of colonial
subjugation and the systematic destruction of individual
dignity, chose to place the right to life and personal liberty at
the very heart of the fundamental rights chapter. Article 21
proclaims, in terms absolute and unequivocal, that 'No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.' This guarantee
admits of no exception save those expressly carved out by
the Constitution itself.
17.The international dimension of this guarantee cannot be
overlooked. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948 , proclaims that 'No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.' Article 9(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966 to which India is a signatory , states that
'Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
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one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law.' More specifically, Article 9(5) of the said Covenant
expressly provides that 'Anyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.' The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nilabati Behera
v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 74 6, took cognizance of
Article 9(5) of the ICCPR while awarding compensation for
violation of Article 21, thereby affirming that the international
law obligation and the constitutional mandate march in the
same direction.
18.The maxim ' ubi jus ibi remedium ' -where there is a right,
there is a remedy , is the foundational principle upon which
the entire edifice of constitutional remedies rests. Personal
liberty is the most precious of all rights. The Latin expression
'salus populi suprema lex esto '- the welfare of the people is
the supreme law , finds its highest expression, in the context
of individual rights, in the protection of personal liberty from
the tyranny of State power. When a person is deprived of
liberty by a public functionary acting without authority, in
defiance of judicial orders, and in utter disregard of
constitutional guarantees, the injury suffered is not merely of
a private or individual character. It is an injury to the
constitutional order itself. It is a wound inflicted upon the
body politic. It is an assault upon the rule of law.
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19.In the present case, the order of suspension of sentence was
passed by the learned Additional Divisional Commissioner,
Ajmer, vide order dated 15.04.2026, which remained in full
force and effect until 12.06.2026. From the moment that
order came into existence, the continued detention of Shri
Ghamandnath ceased to have any legal basis whatsoever. The
sentence, having been suspended, could not be executed.
The detenue was entitled to his liberty as a matter of
constitutional right. Every single hour of his confinement
thereafter was an hour of illegal imprisonment , an hour
during which the State, acting through its functionary,
committed a continuing constitutional wrong of the most
serious character.
As poignantly observed by Oscar Wilde-
“I know not whether Laws be right,
or whether Laws be wrong;
all that we know who be in jail is that the wall is strong;
and that each day is like a year, a year whose days are long.”
Though expressed in a literary context, the sentiment
captures with remarkable force the harsh reality of unlawful
confinement, where each passing day constitutes a renewed
assault upon personal liberty. In a constitutional democracy
governed by the rule of law, such deprivation of freedom,
despite a subsisting order suspending the sentence, cannot
be viewed as a mere administrative lapse but must be
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recognized as a grave infringement of the detenue's
fundamental rights.
20.This Court considers it necessary to emphasise that the
present case is not one in which the detenue's confinement
was illegal from its inception. The initial detention of Shri
Ghamandnath was founded upon lawful authority and was
undertaken in exercise of powers vested in respondent No. 4
under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. At the
stage of commencement, therefore, the custody of the
detenue was supported by law and cannot be characterised
as unlawful. The illegality arose subsequently. Once the
learned Additional Divisional Commissioner, Ajmer, passed the
order dated 15.04.2026 suspending the sentence, the legal
foundation upon which the detenue's continued confinement
rested stood eclipsed. From the moment respondent No. 4
acquired actual or constructive knowledge of the said
suspension order, he became duty-bound to give effect
thereto and restore the detenue's liberty. Any continuation of
custody thereafter ceased to be protected by lawful authority
and assumed the character of illegal detention. The
distinction is of considerable importance. The gravamen of
the present case is not that the detenue was initially confined
without authority of law, but that a detention which was
lawful at its inception was unlawfully prolonged after the very
basis of such detention had ceased to exist. In constitutional
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terms, the transition from lawful custody to unlawful
confinement occurred the moment the subsisting order
suspending the sentence ought reasonably to have been
acted upon, but was not.
III. HUMAN LIBERTY AS A SACROSANCT AND
INVIOLABLE VALUE: A DEEPER ANALYSIS
21.This Court deems it necessary to articulate, at some length,
the philosophical and constitutional foundations of personal
liberty, because the facts of this case reveal a disturbing
indifference on the part of a public functionary to the most
elementary precepts upon which constitutional governance
rests. It is not merely a technical legal error that stands
condemned in these proceedings. What stands condemned is
an attitude , an attitude of arrogance, of impunity, of
contempt towards both the law and the human being whose
life and freedom that law was designed to protect.
22.Personal liberty is antecedent to the Constitution. It is not a
creation of the Constitution; the Constitution merely
recognises, affirms, and guarantees a right that inheres in
every human being by virtue of his or her humanity. The
celebrated philosopher John Locke identified liberty as one of
the inalienable natural rights with which every person is
endowed. The preamble to the Constitution of India secures
to all citizens, inter alia, liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship, and speaks of the fraternity that assures
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the dignity of the individual. Personal liberty , liberty of the
body, liberty from arbitrary confinement, liberty from State
coercion , is the condition sine qua non for the enjoyment of
all other rights. A person deprived of liberty is deprived of his
capacity to exercise any other right. He is reduced, in the
most literal sense, to an object of State power rather than a
subject of constitutional rights.
23.This Court, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978)
1 SCC 248 one of the landmark constitutional
pronouncements of the post-Emergency era , gave the
guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 an expansive
interpretation. The Court held that the procedure established
by law, in order to be valid, must be 'right, just, and fair' and
not 'arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.' The Court further held
that Articles 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually exclusive but
must be read together, so that any law or executive action
depriving a person of life or personal liberty must satisfy all
three constitutional guarantees simultaneously. The principle
of due process , though not expressly used was incorporated
into the constitutional framework through the expansive
reading of Article 21.
24.In the present case, even the narrow technical requirements
of a lawful detention were absent. There was no order of any
competent authority sustaining the detention. The sentence
had been suspended. The detenue had furnished an affidavit
before the appellate authority relinquishing possession of the
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disputed land. The appellate authority had, in express terms,
directed suspension of the sentence. Yet the detenue
continued to be confined. If there is a paradigmatic instance
of detention that is not merely illegal in a technical sense but
illegal in every conceivable sense morally, constitutionally,
and legally it is the detention of Shri Ghamandnath after
15.04.2026.
25.The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rudul Shah v. State of
Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141, made the seminal observation
that Article 21 would be 'denuded of its significant content if
the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of
release from illegal detention.' That celebrated judgment,
which first established the principle of compensatory public
law remedy for violation of Article 21, arose from a situation
where a person continued to be detained for fourteen years
after the order of his release. The Court held: 'The right to
compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of
instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and
which present for their protection the powers of the State as
a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has
perished in some others too well known to suffer mention, it
is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect
for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy.'
26.The words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rudul Shah are
as relevant today as they were in 1983. The manner in which
Shri Ghamandnath , a poor cultivator from the rural lower
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strata of society, suffering from HIV and dependent upon
continuous medical treatment was subjected to prolonged
illegal confinement, even as his wife (herself a cancer
patient) repeatedly and desperately approached the
authorities for his release, is a story not merely of
administrative failure but of callous indifference to human
suffering that shocks the conscience of this Court. Personal
liberty is not a luxury that the powerful alone enjoy and the
poor must beg for. It is a constitutional guarantee equally
available to every person regardless of economic status,
social position, or physical condition. When the State through
the obstinacy of a single functionary subjects a sick,
impoverished man to fifty-three days of illegal confinement
while his ailing wife pleads in vain at the gates of officialdom,
it betrays the foundational promise of the Constitution in the
most egregious manner.
What renders the matter even more distressing is that both
the detenue and his wife were battling serious and potentially
life-threatening medical conditions during the period in
question. The detenue required continuous treatment for HIV,
while the petitioner-wife, a cancer patient, was
simultaneously deprived of the companionship, care and
support of her husband. The consequences of the illegal
detention, therefore, were not confined merely to a
deprivation of physical liberty; they extended into the realm
of human suffering, medical vulnerability and familial
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distress. This Court is constrained to observe that such
conduct cannot be described as merely insensitive or
inhumane. The prolonged continuation of custody in the face
of a subsisting order suspending the sentence, despite its
grave impact upon two medically fragile individuals, assumes
a character that is nothing short of diabolical. In a
constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, no
public functionary can be permitted to treat human liberty
and human suffering with such alarming indifference.
IV. THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT NO. 4: AN
EXAMINATION
27.This Court has examined, with great care, the conduct of
respondent No. 4, Shri Tejpal Pareek, learned Tehsildar, Deh,
in relation to the continued detention of the detenue following
the suspension order dated 15.04.2026. The picture that
emerges is deeply troubling and merits detailed examination.
28.The first matter that requires attention concerns knowledge
of the appellate order. The learned Additional Divisional
Commissioner, Ajmer, passed an order on 15.04.2026
expressly suspending the sentence of civil imprisonment
awarded by respondent No. 4 himself. Under the ordinary
course of administrative and revenue practice, such an
appellate order would be communicated to the subordinate
authority i.e., the Tehsildar as a matter of course. It would be
wholly incongruous to suggest that an appellate forum can
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pass an order suspending the sentence of a subordinate
officer without that order finding its way to the very office
charged with the execution of that sentence. The
presumption arising in law 'omnia praesumuntur rite esse
acta' ( All things are presumed to have been done rightly and
regularly.) This is a well-established maxim of law which
essentially means that all official and judicial acts are
presumed to have been performed correctly, lawfully, and in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, unless the
contrary is proved. It cuts both ways: if the appellate
authority passed an order of suspension, it must be
presumed that proper intimation was sent through official
channels to the subordinate executing authority.
There is yet another circumstance which renders the plea of
complete ignorance difficult to accept. Proceedings before the
District Collector, the Revenue Appellate Authority, the
Divisional Commissioner, and even the Board of Revenue are
not conducted in isolation from the administrative machinery
whose orders are under challenge. In the ordinary course, the
State and its revenue officers are represented before such
forums through designated Government Counsel or law
officers specifically entrusted with defending and conducting
revenue litigation on behalf of the concerned authorities. The
existence of such institutional representation ensures a
regular channel of communication between the appellate
forum, the Government counsel appearing therein, and the
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departmental authorities whose orders are the subject matter
of challenge. Consequently, the passing of an appellate order
suspending the sentence imposed by the Tehsildar was not an
event that would ordinarily remain confined to the knowledge
of the litigating party alone; rather, it was one that would
reasonably be expected to come to the notice of the official
machinery concerned with the execution and defence of the
impugned order. This constitutes an additional circumstance
lending support to the inference that knowledge of the
appellate order was available, or at the very least readily
available, within the official framework long before the stand
now sought to be projected by respondent No. 4.
29.Second, and more significantly, the petitioner herself has
deposed, on oath, that she personally appeared before
respondent No. 4 with a certified copy of the suspension
order and requested the release of her husband. This Court,
in its order dated 08.06.2026, recorded the following
observation, which deserves to be reproduced:
'The assertion made by the petitioner is that soon after
getting the certified copy of the order of the Appellate
Authority, the same was made available to the learned
Tehsildar, but of no avail does not seem untrue since we feel
that no person detained in custody would keep the copy in
his hand and would not be keen, eager or excited to produce
the same before the competent authority for getting released
as that ordinarily happens in the normal course of nature.'
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This reasoning, rooted in sound human psychology and
common sense, carries the full weight of legal logic. A person
who has secured an order of release from an appellate
authority would be desperate to have that order acted upon.
The suggestion that the petitioner obtained a certified copy of
the appellate order and thereafter failed or omitted to present
it to the executing authority defies all reason and human
experience.
Indeed, the very conduct of the detenue in pursuing the
statutory appellate remedy furnishes a strong indicator of his
desire to secure release from custody. It is inconceivable that
a person who had no intention of obtaining liberty would
undertake the exercise of filing an appeal, seeking suspension
of sentence, furnishing an affidavit before the appellate
authority, and obtaining a favourable order suspending his
confinement. The fact that the detenue successfully obtained
an order of suspension of sentence from the learned
Additional Divisional Commissioner leaves little room for
doubt that he intended to avail himself of the relief granted
and regain his freedom. If the detenue had no desire to be
released, there would have been no occasion for him to
challenge the order of imprisonment or seek suspension
thereof in the first place. The very fact that such proceedings
were initiated and pursued to a successful interim outcome
renders wholly implausible the suggestion that the
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suspension order was not promptly communicated or sought
to be acted upon by the detenue and his family.
30.Third, even if the claims of the petitioner regarding personal
presentation of the suspension order are treated as disputed,
as respondent No. 4 appears to urge the fact remains that on
15.05.2026, a coordinate bench of this Court issued notice to
the respondents in the presence of the learned Public
Prosecutor. It was further submitted on behalf of the State
that the Superintendent of Police was also apprised of the
institution of the writ petition after notice was issued. This
Court also takes note of the statement made by learned
Additional Advocate General Shri Deepak Choudhary, as
recorded in the order-sheet, that upon being informed of the
institution of the present habeas corpus proceedings, the
Superintendent of Police had, in turn, communicated the
relevant information to the District Collector as well as to the
concerned authorities responsible for dealing with the matter.
This circumstance further reinforces the inference that the
factum of the pending proceedings and the grievance
regarding the continued detention of the detenue had
permeated the administrative hierarchy and could not have
remained confined to a single office or functionary. There is
no requirement in law that every individual respondent must
be served personally with notice of a court proceeding for
knowledge to be imputed to them. The State speaks through
all its functionaries. When the machinery of the State
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including the public prosecutor and the senior police officer
was put on notice of illegal detention, the knowledge of the
State as an entity must be attributed to all its limbs engaged
in the execution of the impugned detention.
31.Fourth, and most damningly, respondent No. 4 himself, in his
affidavit filed before this Court, does not dispute that he
came to know of the suspension order on 01.06.2026. This
admission is of the highest legal and constitutional
significance. Even proceeding on the most charitable possible
interpretation of the Tehsildar's own case that he was
genuinely unaware of the appellate order until 01.06.2026
the fact remains that upon acquiring knowledge, he took no
steps whatsoever to release the detenue,notwithstanding the
undisputed position that the detenue was not required to be
detained in connection with any other case, proceeding, or
lawful authority. There existed no independent legal
impediment to his immediate release. From 01.06.2026 to
08.06.2026, a period of seven days elapsed. During this
period, respondent No. 4 armed with actual, admitted
knowledge of the suspension order continued to keep Shri
Ghamandnath in illegal confinement. This continued
detention, in the face of admitted knowledge, is not merely
an administrative failure. It is a conscious, deliberate, and
wilful deprivation of personal liberty in defiance of the order
of a superior authority. It is, in the language of constitutional
law, a gross violation of Article 21.
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32.Fifth, even more extraordinary is the conduct of respondent
No. 4 when he appeared before this Court on 08.06.2026.
This Court recorded that he 'vehemently and fervently' urged
that he was unaware of the suspension order and yet could
not provide any satisfactory explanation for why the
petitioner would not have served a copy upon him. He stood
before this Court on that date with the detenue still in
unlawful custody. He ought to have come to this Court, had
the detenue released, and placed on record his compliance
with the appellate order. Instead, he appeared to argue his
case whilst the constitutional rights of the detenue continued
to be violated. The phrase employed by this Court in its order
dated 08.06.2026 - 'brazen defiance' of the appellate order is
not merely rhetorical. It is the most apt and accurate
description of the conduct that this Court has witnessed
throughout these proceedings.
33.In the entire judicial career of the Members of this Bench, it
is rare indeed, it is unprecedented in the experience of this
Court to encounter an officer of the revenue administration
who, in the face of a judicial order of suspension passed by
his own direct appellate superior, in the face of repeated
personal representations by the detenue's wife, in the face of
the institution of a habeas corpus petition in the High Court,
and in the face of his own admitted knowledge of the order,
continued for days on end to keep a sick and helpless
individual in illegal confinement. The stubbornness, the
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obstinacy, the contumacious defiance of the rule of law
exhibited by respondent No. 4 in these proceedings is of a
character and degree that this Court has not previously
encountered and hopes never to encounter again.
34.This Court is also deeply conscious of the particular
vulnerability of the detenue and his family. Shri Ghamandnath
is a person living with HIV, requiring continuous medical
treatment. His detention deprived him of access to the
regular medical care that his condition necessitates. His wife,
who bore the burden of fighting for his release, is herself
battling cancer. The picture of this ailing woman a cancer
patient presenting a suspension order at the gates of the
Tehsil office, only to be turned away by an obdurate
functionary; appearing before every authority; ultimately
filing a habeas corpus petition as a last resort, only for the
State machinery to continue its defiance even after notice
was issued , is a picture that will, this Court hopes, endure as
a reminder to every public functionary of what it means to
betray the constitutional trust that the office of a public
servant carries.
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF 'OBEY FIRST, APPEAL LATER'
AND ITS APPLICATION
35.The principle that a judicial or quasi-judicial order must be
obeyed and complied with, unless and until it is stayed,
modified, or set aside by a competent authority, is a
foundational pillar of the rule of law. The Hon'ble Supreme
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Court, in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal
Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 , reiterated that the
mere filing of an appeal or an application does not, by itself,
operate as a stay of the impugned order. The Supreme Court,
in Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan (supra), has applied this
principle with particular force in the context of release orders,
observing: 'Once the detenue has been ordered to be
released, the same has to be followed no matter what. The
only scenario in which it would not be so done was if a
superior Court has granted stay in the matter.'
36.In Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7
SCC 689, the Supreme Court held: 'We are of the considered
opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent court,
it has to be obeyed and implemented without any
reservation. If an order passed by a court of law is not
complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of the rule of
law.' In Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand,
(2004) 7 SCC 261, the Court articulated the same principle
with admirable directness: 'Right or wrong, the order has to
be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the
party liable for contempt.'
37.The application of this principle to the facts at hand is
straightforward. The Additional Divisional Commissioner,
Ajmer, is the hierarchical superior of the Tehsildar. The order
of the Additional Divisional Commissioner dated 15.04.2026
was a valid, subsisting, and operative judicial order within the
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revenue hierarchy. Respondent No. 4, as the subordinate
authority charged with the execution of the sentence, was
bound to give effect to that order the moment it was brought
to his notice. There was no stay of that order granted by any
superior authority. There was no challenge pending before
any higher court that could have provided even a colourable
justification for non-compliance. The order was clear,
unambiguous, and mandatory in its terms. The failure of
respondent No. 4 to act upon it was a dereliction of duty of
the gravest kind.
VI. COMPENSATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE AND ITS MEASURE
38.Having established that the detention of Shri Ghamandnath
from and after 15.04.2026 was wholly illegal and from at
least 01.06.2026, provably and indisputably illegal on the
Tehsildar's own admitted case this Court now turns to the
question of compensation. The award of compensation for
violation of fundamental rights through writ jurisdiction is not
an act of charity by the Court. It is a constitutional mandate.
It is the natural and necessary consequence of the supremacy
of fundamental rights. It is the only effective means by which
a Constitutional Court can give meaning and content to the
guarantee of personal liberty where that guarantee has been
violated.
Mere declaration of detention as illegal, without anything
further, would in many cases reduce the constitutional
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remedy to a hollow formality. A judicial pronouncement
recording the infringement of liberty undoubtedly vindicates
the rule of law, but it does little to alleviate the actual injury
suffered by the victim of unlawful confinement. The detenue
has already endured the deprivation; the lost days cannot be
restored by judicial words alone. Constitutional courts,
therefore, cannot stop at a bare declaration when the
violation is established. Compensation serves as the tangible
acknowledgment by the legal system that a grave wrong has
been committed and that the State must assume
responsibility for its consequences. It is often the only
practical means by which some measure of solace, dignity,
and restorative justice can be afforded to a citizen whose
fundamental right to personal liberty has been unlawfully
curtailed. To merely record that the detention was illegal and
then leave the injured citizen remediless would be to
recognize the violation while denying an effective remedy, a
course wholly incompatible with the constitutional promise
embodied in Article 21 and the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
39.The jurisprudence of compensatory public law remedy was
inaugurated in India by the landmark judgment in Rudul Sah
v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 , in which the Hon’ble
Supreme Court awarded Rs. 35,000/- as compensation for
detention of fourteen years beyond the release order. In
Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC
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82, compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- each was awarded to the
wives of two persons who were taken into custody and never
returned. In Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC
677, the Hon’ble Supreme Court awarded Rs. 50,000/- to a
sitting legislator who was wrongfully arrested and detained,
with O. Chinappa Reddy, J., holding: 'When a person comes
to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and
imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his
constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or
malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished
away by his being set free.' In Nilabati Behera v. State of
Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as he then
was) articulated the theoretical foundation of this remedy
with crystalline clarity, holding that compensation under
public law is 'in the nature of exemplary damages awarded
against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty'
and is 'independent of the rights available to the aggrieved
party to claim compensation under the private law.'
40.In the most recent pronouncement on this question, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daudayal v. State of
Rajasthan, 2026 INSC 599 (decided 29.05.2026),
awarded compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven
Lakhs) for twenty-four days of illegal detention suffered by a
convict who had been ordered to be released on parole but
was not released despite having fulfilled all conditions. The
Court held that 'the liberty of an individual is not a trivial
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matter. The State cannot continue curtailing the same in the
face of a court order, on account of its slow bureaucratic
processes of taking decisions whether to file appeals in a
particular matter or not.' The Court further observed that
'just because a person had been convicted does not mean
that his rights weigh less on the scales of justice.'
41.In Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 11244/2025),
compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- was awarded by the
Supreme Court where a convict had completed his full
sentence yet continued to be detained. In S. Nambi
Narayanan v. Siby Mathews, (2018) 10 SCC 804 , the
Supreme Court awarded Rs. 50,00,000/- as compensation to
a scientist whose fundamental rights were grossly violated
through malicious prosecution and wrongful arrest.
Before proceeding to determine the question of
compensation, this Court considers it necessary to record that
respondent No. 4 was afforded full and adequate opportunity
to address this issue. In the earlier proceedings and orders
passed by this Court, the respondent was specifically put to
notice that the question of grant of compensation on account
of the alleged illegal detention was under active consideration
and that he should explain as to why compensation ought not
to be awarded to the detenue for the violation of his
fundamental rights. The principles of natural justice thus
stood fully satisfied. Despite being granted such opportunity,
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respondent No. 4 has failed to furnish any satisfactory
explanation capable of justifying either the continued
detention of the detenue after acquiring knowledge of the
suspension order or the denial of compensatory relief. The
response submitted by him neither dispels the constitutional
injury suffered by the detenue nor provides any legally
sustainable ground for withholding compensation. This Court
is therefore left with no reason to decline the grant of
compensation and no justification has been shown as to why
the ordinary public law consequence of a proven violation of
personal liberty should not follow.
42.The question before this Court is: what is the appropriate
measure of compensation in the present case? In addressing
this question, this Court is guided by the following
considerations. First, the duration of illegal detention: the
detenue was unlawfully confined for approximately 53 days
after the suspension order was passed. Even on the
Tehsildar's own case, the detention was illegal for at least
seven days from 01.06.2026 to 08.06.2026 a period during
which there is no doubt whatsoever that the Tehsildar had
actual knowledge of the suspension order yet chose to do
nothing. Second, the nature of the detenue's vulnerability:
Shri Ghamandnath is a person living with HIV, whose
prolonged detention deprived him of necessary medical care,
with potentially serious and irreversible consequences for his
health. The State had a heightened duty of care towards a
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person of his medical condition. Third, the impact upon the
detenue's family: the petitioner, herself battling cancer, was
deprived of the care and support of her husband and
compelled to exhaust her limited resources in repeated visits
to authorities, engagement of counsel, and ultimately in filing
a habeas corpus petition. The injury to the family as a whole
is immeasurable. Fourth, the gravity of the official
misconduct: the conduct of respondent No. 4 was not merely
negligent. It was wilful, deliberate, and contumacious. An
officer who continues to confine a person in the face of a valid
suspension order, repeated personal requests for release,
institution of a writ petition in the High Court, and his own
admitted knowledge of the order, cannot be heard to say that
his misconduct was innocent or accidental. The element of
wilfulness elevates the gravity of the wrong and must be
reflected in the quantum of compensation.
43.The injury suffered by a person deprived of liberty is not
measurable in mathematical terms. The law has long
recognised this difficulty. In Bhim Singh (supra), the Hon’ble
Court observed that compensation must be 'suitable.' The
standard is not one of full restitution for the liberty that was
stolen cannot be restored , but of meaningful
acknowledgment of the constitutional wrong, meaningful
deterrence for future misconduct, and meaningful relief to the
victim. The Latin maxim 'restitutio in integrum' restoration to
the original position , cannot be achieved where the harm is
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the deprivation of something as precious and irreplaceable as
fifty-three days of a sick man's freedom. But the principle
underlying that maxim demands that the Court do all that
can be done to make whole, so far as money can make
whole, the person who has suffered.
44.This Court is firmly of the view that in cases of wilful and
deliberate illegal detention particularly where the detenue is a
person of no means, suffering from serious illness, and where
the detention was in brazen defiance of a superior order the
question of whether a portion of the compensation should be
recovered from the erring officer personally is a question that
must be answered in the affirmative. Public law compensation
under Article 226 is ordinarily payable by the State, which
may then have recourse against the erring official. However,
this Court, in appropriate cases, has the power to and should
direct that a portion of the compensation be borne personally
by the offending functionary, both as a measure of
accountability and as a deterrent. The purpose of public law
compensation would be subverted if the entire financial
burden were always absorbed by the State i.e., by the
taxpayer while the officer whose wilful misconduct caused
the violation walks away without personal consequence. In
Rudul Sah (supra), the Supreme Court itself noted that 'the
State may have recourse against those officers.' The time has
come for this Court to give operational content to that
observation.
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45.Having regard to all the circumstances the duration of illegal
detention, the medical vulnerability of the detenue, the
suffering of the petitioner family, the wilfulness of respondent
No. 4's conduct, and the imperative of deterrence this Court
is of the view that adequate compensation must be awarded.
The loss suffered by Shri Ghamandnath and his family is, in
its truest sense, immeasurable and incalculable. No sum of
money can restore fifty-three days of liberty stolen from a
sick and helpless man by the obstinacy of an officer of the
State. Yet the obligation of this Court to provide meaningful
relief is clear, and a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two
Lakhs) is hereby determined as the measure of compensation
payable to the petitioner, to be deposited within forty-five
days.
While determining the quantum of compensation, this Court
has also remained conscious of the fact that the amount
directed to be paid personally by respondent No. 4 must be
proportionate not only to the gravity of the constitutional
wrong but also to the financial realities of the officer
concerned. The object of the present order is not to impose a
punitive or confiscatory burden so excessive as to be
impossible of compliance, but to ensure meaningful
accountability for the violation committed. The compensation
awarded must be substantial enough to serve as a genuine
deterrent and a reminder of the sanctity of personal liberty,
yet not so exorbitant as to become oppressive, unrealistic, or
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incapable of being discharged by the officer from his lawful
means. Bearing in mind the nature of the post held by
respondent No. 4, his emoluments and social standing as a
serving Tehsildar, and the requirement that the compensation
remain both meaningful and enforceable, this Court is
satisfied that the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs)
strikes an appropriate balance between deterrence,
accountability, and fairness.
VII. ACCOUNTABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
46.This Court is cognizant that the present case is not merely
about one individual's suffering, grievous as that suffering
has been. It is about a pattern of executive impunity that, if
left unremarked and unremedied, will become entrenched.
Every time a public functionary defies a judicial order and
escapes without consequence, the authority of the court
diminishes. Every time the State shields an erring officer from
personal accountability, the officer learns that the power of
the State is his shield and the fundamental rights of citizens
are his plaything. This Court cannot, and will not, be a
passive witness to such a subversion of the constitutional
order.
47.The conduct of respondent No. 4 throughout these
proceedings has been characterised by an extraordinary and
wholly unprecedented degree of obstinacy. This Court has, in
its collective judicial experience, encountered officers who
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[2026:RJ-JD:27065-DB] [HC-282/2026]
made mistakes, officers who were negligent, officers who
were slow to act. But this Court has rarely, if ever,
encountered an officer who, in possession of actual
knowledge of a validly passed order of his own appellate
superior suspending the sentence he had awarded, in the
face of repeated personal representations from the detenue's
wife, in the face of the institution of a writ petition in the High
Court, and in the face of notice from this Court, continued to
keep a sick and helpless individual in illegal confinement and
then appeared before this Court to argue that he did not
know. An officer of this character is not merely a liability to
the revenue administration. He is a threat to civil society. He
is a threat to the constitutional order. He is a threat to the
very idea that government is accountable to the governed.
48.There is a further and graver dimension to the present case.
The Tehsildar, by his conduct in these proceedings, has
demonstrated a mindset of impunity that this Court cannot
ignore. An officer who is capable of such brazen defiance of
his superiors' orders is an officer who, if left unchecked in his
field posting, may be capable of causing incalculable mischief
with the official documents, registers, revenue records, and
correspondence that fall within the domain of his office. This
Court cannot permit such an officer to continue in a position
where he has access to, and authority over, sensitive revenue
records and proceedings.
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The concern is not merely speculative. A Tehsildar is the
highest executive and revenue authority within the tehsil
establishment and exercises administrative, supervisory, and
disciplinary control over the employees posted in the Tehsil
office. The clerical staff, record keepers, assistants, and other
ministerial employees through whom official files, records,
and correspondence are processed function under his
authority and direction. In such circumstances, it would be
unrealistic to assume that respondent No. 4 would be
incapable of exercising influence over the subordinate staff
attached to his office. The possibility of direct or indirect
influence upon employees who may possess knowledge of
relevant facts, handle official records, or otherwise be
connected with the subject matter of the proposed inquiry is
both real and inevitable. Permitting respondent No. 4 to
continue in the same establishment would therefore carry a
substantial risk of compromising the fairness, independence,
and credibility of the inquiry process.
49.It is also to be noted that the presumptions outlined earlier
in this order namely, the communication of the appellate
order to the Tehsildar through official channels, the personal
presentation of the suspension order by the petitioner, and
the imputation of constructive knowledge from the notice
issued by the coordinate bench are disputed by respondent
No. 4. These are questions of fact that require a proper
disciplinary inquiry. This Court directs that such an inquiry be
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[2026:RJ-JD:27065-DB] [HC-282/2026]
conducted by the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue,
Government of Rajasthan, who shall depute a responsible
senior officer to carry out the inquiry and shall constitute an
appropriate mechanism for fact-finding in accordance with
the applicable service rules." If, upon inquiry, any or all of
these facts are found to be established, respondent No. 4
shall be held accountable and punished in accordance with
law. The finding of guilt, if any, shall be treated as an
aggravating circumstance warranting the most stringent
disciplinary penalty available.
VIII. DIRECTIONS
50.In view of the foregoing observations and findings, this Court
issues the following directions:
(i) It is hereby declared that the continued detention of Shri
Ghamandnath after 01.06.2026 was illegal, unconstitutional,
and violative of his fundamental right to personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Insofar as the period commencing from 01.06.2026 until his
eventual release is concerned, the illegality of the detention
stands established on the admitted case of respondent No. 4
himself, who acknowledges having acquired knowledge of the
order dated 15.04.2026 suspending the sentence. As regards
the period preceding 01.06.2026 and subsequent to the
passing of the suspension order dated 15.04.2026, the precise
commencement and extent of the illegal detention shall be
subject to and dependent upon the findings recorded in the
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[2026:RJ-JD:27065-DB] [HC-282/2026]
departmental inquiry directed by this Court. In the event the
inquiry establishes that respondent No. 4 or his office had
actual or constructive knowledge of the suspension order at
any earlier point of time, the period of illegal detention shall
stand correspondingly extended from such date, and
respondent No. 4 shall be liable for all legal and disciplinary
consequences flowing therefrom.
(ii) This Court directs the concerned Tehsildar, who is
responsible for the unlawful detention of the detenue Shri
Ghamandnath, to pay compensation of ₹2,00,000/- (Rupees
Two Lakhs Only) personally from his own income or property,
to the detenue Shri Ghamandnath, who has since been
released from detention, within a period of forty-five (45) days
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The said
amount shall be deposited directly into the bank account of
Shri Ghamandnath, details of which shall be furnished by the
learned counsel for the petitioner to the concerned Tehsildar
within seven (7) days from the date of this order.
The compensation shall be borne and paid personally by the
Tehsildar concerned, and under no circumstances shall the
State of Rajasthan or any Government Department bear,
reimburse, or facilitate the payment of this amount on his
behalf. The Revenue Department is further specifically directed
not to provide any financial assistance or deposit any amount
on behalf of the erring Tehsildar in satisfaction of this order, as
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the liability arising from his unlawful actions is strictly and
exclusively personal in nature.
Proof of compliance, including documentary evidence/receipt
of the amount deposited into the bank account of the detenue
Shri Ghamandnath, shall be duly submitted before this Court
through appropriate application.
(iii) The Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue, Government of
Rajasthan, is hereby directed to forthwith initiate a detailed
and time-bound departmental inquiry, by deputing a
responsible senior officer, against respondent No. 4 — Shri
Tejpal Pareek, Tehsildar for his conduct in the present matter,
including but not limited to:
(a) whether and when official intimation of the order of the
Additional Divisional Commissioner dated 15.04.2026 was
received by the Tehsil office;
(b) whether the petitioner personally and through her counsel
had presented a certified copy of the suspension order to
respondent No. 4 or his office; (c) whether respondent No. 4
had constructive or actual knowledge of the suspension order
prior to 01.06.2026; and (d) whether his failure to release the
detenue upon acquiring admitted knowledge on 01.06.2026
constitutes wilful disobedience of a superior order, misconduct,
and violation of service rules.
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The inquiry shall be completed within ninety (90) days from
the date of this order and a compliance report shall be placed
before this Court.
(iv) Pending conclusion of the aforesaid inquiry and as an
interim measure, respondent No. 4 shall forthwith be relieved
of his field posting as Tehsildar, Deh, District Nagaur. He shall
not be permitted to enter the premises of the Tehsil office,
Deh, until further orders. He shall have no access to, and shall
be strictly prohibited from touching, handling, or interfering in
any manner with, any document, register, record, file,
correspondence, or proceeding pertaining to or maintained in
the Tehsil office, Deh, or any office within District Nagaur.
This direction is considered necessary having regard to the
nature of the office held by respondent No.4. Being the
Tehsildar, he exercises administrative and supervisory control
over the Tehsil establishment and its records. His continued
presence in, or access to, the office may reasonably give rise
to apprehensions of influence upon official records,
correspondence, or personnel connected with the proposed
inquiry. To ensure that the inquiry remains fair, independent
and free from any perception of interference, respondent No.4
shall remain completely disengaged from the functioning of the
Tehsil office, Deh, till conclusion of the inquiry.
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(v) The Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue, shall take
respondent No. 4 on attachment at the Revenue Headquarter
in terms suitable to the ACS Revenue in the interest of
administration and in accordance with applicable service rules,
pending the conclusion of the inquiry. It is directed that
respondent No. 4 shall not, during the period of inquiry, be
assigned any field or quasi-judicial role involving the exercise
of authority over any individual.
51. In view of the foregoing discussion, findings, and directions,
this Court is satisfied that the continued detention of the
detenue after suspension of his sentence was wholly
unjustified and constituted a grave infringement of his
fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. The matter has necessitated
judicial intervention not merely to redress an individual wrong
but also to preserve public confidence in the rule of law and
the accountability of public authorities. Accordingly, subject to
the directions contained hereinabove, including those relating
to departmental inquiry and consequential action against
respondent No. 4, the present petition stands disposed of. All
pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of
(SUNIL BENIWAL ,VJ (FARJAND ALI),VJ
40-Mamta/-
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