Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal vs State Of U.P.

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 22566 of 2026
Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Suneel Kumar
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 66
HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH DESHWAL, J.
1. Heard Mr. Suneel Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant, Ms.
Mayuri Mehrotra, learned State Law Officer for the State, Mr. Rakesh
Kumar Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
2. The instant bail application has been filed with a prayer to release the
applicant on bail during the trial in Case Crime No.24 of 2026, under
Sections 85, 80(2) of BNS and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
Police Station-Madhautanda, District-Pilibhit.
3. This matter was heard on 06.07.2026, on that date, counsel for the
applicant submitted that the deceased was his second wife as the
marriage was performed with the deceased during subsistence of earlier
marriage and his first wife was also alive, therefore, second marriage
was void, therefore, the applicant will not come in the definition of
husband, therefore, definition of Section 80 of BNS as well as

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presumption of Section 118 of the BSA are not attracted against the
applicant, therefore, the applicant is entitled to be released on bail.
4. Considering the above submission, a preliminary legal issue was
framed whether a person who performed a second marriage during the
lifetime of the first wife would come within the definition of husband for
the purpose of Section 80 BNS as well as Section 118 of BSA. On that
date, considering the legal issue, this Court directed Mr. Rakesh Kumar
Mishra, learned A.G.A. as well as Ms. Mayuri Mehrotra, learned State
Law Officer to prepare the case and address the Court on the issue on the
next date.
5. Today, Ms. Mayuri Mehrotra, learned State Law Officer submitted
that this issue was considered by Karnataka High Court in Criminal
Application under Section 528 No.8134 of 2024 (Dr. Lokesh B H vs.
State of Karnataka), wherein the Court after framing the specific issue
whether an offence under Section 498-A could be committed only a
valid marriage, relationship or could it be committed or void or voidable
marriage or relationship in the nature of marriage like live in
relationship.
6. The Hon'ble Single Bench of the Karnataka High Court, after
considering the issue, observed that the expression of husband under
Section 498-A cannot formed again in a legal marriage to extent to enter
into a marital relationship, which is void for voidable as also to live in
relationship, which bears the attributes of marriage so long as essential
ingredients of cruelty as defined in section are satisfactory. This
judgment of the Karnataka High Court was challenged before the Apex
Court through SPL Criminal No. 2240-2241 of 2026. The Apex Court,
by order dated 13.02.2026, stayed the order of the Karnataka High
Court; the matter was heard on 28.05.2026, and judgment was reserved.
7. Ms. Mehrotra further relied upon the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in 482 No.27734 of 2024, wherein the court observed that
the husband who performed a second marriage during the lifetime of his

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first wife will also come within the definition of husband for the purpose
of Section 498-A. In this judgment, the co-ordinate bench of this Court
also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of  Reema
Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (2004) 3 SCC 199 .
8. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mishra, learned A.G.A., also submitted that two
husbands have not been defined in statute; however, domestic
relationship has been defined under Section 2(f) of the Prevention of
women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (hereinafter will be referred as
Domestic violence Act) and as per the definition, even if a person male
or female has been residing in share household and related by marriage
or through relationship in the nature of marriage. This shows that even if
two persons are living together in a void marital relationship, they will
be treated as husband and wife for the purpose of Section 80 BSA 2023.
They will be treated as husband and wife. Section 2(f) of the Domestic
Violence Act is quoted as under:
"domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who
live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household,
when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family".
9. After considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties,
the legal question which has to be decided is:
Whether any person who performed a second marriage during the
lifetime of his first wife would come within the definition of
"husband" for the purpose of Sections 80 and 85 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 with regard to the second wife?
10. To decide the aforesaid issue, it would be appropriate to quote
Section 80 of the BNS. Section 80 of the BNS is being quoted as under:
"Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death

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shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death."
11. From the perusal of Section 80 of the BNS, it is clear that the cruelty
or harassment by the husband to the woman should be for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry . Likewise, Section 85 of the
BNS also contemplates cruelty by the husband or his relatives. The word
"dowry" has been defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. As per Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, "dowry"
means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given by
one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the
parents of either the bride or the bridegroom or by any other person to
either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any
time after the marriage, in connection with the marriage of the said
parties , except dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 is being quoted as under:
"In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to
either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before 1[or any time after the marriage] 2[in connection with the
marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the
case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
12. From the perusal of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, it
is clear that dowry means any property or valuable security which is
related to or given in connection with the marriage of the said parties.
Therefore, if any demand is made by one party from the other party
which is not related to or in connection with the marriage of the said
parties, the same will not come within the ambit of dowry.
13. Section 85 of the BNS provides punishment where a woman is
subjected to cruelty by her husband or the relatives of her husband. The
word " cruelty " has been defined in the Explanation to Section 85 of the

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BNS, which includes any wilful conduct of the husband or his relative
which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to the life, limb or physical or
mental health of the woman, even though there is no unlawful demand.
14. Apart from this, harassment of a woman with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security, or on account of failure by the woman or
her relative to meet such demand, also amounts to cruelty. Such unlawful
demand of property or valuable security is not necessarily with regard to
dowry. Therefore, cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband may
be an offence under Section 85 of the BNS even though the same is not
with regard to dowry, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Aluri
Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao , SLP (Crl.) No. 9243 of
2024 / Criminal Appeal No. 5239 of 2024, decided on 12.12.2024.
15. Therefore, the question arises whether a person who performed a
second marriage during the lifetime of his first wife with a woman
having knowledge of and consenting to the subsistence of the first
marriage would come within the ambit of the expression “husband”
for the purpose of Sections 80 and 85 of the BNS.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam
and others (2004) 3 SCC 199 considered all these issues and observed
that while interpreting the word "husband" mentioned under Sections
498A and 304B I.P.C miship rule on handerson's case can be pressed into
service with a view to press the miship which would suppress literal rule
being allowed to cover the field and further observed that it would be
appropriate to construe the expression "husband" to cover a husband
who enter into marital relationship under the colour of such proclaimed
status of husband, such the women concerned but cruelty or coarse her in
any manner for any of the purpose enumerated under Section
304B/498B  I.P.C., irrespective of legitimacy of the marriage itself for

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limited purpose of Section 498A and 304B I.P.C. Paragraph 18 of
Reema Agarwal (supra) is being quoted as under:
"18. The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a marriage and
the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. If the
legality of the marriage itself is an issue further legalistic problems do
arise. If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the
demand of dowry in respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not
recognizable. Even then the purpose for which Sections 498A and 304B-
IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the
'Evidence Act') were introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations
enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant
in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively
requires to be interpreted with certain element of realism too and not
merely pedantically or hyper technically. The obvious objective was to
prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship
with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. Can
a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a
shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid
marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties
would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic
approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of
money. The nomenclature 'dowry' does not have any magic charm written
over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital
relationship. The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only
the husband but also his relations who are covered by Section 498A.
Legislature has taken care of children born from invalid marriages.
Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with legitimacy of children of void
and voidable marriages. Can it be said that legislature which was
conscious of the social stigma attached to children of void and voidable
marriages closed eyes to plight of a woman who unknowingly or
unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital
relationship. If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the
legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown
by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of
money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has
also some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply
to "any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been
declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction". It would be
appropriate to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a person who
enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed
or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or
coerce her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the
relevant provisions  Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of
the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B
IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive
construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence
of a definition of 'husband' to specifically include such persons who
contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the

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purported exercise of his role and status as 'husband' is no ground to
exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC, viewed in
the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing
those provisions."
17. This issue was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivcharan
Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2007) 15 SCC
369 , wherein a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges observed that where the
marriage itself is null and void, the prosecution under Section 498-A IPC
against the husband is not maintainable at the instance of the alleged
wife in respect of cruelty meted out to her. Paragraph 2 of Shivcharan
Lal Verma (supra) is being quoted as under:
"2. This matter had not been taken up for hearing for this length of time
as the judgment of this Court holding Section 306 IPC to be
unconstitutional was under reconsideration by the Constitution Bench.
The Constitution Bench [Ed.: Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2
SCC 648: 1996 SCC (Cri) 374] finally disposed of the matter in Criminal
Appeal No. 274 of 1984 and batch and set aside the earlier judgment
[Ed.: P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 394: 1994 SCC (Cri)
740] of this Court and held that Section 306 is constitutionally valid. In
view of the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision two questions arise for
consideration in this appeal. One, whether the prosecution under Section
498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with Mohini itself was
null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of
Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction under Section 306 could at all
be sustained in the absence of any positive material to hold that Mohini
committed suicide because of any positive act on the part of either Shiv
Charan or Kalindi. There may be considerable force in the argument of
Mr Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far as conviction
under Section 498-A is concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage
with Mohini during the subsistence of a valid marriage with Kalindi is
null and void. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under
Section 498-A IPC. But so far as the conviction under Section 306 is
concerned, the evidence of the three witnesses already referred to, makes
it absolutely clear that it is on account of torture by both Kalindi and
Shiv Charan that Mohini committed suicide inside the house of Shiv
Charan in another room. The learned Sessions Judge as well as the High
Court have appreciated the evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses and
on going through the evidence of these three witnesses, we do not find
any error committed by the courts below either in the matter of
appreciation or in their approach relating to the evidence in question.
We, therefore, do not find any infirmity with the conviction of the
appellants under Section 306 IPC. So far as the sentence is concerned,
they have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven
years but having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we

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reduce the sentence to five years. This appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Bail bonds of the appellants would stand cancelled and they must
surrender to undergo the remaining period of sentence."
18. The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in P. Sivakumar v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1737 , and the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that where the second marriage is void, the alleged
husband of such second marriage cannot be convicted under Section
498-A IPC (corresponding to Section 85 of the BNS). Paragraph 7 of P.
Sivakumar (supra) is being quoted as under:
"7. Undisputedly, the marriage between the appellant No. 1 and PW-1
has been found to be null and void. As such the conviction under Section
498-A IPC would not be sustainable in view of the judgment of this Court
in the case Shivcharan Lal Verma's case supra. So far as the conviction
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the
learned trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after
appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In an appeal/revision, the High
court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as
recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible."
19. This issue was also considered by the Allahabad High Court in the
case of Akhilesh Kesari and 3 others v. State of U.P. and another in
Application u/s 482 No.38288 of 2023 dated 28.03.2024, wherein the
Court observed that for interpreting the word "husband" enshrined under
Section 498A, strict interpretation is required being a penal provision,
therefore, proceedings under Section 498A I.P.C. will not be
maintainable against an alleged husband of marriage which is itself void.
Paragraph 10 of Akhilesh Kesari (supra) is being quoted as under:
"10. From the perusal of the judgments mentioned above of the Apex
Court, it is clear that strict interpretation is required when interpreting
the word husband in Section 498-A I.P.C. as the I.P.C. is a penal
provision, not beneficial legislation where the liberal interpretation is
permissible. Therefore, this Court holds that proceeding under Section
498-A I.P.C. by the opposite party no. 2, who is not the legally wedded
wife of applicant no. 1, is not maintainable against applicants."
20. This issue was again considered by a single Bench of this Court in
Application u/s 482 No.27734 of 2024, (Adarsh Yadav v. State of U.P.
& another), decided on 20.09.2024 , wherein the court took contrary

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BAIL No. - 22566 of 2026
view to the judgement of Akhilesh Kesari (supra) and it was observed
that to attract the provision of Sections 304B and 498B I.P.C., it is
sufficient to show that the victim women and accused husband were
residing as a husband and wife at the relevant point of time. As the
validity of the marriage cannot be decided in criminal proceedings.
Paragraph 8 of Adarsh Yadav (supra) is being quoted as under:
"8. Following the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High
Court in case of Mohitram vs. State of Chhattisgarh
2004(3)MPHT22(CG) has held that the intention of legislature behind
inserting the provisions of Section - 304-B I.P.C. was that husband and
his relatives, who are responsible for the dowry death of a woman should
be brought into mischief of dowry death whether the marriage in
question was valid or not. It was observed that in order to attract
provisions of Section - 304-B and 498-A of I.P.C., it is sufficient to show
that victim woman and accused husband were residing as husband and
wife at the relevant point of time. In the instant case, for the sake of
arguments even if it is assumed that the deceased does not fall within the
ambit of legally wedded wife, there is ample evidence on record that
applicant and deceased were residing together as husband and wife at
the relevant point of time."  
21. A single Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Dr.
Lokesh B H and others v. State of Karnatka (2025) SCC Online
21706 , a view was taken that the expression "husband" under Section
498A I.P.C. is not confined to a man to in a legally valid marriage, but
explains to one who enters into a marital relationship which is void or
voidable, as also to a live-in-relationship which bears the attributes of
marriage. However, this judgment was challenged before the Apex Court
in S.L.P. No.2240-2241 of 2026, in which judgment was reserved on
20.05.2026 and further proceedings pending before the District Court
were stayed.  
22. From the above mentioned judgments, it is clear that though in the
 year 2024, the Hon. Apex Court in the case of Reema Aggarwal
(supra) observed that  Section 498A  and Section 304B I.P.C. (Sections
85 and 80 of BNS) were enacted with policy and curved an evil rampant
among people of the society, therefore, these provisions have to be
construed liberally considering the object of the legislature as per

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handerson's case, therefore, the word "husband" should not be strictly
construed but it should be interpreted in such a manner even a person
having living spouse started living with another women or contract
marriage with  with a women ostensibly cohabited with such women
would fall within the category of husband for the purpose of Section
304B and 498A I.P.C. However, the three-judge bench of the Apex Court
in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) (2007) took a view that
the second marriage is void; therefore, the person living with a woman in
a second marriage will not come within the premises of husband for the
purpose of Section 304B and 498A I.P.C. This three-judge bench
judgment was again relied on by the Hon. Apex Court in P. Shivakumar
v. State, 2023 (supra) , wherein it was observed that even if a marriage
is null and void, then the alleged husband cannot be convicted under
Section 498A I.P.C.
23. This Court is of the view that though there was a detailed reasoning
in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra) for including the alleged
husband of void marriage for the purpose of Section 498A/ 304B I.P.C.
but subsequent judgement of larger bench in the case of Shivcharan Lal
Verma (supra) took a different view, therefore, that must prevail and the
same was again reiterated in the year 2023 by the Apex Court in the case
of P. Shivakumar v. State, 2023 (supra) .
24. The word "husband" has not been defined in any statute, but as per
the Black Law Dictionary, the word "husband" means a married man
who has a lawful spouse living; therefore, a person who does not have a
lawful spouse living in the marriage in question will not be included in
the category of husband.
25. The Hon. Apex Court has already observed in the case of M/s. Balaji
Traders v. State of U.P. & Anr., SLP (Crl.) No.3159 of 2025 that there
is a scope of the provision which is penal in nature and that cannot be
extended by reading into words which are not there; therefore, it has to

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BAIL No. - 22566 of 2026
be strictly interpreted. Para 24 of the M/s. Balaji Traders (supra) is
being quoted as under:
"24. The scope of the provision cannot be extended by reading into it
words which are not there. Section 387IPC, being a penal provision, has
to be strictly interpreted, and no condition/essential ingredient can be
read into it that the statute/section does not prescribe. Since there is no
ambiguity in the ingredients of Section 387IPC, the observations of
Tolaram Relumal [Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1954) 1 SCC
961] as contended by the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 2
would not come to his rescue."
26.  It is also settled law that if there are two views possible, then the
Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject
from penalty when one imposes a penalty.  This issue was considered by
the Apex Court in the case of Tolaram Relumal and another v. State of
Bombay (1954) 1 SCC 961 . Para 8 of the Tolaram Relumal (supra) is
being quoted as under:
"The question that needs our determination in such a situation is whether
Section 18(1) makes punishable receipt of money at a moment of time
when the lease had not come into existence, and when there was a
possibility that the contemplated lease might never come into existence.
It may be here observed that the provisions of Section 18(1) are penal in
nature and it is a well settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if
two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal
provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts
the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It if;
not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used
by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature.
As pointed out by Lord Macmillan in London and North Eastern Railway
Co. v. Berriman:
"where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to
stretch the language of a rule, however beneficent its intention, beyond
the fair and ordinary meaning of its language."  
27. The Hon. Apex Court in the case of M. Ravindran v. Intelligence
Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 again
observed that when there appears to be ambiguity in the construction of
a penalty, then the court must interpret towards protecting the rights of
an accused. Paragraph 17.9 of M. Ravindran (supra) is being quoted as
under:

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BAIL No. - 22566 of 2026
"17.9. Additionally, it is well-settled that in case of any ambiguity in the
construction of a penal statute, the courts must favour the interpretation
which leans towards protecting the rights of the accused, given the
ubiquitous power disparity between the individual accused and the State
machinery. This is applicable not only in the case of substantive penal
statutes but also in the case of procedures providing for the curtailment
of the liberty of the accused."
28.  In view of the above analysis, it is clear that the presumption of
dowry death in case of unnatural death within seven years of marriage as
per Section 80 B.N.S. (Section 304B I.P.C.) read with Section 118 of
B.S.A. should be interpreted strictly in such a manner which favours to
an accused, therefore, this Court is of the view that the word "husband"
in section 80 BNS as well as Section 85 B.N.S.  will cover person only
when he is legally married to a women, not the person whose marriage is
itself void with a women. This view is also in consonance with a view
taken by a three-judge bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) . However, this Court further observes
that in case there is a doubt about the first marriage, then  a person living
as "husband" in an alleged second marriage will be covered in the
definition of husband for the purpose of  section 80 and 85 BNS,
because it is not possible in criminal proceedings to determine the  issue
of validity of marriage. Similarly when a person performed second
marriage to a woman without disclosing his validly married living
spouse and continued to live with his second wife as her husband and
second wife is also not aware about this fact till commission of this
offence, in that case also he will be deemed as husband for the purpose
of section 80 and 85 of BSA as he can not be allowed to take advantage
of his wrong.
29. However, it is mentioned here that this second marriage is void if
same is performed during subsistence of first marriage as per following
laws:
(i) Special Marriage Act, 1954;
(ii) Foreign Marriage Act, 1969;

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(iii) Christian Marriage Act, 1872;
(iv) Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936;
(v) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
30. Therefore, if the first marriage is performed under any of the above
mentioned acts, then the second marriage would be void. However, in
the case of Muslim, if the marriage is performed as per Sharia law,
second, third and fourth marriage shall also be valid and in such cases if
a Muslim person is living as a husband whether with second, third or
fourth wife would also cover under the definition of husband for the
purposes of Section 80 and 85 BNS.
(Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.)
July 22, 2026
CS/-
.
.
.
After delivery of the judgment on preliminary legal issue this court
further proceeds to decide this bail on merit.
1. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that it is admitted to the
first informant that the marriage of the applicant with the deceased was
the second marriage of the applicant, solemnized during the subsistence
of his first marriage, and his first wife was alive and residing with them.
Therefore, as the marriage itself was void and the issue has already been
decided in the first part of this judgment, the applicant would not come
within the definition of "husband", and consequently, the provisions of
Sections 80 and 85 of BNS cannot be invoked against him. It is further
submitted that deceased committed suicide by consuming poison and no
specific allegation has been made against the applicant. Therefore, the
applicant is entitled to be released on bail. It is further submitted that the
applicant has no criminal history. It is also submitted that the charge
sheet has already been filed in the present case; therefore, no custodial
interrogation of the applicant is required. The applicant is a law-abiding

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BAIL No. - 22566 of 2026
citizen and has been languishing in jail since 28.01.2026. In case he is
granted bail, he will not misuse the liberty of bail and shall cooperate in
the trial proceedings.
2. Per contra, learned State Law Officer for the State has vehemently
opposed the prayer for bail but could not dispute the aforesaid facts.
3. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case,
submissions of learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the
nature of offence, evidence, complicity of the accused and taking into
account overcrowded jails and heavy pendency of criminal cases before
the trial courts as well as considering the mandate of the judgement of
the Apex Court in the case of Kapil Wadhawan vs Central Bureau of
Investigation reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3038 as well as
guideline of this Court in the case of Maya Tiwari Vs. State of U.P., 2024
SCC Online All 6765 regarding grant of bail and without expressing any
opinion on the merits of the case, I am of the opinion that the applicant is
entitled to be enlarged on bail. Accordingly, the present application is
allowed.
4. Let the applicant- Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal, involved in
the aforementioned crime be released on bail, on his furnishing a
personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount, to the
satisfaction of the court concerned, with the following conditions:-
i. The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement,
threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so
as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any
police officer or tamper with the evidence.
ii. The applicant shall cooperate in the trial/investigation sincerely
without seeking any adjournment.
iii. The applicant shall not indulge in any criminal activity or
commission of any crime after being released on bail.

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BAIL No. - 22566 of 2026
iv. The applicant shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the
bond executed by him.
5. In case of breach of any of the above conditions, it shall be a ground
for cancellation of bail.
6. Identity, status and residence proof of the applicant and sureties be
verified by the court concerned before the bonds are accepted.
7. Verification of mobile number and Aadhaar card of the applicant as
well as sureties should be verified by the court concerned.
8. It is made clear that the applicant shall be released on the basis of
computer generated copy of this order, downloaded from the official
website of High Court Allahabad and verified by the concerned counsel
with the undertaking that the certified copy will be filed within 15 days.
9. It is further directed that the trial court shall send the release order to
the concerned jail through Bail Order Management System (BOMS) to
ensure early release of the applicant.
10. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the applicant
through Jail Superintendent, Pilibhit via e-mail or on e-prison portal and
Trial Court via e-mode within 24 hours in compliance of the order of the
Apex Court in the case of Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, In Re: Suo
Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.4 of 2021 decided on 31.01.2023 reported
in (2024) 10 SCC 685 as well as Pila Pahan@Peela Pahan and others Vs.
State of Jharkhand and another, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 169 of
2025, decided on 29.05.2026.
11. Application, if any, stands disposed of. 
(Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.)
July 22, 2026
SA/CS/-
Digitally signed by :-
CHANDAN SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad