The Union Of India vs M/S Ankur Business P Ltd And Anr

1

GAHC010014632017
2026:GAU-AS:12641
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

MFA/49/2017

The Union of India,
Represented By the General Manager,
N.F.Railway, Guwahati-11, Assam.

…..Appellant
-Versus-
1. M/s Ankur Business P Ltd,
rd
Sri Ramcharit Thakur Market, 3 Floor,
Athgaon, Guwahati-1, Assam.

2. The General Manager,
Western Railway, Churchgate,
Mumbari-2.

……Respondents

For Appellant Ms. U. Chakraborty, Senior Standing Counsel,

Railway.

Mr. G. Goswami, Advocate.


For Respondents Mr. D. Rathi, Advocate


Date of Hearing 21.07.2026
:
02.09.2026
Date of Judgment :

BEFORE




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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

[1] Heard Ms. U. Chakraborty, the learned Senior Railway
Counsel, assisted by Mr. G. Goswami, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. D. Rathi, the

learned counsel for the respondents/claimants.

[2] This appeal, under section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
Act, 1987, has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 24.11.2016, passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal,
Guwahati Bench, in Original Application No. 88/2006, whereby
the appellant was directed to refund the punitive charges
imposed on the respondents/claimants for overloading of the

consignment.

[3] The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in
brief, are that the respondent No. 1, namely, M/s Ankur
Business (P) Ltd., had filed an original application which was
registered as Original Application No. 88/2006, before the
Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, seeking refund of
excess freight charges of Rs. 91,377/- (Rupees Ninety-One
Thousand Three Hundred and Seventy Seven) only which was
imposed on them by the present appellant, as overloading
charges. The claimants (respondent No. 1) had booked a
consignment of refined Salt from Chirai(CHIB) under Western
Railways to New Guwahati (NGC) under invoice No. 8 and 10


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RR(Railway Receipt) No. 220466 and 220468 dated
12.07.2005. The Railway collected the under charges of Rs.
38939/- on 21.08.2005 on the allegation of over-loading

detected en-route.

[4] The present appellant contested the claim case by filing
separate written statement, wherein, it took the plea that
since weighment facilities were not available at the original
station, the weighment was done en-route in the weighbridge
at Viramgram (VG) Station of Western Railway and it was

found that the excess load was there in the wagons.

[5] On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues

were framed by the Railway Claims Tribunal: -
i. “Whether proper notice under Section 106 of the
Railways Act was served on the appellant within
time?”
ii. “Whether the appellant holds legal title?”
iii. “Whether the appellant is entitled to refund of
freight over-charges as claimed, if so, to
whatsum?”

iv. “What reliefs and orders?”

[6] The Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati, thereafter disposed of
the aforesaid Original Application No. 88/2006, along with 45
other similar matters by a common judgment on the ground
that similar question of law and facts were involved in all the


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46 claims cases and directed the present appellant to refund
the excess freight of Rs. 91,377/-(however, in page No. 21 of
the impugned judgment wherein, the calculation of excess
freight to be referenced by has been made against Original
Application No. 88/2006, it indicates that the freight over

charged was only to the tune of Rs. 81,377/-).

[7] Ms. U. Chakraborty, the learned Senior Railway Counsel,
appearing for the appellant, submits that the Railway Claims
Tribunal has erred in passing a common judgment for 45
Original Applications, wherein the facts were different and
issues involved were also different. She submits that under
Rule 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1989, the two or more applications pending before the
Tribunal can be heard simultaneously only if they arise out of
same facts and issues involved are common in such
applications. She submits that in the instant case, facts
involved in all the 45 applications were different, though there
might be some similarities in some aspects. She submits that
as the facts were not same, the Railway Claims Tribunal could
not have invoked Rule 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989, and could not have disposed of the
Original Application No. 88/2006, by clubbing it with 44 other

applications in a common judgment.

[8] She further submits that the impugned judgment is also liable
to be set aside on the ground that same was delivered by only


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a single member of the Railway Claims Tribunal, which is
contrary to the requirement contained in Section 4 of the
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 which provides that a bench
of the Railway Claims Tribunal shall consists of one judicial
member and one technical member. She submits that though
Section 4(4) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides
that chairman of the Tribunal may by General or Special Order
authorize a single member to exercise the power and
authority of Railway Claims Tribunal in respect of some cases,
however, she submits that in the instant case, no such
authority was there and, therefore, she submits that on that

count also the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

[9] The learned Senior Standing Counsel, Railway, appearing for
the appellant further submits that the Railway Claims Tribunal
also failed to take into consideration that while imposing
punitive charges for overloading no notice is required to be
given to the claimant as held by a division bench of this court
in the case of “ Union of India & Ors. Vs. Megha Technical &

Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd.” reported in “SLP (C) 8024/2018”.

[10] She submits that though a full bench of this court in the case
of “ Megha Technical and Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India ”
(Writ Appeal No. 333/2010
) held that under Section 73 of the
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 punitive charges cannot be
imposed without affording an opportunity of being heard to
the person on whom charges were sought to be imposed,


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however, she submits that the Supreme Court of India in the
case of “Union of India & Ors. Vs. Megha Technical & Engineers
(Pvt.) Ltd.” (supra) has set aside the judgment of the full
bench of this court and held that when excess charges
weightage is detected at the time of off loading it would be
practically difficult for the railways to issue a show-cause
notice to consigner or the consignee and to hold a mini trial to
determine the question of levy of compensatory charges for
excess freight.” Therefore, she submits that the appellant, i.e.,
the Railway were well within their right to impose punitive

charges for overloading of wagons by the respondent No. 1.


[11] She further submits that in the instant case, the weighment
charts were furnished to the respondent No. 1 indicating the
excess weight and as such, she submits that it was for the
respondent No. 1 to prove anything contrary to that as the
burden of proving that there was no excess weight shifts to
the respondent No. 1 under Section 110 read with Section 65

of the Railways Act, 1989.

[12] She further submits that since the weighment chart showing
excess weight was furnished to the respondent No. 1, the
respondent No. 1 could have requested for re-weighment of
the consignment under Section 79 of the Railways Act, 1989.
She, therefore, submits that this appeal may be allowed and
the impugned judgment may be set aside and the case may


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be remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in

accordance with the provisions of law

[13] On the other hand, Mr. D. Rathi, the learned counsel for the
respondent No. 1/claimant, has submitted that the Railway
Claims Tribunal has rightly allowed the claim of the
respondent No. 1 for refund of excess freight after considering

the materials on record in its true perspective.

[14] He submits that the Railways have failed to prove the alleged
overloading for which excessive freight was charged from the
respondent No. 1. He submits that in spite of the direction by
the Railway Claims Tribunal, the appellant has failed to
produce relevant documents like original forwarding notes,
loading tally book, unloading tally book, delivery deficiency
message, details of disposal of alleged excess goods, full
delivery records, proper weighment records, and show-cause

notice allegedly issued before levying punitive charges.

[15] The learned counsel for respondent No. 1/claimant has also
submitted that the Railways have also erred in imposing
punitive charges on the respondent No. 1 after delivery of the
consignment. He submits that the consignment arrived at
destination and was delivered on 20.06.2005, whereas, the
railway authorities issued the demand notice on 24.06.2005,
i.e., after delivery of consignment. He submits that it is settled
proposition of law that a notice demanding additional amount


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for alleged excess weight/overloading can be issued only at a
pre-delivery stage, and once the delivery is made, the
provisions contained in the Railways Act do not empower the
Railways to issue notice claiming penal charges for

overloading.

[16] The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 also submits that
the penal charges were imposed on the respondent No.
1/claimant without prior issuance of any show-cause notice to
that effect, and as such, the principles of natural justice have
been violated and the respondents was not given any
opportunity of being heard before imposing penal charges on

him for purported overloading.

[17] The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant also
submits that the contention of the appellant that the Tribunal
could not have passed the common judgment because of the
embargo under Rule 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989, is also misconceived, inasmuch as,
though the Tribunal decided 46 Original Applications by a
common judgment, however, it did not decide the matters
mechanically and has considered each Original Application on
its own merit. He submits that the Tribunal was not wrong in
deciding those cases by a common judgment as it involved
similar questions of law and facts. He submits that on bare
perusal of the impugned judgment, it would reveal that the


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Tribunal decided all the 46 Original Applications by a common
judgment as the same was also agreed to by the learned
counsel for both sides. He further submits that the appellant
has also failed to show any prejudice caused to them by the
Tribunal in deciding the Original Application No. 88/2006 by a
common judgment along with other 45 similar Original
Applications. As such, he submits that the contention raised

by the appellant is liable to be rejected.

[18] The learned counsel for respondent No. 1/claimant further
submits that the impugned judgment is also not bad on the
ground that it was rendered by only a single member of the
Railway Claims Tribunal, inasmuch as the said member in the
instant case was a Judicial Member. He submits that the Apex
Court in the case of “ State of M.P. Vs. B.R. Thakare And Ors.”
reported in “ (2002) 10 SCC 338 ,” has observed that even
assuming that all the powers of Tribunal could be exercised by
any single member, it can be by a Judicial Member of Tribunal
only. He submits that in the instant case, as the impugned
judgment was rendered by a Judicial Member of Railway
Claims Tribunal sitting singly, there is no error or infirmity in
the same.

[19] He further submits that this Court in an appeal under Section
23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act can decide the matter
after taking into consideration the materials before it as it is
exercising powers of a first appellate court, which can go into


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the question of law as well as that of fact in such an appeal.
He submits that the contentions raised by the appellant do not
have any merit and, therefore, he prays for dismissing the

appeal.


[20] In support of his submission, the learned counsel for

respondent No. 1/claimant has cited following rulings:
a) “Ranjan Roy Vs. The Union of India ” reported in
“MANU/BH/1074/2013 ;”
“Megha Technical and Engineers (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India
b)
and Others” MANU/GH/0407/2017;”
reported in “
c) “Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Chandramaul ” reported in “1965 SCC
OnLine SC 111; ”
d) “Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills Vs. Chief Commercial
Superintendent, N.R. And Others ” reported in “(1998) 5 SCC
126;”
e) “Cement Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Others” [judgment dated 08.12.2019 in WP(C) No.
2288/2010];
f) “M/s Meghalaya Mines Sundicate And Anr. Vs. The Union of
India And Ors.” [judgment dated 18.03.2013 in WP(C) No.
6074/2005];
g) “Union of India and Others Vs. Megha Technical and
Engineers Pvt. Ltd.” [ Judgment dated 07.03.2013 in Writ
Appeal No. 71/2013].


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[21] I have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials
available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited
by learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective

submissions.

[22] Before going into the merits of this appeal, it would be
appropriate to decide the question regarding the jurisdictional
aspects at the very beginning. For the said purpose, it would
be convenient if the provisions contained in the Section 4 of
The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is reproduced herein
below:-
“4. Composition of Claims Tribunal and Benches
thereof. —
(1) The Claims Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman, four
Vice-Chairmen and such number of Judicial Members
and Technical Members as the Central Government may
deem fit and, subject to the other provisions of this Act,
the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims
Tribunal may be exercised by Benches thereof.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Bench
shall consist of one Judicial Member and one Technical
Member.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the Chairman—
(a) may, in addition to discharging the functions of the
Judicial Member or the Technical Member of the Bench
to which he is appointed, discharge the functions of the
Judicial Member or, as the case may be, the Technical
Member, of any other Bench;


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(b) may transfer a Vice-Chairman or other Member from
one Bench to another Bench;
(c) may authorise the Vice-Chairman or the Judicial
Member or the Technical Member appointed to one
Bench to discharge also the functions of the Vice-
Chairman or, as the case may be, the Judicial Member or
the Technical Member of another Bench.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
provisions of this section, it shall be competent for the
Chairman or any other Member authorised by the
Chairman in this behalf to function as a Bench consisting
of a single Member and exercise the jurisdiction, powers
and authority of the Claims Tribunal in respect of such
classes of cases or such matters pertaining to such
classes of cases as the Chairman may, by general or
special order, specify:
Provided that if at any stage of the hearing of any such
case or matter, it appears to the Chairman or such
Member that the case or matter is of such a nature that
it ought to be heard by a Bench consisting of two
Members, the case or matter may be transferred by the
Chairman or, as the case may be, referred to him for
transfer, to such Bench as the Chairman may deem fit.
(5) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the
Benches shall sit at such places as the Central

Government may, by notification, specify. ”


[23] On a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that
the statute mandates that a Bench of Railway Claims Tribunal
shall consist of one Judicial Member and one Technical


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Member. However, the statute in Section 4(4) also provides for
an exception thereto, whereby it provides that it shall be
competent for the Chairman or any other Member authorized
by the Chairman in this behalf to function as a Bench
consisting of a single Member, and the jurisdiction, powers
and authority of the Claims Tribunal in respect of such classes
of cases or such matters pertaining to such classes of cases as

the Chairman may by general or special order specify.

[24] Thus, for a single Member to act as a Bench of Claims Tribunal
and exercise its jurisdiction, it is required that if the Chairman
himself is not sitting singly and exercising jurisdiction, powers
and authority of Claims Tribunal, any other Member has to be
authorized by the Chairman in that behalf for sitting singly.
Further, such authority, by general or special order, shall have
to specify the classes of cases or such matter pertaining to
such classes of cases in respect of which a Bench consisting of
single Member may exercise the jurisdiction, power and
authority of the Claims Tribunal.

[25] As such, it is incumbent on any Member sitting singly as a
Bench of the Railway Claims Tribunal and exercising powers
thereof to specify the general and special order which has
given it the authority to decide cases by sitting singly. In the
instant case, no such authorization or general or special order
of the Chairman authorizing the single Member to exercise the
jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal has been


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produced before this Court. As such, it appears that the
exercise of jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims
Tribunal by the single Member of the Railway Claims Tribunal,
Guwahati Bench, in the instant case, is contrary to the
provisions contained in Section 4(2) and Section 4(4) of the

Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.

[26] It is pertinent to note herein that in the instant case, the
Member who has delivered the impugned judgment is a
Judicial Member. However, the statute does not discriminate
amongst Members of the Railway Claims Tribunal, and it
would be wrong to assume that when a Judicial Member
exercises jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims
Tribunal, by sitting singly, no authority under Section 4(4) of
the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is required. The statute does
not provide for any such exception in respect of a Judicial

Member.

[27] In this regard, the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the
respondent/claimant of the Apex Court in the case of “ State of
M.P. Vs. B.R. Thakare And Ors”
(supra) is not of much aid to
the claimant, as in the said case, the Apex Court was dealing
with the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 and has observed that even assuming that
all the powers of the Tribunal could be exercised by a single
Member, it can only be by a Judicial Member of the Tribunal
and not by any other Member. By observing as such, the Apex


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Court was only contemplating a situation on the basis of
assumption that the powers of the Tribunal under the
aforesaid Act could be exercised by a single Member. However,
the provisions of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 do not
provide for any other circumstances, apart from what has
been contemplated under Section 4(4) of the said Act, when a
Member sitting singly can exercise the powers, jurisdiction and

authority of Claims Tribunal.

[28] For exercising such power, a Member sitting singly has to be
authorized as such by the Chairman of the Railway Claims
Tribunal under Section 4(4) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act,
1987, and in absence thereof, any exercise of jurisdiction by a
Member sitting singly would be an illegal exercise of
jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, only two
consequences are contemplated: that is, either the single
Member has to be authorized under Section 4(4) to act as a
Bench sitting singly by the Chairman of the Tribunal, or the
matter has to be heard by a Bench consisting of two
Members, namely, Judicial Member and Technical Member

both.

[29] In view of the above discussion, this Court is unable to
persuade itself with the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant that there is no
error of jurisdiction in a Judicial Member sitting singly and
deciding the claims cases without there being any


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authorization for the same under Section 4(4) of the Railway
Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 .
[30] Now, let us discuss as to whether the Tribunal was right in
hearing 46 Original Applications together on the ground that
similar questions of law and facts are involved in those 46
Original Applications and deciding those Original Applications
by rendering a common judgment. In this regard, the
provisions contained in Rule 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989 is relevant and, as such, the same is

reproduced herein below:-

“ 24. Procedure in connected cases.
(1)Where two or more applications pending before a
Tribunal arise out of the same facts and any issue
involved is common to two or more such applications,
such applications may, so far as the evidence bearing on
such issue is concerned, be heard simultaneously.
(2) Where action is taken under sub-rule (1), the
evidence bearing on the common issue or issues shall be
recorded on the record of one application the Tribunal
shall certify under its hand on the records of any such
other application, the extent to which evidence so
recorded applies to such other case and the fact that the
parties to such other case had the opportunity of being
present, and, if they were present for cross-examining

the witnesses.”

[31] On perusal of the aforesaid provisions, there remains no doubt
that for hearing two or more original applications together,
two conditions are prerequisites, namely, that those


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applications must arise out of the same facts, and secondly,
the issue involved is common to them. Both the conditions
mentioned in the aforesaid Rule should exist together for the
Tribunal to decide to hear two or more applications pending

before it simultaneously.

[32] The first requisite condition is that two or more applications
pending before the Tribunal must arise out of the same facts.
The requirement under Rule 24 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989 of the applications arising out of the
same facts may not be confused with similarity of facts in
different original applications. What is required for
simultaneous hearing is that the applications must arise out of
same facts and not similar facts. However, in the instant case,
all the 46 Original Applications decided by the Railway Claims
Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, by the common judgment which
has been impugned in this appeal, have different facts, like
the consignors and the consignees are different, the
consignment is of different quantity and quality, the
originating station and destination station are different, the
money involved is different, and the punitive charges imposed
are also different. Merely because the Railway imposed
punitive charges in all the 41 cases, the same may not be
clubbed together and decided by a common judgment after
hearing them simultaneously, as the same would be contrary
to the procedure laid down by the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989.


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[33] When the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989
lays down the procedure to be adopted while adjudicating an
application under Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
Act, 1987, the said procedure has to be adopted and no
tinkering with the same can be done at the whims and
caprices of the Tribunal. As Rule 24 prescribes the
contingencies under which two or more applications pending
before the Tribunal may be heard simultaneously, the
prerequisite conditions prescribed in the said Rule must be
fulfilled for two or more applications pending before the
Tribunal to be heard simultaneously. The Tribunal, on its own,
cannot decide to hear two or more applications

simultaneously, which arose out of different facts.

[34] Each claim application before the Railway Claims Tribunal
represents a distinct legal cause of action requiring
independent appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal.
Simultaneous handling of such a large number of applications
in contravention of the Rules risks cross-contamination of
evidence, that is, where proof meant for one set of facts is
improperly imported or generalized to resolve a completely
different factual scenario, leading to potential miscarriage of
justice for either the claimant or the Railway Administration.
As such, such procedural overreach in violation of the
prescribed Rules cannot be approved.



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[35] In view of the aforesaid discussion, where the jurisdictional
overreach by the Railway Claims Tribunal in deciding the
Original Application No. 88/2006 along with 45 other Original
Applications, where facts involved were not the same, is
apparent, the matter is remanded back to the Railway Claims
Tribunal for rendering a fresh judgmentin the Original
Application No. 88/2006 after giving fresh opportunity of

being heard to both the parties.


[36] This appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

[37] Send back the records of Original Application No. 88/2006 to
the Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, along with a
copy of this judgment immediately.



JUDGE
Comparing Assistant

Munmun
Boruah
Digitally signed by
Munmun Boruah
Date: 2026.09.02
17:21:20 +05'30'


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