MAHAVEER KUMAR JAIN (AY 2014-15) S/O LATE KALYAN MAL JAIN vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:46383-DB] Reportable
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
Judgment reserved on : 28/10/2026
Judgment delivered on : 18/ 11/2026
Judgment (full) uploaded on : 18/11/2026
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15442/2025
CNR: RJHC020868932025 | URN: CW / 35045U / 2025
Geeta Devi Jain (Ay 2014-15) W/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged
About 65 Years, 65 Surya Nagar Gopalpura Bypass Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circel-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15428/2025
CNR: RJHC020869162025 | URN: CW / 35025U / 2025
Mahaveer Kumar Jain (Ay 2015-16) S/o Late Kalyan Mal Jain,
Aged About 72 Years, 65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle -1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur 302005.
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15440/2025
CNR: RJHC020868522025 | URN: CW / 35043U / 2025
Mahaveer Kumar Jain (Ay 2013-14) S/o Late Kalyan Mal Jain,
Aged About 72 Years, 65 Surya Nagar Gopalpura Bypass Jaipur
----Petitioner
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Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circel-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15441/2025
CNR: RJHC020868692025 | URN: CW / 35044U / 2025
Geeta Devi Jain (Ay 2013-14) W/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged
About 65 Years, 65 Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circel-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15473/2025
CNR: RJHC020868602025 | URN: CW / 35174U / 2025
Sanjay Jain (Ay-2013-14) S/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged About
44 Years, 65 Surya Nagar Gopalpura Bypass Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle-1,
Jaipur Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15477/2025
CNR: RJHC020868772025 | URN: CW / 35180U / 2025
Geeta Devi Jain (Ay 2015-16) W/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged
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About 65 Years, 65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur- 302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15420/2025
CNR: RJHC020868562025 | URN: CW / 35011U / 2025
Mahaveer Kumar Jain (Ay 2014-15) S/o Late Kalyan Mal Jain,
Aged About 72 Years, 65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle -1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur 302005.
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15469/2025
CNR: RJHC020868662025 | URN: CW / 35163U / 2025
Sunita Jain (Ay 2013-14) W/o Sanjay Jain, Aged About 45 Years,
65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 48, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
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D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15474/2025
CNR: RJHC020870242025 | URN: CW / 35175U / 2025
Sunita Jain (Ay 2015-16) W/o Sanjay Jain, Aged About 45 Years,
65 Surya Nagar Gopalpura Bypass Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commisioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle-1,
Jaipur, Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur-302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15478/2025
CNR: RJHC020869062025 | URN: CW / 35184U / 2025
Sanjay Jain (Ay 2015-16) S/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged About
44 Years, 65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle -1,
Jaipur Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur- 302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15486/2025
CNR: RJHC020868462025 | URN: CW / 35202U / 2025
Sanjay Jain (Ay 2014-15) S/o Mahaveer Kumar Jain, Aged About
44 Years, 65 Surya Nagar Gopalpura Bypass Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle -1,
Jaipur Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur- 302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
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Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15520/2025
CNR: RJHC020869962025 | URN: CW / 35264U / 2025
Sunita Jain (Ay 2014-15) W/o Sanjay Jain, Aged About 45 Years,
65, Surya Nagar, Gopalpura Bypass, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle -1,
Jaipur Room No. 408, 4Th Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-2, Lic
Building, Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur- 302005
2. Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central), New
Central Revenue Building, Bhagwan Das Road, Jaipur,
Rajasthan 302005
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Tanuj Agrawal
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Siddharth Bapna with
Ms. Tanushka Saxena
Mr. Rahul Kumar
Mr. Jai Prakash Meena &
Mr. Yashvi Khandelwal
DIVISION BENCH
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
C.A.V. Judgment
SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, CJ
1. In the present batch of writ petitions, the ambit of the
controversy, albeit not exhaustively circumscribed, is broadly and
predominantly delineated by the challenge laid to the correctness
and/or validity of the impugned orders whereby the respondents
have given directions for reassessment under the Income Tax Act,
1961. In view of the fact that the instant writ petitions necessitate
adjudication upon common and overlapping questions of law, and
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with the consent of learned counsel appearing for all contesting
parties, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15442/2026 , titled Geeta
Devi Jain v. the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and
anr., is hereby treated as the lead matter. It is, however,
cautiously clarified that any dissimilarities or variances in the
present batch of petitions are confined strictly to the individual
factual matrices and shall not impinge upon, nor bear relevance
to, the uniform questions of law that fall for determination before
this Court; and that the instant judgment shall be applicable on
mutatis mutandis basis on all the connected petitions.
2. The lead petition has been filed invoking the writ jurisdiction
of this Court, being aggrieved of the notice under section 148A(b)
dated 13.03.2024, order passed under Section 148(d) dated
29.04.2024, notice under Section 148 dated 29.04.2024 and
notice issued under section 142(1) dated 25.07.2025 and
reassessment proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the
annual year 2014-15.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
impugned reassessment proceedings initiated against the
petitioner for Assessment Year 2014–15 are wholly illegal, time-
barred and without jurisdiction. It was contended that the
petitioner had duly filed its return of income on 17.07.2014,
pursuant to which assessment was completed under Section 153A
read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on
24.12.2019, wherein additions were made on account of alleged
unexplained investment in the construction of house property on
the basis of the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) report.
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4. It was submitted that the first appellate authority, vide order
dated 30.11.2023, deleted the additions by holding that no
incriminating material was found during the course of search,
relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PCIT
1
v. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. . Subsequently, the respondent
initiated reassessment proceedings by issuing a notice under
Section 148A(b) dated 13.03.2024, solely on the basis of the DVO
report, culminating in the order under Section 148A(d) and
issuance of notice under Section 148 on 29.04.2024.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner, in
response to the notice under Section 148, filed its return of
income declaring the same income as originally disclosed.
Thereafter, detailed objections dated 11.08.2025 were submitted
challenging the validity of the reassessment proceedings on
various legal grounds. However, the respondent, vide the
impugned order dated 11.09.2025, rejected the objections in a
mechanical and non-speaking manner, without duly considering
the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court or the specific
objections raised by the petitioner.
6. It was contended that the reassessment proceedings are
founded exclusively upon the DVO report, which, by itself, does
not constitute valid information for initiating reassessment
proceedings, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asstt. CIT
2
v. Dhariya Construction Co. . The respondent has not only
failed to consider the binding legal position and the judgments
1(2023) 459 ITR 212 (SC)
2(2010) 328 ITR 515 (SC)
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relied upon by the petitioner in this regard, but has passed the
impugned order in a cryptic manner.
7. It is further submitted that the DVO erroneously adopted
CPWD rates instead of the applicable State PWD rates, contrary to
the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT,
3
Ajmer v. Sunita Mansingha . It was stoutly averred that had
the appropriate State PWD rates been applied, the alleged income
escaping assessment would have fallen below the statutory
threshold of Rs. 50 lakhs, thereby rendering the reassessment
notices barred by limitation under Section 149(1)(a) of the Act.
8. Learned counsel contended that the respondent has failed to
properly consider the objections concerning the limitation,
jurisdiction and validity of the reassessment proceedings and has
passed the impugned order without application of mind, in
contravention of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
4
in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer . In
support of the contentions made insofar, learned counsel had
placed reliance upon the ratio encapsulated in ACIT Vs. Dhariya
5 6
Construction Company ; Sardar Kehar Singh Vs. CIT ; Tara
7
Chand Mundhra Vs. Union of India ; CIT Vs. Prem Kumari
8 9
Surana ; CIT Vs. Darshan Singh and CIT Vs. Sunita
10
Mansingha .
3 (2017) 393 ITR 121 (SC)
4 (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC)
5 2010 (15) SCC 251
6 CW No. 2 & 4/1990
CW No.3998/1988
7
8 IT Ref. No.33/1982
9 ITA NO. 185, 191/2002
10 2018(12) SCC 296
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9. It was, therefore, submitted that the initiation of
reassessment proceedings, being founded upon an invalid basis
and having been undertaken beyond the prescribed period of
limitation, is unsustainable in law. The impugned order disposing
of the objections, along with the consequential notices issued
under Sections 148A, 148 and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act,
1961, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, learned
counsel for the petitioner prayed that the writ petition be allowed
and the impugned reassessment proceedings be declared illegal,
time-barred and without jurisdiction.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the petitioner-assessee had filed his return of income on
08.08.2018 under Section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Subsequently, search and seizure action under Section 132(1) of
the Act was conducted at the premises of the petitioner-assessee
on 28.09.2017, pursuant to which assessment proceedings were
initiated and culminated in the passing of the assessment order
dated 24.12.2019 under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) of
the Act.
11. It was submitted that the petitioner-assessee had preferred
an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-4,
Jaipur, which was partly allowed vide order dated 30.11.2023,
whereby the additions made by the Assessing Officer were deleted
on the ground that the same were not based upon any
incriminating material found during the course of search.
12. Learned counsel further submitted that, subsequently, on the
basis of the search conducted and the report of the District
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Valuation Officer (DVO), the answering respondent had issued a
show-cause notice dated 12.03.2024 under the relevant provisions
of the Act. The objections submitted by the petitioner-assessee
thereto were rejected vide order dated 29.04.2024 passed under
Section 148A(d) of the Act, whereafter notice under Section 148
of the Act was issued on the same date. In response thereto, the
petitioner-assessee had filed his return of income declaring the
same income as originally disclosed in the return filed under
Section 139(1) of the Act.
13. It was contended that the petitioner-assessee had an
efficacious alternative statutory remedy available under the
provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, whereby all legal, factual
and jurisdictional objections could be raised before the Assessing
Officer during the reassessment proceedings, followed by an
appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and,
thereafter, before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, if aggrieved.
It was submitted that the petitioner had bypassed the statutory
mechanism and had directly invoked the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of
11
Income Tax & Ors. v. Chhabil Das Agarwal , wherein it was
held that where the statute provides a complete machinery for
assessment and reassessment, the assessee ought not to bypass
the same and invoke the writ jurisdiction, particularly when an

11 (2014) 1 SCC 603
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efficacious alternative remedy is available. It was further
submitted that the present matter involved disputed factual issues
relating to valuation, which could appropriately be examined by
the statutory authorities. It was further contended that the
respondents had acted bona fide and strictly in accordance with
the statutory provisions. In support thereof, learned counsel relied
upon the judgment passed by this Court in Sachin Panchal v.
12
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. , wherein the
Court had examined the applicability of the amended provisions of
Section 149 of the Act, read with the erstwhile provisions of
Sections 153A and 153C, and had held that the limitation for
issuance of notice under Section 148, under the amended
provisions, was required to be construed in accordance with the
period within which proceedings could have been initiated under
the erstwhile provisions of Sections 153A and 153C of the Act.
15. Accordingly, learned counsel submitted that the
reassessment proceedings had been initiated in accordance with
law and that the petitioner-assessee had an adequate and
efficacious alternative remedy under the statutory framework. It
was, therefore, prayed that the writ petition, being premature and
not maintainable in view of the availability of an alternative
remedy, deserved to be dismissed.
16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
material available on record and considered the rival submissions,
this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present writ
petition essentially pertains to the legality and jurisdictional

12 D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14368/2025
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validity of the reassessment proceedings initiated against the
petitioner-assessee for the relevant assessment year, particularly
when the initiation thereof was founded upon the report of the
Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO), and the objections raised
by the petitioner with regard to the validity of such proceedings
were rejected without due consideration of the binding judicial
precedents.
17. At the outset, this Court considers it appropriate to deal with
the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding the
availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy. It is true
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the ratio encapsulated in
Chhabil Das Agarwal (supra), has reiterated the settled principle
that ordinarily, where a statute provides an effective and
efficacious alternative remedy, the writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be exercised.
However, the said principle is not an absolute bar to the exercise
of constitutional jurisdiction by this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
13
Mumbai & Ors. , has categorically held that the existence of an
alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute impediment to
the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, particularly where the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction, where there is a violation of the principles of natural
justice, where enforcement of fundamental rights is sought, or
where the vires of a statutory provision is challenged.

13 (1998) 8 SCC 1
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18. The aforesaid principles have subsequently been reiterated
and elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radha Krishan
14
Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. , wherein it
was held that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedies is a
rule of policy, convenience and discretion, and does not divest the
High Court of its constitutional powers in an appropriate case.
19. In the present matter, the petitioner has not merely raised
disputed questions relating to the quantum of valuation or the
determination of taxable income. The challenge is fundamentally
directed against the very assumption of jurisdiction by the
Assessing Officer, the alleged initiation of reassessment
proceedings beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the
failure of the respondent authority to consider the objections
raised by the petitioner in accordance with the settled principles of
law. Such issues go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Assessing
Officer and cannot be relegated to the appellate forum merely on
the ground of availability of an alternative remedy.
20. This Court, therefore, finds that the present case falls within
the recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, as
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool
Corporation (supra). Consequently, the objection raised by the
respondents regarding maintainability of the writ petition does not
merit acceptance.
21. Coming to the merits of the controversy, it emerges from the
record that the petitioner-assessee had filed his return of income
under Section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Thereafter,
14 (2021) 6 SCC 771
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search and seizure proceedings under Section 132(1) of the Act
were conducted at the premises of the petitioner-assessee on
28.09.2017, pursuant to which assessment proceedings
culminated in the passing of an assessment order dated
24.12.2019 under Section 153A read with Section 143(3) of the
Act. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-4, Jaipur, which was partly
allowed vide order dated 30.11.2023, whereby the additions made
by the Assessing Officer were deleted on the ground that the same
were not based upon any incriminating material found during the
course of search, relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
22. Subsequently, the respondent authority initiated
reassessment proceedings by issuing a show-cause notice under
Section 148A(b) of the Act on the basis of the DVO report,
followed by an order under Section 148A(d) dated 29.04.2024 and
issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act on the same date.
The petitioner, in response thereto, filed the return of income
declaring the same income as originally disclosed. The principal
objection raised by the petitioner is that the reassessment
proceedings have been initiated solely on the basis of the DVO
report, without there being any independent tangible material or
information forming the basis of a valid belief regarding
escapement of income. In this regard, the dictum of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dhariya Construction Co . (supra), assumes
significance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while examining the
validity of reassessment proceedings initiated on the basis of the
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opinion furnished by the DVO, held that the opinion of the DVO
per se does not constitute information for the purposes of
reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the Act. It was
further held that the Assessing Officer is required to apply his
mind to the information, if any, collected and independently form
the requisite belief. For the sake of reference the relevant extract
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“2. Opinion of the DVO per se is not an
information for the purposes of reopening
assessment under section 147 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 . The A.O. has to apply his mind to
the information, if any, collected and must form a
belief thereon.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. The aforesaid pronouncement lays down a binding principle
that the opinion of the DVO, by itself, cannot be treated as
sufficient foundation for initiating reassessment proceedings. The
statutory authority is required to independently examine the
material and arrive at a legally sustainable conclusion regarding
escapement of income. In the present case, the respondents have
sought to justify the initiation of reassessment proceedings on the
basis of the DVO report. However, the objections raised by the
petitioner specifically questioned the legality of such initiation in
view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
impugned order disposing of the objections does not demonstrate
that the respondent authority undertook any independent
examination of the material or addressed the binding legal
position governing the use of a DVO report for reopening an
assessment.
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24. It is a settled principle of law that the mere existence of a
valuation report cannot substitute the statutory requirement of
formation of an independent belief by the Assessing Officer. The
jurisdiction to reopen an assessment cannot be exercised
mechanically or merely on the basis of an opinion furnished by
another authority. The action of the respondent authority,
therefore, cannot be sustained if the DVO report constituted the
sole basis for initiation of reassessment proceedings and no
independent material or application of mind was demonstrated in
accordance with law.
25. Another significant aspect of the matter is the objection
raised by the petitioner with regard to the adoption of Central
Public Works Department (CPWD) rates by the DVO instead of the
applicable State Public Works Department (PWD) rates for
determining the alleged unexplained investment in the
construction of the property. In this regard, the petitioner has
placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
15
CIT, Ajmer v. Sunita Mansingha , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court upheld the applicability of local PWD rates in place
of CPWD rates for the purpose of determining the cost of
construction. The relevant extract from the aforerelied ratio is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“2. From the order of the Tribunal we find that the
Tribunal has even though held that the reference to
the Departmental Valuation Officer in question is
not valid, in view of the decision of this Court in the
Case of Amiya Bala Paul v. CIT (2003) 262 ITR
407 , but it has also held that it is s settled principle
of law that in place of Central Public Works
Department rates local Public Works Department

15 (2017) 393 ITR 121 (SC)
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rates are to be applied and adopted to determine
the cost of construction. In view of the fact that
Section 142A was inserted by Finance (No.2)Act,
2014 (23 of 2004) w.e.f. 15th November, 1972 and
subsequently again substituted by Finance Act,
2010 (14 of 2010) w.e.f. 1st July, 2010 and
Finance (No.2) (225 of 2014) wef. 1st October,
2014, as the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section
142A as it existed during the relevant period,
reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer can
be made because assessment in the present case
had not become final and conclusive because the
appeal preferred by the Revenue under Section
260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was pending
before the Rajasthan High Court.
3. However, in view of the finding recorded by the
Tribunal that the local Public Works Department
rates are to be applied and adopted in place of
Central Public Works Department rates, we do not
find any good ground to interfere in the impugned
judgment on this issue on merits. The appeal fails
and is dismissed.”
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the issue,
observed that the local PWD rates were required to be applied and
adopted in place of CPWD rates for determination of the cost of
construction. The said principle assumes relevance in the present
case, particularly when the petitioner has specifically contended
that the adoption of CPWD rates has resulted in an inflated
valuation of the property and consequently in an incorrect
computation of the alleged income escaping assessment. The
petitioner has further contended that, upon adoption of the
applicable State PWD rates, the alleged income escaping
assessment would fall below the statutory threshold of Rs. 50
lakhs, thereby materially affecting the applicability of the
extended period of limitation under Section 149 of the Act.
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27. This Court finds that the aforesaid objection was not a mere
technical objection but one which directly affected the jurisdiction
of the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceedings. The
determination of the applicable valuation rates was, therefore,
intrinsically connected with the question of limitation and the
legality of the reassessment notices. Where the jurisdiction of the
Assessing Officer is dependent upon the satisfaction of a statutory
monetary threshold, the authority is required to examine the
relevant material and objections with due care and application of
mind. An erroneous determination of the alleged escaped income,
particularly where such determination is based upon the adoption
of an incorrect valuation methodology, cannot be permitted to
sustain the assumption of jurisdiction if the statutory conditions
are otherwise not fulfilled.
28. The respondents, therefore, could not have brushed aside
the petitioner’s objection regarding the applicability of State PWD
rates and the consequential effect upon limitation without
undertaking a reasoned examination of the same. This Court
further finds that the manner in which the objections raised by the
petitioner were disposed of is contrary to the settled principles
governing the procedure for reassessment proceedings.
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India)
Ltd. (Supra) has laid down that where an assessee, upon receipt
of a notice under Section 148 of the Act, seeks reasons for
reopening and raises objections thereto, the Assessing Officer is
required to dispose of such objections by passing a speaking order
before proceeding further with the reassessment. The requirement
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of passing a speaking order is not an empty formality. It is
intended to ensure that the Assessing Officer has duly considered
the objections raised by the assessee and has applied his mind to
the jurisdictional requirements of the reassessment proceedings.
30. In the present case, the petitioner had raised specific
objections concerning the validity of initiation of reassessment
proceedings on the basis of the DVO report, the applicability of the
judgment in Dhariya Construction Co . (supra), the adoption of
CPWD rates instead of State PWD rates and the consequential
issue of limitation under Section 149 of the Act. The impugned
order disposing of the objections does not reflect a meaningful
consideration of the aforesaid objections in the light of the binding
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The failure to deal with
the material legal objections raised by the petitioner renders the
impugned order unsustainable.
31. It is well settled that an administrative or quasi-judicial
authority exercising statutory powers is required to record reasons
for its decision, particularly when the decision affects the rights
and liabilities of the assessee. A reasoned order ensures
transparency, fairness and judicial accountability in the exercise of
statutory jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti
16
Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan , has
emphasized the necessity of recording reasons by judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative authorities exercising adjudicatory
functions. The Court held that recording of reasons is an essential

16 (2010) 9 SCC 496
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component of the principles of natural justice and reflects the
application of mind by the authority concerned.
32. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court finds that the objections raised by the petitioner
were of a substantial jurisdictional nature and required specific
consideration. The respondent authority could not have rejected
the same in a mechanical manner without examining their legal
implications. The failure to consider the binding precedent in
Dhariya Construction Co. (supra), coupled with the absence of a
reasoned determination of the objection concerning the
applicability of State PWD rates and the statutory limitation, has
resulted in an order which does not satisfy the requirements of a
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
33. It is also necessary to observe that the judgment passed by
this Court in Sachin Panchal (supra), relied upon by the
respondents, does not dispense with the requirement of
compliance with the statutory conditions governing reassessment
proceedings. The said judgment dealt with the interpretation of
the amended provisions of Section 149 read with the erstwhile
provisions of Sections 153A and 153C of the Act in the context of
search-related proceedings. The interpretation of the limitation
provisions in the aforesaid judgment cannot be construed to
confer an unrestricted power upon the Assessing Officer to initiate
reassessment proceedings irrespective of the statutory
requirements. The applicability of the limitation provisions has to
be examined with reference to the facts of each case and the
satisfaction of the conditions prescribed under the Act. The
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respondents were, therefore, required to establish that the
reassessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner were
within the prescribed period of limitation and were founded upon
legally sustainable information. The availability of an extended
limitation period, where applicable, cannot cure the absence of a
valid jurisdictional foundation for reassessment.
34. This Court is conscious of the fact that the reassessment
proceedings involve questions relating to valuation and
computation of income. However, the present controversy does
not require this Court to undertake a fresh determination of the
actual cost of construction or to adjudicate upon the quantum of
alleged unexplained investment. The limited issue is whether the
reassessment proceedings were initiated in accordance with the
statutory requirements and whether the objections raised by the
petitioner were lawfully considered. The existence of disputed
factual questions does not preclude the exercise of writ jurisdiction
where the challenge is directed against the assumption of
jurisdiction itself and the impugned action is found to suffer from a
manifest legal infirmity.
35. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the reassessment proceedings cannot be
sustained merely on the basis of the DVO report, particularly when
the respondent authority has failed to demonstrate independent
application of mind to the material relied upon for initiating the
proceedings. Further, the objections relating to the applicability of
State PWD rates and the consequential effect upon limitation were
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required to be considered in a reasoned manner, which has not
been done.
36. The impugned order disposing of the objections, therefore,
suffers from non-application of mind and is contrary to the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the ratio
enunciated in Dhariya Construction Co . (supra) and GKN
Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra). The action of the respondents,
in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is
consequently found to be unsustainable in law.
37. Accordingly, the present batch of writ petitions is allowed .
The impugned order dated 29.04.2024 passed under Section
148A(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the consequential
notice issued under Section 148 of the Act, along with the
subsequent reassessment proceedings, are hereby quashed and
set aside ( mutatis mutandis in the connected petitions). The
subsequent proceedings initiated pursuant to the aforesaid
notices, including the notice issued under Section 142(1) of the
Act, shall consequently stand quashed. The respondents are
directed to act in accordance with the statutory provisions and the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
38. No order is made as to costs. Pending applications, if any,
shall stand disposed.
39. A copy of the present order be separately placed in each
connected file.
(SAMEER JAIN),J (SANJAY K. AGRAWAL),CJ
Crt_1/Preeti Asopa
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