Itw Gse Aps & Anr. vs Dabico Airport Solutions Pvt Ltd & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court
Case type
Civil Suit Commercial
Decided on
12-03-2026

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 08.12.2025
Date of Decision: 12.03.2026
Judgment uploaded on: As per digital signature
+ CS(COMM) 628/2023 & CC(COMM) 1/2024 I.A. 18297/2023 I.A.
29589/2025

ITW GSE APS & ANR. .....Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Anirudh Bhakhru, Ms. Vaishali
Mittal, Mr. Siddhant Chamola and Mr.
Gursimran Singh Narula, Advocates

versus

DABICO AIRPORT SOLUTIONS PVT LTD & ORS.
.....Defendants
Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Apoorva Murali, Ms.
Aishwarya Chaturvedi and Ms.
Aishwarya Mukherjee, Advocates for
D-1, D-2 & D-3.
Mr. Rohan Swarup, Advocate for D-4

%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
J U D G M E N T

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:

I.A. 18297/2023 (application on behalf of defendant no. 3 under Order I Rule
10(2) CPC)

Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 1 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

1. This is an application filed by defendant no. 3 under Order I Rule 10(2)
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [‘CPC’], seeking
its deletion from the array of parties in the instant suit.
2. The plaintiffs have filed this suit seeking permanent injunction for
restraining infringement of their Indian Patent No. 330145 [‘IN’145’];
rendition of accounts; damages, etc. against defendant nos. 1 to 4.
2.1. It is averred in the plaint that plaintiffs have acquired knowledge that
defendants are manufacturing, using, offering for sale, selling, etc., by way of
airport tenders, infringing Pre-Conditioned Air units [‘PCA units’], in which
both the plaintiffs and defendants have participated.
2.2. The plaint sets out the infringing activities of the defendants in Section
‘D’ of the plaint, wherein the plaintiffs have raised a grievance about the sale
and installation of PCA units by the defendants at the Rajiv Gandhi
International Airport at Hyderabad [‘Hyderabad Airport’], Manohar
International Airport at Goa [‘Goa Airport’] and Indira Gandhi International
Airport at New Delhi [‘Delhi Airport’].
2.3. It is alleged that the infringing PCA units have been manufactured by
1
defendant no. 4 and installed by defendant no. 1 .
2.4. The alleged infringing models manufactured by defendants are enlisted
2
in Section ‘F’ of the plaint .
3
2.5. The cause of action has been set out in Section ‘H’ of the plaint , which
reiterates that the plaintiffs are aggrieved with the supply of allegedly
infringing PCA units at the Hyderabad Airport, Goa Airport and New Delhi
Airport.

1
Paragraph No. 36 of the plaint.
2
Paragraph No. 59 of the plaint.
3
Paragraph Nos. 65 to 69 of the plaint.
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 2 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

3. Defendant no. 3 in the captioned application, as well as in its written
statement, has categorically asserted that it is neither making, using, offering
for sale, selling, nor importing the alleged infringing PCA units or products
for which the IN’145 is allegedly applied.
3.1. It contends that there is no specific allegation made against defendant
no. 3 in the plaint, no relief has been sought against it and, therefore, contends
that defendant no. 3 has been incorrectly impleaded by the plaintiffs.
3.2. It contends that it is neither involved in the day-to-day business of
defendant nos. 1 and 2, nor does it have control over the businesses of the said
defendants.
3.3. The said pleas have been specifically pleaded in paragraph nos. ‘6 to 9’
of the preliminary submissions of its written statement.
4. The plaintiffs in their replication have stated that defendant no. 3, as per
the website of defendant no. 1, plays a pivotal role in the business of
defendant no. 1 inasmuch as it is involved in the management expertise,
combining capital with intellectual property, addressing functional areas, etc.
4.1. It is contended that defendant no. 3 is a proper party, and the plaint
sufficiently discloses the cause of action qua the said defendant.
4.2. The plaintiffs contend that Ms. Nidhi Arora, who has filed the written
statement on behalf of defendant no. 1 in the present suit, is also the Vice
President of defendant no. 3, and this fact highlights that defendant no. 3 plays
a significant role in the day-to-day business operations of defendant no. 1.
4.3. The plaintiffs have also relied upon the fact that the infringement was
initially carried out by an entity called Cavotec SA, which supplied the
allegedly infringing PCA units at the Hyderabad Airport and defendant no. 3
has acquired this [Airport] business from the said entity, i.e., Cavotec SA,
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 3 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

with knowledge of the patent disputes raised by the plaintiffs. In this regard,
the plaintiffs are relying upon the communication dated 09.05.2022.
4.4. Furthermore, the plaintiffs plead in replication that they believe that
defendant no. 3 is a key driver behind defendant no. 1’s decision to continue
infringement of the plaintiffs’ patent IN’ 145, and therefore the plaintiffs have
sufficient cause of action against defendant no. 3 to maintain this suit.
Therefore, the plaintiffs have stated that defendant no. 3 is a proper party to
the instant suit.
COURT’S FINDINGS
5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
6. The suit has been filed by the plaintiffs aggrieved by the alleged
infringement of their patent IN’145 by the defendants, who, as per the
plaintiffs, are manufacturing the alleged infringing PCA units and supplying
the said units in India, specifically at Hyderabad Airport, Goa Airport and
New Delhi Airport.
The record of the suit shows [and it is not disputed by the plaintiffs]
that defendant no. 3 had no direct role in the said supply of the PCA units at
any of the three [3] Airports. It is a matter of record that supplies of the PCA
units have been made by defendant no. 1 in the case of Goa Airport and Delhi
Airport. The supplies of PCA units for the Hyderabad Airport have been
made by a distinct UAE entity (who is not a party to these proceedings).
Defendant No. 4 has been impleaded in its capacity as the manufacturer
of the allegedly infringing PCA units.
7. In the plaint, the sole basis for impleading defendant nos. 2 and 3 is on
the premise that they are the shareholders in defendant no. 1. The plaint
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 4 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

identifies defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 4 as the infringing entities. In the
replication, the plaintiffs have averred in response to applicant/defendant no.
3’s plea for its deletion that the said defendant is a ‘ proper party ’.
8. Before examining the merit of this plea raised by the plaintiffs, it would
be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramesh
Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
4
and Others which sets out the well-settled legal principles for determining
who is a necessary or proper party. The relevant paragraph 6 reads as follows:
“6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every
case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to
bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party
has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that
only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one
without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in
whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is
necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the
proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial
jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised
in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”

9. The expressions necessary or proper party have been considered by the
Courts in several decisions, and it is well settled that a necessary party is one
without whom no order can be passed effectively. Whereas a proper party is
one in whose absence though an effective order can be passed, but whose
presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question
involved in the proceedings. [ Re: Globe Ground (India) Employees Union
5
v. Lufthansa German Airlines] .
10. Initially, when the captioned application was argued on 04.09.2025, the
plaintiffs had opposed the prayer for deletion by reiterating the plea that

4
(1992) 2 SCC 524
5
(2019) 15 SCC 273 [Paragraph No. 10]
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 5 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

defendant no. 3 is a shareholder in defendant no. 1 and, therefore, a proper
party .
11. Defendant no. 3 disputed the said submission of the plaintiffs and
sought liberty to file an affidavit. Defendant no. 3 has since filed an affidavit
dated 22.09.2025 in support of the captioned application, setting out in detail
facts to demonstrate that it is not a direct shareholder in either defendant no. 1
or defendant no. 2. The relevant paragraphs of the said affidavit read as
under:-
“3. I state that Fernweh Group LLC (Defendant No. 3) has filed the
Application under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") seeking the deletion of its name from the array of
parties in the present Suit.

4. I state that Defendant No. 3 acquired the airport solutions business of
Cavotec SA, which was later rebranded to Dabico Airport Solutions.

5. I say that Defendant No. 3, a United States limited liability company, is an
investment holding entity that ultimately owns and controls a portfolio of
companies, including Femweh Dabico LLC and Femweh Dabico Holdings
LLC.

6. I say that Defendant No. 3 directly owns 100% of Femweh Dabico LLC
which in tum holds a direct 94.21 % economic interest (with 100% voting
control) in Femweh Dabico Holdings LLC. I say that four other LLC
companies unrelated to our company, also have economic interest in Femweh
Dabico Holdings LLC in amounts ranging from 0.29% to of2.49% each.

7. I state that Femweh Dabico Holdings LLC owns the Dabico Corporation
and its operating subsidiaries, including Dabico Netherlands Holding BV
(Defendant No. 2) which in turn owns Dabico Airport Solutions India Pvt.
Ltd. (Defendant No. I).

8. As is evident from the foregoing, Defendant No.3 is merely a shareholder,
through a chain of intermediary entities, in Defendant No. I and Defendant
No.2.

9. I state that the involvement of Defendant No.3 in Dabico Corporation,
including Defendant No. I and 2, is limited to that of a passive shareholder
and ultimate beneficiary owner without any effective operational control, or
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 6 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

day-to-day involvement in the affairs or business decisions of the said
Defendants.

10. I confirm that Defendant No.3 does not:
(a) manufacture, use, sell, offer for sale, or import any products
alleged to infringe the Plaintiffs' Indian Patent No. 330145;
(b) participate in, direct, supervise or control the business
operations, strategic decisions, or technical functions of Defendant
Nos. 1 and 2;
(c) derive any revenue m India other than by way of shareholder
returns, if any, declared by Defendant No.1.

11. I state that Defendant N o.3 's role is confined to that of a passive financial
investor whose role does not extend to the day-to-day activities of its
portfolio companies.”
[Emphasis supplied]

6

12. Similarly, defendant nos. 1 and 2 in their joint written statement have
categorically averred that defendant no. 2 is a shareholder of defendant no. 1
company and holds 100% shareholding in defendant no. 1. Thereby
confirming that defendant no. 3 is not a shareholder in defendant no. 1.
13. The aforesaid fact with respect to the composition of the shareholding
of defendant no. 1 is now undisputed.
14. Therefore, the initial premise setup in the plaint alleging that defendant
no. 3 is a shareholder in defendant no. 1, as the basis for the impleadment of
defendant no. 3 is factually incorrect. The captioned application for deletion
is liable to be allowed on this ground alone.
15. Nevertheless, this Court has also examined the legality of the plaintiffs’
submission regarding whether defendant no. 3 can be considered a proper
party to the suit on the premise that defendant no. 3 is the shareholder of
defendant no. 1.

6
Dated 29.12.2023
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 7 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs’ plea that
defendant no. 3 is a proper party to the suit as it is the shareholder of
defendant no. 1 cannot form the legal basis for impleading defendant no. 3 in
this suit, as a proper party . It is a settled position in law that the liabilities of
each juristic entity, even if it is a wholly owned subsidiary of another
company, are distinct and separate. And the holding company or a
shareholder is not liable for the actions of the subsidiary company. The
authoritative judgment on this issue by the Supreme Court in Vodafone
7

International Holdings BV v. Union of India is as under: -
254. The Companies Act in India and all over the world have statutorily
recognised subsidiary company as a separate legal entity . Section 2(47) of
the Companies Act, 1956 defines “subsidiary company” or “subsidiary”, a
subsidiary company within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act. For the
purpose of the Companies Act, a company shall be subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3) of Section 4, be deemed to be subsidiary of another, subject
to certain conditions, which includes holding of share capital in excess of
50% controlling the composition of the Board of Directors and gaining status
of a subsidiary with respect to the third company by the holding company's
subsidisation of the third company.

255. A holding company is one which owns sufficient shares in the subsidiary
company to determine who shall be its Directors and how its affairs shall be
conducted. The position in India and elsewhere is that the holding company
controls a number of subsidiaries and respective businesses of companies
within the group and manage and integrate as a whole as though they are
merely departments of one large undertaking owned by the holding company.
But, the business of a subsidiary is not the business of the holding
company (see Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley [(1908) 2 KB 89:
(1908-10) All ER Rep 833], All ER Rep at p. 837).

256. Subsidiary companies are, therefore, the integral part of corporate
structure. Activities of the companies over the years have grown enormously
of its incorporation and outside and their structures have become more
complex. Multinational companies having large volume of business
nationally or internationally will have to depend upon their subsidiary
companies in the national and international level for better returns for the

7
(2012) 6 SCC 613
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 8 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

investors and for the growth of the company. When a holding company owns
all of the voting stock of another company, the company is said to be a WOS
of the parent company. Holding companies and their subsidiaries can create
pyramids, whereby a subsidiary owns a controlling interest in another
company, thus becoming its parent company.

257. The legal relationship between a holding company and WOS is that they
are two distinct legal persons and the holding company does not own the
assets of the subsidiary and, in law, the management of the business of the
subsidiary also vests in its Board of Directors. In Bacha F.
Guzdar v. CIT [AIR 1955 SC 74], this Court held that shareholders' only
right is to get dividend if and when the company declares it, to participate in
the liquidation proceeds and to vote at the shareholders' meeting. Refer also
to Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 791] and Carrasco
Investments Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement [(1994) 79 Comp Cas 631
(Del)].

258. Holding company, of course, if the subsidiary is a WOS, may appoint or
remove any Director if it so desires by a resolution in the general body
meeting of the subsidiary. Holding companies and subsidiaries can be
considered as single economic entity and consolidated balance sheet is the
accounting relationship between the holding company and subsidiary
company, which shows the status of the entire business enterprises. Shares of
stock in the subsidiary company are held as assets on the books of the parent
company and can be issued as collateral for additional debt
financing. Holding company and subsidiary company are, however,
considered as separate legal entities, and subsidiary is allowed decentralised
management. Each subsidiary can reform its own management personnel
and holding company may also provide expert, efficient and competent
services for the benefit of the subsidiaries .

259. The US Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods [141 L Ed 2d 43 :
524 US 51 (1998)] explained that it is a general principle of corporate law and
legal systems that a parent corporation is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiary, but the Court went on to explain that corporate veil can be pierced
and the parent company can be held liable for the conduct of its subsidiary, if
the corporal form is misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, when
the parent company is directly a participant in the wrong complained of. Mere
ownership, parental control, management, etc. of a subsidiary is not sufficient
to pierce the status of their relationship and, to hold parent company liable. In
Adams v. Cape Industries Plc. [1990 Ch 433 : (1990) 2 WLR 657 : (1991) 1
All ER 929 (CA)], the Court of Appeal emphasised that it is appropriate to
pierce the corporate veil where special circumstances exist indicating that it is
mere facade concealing true facts.

Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 9 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

260.Courts, however, will not allow the separate corporate entities to be used
as a means to carry out fraud or to evade tax. Parent company of a WOS, is
not responsible, legally for the unlawful activities of the subsidiary save in
exceptional circumstances, such as a company is a sham or the agent of the
shareholder, the parent company is regarded as a shareholder. Multinational
companies, by setting up complex vertical pyramid-like structures, would be
able to distance themselves and separate the parent from operating
companies, thereby protecting the multinational companies from legal
liabilities.
[Emphasis supplied]

17. It would also be apposite to refer to the dicta of the Supreme Court in
Globe Ground (India) Employees Union (supra), which held in favour of
the respondent [holding company] therein whilst reiterating the well-settled
legal principle that though shares may be held by a holding company in a
subsidiary, the subsidiary continues to exist as an independent corporate
entity. The Supreme Court opined that the mere fact that a company holds
shares in such a subsidiary cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds for
directing the impleadment of the parent or holding company. The relevant
paragraph reads as follows: -
“18. The other judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal , this Court again considered the test
to be applied while considering the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is held that to consider the scope of
application, the tests are:

(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of
controversies involved in the proceedings;

(2) no effective decree can be passed in its absence.

Applying the aforesaid ratio laid down in the judgment, referred in the
aforesaid cases, we are of the view that the said judgment relied on supports
the case of the respondents. Further, we are of the view that even in a
subsidiary company which is an independent corporate entity, if any
other company is holding shares, by itself is no ground to order
impleadment of parent company per se. In the case at hand, it is clear that
the second respondent itself is a company in which the subsidiary of the first
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 10 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

respondent, namely, Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH, was holding 51%
shares and 49% shares were held by the Bird Group. As per the case of the
appellant, the Bird Group has floated another company and started handling
services from the month of January, 2009 by utilising the same equipments
and vehicles belonging to the second respondent.”
[Emphasis supplied]

18. In view of the settled position of law which recognizes the subsidiary as
an entity separate from the holding company and a juristic entity separate
from its shareholder, the fact that defendant no. 3 is the ultimate beneficial
owner or shareholder of defendant no. 1, would not make it liable for the
alleged infringement actions of defendant no. 1 and therefore, the plaintiffs
cannot have any cause of action against defendant no. 3.
19. This Court has also perused the plaint, and it notes that the plaint fails
to disclose any cause of action against defendant no. 3. The cause of action of
the plaintiffs against defendant no. 3 is not clearly discernible from the plaint
and appears to have changed/evolved in the pleadings filed subsequent to the
institution of the suit. The sole basis for impleading defendant no. 3 in the
8
plaint is that it acquired defendant no. 1 from Cavotec, SA.
20. This Court notes that at paragraph nos. ‘19’, ‘20’ and ‘21’ of the plaint,
after referring to defendant no. 3, the plaint makes a declaration that the
defendant nos. 1 to 3 in the plaint will be simply referred to collectively as
DABICO. Resultantly, there are no specific pleadings qua defendant no. 3’s
role qua infringement of IN’145 in the plaint. This form of pleading has led to
ambiguity, as the plaint fails to identify the specific role of defendant no. 3 in
the cause of action of infringement, which forms the fundamental basis of the
plaintiffs’ grievance. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to take advantage of

8
Paragraph 20 of the plaint.
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CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 11 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

the deliberate ambiguity in their pleading in the plaint to oppose this prayer of
deletion of defendant no. 3.
21. The only discernible plea in the plaint is that defendant no. 3 is a
shareholder of defendant no. 1 [which as noted above is incorrect]. In the
considered opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs cannot maintain this suit for
infringement against defendant no. 3 on the plea that defendant no. 3
exercises any alleged indirect control over defendant no. 1’s managerial
decisions.
22. Defendant no. 3 has already stated that it is not manufacturing the
alleged infringing PCA units.
23. As a matter of fact, defendant no. 3 played no role in the supply of PCA
units to Hyderabad Airport, Goa Airport and New Delhi Airport, and this fact
is not disputed by the plaintiffs, which is itself sufficient to allow the
application. Admittedly, it is defendant no. 4, who is manufacturing the PCA
units and defendant no. 1, who is installing the said units.
24. If the plaintiffs succeed in proving their claim of infringement in the
suit, their claim for damages would be maintainable against defendant no. 1
only [for the supplies made by defendant no. 1 to Goa Airport and Delhi
Airport] as well as defendant no. 4. However, there can be no claim for the
said supplies against defendant no. 3. For determination of the said reliefs
sought by the plaintiffs against defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 4, the
presence of defendant no. 3 is not required [which is the only test for a proper
party ].
25. The plaintiffs, during arguments, orally submitted that defendant no. 1
in the pleadings has denied its [monetary] liability for the supply of infringing
PCA units made to Hyderabad Airport and for this reason, defendant no. 3’s
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CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 12 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

presence is proper. It is argued that the supply of PCA units to Hyderabad
Airport was made by an entity called Cavotec, Middle-East, FZE, UAE
[‘Cavotec UAE’], and since the airport business of Cavotec SA has been
taken over by defendant no. 3, the liabilities on account of patent infringement
attached with the said sale to Hyderabad Airport would also fall on defendant
no. 3.
26. For raising this plea, the plaintiffs rely upon the reply filed by
defendant nos. 1 and 2 to I.A. 37937/2024 for making these submissions. The
relevant paragraphs of the reply read as follows: -
“6. In good faith and without prejudice to its rights and contentions, it is
submitted that the order for supplying the PCA units to the Hyderabad
Airport was placed on Cavotec Middle East FZE (a UAE entity) [“Cavotec
UAE”] by Megawide Construction (Singapore) PTE. Ltd.

7. It is submitted that the scope of this order included the supply of 25
(twenty-five) Ground Power Units [“GPU”] and 36 (thirty-six) PCA units
along with accessories. The revenue earned by Cavotec UAE from the sale of
the said 36 (thirty-six) PCA units (excluding accessories) was USD
42,71,612 [USD Four Million Two Hundred Seventy-One Thousand Six
Hundred and Twelve Only].”

27. The submission of the plaintiffs that defendant no. 3 is a proper party
to enable the plaintiffs to recover their claim of damages for the infringing
products supplied/sold at Hyderabad Airport by Cavotec UAE, is a plea that is
not raised in the plaint, the replication or reply to the application. This is a
plea raised during arguments and in the written submissions.
28. In the replication filed to the plaint, the impleadment of defendant no. 3
was sought to be justified by stating that defendant no. 3 exercises
decision-making control on the affairs of defendant no. 1 and, therefore,
sought to attribute the alleged act of infringement of defendant no. 1 to the
managerial control of defendant no. 3 over defendant no. 1.
Signature Not Verified
CS(COMM) 628/2023 Page 13 of 17

Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

29. The plaintiffs thereafter changed their stand in their written
submissions dated 10.12.2025 filed in support of the captioned application,
contending that the role of defendant no. 3 in the supply of PCA units to
Hyderabad Airport would require determination at trial. It was further
submitted therein that the impleadment of defendant no. 3 is necessary to
ensure accountability in respect of the disclosures made by defendant nos. 1
and 2 regarding the income which accrued to Cavotec, UAE, under the
Hyderabad contract, and for confirmation of the revenue disclosures made by
defendant nos. 1 and 2.
30. However, the Supreme Court in its judgment of Ramesh Hirachand
Kundanmal (supra) has held that no person can be made a party to the suit for
the purposes of seeking information from it. The relevant para 14 reads as
follows:-
“14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that
appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main
objective . The person to be joined must be one whose presence is
necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely
that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that
would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an
interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of
relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to
make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result
of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in
the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a
party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between
the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is,
therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in
the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a
result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is
difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person
whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision
was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273
: (1956) 1 QB 357], wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry,
J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England [(1950) 2 All ER
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Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07

605, 611], that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the
constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result
on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established,
Devlin, J. has stated:

“The test is ‘May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect
the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights’.”
[Emphasis supplied]

31. The aforesaid improvements and changing stances in the pleadings and
oral submissions show that the plaintiffs are without any legal basis raising
pleas to somehow continue the suit defendant no. 3 on one ground or another
as a party to the present suit, seemingly with a view to exert some form of
coercion. It is otherwise apparent that the alleged acts of infringement, of
which the plaintiffs claim to be aggrieved, are attributed only to defendant
nos. 1 and 4.
This plea is, therefore, liable to be rejected and not considered on this
ground alone.
32. Nevertheless, this Court notes that the Cavotec UAE entity is also a
distinct and separate juristic entity, and there is no legal basis for the plaintiffs
to seek recovery of damages from defendant no. 3 for the supplies made by
Cavotec, UAE, to the Hyderabad Airport.
33. The suit cannot continue against defendant no. 3 on the plea that it has
acquired the airport business of Cavotec SA, in the absence of proof of any
legal liability assumed by defendant no. 3 for the supplies made by Cavotec
UAE to the Hyderabad Airport, and to permit the continuation of the suit
against defendant no. 3 on such a vague oral plea would be without any legal
basis. The plaintiffs have sought to rely upon the e-mail/letter dated
09.05.2022 addressed by the plaintiffs to defendant no. 3 as forming the basis
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of its cause of action. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, the
said e-mail would not make defendant no. 3 liable for the actions of Cavotec,
UAE or Cavotec, SA.
34. There is no basis in law for the plaintiffs to contend that defendant no. 3
is liable for rendering accounts for the sale made of the PCA units by Cavotec,
UAE, to Hyderabad Airport.
35. Therefore, as noted above, the plaintiffs have been unable to set forth
any facts which would persuade this Court to hold that defendant no. 3’s
presence is necessary in these proceedings for the determination of the issue
of infringement of IN’ 145 by defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 4. The relief
of injunction and damages prayed for by the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs
succeed, can be granted against defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 4 without
the presence of defendant no. 3. This Court, therefore, finds that defendant no.
3 is not a proper party in these proceedings.
36. In these facts, this Court finds that the application is liable to succeed as
defendant no. 3 is neither a proper nor a necessary party.
37. This Court takes on record the statement made by defendant no. 3 that
it is not making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the products on
which the IN’145 is allegedly applied as set out in paragraph ‘8’ of the
preliminary submissions of its written statement. Defendant no. 3 is bound
down to the said statement.
38. The application is accordingly allowed.
39. It is made clear that the deletion of defendant no. 3 is not an expression
of opinion on the merits of the claim made by the plaintiffs with respect to the
infringement qua its PCA units.
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40. This application has been allowed upon the consideration and the
finding that defendant no. 3 is not liable for the alleged acts of infringement,
which acts are specifically ascribed to an independent legal entity, such as
defendant nos. 1 and 4 in the plaint and the cause of action, if any, which the
plaintiffs can have is only qua the UAE entity which made the supplies to the
Hyderabad Airport.
CS(COMM) 628/2023
41. The plaintiffs are directed to file an amended memo of parties.
42. List before the Roster Bench for directions on 27.03.2026.


MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
(JUDGE)
MARCH 12, 2026 /mt/aa


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Digitally Signed
By:RASHMI DABAS
Signing Date:16.03.2026
11:45:07