JOGINDER SINGH vs STATE OF HP

Court
High Court of Himachal Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 369 of 2015
Reserved on: 30.10.2026
Date of Decision: 19.11.2026.
Joginder Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vipin Pandit,
Advocate.
For the respondent/State : Mr. P.K. Nadda, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the
judgment dated 06.08.2015 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District, Solan, camp at Nalagarh
(learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of
conviction dated 30.08.2012 and order of sentence dated
24.09.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Court No. 2, Nalagarh, District Solan (learned Trial Court) were
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
complaint are that the police presented a challan before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian
Penal Code (in short "IPC") and Sections 181 and 190 (3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act (in short "MV Act"). It was asserted that the
informant, Bhag Singh (PW2), is running a shop at Peerthan. A
truck bearing registration number HP-12-2588 came from
Baddi at about 8:25 p.m. at high speed. One of its headlights
was not functioning. The truck hit the motorcycle without any
registration number. The motorcycle rider sustained injuries.
The informant and other people carried the injured to the
hospital. The truck driver identified himself as Joginder Singh
(the present accused). The accident occurred because of the
negligence of the accused and the high speed of the truck. An
intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext.PW8/A) was
recorded at the Police Station, and ASI Paramjit Singh (PW6)
went for verification. He recorded the informant's statement
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(Ext.PW2/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR
(Ext.PW6/A) was registered. ASI Paramjit Singh (PW6)
investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/B),
took photographs of the spot (Ext.P1 to Ext.P4), whose
negatives are Ext. P5 to Ext. P8, and seized the motorcycle and
the truck vide memo (Ext.PW2/B). Rajinder Singh (PW3)
examined the vehicles and found that they had no defect that
could have led to the accident. He issued the reports
(Ext.PW3/A and Ext. PW3/B). ASI Paramjit Singh (PW6) went to
the hospital, where he found that the injured Mukesh Kumar
had succumbed to his injuries. ASI Paramjit Singh (PW6)
conducted the inquest (Ext. PW5/A) on the dead body and filed
an application for conducting the post-mortem examination of
the deceased. Dr Seema (PW9) conducted the post-mortem
examination and found that the cause of death was a head
injury. She issued the report (Ext.PW9/A). Bimal Gupta, the
owner of the truck, produced the documents which were seized
vide memo (Ext. PW5/A). Yashpal produced the documents of
the motorcycle which were seized vide memo (Ext. PW4/A).
Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version,
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and after the completion of investigation, the challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and
Sections 181 and 190 (3) of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove
its case. Gurcharan Singh (PW1) did not support the
prosecution’s case. The informant Bhag Singh (PW2)
witnessed the accident. Rajinder Singh (PW3) conducted the
mechanical examination of the vehicles. Narinder Kumar
(PW4), HC Ram Nath (PW5) and Mohammed Mushtaq (PW7)
witnessed the recoveries. ASI Paramjit Singh (PW6) conducted
the investigation. Constable Naresh Kumar (PW8) proved the
entry in the daily diary. Dr Seema (PW9) conducted the
postmortem examination.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted
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that he was driving the truck bearing registration number HP-
12-2588, which was taken into possession by the police. He
denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that the
motorcycle had not hit the truck and he was innocent. He did
not produce any evidence in his defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant
Bhag Singh did not name the driver of the truck; however, the
accused admitted in his statement recorded under section 313
of the CrPC that he was driving the truck at the time of the
accident. The suggestions put to the informant also established
that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the
accident. It was duly proved on record that one of the
headlights of the truck was not functioning, and the truck was
being driven towards the wrong side of the road. These
circumstances proved the negligence of the accused. Mukesh
had died in the accident caused by the negligence of the
accused. The accused had also not produced his driving licence.
Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the
accused as under:
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Sections Sentences
279 of the Indian
Penal Code
The accused was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for
three months, pay a fine of
₹1,000/-, and, in default of
payment of the fine, to undergo
further simple imprisonment for 30
days.
304-A of the Indian
Penal Code
The accused was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for
three months, pay a fine of
₹1000/-, and, in default of payment
of the fine, to undergo further
simple imprisonment for 30 days.
181 of the Motor
Vehicles Act.
The accused was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for
three months, pay a fine of ₹500/-,
and, in default of payment of the
fine, to undergo further simple
imprisonment for 30 days.
190 (3) of the Motor
Vehicle Act.
The accused was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for
three months, pay a fine of
₹3,000/-, and, in default of
payment of the fine, to undergo
further simple imprisonment for 30
days.
All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were
ordered to run concurrently.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed
by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which
was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan,
District Solan, Camp at Nalagarh (learned Appellate Court).
The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused admitted
in his statement recorded under section 313 of the CrPC that he
was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. It was duly
proved on record that the truck had only one headlight
functioning. Driving the truck in the middle of the night with
one headlight functioning amounted to negligence. Mukesh
Kumar died in the accident because of the negligence of the
accused. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate
sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment
and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal
was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material on record. The statements of the
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
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aspects. The site plan does not corroborate the statements of
the witnesses. The informant Bhag Singh specifically stated
that the motorcycle had hit the truck, which showed the
negligence of the motorcyclists. The prosecution had not led
any evidence to show that the accused was driving the truck at
the time of the accident, and the learned Courts below erred in
relying upon the statement of the accused recorded under
section 313 of the CrPC to record the conviction of the accused.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed
and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts
below be set aside.
9. I have heard. Mr Vipin Pandit, learned counsel for
the petitioner/accused, and Mr P K Nadda, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
10. Mr Vipin Pandit, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below
erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The statements of
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
aspects. The prosecution had not led any evidence to show that
the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident,
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and the learned Courts below relied upon the statement of the
accused recorded under section 313 of the CrPC to convict the
accused. The statement of the accused recorded under section
313 of the CrPC does not amount to substantive evidence, and
no conviction could have been recorded on it. There was no
evidence of the negligence of the accused, and the learned
Courts below erred in convicting the accused merely because
an accident had taken place. The benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act was not extended to the accused. Therefore, he
prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments
and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr P K Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General
for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused had
admitted in his statement recorded under section 313 of the
CrPC that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident
and the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the
statement. It was duly proved on record that the truck was
being driven towards the wrong side of the road with only one
functioning headlight, which showed the negligence of the
accused. Mukesh Kumar had died in the accident and learned
Courts below had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused.
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This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while
deciding the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present
revision be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a
revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can
only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It
was observed:
“7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the
contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as
a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the
power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine
the correctness, legality or propriety of any order
passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is
extracted as hereunder:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision.— (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
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satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling, for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement that he be released
on his own bond or bail bond pending the
examination of the record.
Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this
subsection and of section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been
made by any person either to the High Court or to the
Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of them.”
Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
should be exercised within the four corners of this
section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice.
However, while exercising power under this section, the
Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore,
while considering the legality, propriety or the
correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional
court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and
the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court,
in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself
about the correctness, legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower
court, and should refrain from substituting its
conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence,
and the findings of the lower courts should not be
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reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view
is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a
position did not also emanate from the evidence on
record.
7.1. This Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan
Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-
depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and
medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to
the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the
facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the
High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent
findings of conviction of the trial court and the
Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and
reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in
setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment
and orders of the trial and appellate courts.
7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order
dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court
went into great detail into each of the testimonies,
documents and merits of the case, which could have
been avoided, especially when the subject matter had
come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as
an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go
into the merits of the case, something which is
generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction
is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC
452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 , while considering the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following:
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is
one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
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Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the
power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even
as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily,
therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its
own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as
the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring
feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to a gross
miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned
judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid
standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the
conclusion that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the
Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction
have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court
wherein time and again it has been observed that the
High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the
lower court unless:
i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse,
grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or
wholly unreliable or untenable in law.
ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order
after considering immaterial or irrelevant
material or no material at all.
iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant
material or the judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025
INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein
the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of
conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act, while setting
aside the impugned order, observed as under:
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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence
of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This
Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional
Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on
record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH,
(2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of
law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even
if a wrong order is passed by a Court having
jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in
the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High
Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction,
to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court
and the Sessions Court.”
7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the
High Court has failed to highlight any reason or
material satisfaction to the effect that there was any
such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the
face of the record to justify the exercise of the powers
under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in
interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts
below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed
by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view
that the High Court committed an error in setting aside
the order of conviction in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned
by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise
its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the
conviction.
14. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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15. The informant Bhag Singh (PW2) stated that he
could not identify the truck driver because the driver had run
away from the spot. He admitted in his cross-examination that
the police had not asked him to identify the truck driver and he
could not say who was driving the truck at the time of the
accident. Therefore, his testimony does not prove that the
accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident.
16. The prosecution did not examine the owner of the
truck to prove that he had employed the accused as the driver.
No other person stated that the accused was driving the truck
at the time of the accident. Thus, the prosecution’s evidence
did not prove that the accused was driving the truck at the time
of the accident.
17. The learned Courts below held that the statement of
the accused recorded under section 313 of CrPC proved that the
accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. This
conclusion cannot be sustained. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002)
10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933 , that the
statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can be
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used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution,
but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It
was observed at page 244:
27. The statement made in defence by the accused under
Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend
credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but
only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole
basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost
settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the
accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It
may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of
his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false
on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See
Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969
SC 422 : (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23)
“ 23 . In this case, the exculpatory part of the
statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently
improbable but is contradicted by the other
evidence. According to this statement, the injury
that the appellant received was caused by the
appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of
Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the
victim. This was contradicted by the statement of
the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the
effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle
with a herdsman. The injury found on his body
when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-
1961 negates both these versions. Neither of these
versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which
led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in
River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the
washing of the bloodstains being so considerable
as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey,
PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The
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bleeding was not a simple one, as his clothes all
got stained with blood, as also his books, his
exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than
that, the knife which was discovered on his person
was found to have been stained with blood
according to the report of the Chemical Examiner.
According to the post-mortem report, this knife
could have been the cause of the injuries on the
victim. In circumstances like these, there being
enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the
statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High
Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory
part and piercing the same with the other evidence to
come to the conclusion that the appellant was the
person responsible for the crime .” (emphasis
supplied)
18. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC
OnLine SC 213 , that the statement of the accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C., insofar as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be
used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at
page 275: -
“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to
put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of
recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC
is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
circumstances appearing against him as well as to put
forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once
he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences
in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of
this opportunity, then his statement made under
Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the
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prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a
conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the
consequences in law.”
19. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.
State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014
SCC OnLine SC 199 , and it was held that the statement of the
accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to
lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses,
but the accused cannot be held liable for punishment merely
based on the answers given by him in his statement recorded
under section 313 of the CrPC. It was held at page 761: -
24. We are of the view that, under Section 313
statement, if the accused admits that, from the
evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained
severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and
his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313
statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court, in State
of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992
SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to
the accused, the statement made by the accused under
Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and
the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable
to punishment merely on the basis of answers given
while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC.
But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the
accused in response to his examination under Section
313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an
inquiry or trial. This Court, in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh
v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC
468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933, held that the answers given by the
accused under Section 313 examination can be used for
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proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the
prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab
(1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that
when the accused confesses to the commission of the
offence with which he is charged, the court may rely
upon the confession and proceed to convict him.
25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10
SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para
27)
“ 27 . The statement made in defence by the
accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly
be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence
led by the prosecution, but only a part of such
statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be
made the sole basis of his conviction.”
In this connection, reference may also be made
to the judgments of this Court in Devender
Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9
SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185; and Bishnu Prasad
Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467:
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766 . The above-mentioned
decisions would indicate that the statement of
the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the
admission of his guilt or confession as such
cannot be made the sole basis for finding the
accused guilty, the reason being that he is not
making the statement on oath, but all the
same, the confession or admission of guilt can
be taken as a piece of evidence since the same
lends credence to the evidence led by the
prosecution.
26. We may, however, indicate that the answers
given by the accused while examining him under
Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW
10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled
against the appellant stand proved, and the trial
court and the High Court have rightly found him
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guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436
and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.”
20. A similar view was taken in Mohd. Firoz v. State of
M.P. , (2022) 7 SCC 443: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 165 : 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 480, wherein it was observed at page 460:
“36… ..There cannot be gainsaying that no conviction
could be based on the statement of the accused recorded
under Section 313CrPC and the prosecution has to prove
the guilt of the accused by leading independent and
cogent evidence; nonetheless, it is an equally settled
proposition of law that when the accused makes
inculpatory and exculpatory statements, the inculpatory
part of the statement can be taken aid of to lend
credence to the case of the prosecution.
*
38. In the instant case also, though the conviction of the
appellant-accused could not be made merely on his
admission of the circumstance of his visit to the house
of the informant on the previous day evening of the
fateful day, such admission could certainly be taken aid
of to lend assurance to the evidence of the prosecution.
21. The law relating to the statement of the accused
under Section 313 of CrPC was summarised in Indrakunwar v.
State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364 wherein it was
observed:
35. A perusal of various judgments [ Premchand v. State
of Maharashtra, (2023) 5 SCC 522 (2-Judge Bench); Jai
Dev v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 612]; Asraf Ali v. State
of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328 (2-Judge Bench); Inspector of
Customs v. Yashpal, (2009) 4 SCC 769 (3-Judge Bench);
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Fainul Khan v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 9 SCC 549 (2-
Judge Bench); Mohd. Firoz v. State of M.P., (2022) 7 SCC
443 (3-Judge Bench); Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of
Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 467 (2-Judge Bench; Dehal Singh v.
State of H.P., (2010) 9 SCC 85 (2-Judge Bench);
Brajendrasingh v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 289 (2-Judge
Bench); Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 (3-Judge Bench); Hate
Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1951 SCC
1060]; Shamu Balu Chaugule v. State of Maharashtra,
(1976) 1 SCC 438; Paul v. State of Kerala, (2020) 3 SCC 115
(2-Judge Bench); Kalicharan v. State of U.P., (2023) 2 SCC
583 (2-Judge Bench); Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2022) 2 SCC 89 (3-Judge Bench); Jai Prakash Tiwari v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 966 (3-
Judge Bench); Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2021) 6
SCC 1 (2-Judge Bench); Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2012) 11 SCC 181 (2-Judge Bench) ; and Selvi v. State of
Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263 (3-Judge Bench) .] rendered
by this Court reveals the following principles, as evolved
over time when considering such statements.
35.1 The object, evident from the Section itself, is to
enable the accused to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against them.
35.2 The intent is to establish a dialogue between the
Court and the accused. This process benefits the
accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final
verdict.
35.3 The process enshrined is not a matter of
procedural formality but is based on the cardinal
principle of natural justice, i.e., audi alteram partem .
35.4 The ultimate test when concerned with the
compliance of the Section is to enquire and ensure
whether the accused got the opportunity to say his
piece.
35.5 In such a statement, the accused may or may not
admit involvement or any incriminating
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circumstance or may even offer an alternative
version of events or interpretation. The accused may
not be put to prejudice by any omission or
inadequate questioning.
35.6 The right to remain silent or any answer to a
question which may be false shall not be used to his
detriment, being the sole reason.
35.7 This statement cannot form the sole basis of
conviction and is neither a substantive nor a
substitute piece of evidence. It does not discharge but
reduces the prosecution's burden of leading evidence
to prove its case. They are to be used to examine the
veracity of the prosecution's case.
35.8 This statement is to be read as a whole. One part
cannot be read in isolation.
35.9 Such a statement, as not on oath, does not
qualify as a piece of evidence under Section 3 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872; however, the inculpatory
aspect as may be borne out from the statement may
be used to lend credence to the case of the
prosecution.
35.10 The circumstances not put to the accused while
rendering his statement under the Section are to be
excluded from consideration as no opportunity has
been afforded to him to explain them.
35.11 The Court is obligated to put, in the form of
questions, all incriminating circumstances to the
accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate
his defence. The defence so articulated must be
carefully scrutinised and considered.
35.12 Non-compliance with the Section may cause
prejudice to the accused and may impede the process
of arriving at a fair decision.
22. Therefore, it is apparent from the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court can rely upon the
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statements of the accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to
lend assurance to the prosecution case. However, the
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot form the
sole basis for conviction without any evidence. The reason for
this is not far to seek. The Courts can only put the proved
incriminating circumstances to the accused in a statement
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and if there are no
incriminating circumstances, the question cannot be put to the
accused, and the accused cannot be expected to answer it.
Hence, any question put without any evidence and any answer
thereto will be insufficient to record the conviction of the
accused. The statement recorded under section 313 of the CrPC
is intended for the benefit of the accused to explain any
incriminating circumstances appearing in the record against
him and not for the benefit of prosecution to elicit
incriminating facts from the accused.
23. In the present case also, no witness had deposed
that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the
accident the learned trial Court could not have put any question
to the accused that he was driving the truck at the time of the
accident, and the accused cannot be held liable merely because
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he had admitted in his statement recorded under section 313 of
the CrPC that he was driving the truck at the time of the
accident.
24. The learned appellate Court was aware of the legal
position but held that in the present case the prosecution had
adduced cogent and satisfactory evidence on the point of
accident and the cause thereof; however, it ignored that there
was no evidence regarding the identity of the accused as the
driver of the truck.
25. Learned trial Court also held that the suggestions
put to the informant in the cross-examination also proved that
the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident
because the accused could not have known about the pebbles
on the road and how the motorcycle had hit the truck. This
finding ignored the site plan (Ext. PW6/B) wherein the grits are
shown to be lying at the place of the accident. Thus, the
accused could not have been convicted merely because of the
suggestions made to the informant.
26. Thus, the learned Courts below erred in relying
upon the statement of the accused recorded under section 313
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of the CrPC to record the conviction and the judgments and
order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained.
27. No other point was urged.
28. In view of the above, the judgments and order
passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained.
Hence, the present revision is allowed, and the judgment of
conviction dated 30.08.2012 and order of sentence dated
24.09.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Court No. 2, Nalagarh, District Solan, as affirmed by the
judgment dated 06.08.2015 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District, Solan, camp at Nalagarh, are
ordered to be set aside, and the accused is acquitted of the
charged offences. The fine, if deposited, be refunded to the
petitioner/accused after the expiry of the period of limitation,
in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same
be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India.
29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the petitioner/accused is
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directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with
one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within
four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with
stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being
filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the
petitioner/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
30. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of
the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
31. The present revision stands disposed of, and so do
the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
19 November, 2026
(Nikita)
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