SMT SANNAMMA vs MOHAMMAD SHARIFF ALIAS AHMED SHARIFF
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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W.P. No.5848/2022
R
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF JUNE, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO.5848/2022 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. SANNAMMA
W/O LINGEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
R/AT. MARAKADUDODDI VILLAGE
KOTHATHI HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT-571478.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. K.N. NITISH, ADV., FOR
SRI. K.V. NARASIMHAN, ADV.,)
AND:
1. MOHAMMAD SHARIFF ALIAS AHMED SHARIFF
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
S/O MOHAMMED KHASIM SAB
R/AT. 3RD CROSS, MARUTHI NAGAR
MANDYA CITY-571401.
Digitally signed
by RUPA V
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADV.,)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE AWARD
DATED 23.11.2013 PASSED IN O.S.NO.81/2013 BY THE
DISTRICT LEGAL SERVICE AUTHORITY AT MANDYA (THE
COURT OF THE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT MANDYA) AT
ANNEXURE-D & ETC.
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THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
10.06.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV ORDER
This writ petition is filed challenging the decree dated
23.11.2013 passed in O.S.No.81/2013 in the Lok Adalat
conducted by the District Legal Services Authority, Mandya
(the Court of Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya) (for
short, 'the Trial Court').
2. Sri.K.V.Nitish, learned counsel for the petitioner
makes the following submissions:
(a) The respondent-plaintiff has filed O.S.No.81/2013
against the petitioner-defendant No.2 and others
seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is in
possession and enjoyment of land bearing
Sy.No.86/18 i.e. Schedule ‘A’ property and that
Sy.No.84/3 originally belonging to the defendant
No.1, now divided among the defendant Nos.2 to
5 under panchayath palupathrika dated
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13.02.1979, however, the plaintiff and the
defendants are in possession and enjoyment of
their corrective landed properties, but only survey
numbers are to be correctly assigned in the
revenue records. The case of the plaintiff is that
the plaintiff is the owner of the land bearing
Sy.No.86/18 and the defendant No.2 is the owner
of the land bearing Sy.No.84/3.
(b) The petitioner-defendant No.2 filed a written
statement in the said suit and thereafter, the
respondent-plaintiff filed an application for
advancing the case which was allowed and the
case was advanced from 21.01.2014 to
23.11.2013.
(c) On 23.11.2013, the defendant Nos.3 to 5 were
deleted. On the same day, the matter was
referred to the Lok Adalat and a compromise
petition was filed which was accepted and the
impugned decree was passed.
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(d) As per the compromise decree between the
plaintiff and the defendants, the properties were
exchanged as per the prayer in the plaint. The
property bearing Sy.No.86/18 i.e. Schedule ‘A’
property was allotted to the plaintiff-respondent
and the property in Sy.No.84/3 i.e. Schedule ‘B’
property was allotted to the petitioner-defendant
No.2.
(e) The respondent-plaintiff played a fraud on the
petitioner-defendant No.2 by not disclosing in the
compromise petition that the property in
Sy.No.84/3 was not available for allotment as the
same was already sold by the respondent-plaintiff
vide registered sale deed dated 06.02.1992 in
favour of one G.B. Jayaramu prior to the decree in
question.
(f) It is submitted that the legal heirs of
G.B.Jayaramu have executed the agreement of
sale in favour of J.Annegowda and he filed a suit
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for specific performance which came to be
decreed, the appeal filed by the legal heirs of
G.B.Jayaramu was allowed and the regular second
appeal is pending.
(g) It is further submitted that the suit in the name of
the petitioner was filed in O.S.No.760/2017 and
the same later came to be dismissed for non-
prosecution. It is also submitted that the said suit
was presented by the counsel M.G.M.Latha,
Advocate, Mandya, as the appearing counsel for
the petitioner-defendant No.2 and the very same
counsel has filed a suit in O.S.No.81/2013 on
behalf of the respondent herein which clearly
demonstrates that the fraud is played on the
husband of the petitioner as well as the petitioner
as they are illiterates.
(h) It is contended that the property which was not
available for allotment which was sold by the
respondent-plaintiff wayback in the year 1992,
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has been allotted to the petitioner by making her
believe that the property is available which is a
fraud and also the decree of the Lok Adalat is
liable to be set aside as there is no consideration
for the transfer of property under Section 25 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the
Act’).
(i) It is further contended that the respondent has
filed O.S.No.299/2021 against the petitioner for
the relief of injunction based on the fraudulent
decree in O.S.No.81/2013. Hence, he seeks to
allow the petition.
3. Per contra , Sri.Mohammad Tahir, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent makes the following
submissions:
(a) The writ petition challenging the decree in the
suit is not maintainable and in support of his
contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the
NAVRATAN
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
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LAL SHARMA Vs. RADHA MOHAN SHARMA AND
1
OTHERS
.
(b) It is submitted that the decree is of the year
2013 and the present writ petition is filed in the year
2022 and no explanation is provided for the delay.
(c) It is further submitted that O.S.No.369/1994 is
filed by the respondent against his brother and
G.B.Jayaramu for a declaration that the plaintiff is
the owner by contending that his brother
impersonated the respondent and executed a sale
deed on 06.02.1992 and the said suit was decreed
later in an appeal it was reversed and the regular
second appeal is pending.
(d) It is also submitted that in the instant suit, the
relief was only to exchange the survey numbers and
the petitioner is in possession of the property, hence,
he cannot allege the fraud.
1
2024 SCC Online SC 3720
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(e) It is contended that insofar as filing of the
present suit by one counsel who is alleged to have
filed a suit on behalf of the petitioner in
O.S.No.760/2017 is concerned, there may not be any
impediment for filing of the suit on behalf of the
respondent herein by the same counsel. It is further
contended that in the absence of such a counsel
before the Court, no finding can be recorded. Hence,
he seeks to dismiss the petition.
4. I have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the
respondent and meticulously perused the material
available on record.
5.
The respondent-plaintiff has filed
O.S.No.81/2013 against the husband of the petitioner,
petitioner and others seeking a declaration that the
respondent-plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the
land bearing Sy.No.86/18 measuring 31 guntas mentioned
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as Schedule ‘A’ property and that the land in Sy.No.84/3
measuring 1 acre 17 guntas originally belonging to the
defendant No.1 and now divided between the defendant
Nos.2 to 5 under panchayat palupathrika dated
13.02.1979 referred in the plaint, however, the plaintiff
and the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of
their respective properties, but only survey numbers are
to be correctly assigned in the revenue records.
6. In the said suit, the plaintiff advanced the
case, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat and a
compromise petition came to be filed between the plaintiff
and the defendants. On 23.11.2013 the Lok Adalat
accepted the compromise and decreed the suit. As per the
decree dated 23.11.2013, the land in Sy.No.84/3
measuring 1 acre 17 guntas situated at Guthalu Village,
Kothathi Hobli, Mandya Taluk, was allotted to the
petitioner and the land in Sy.No.86/18 measuring 32
guntas including 1 gunta kharab land, situated at Guthalu
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Village, Kothathi Hobli, Mandya Taluk, was allotted to the
respondent.
7. The primary contention of the petitioner is that
the respondent-plaintiff in O.S.No.81/2013 has not
disclosed to the defendants at the time of compromise
before the Lok Adalat that the property allotted to the
defendants is not available in view of the registered sale
deed dated 06.02.1992 executed by the plaintiff in favour
of one G.B.Jayaramu. The said contention is refuted by
the respondent-plaintiff by contending that the brother of
the respondent-plaintiff has impersonated and executed a
registered sale deed and thereafter, the suit in
O.S.No.369/1994 was filed which came to be decreed and
later, in the first appeal filed by Sri. G.B.Jayaramu, the
decree in O.S.No.369/1994 was set aside and RSA
No.1069/2015 is pending. It is to be noticed that the
alleged impersonation by the brother of the plaintiff, filing
of the suit in O.S.No.369/1994 against his brother and one
G.B.Jayaramu and then appeal and regular second appeal
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are not disclosed to the petitioner while entering into the
compromise before the Lok Adalat. Admittedly, the
property allotted to the defendant-petitioner is not free
from encumbrance, litigation and non-disclosure of non-
availability of the property at the time of signing of the
compromise petition by the defendants in O.S.No.81/2013
is amounting to concealment of the relevant facts by the
plaintiff-respondent which amounts to a fraudulent act. It
is to be noticed that as per the compromise decree, the
revenue records were never mutated. It is to be further
noticed that after the death of G.B.Jayaramu, his legal
heirs have executed an agreement of sale in favour of
Sri.J.Annegowda in respect of land allotted to the
petitioner-defendant No.2 in O.S.No.81/2013. The said
J.Annegowda filed O.S.No.119/2013 for the relief of
specific performance of the contract against the legal heirs
of G.B.Jayaramu and the said suit came to be decreed on
17.08.2019. It is also to be noticed that the present
petitioner is alleged to have filed a suit in
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O.S.No.760/2017 against the respondent-plaintiff and
others for the relief of declaration that the respondent-
plaintiff is the absolute owner and enjoyment of the suit
schedule property and the prayer for permanent injunction
showing the property as the land in Sy.No.84/3 measuring
1 acre 17 guntas (allotted to the petitioner in
O.S.No.91/2013). The records indicate that the said suit
was dismissed for non-prosecution. Interestingly, it is to
be noticed that the suit in O.S.No.81/2013 is filed by the
respondent and the respondent-plaintiff is represented by
a counsel namely Smt.M.G.M.Latha and the very same
counsel has filed a suit in O.S.No.760/2017 on behalf of
the petitioner herein which later came to be dismissed for
non-prosecution. The contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that this is the one circumstance where
the same counsel has appeared for the respondent-plaintiff
in O.S.No.81/2013 and the very same counsel is alleged to
have been filed O.S.No.760/2017 on behalf of the
petitioner, which establishes the fraud. It is specifically
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contended by the petitioner that the suit is
O.S.No.760/2017 is not filed by the petitioner and it is not
her thumb impression. In my considered view, recording
any finding on the aspect of the act of counsel
representing the petitioner as well as the respondent in
two different suits may not be appropriate in the absence
of hearing of the said counsel in the present petition. The
aforesaid chronology of events clearly indicate that the
petitioner in O.S.No.81/2013 has not disclosed the
relevant fact that the property allotted to the defendant
was not available and non-disclosure of the relevant fact
and making the petitioner to believe and sign the
compromise petition which was accepted by the Lok Adalat
is a clear fraud on the face of it. It would be useful to refer
the definition of fraud defined under Section 17 of the Act,
which reads as under:
“ 17. ‘Fraud’ defined.—'Fraud’ means and
includes any of the following acts committed
by a party to a contract, or with his
connivance, or by his agent , with intent to
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deceive another party thereto of his agent, or
to induce him to enter into the contract:— (1)
the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not
true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one
having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a
promise made without any intention of
performing it; (4) any other act fitted to
deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the
law specially declares to be fraudulent.
Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts likely to
affect the willingness of a person to enter into
a contract is not fraud, unless the
circumstances of the case are such that,
regard being had to them, it is the duty of the
person keeping silence to speak , or unless his
silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.”
8. The material on record clearly indicates that the
respondent-plaintiff made the petitioner-defendant to
believe that the property allotted to her is available which
was otherwise. Such an act of the respondent is nothing
but deceiving the petitioner. The non-disclosure of earlier
alienation and pendency of the proceedings with regard to
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the allotted property to the petitioner-defendant is an act
of active concealment of material fact by the respondent-
plaintiff despite having knowledge, such an act amounts to
a fraudulent act.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
PAPAYYA SHASTRY AND ORS. Vs. GOVERNMENT OF
2
ANDHRA PRADESH
has clearly held as under:
"21.
Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any
judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be
said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three
centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal.”
22.
It is thus settled proposition of law that a
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud
on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non
est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or
order—by the first court or by the final court—has to
be treated as nullity by every court, superior or
inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any
time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral
proceedings.
2
(2007) 4 SCC 221
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23.
In the leading case of Lazarus Estates
Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB
702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] Lord Denning
observed: (All ER p. 345 C).
“No judgment of a court, no order of a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has
been obtained by fraud.”
24.
In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases,
13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de
Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be
res judicata and not impeachable from within, it
might be impeachable from without. In other words,
though it is not permissible to show that the court
was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was
“misled”. There is an essential distinction between
mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the
distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment
cannot be brought on the ground that it has been
decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the
decision was one which should not have been
rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was
imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25.
It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell
together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud
and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus
nemini patrocinari debent).
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26.
Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate
deception with the design of securing some unfair or
undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of
another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another.
Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they
are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic
collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether
in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of
litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an
absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of
oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
27.
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath
[(1994) 1 SCC 1] this Court had an occasion to
consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof
on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case,
one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights
in the suit property in favour of C who sold the
property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a
suit for possession against B and obtained
preliminary decree. During the pendency of an
application for final decree, B came to know about
the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He,
therefore, contended that the decree was obtained
by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The
trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the
application. The High Court, however, set aside the
order of the trial court, observing that “there is no
legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court
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with a true case and prove it by true
evidence”. B approached this Court.
29.
The Court proceeded to state: (SCC p. 5, para 6)
“A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to
produce all the documents executed by him which
are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital
document in order to gain advantage on the other
side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the
court as well as on the opposite party.”"
(E mphasis supplied )
10. In the case on hand, prima facie established
that there has been an act of fraud firstly by not disclosing
the relevant fact that the said land bearing Sy.No.84/3
was not available for allotment as it was sold to one
G.B.Jayaramu and secondly, by not changing the revenue
records even after the compromise decree, which makes it
evident that the respondent has not made any effort in
confronting the petitioner regarding the same which
showcases their mala fide intention of committing fraud.
As per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
PAPAYYA
in the case of referred supra , any judgment or
decree obtained by fraud cannot be said to be a judgment
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in the eyes of law as 'fraud vitiates everything'. Therefore,
in the present case as the compromise decree was
obtained by fraudulent means the said compromise decree
is null and void and does not hold any legal validity. It is
to be noticed that the petitioner came to know about the
compromise petition only after receiving the summons in
O.S.No.299/2021 until then she was completely unaware
of the said compromise decree. Therefore, since the said
decree is void, laches alone cannot be a reason for non-
suit when there is a decree obtained by fraudulent means.
11. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS AND ORS. Vs.
case of
3
KOTHAKAPU MUTHYAM REDDY AND ORS
has laid
down the ratio as under:
"23. This is what their Lordships held in para 12:
(Jalour Singh case [State of Punjab v. Jalour
Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669
: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S)
535] , SCC p. 666, para 12)
3
MANU/SC/1119/2017
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“12. It is true that where an award is
made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a
settlement arrived at between the parties
(which is duly signed by parties and
annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat),
it becomes final and binding on the
parties to the settlement and becomes
executable as if it is a decree of a civil
court, and no appeal lies against it to any
court. If any party wants to challenge
such an award based on settlement, it
can be done only by filing a petition
under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of
the Constitution, that too on very limited
grounds. But where no compromise or
settlement is signed by the parties and
the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer
to any settlement, but directs the
respondent to either make payment if it
agrees to the order, or approach the High
Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if
it does not agree, is not an award of the
Lok Adalat. The question of challenging
such an order in a petition under Article
227 does not arise. As already noticed, in
such a situation, the High Court ought to
have heard and disposed of the appeal on
merits.”
22. The question arose before this Court (three-
Judge Bench) in State of Punjab [State of
Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008)
1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008)
1 SCC (L&S) 535] as to what is the remedy
available to the person aggrieved of the award
passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the
Act. In that case, the award was passed by the Lok
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Adalat which had resulted in disposal of the appeal
pending before the High Court relating to a claim
case arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act. One
party to the appeal felt aggrieved of the award
and, therefore, questioned its legality and
correctness by filing a writ petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition holding it to be
not maintainable. The aggrieved party, therefore,
filed an appeal by way of special leave before this
Court. This Court, after examining the scheme of
the Act allowed the appeal and set aside the order
of the High Court. This Court held that the High
Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition
as not maintainable. It was held that the only
remedy available with the aggrieved person was to
challenge the award of the Lok Adalat by filing a
writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article 227 of
the Constitution of India in the High Court and that
too on very limited grounds. The case was
accordingly remanded to the High Court for
deciding the writ petition filed by the aggrieved
person on its merits in accordance with law.
24. In our considered view, the aforesaid law laid
down by this Court is binding on all the courts in
the country by virtue of mandate of Article 141 of
the Constitution. This Court, in no uncertain terms,
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has laid down that challenge to the award of Lok
Adalat can be done only by filing a writ petition
under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the
Constitution of India in the High Court and that too
on very limited grounds. In the light of clear
pronouncement of the law by this Court, we are of
the opinion that the only remedy available to the
aggrieved person (respondents herein/plaintiffs)
was to file a writ petition under Article 226 and/or
Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High
Court for challenging the award dated 22-8-2007
passed by the Lok Adalat. It was then for the writ
court to decide as to whether any ground was
made out by the writ petitioners for quashing the
award and, if so, whether those grounds are
sufficient for its quashing."
12.
The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS
referred supra clearly lays
down that an award passed by a Lok Adalat is final and
binding on the parties and is deemed to be a decree of a
Civil Court. However, such an award is not the result of an
adjudication by a Civil Court but is based upon the
settlement arrived at between the parties before the Lok
Adalat. Consequently, by virtue of Section 21(2) of the
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Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, no appeal lies against
a Lok Adalat award and any challenge thereto can be
made only by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of
India. The Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of DILIP
4
MEHTA Vs. RAKESH GUPTA AND ORS. has reiterated
the law laid down by in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
5
case of STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. JALOUR SINGH and the
BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS
decision of referred supra .
13. The learned counsel for the respondent relied
NAVRATAN LAL SHARMA V. RADHA
on the decision in
6
MOHAN SHARMA & ORS.
which dealt with a
compromise decree passed by a Civil Court under Order
XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for
short ‘CPC’) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
while recording a compromise, the Civil Court is under an
obligation to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2737
5
(2008) 2 SCC 60
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3720
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and not hit by any provision of law relating to void or
voidable agreements. Since the decree in that said case
was passed by the competent Civil Court and not by the
lok Adalat under such circumstances the correctness and
legality of the compromise decree is required to be
challenged before the same court. It is further observed
that Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC bars a separate suit
for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that
the compromise was not lawful.
14. Therefore, the principle laid down in
NAVRATAN LAL SHARMA
stated supra has no
application to the facts of the present case. The decree
under challenge is not a compromise decree passed by a
Civil Court but an award passed by a Lok Adalat. Although
a Lok Adalat award is deemed to be a decree of a Civil
Court for the purpose of enforceability, the remedies
available against such an award are fundamentally
different. While a compromise decree passed by a Civil
Court may be questioned before the same Court by way of
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a recalling application, a Lok Adalat award can be
challenged only before the High Court under Articles 226
and/or 227 of the Constitution as per the decisions of the
JALOUR SINGH
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ,
BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS and DILIP MEHTA
NAVRATAN
referred supra . Consequently, the ratio in
LAL SHARMA
, which concerns the recall of a compromise
decree passed by a Civil Court, cannot be extended to or
relied upon in relation to a Lok Adalat award. Hence, the
NAVRATAN LAL SHARMA
decision in the case of stated
supra will not be applicable in the present case.
15. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid analysis, I
am of the considered view that the compromise decree
has been obtained by employing fraudulent means and the
same is required to be interfered with.
16. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to
pass the following:
- 26 -
NC: 2026:KHC:29269
W.P. No.5848/2022
HC-KAR
ORDER
allowed
(i) The writ petition is .
(ii) The impugned award/decree dated 23.11.2013
passed in O.S.No.81 /2013 in the Lok Adalat
conducted by the District Legal Services
Authority, Mandya earlier pending on the file of
Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Mandya, is set
aside.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 1