Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt. Limited vs Praharsh Corporation Pvt. Ltd.

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 925
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. …………. OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (C) NO.14435 OF 2024]
MADHAV VIDARBHA ESTATE PVT. LTD. …APPELLANT

VERSUS
PRAHARSH CORPORATION PVT. LTD. & ORS …RESPONDENTS
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. …………. OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (C) NO.14885 OF 2024]
MADHAV VIDARBHA ESTATE PVT. LTD. …APPELLANT

VERSUS
SHRI SAWAN NANDKUMAR
BHATEWARA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since we intend to deal with the present appeals only on two
Signature Not Verified
substantial questions of law that emerge for our consideration, the
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.08.31
14:10:41 IST
Reason:
factual matrix is set out only to the extent it is necessary to do so.
1

3. Both the appeals, at the instance of Madhav Vidarbha Estate Private
1 th
Limited , impugn a common judgment and order dated 8 May, 2024
2
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench , passed in
3
its revisional jurisdiction . Impugned in the revisional applications
th
before the High Court were orders passed by the 18 Joint Civil Judge,
4
Senior Division, Nagpur dismissing the applications under Order VII,
5
Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 filed by Praharsh
6 7
Corporation Private Limited and Mr. Sawan Nandkumar Bhatewara ,
8
seeking rejection of the plaint in Special Civil Suit No. 408 of 2017 .
9
4. International Asset Reconstruction Company Private Limited along
with Madhav Vidarbha instituted the relevant suit against Praharsh,
10
Riddhi Investment and Properties Private Limited and Sawan inter
th
alia seeking the following relief: (I) sale deed dated 16 January, 2015
executed between Praharsh and court Nazir be declared null, void, and
rd
not binding on the plaintiffs; (Ia) sale deed dated 3 March, 2017
between Praharsh and Sawan be declared null, void, and not binding
upon the plaintiffs; (II) declaration that Praharsh is in illegal
possession of the suit property; (III) direction against Praharsh and
Riddhi to deliver possession of the suit property; (IIIa) declaration that

1
Madhav Vidarbha
2
High Court
3
in Civil Revision Application No.92/2019 and Civil Revision Application No.22/2021
4
Trial Court
5
CPC
6
Praharsh
7
Sawan
8
relevant suit
9
IARCPL
10
Riddhi
2

Sawan is in illegal possession of the suit property, having obtained it
fraudulently; (IV) in the alternative, a direction against Praharsh and
Riddhi to pay Rs. 5,06,00,000/- to IARCPL along with 24% interest;
(V) Damages and compensation of Rs. 20,00,00,000/- with 24%
interest to the plaintiffs from the date of filing of the suit.
5. Plaintiffs claimed that the cause of action arose in 2016 when Praharsh
obtained possession of the suit property fraudulently.
6. Soon after the relevant suit was instituted, the applications seeking
rejection of plaint came to be filed. The primary ground averred in the
applications was that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action and
that it was barred by law, viz. by section 11 and section 47, CPC.
7. The Trial Court, after hearing counsel for parties, rejected both the
applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC by separate reasoned
orders. The Trial Court found that the grounds raised by Sawan and
Praharsh in their respective applications were not sufficient to reject
the plaint at the threshold. Their reliance on the documents, allegedly
suppressed by the plaintiffs, could not be relied upon; only the plaint
and documents thereto must be examined to consider the claim under
Order VII, Rule 11, CPC; the suit was not barred by section 47 of the
CPC; the issue of res judicata must be decided at the trial; and, the
issue of limitation must also be decided at the trial.
8. Aggrieved thereby, Praharsh and Sawan filed revision applications
under section 115, CPC before the High Court, which culminated in the
impugned order being passed.
3

9. The High Court, by its judgment spread over 117 (one hundred
seventeen) pages and containing almost equal number of paragraphs,
allowed the revision applications resulting in rejection of the plaint qua
Praharsh and Sawan.
10. We have heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Pravin Samdani,
learned senior advocates for Madhav Vidarbha and Mr. Ranjit Kumar
and Mr. Jaydeep Gupta, learned senior advocates for Praharsh and
Sawan, respectively.
11. Reading of the impugned judgment, in between the lines, would
surprisingly reveal complete absence of any discussion on one question
in particular: where and/or how did the Trial Court err while rejecting
the applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC? This appears to be a
unique case where not a single sentence in the 118 (one hundred
eighteen) paragraphs of the judgment is devoted to the Trial Court’s
commission of an error justifying interference in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction. Responding to our query, Mr. Kumar and Mr. Gupta did
not join issue.
12. Section 115, CPC provides for revision against an order of a
subordinate court against which no appeal lies. Exercise of such
revisional jurisdiction, as has been discussed ad nauseam by this
Court, must be confined to the narrow compass of section 115. The
conditions under which a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may
be invoked against an order of a subordinate Court are: (a) exercise
of jurisdiction not vested by law; or (b) failure to exercise jurisdiction
4

so vested; or (c) exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity.
13. The difference between an appeal and a revision is well settled.
Nonetheless, considering that the issue is a recurring one, we examine
the law laid by this Court by referring to only one precedent. In Shiv
11
Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers , speaking
through Arijit Pasayat, J., this Court observed as under:

13. First aspect that has to be considered is the respective scope of appeal
and revision. It is fairly a well-settled position in law that the right of appeal
is a substantive right. But there is no such substantive right in making an
application under Section 115. Though great emphasis was laid on certain
observations in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya
12
Bapat to contend that appeal and revision stand on the same pedestal, it
is difficult to accept the proposition. The observations in the said case are
being read out of context. What was held in that case related to the exercise
of power of a higher court, and in that context the nature of consideration
in appeal and revision was referred to. It was never held in that case that
appeal is equated to a revision.
14. Section 115 is essentially a source of power for the High Court to
supervise the subordinate courts. It does not in any way confer a right on
a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court to approach the
High Court for relief. The scope for making a revision under Section 115 is
not linked with a substantive right.
15. Language of Sections 96 and 100 of the Code which deal with appeals
can be compared with Section 115 of the Code. While the former two
provisions specifically provide for right of appeal, the same is not the
position vis-à-vis Section 115. It does not speak of an application being
made by a person aggrieved by an order of subordinate court. As noted
above, it is a source of power of the High Court to have effective control on
the functioning of the subordinate courts by exercising supervisory power.
…
17. Right of appeal is statutory. Right of appeal inhered in no one. When
conferred by statute it becomes a vested right. In this regard there is
essential distinction between right of appeal and right of suit. Where there
is inherent right in every person to file a suit and for its maintainability it
requires no authority of law, appeal requires so. As was observed in State
13
of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdulla and Co. the distinction between right of
appeal and revision is based on differences implicit in the two expressions.
An appeal is continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire
proceedings are before the Appellate Authority and it has the power to

11
(2003) 6 SCC 659
12
(1969) 2 SCC 74
13
AIR 1965 SC 1585
5

review the evidence subject to statutory limitations prescribed. But in the
case of revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not
have, it has no power to review the evidence, unless the statute expressly
confers on it that power. It was noted by the four Judge Bench in Hari
14
Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury that the distinction between an
appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right
of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right
of appeal limits the rehearing in some way, as has been done in second
appeals arising under the Code. The power of hearing revision is generally
given to a superior court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case
has been decided according to law. Reference was made to Section 115 of
the Code to hold that the High Court's powers under the said provision are
limited to certain particular categories of cases. The right there is confined
to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone.
(emphasis supplied)

14. We may walk down memory lane for discerning what was the position
on the ground 11 (eleven) years after achieving independence. In the
context of rising litigation due to the routine manner of pursuing of
revisional applications before the high courts, the First Law
th
Commission made significant observations. The 14 report of the
Commission was submitted by Mr. M.C. Setalvad (the then Attorney-
th
General of India) on 16 September, 1958, while working with several
other illustrious members such as M. C. Chagla, CJ. (the then Chief
Justice of the Bombay High Court), K. N. Wanchoo, CJ. (the then Chief
Justice of the Rajasthan High Court), G. N. Das, J. (retired Judge of
the Calcutta High Court), P. Satyanarayana Rao, J. (retired Judge of
the Madras High Court), Dr. N. C. Sen Gupta (advocate, Calcutta), Mr.
V. K. T. Chari (the then Advocate-General, Madras), Mr. Narasa Raju
(the then Advocate-General, Andhra), Mr. S. M. Sikri (the then

14
AIR 1963 SC 698
6

Advocate-General, Punjab), Mr. G. S. Pathak (then advocate,
Allahabad), and Mr. G. N. Joshi (advocate, Bombay).
15. The members brought with them considerable experience at the Bar
and a deep familiarity with the nuances of legal practice. The
observations made in the report, about 7 (seven) decades back, are
not so different from the realities of litigation faced by the Courts
today. The report was prepared after collecting empirical data by
visiting all the high courts across the country and speaking with several
individuals including the Chief Justices of those high courts and
members of the Bar.
16. On civil revision, the report noted:
9. Since a large number of these revision applications are filed against
interlocutory orders we invited opinion through our Questionnaire on a
proposal that the right of revision against interlocutory orders should be
drastically curtailed and that revision should be restricted only to cases
falling within clause (a) of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and not
be permitted in cases falling under clauses (b) and (c) of that section.
Although there was general agreement that many of these applications are
lacking in substance and are filed with the sole object of delaying the
proceedings, the proposal made by us met with general opposition. Dealing
with the question of curtailment of the right of revision in respect of
interlocutory orders, an experienced Chief Justice stated that ‘it is not
unoften that a very wrong order is made. If it be made impossible to
challenge the order immediately and have it set aside and if the error is left
to be corrected in the appeal from the final order if and when such an appeal
is taken, the intermediate proceedings will necessarily all be on an
erroneous basis and it can hardly be just to compel the parties to submit to
the order without any change of instant redress.’
10. It was alternatively proposed that in such cases, in lieu of a revision to
the High Court, the aggrieved party might be given a right of appeal to a
lower appellate court in cases in which the orders made were such as would
lead to the whole proceedings being conducted on an erroneous basis or
where the order was one which went to the root of the proceedings. This,
however, appeared merely to substitute one type of proceeding for another
leaving the right of revision to the High Court against the order in appeal
still open to the party concerned.
7

11. It was pressed upon us that 'provided a superior court is discerning and
firm, there ought not to be any undue interruptions of the proceedings of
the subordinate courts, simply because a right of revision is provided in the
law…. The evil of a voluminous body of Rules against interlocutory orders
with all the undesirable consequences of such Rules, which has undoubtedly
grown is to my mind not due to any deficiency or superfluity in the law but
due entirely to laxity in its administration'. This is no doubt true and, as in
the case of second appeals, we are driven to the conclusion that enough
care is not exercised in granting rule nisi and issuing stay orders at the time
of admission of these revision applications. Nor have the High Courts,
except a few, accepted as they well might have, the recommendation of the
15
Rankin Committee , of which we approve, for obtaining from the
subordinate courts a periodical return of cases so that they may be
expeditiously disposed of. The real remedy lies, in our opinion, in the
superior courts keeping in view the following essential rules in dealing with
these revisions:
(1) That the rule nisi should not be issued except upon a very careful
and strict scrutiny;
(2) That where a stay is not granted, the records of the subordinate
courts should not be called for and when the records are necessary,
only copies of the records should be required to be produced; and
(3) That whenever a rule nisi is granted and a stay order issued,
every effort should be made to dispose of the revision application
within two or three months.
12. On the whole and after careful consideration of the views and
information placed before us, we are of the opinion, that the fact that a
large percentage of these revision applications, particularly against
interlocutory orders, are lacking in substance and are eventually dismissed
is not a ground for curtailing the powers of the High Court in revision
generally.
13. But, nevertheless, an amendment of the law is necessary in order to
remedy the grave evil of delays arising out of revision applications in
interlocutory orders. It appears to us that it would be unsafe to expect an
improvement in the situation merely by reason of the superior courts
observing the rules mentioned above. We are of the view that it would
strengthen the hands of the revising courts and constantly remind them of
the danger of entertaining and granting stay in revision applications against
interlocutory orders, if provision were made in Section 115 of the Code that
nothing therein shall apply to interlocutory orders from which no appeal
lies, unless the order is likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an
irreparable injury.
14. It is, we think, also necessary to enact provisions similar to those in
Order XLI, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure limiting the powers of the Court
to grant stays in revision applications.
…

15
Report of the Civil Justice Committee, p. 281, para 4.
8

17. The High Courts are also not agreed on what amounts to an illegality
or material irregularity within the meaning of clause (c) of the section. What
is not an illegality or a material irregularity within the meaning of the section
was decided by the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh
16
Singh , where the Judicial Committee laid down that where a Court has
jurisdiction to decide a question before it and, in fact, decides the question,
it cannot be regarded as acting in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity, merely because its decision in erroneous. This was
further emphasized by the Judicial Committee in Balakrishna Udayar v.
17
Vasudeva Ayyar , in which it was laid down that the section applies to
jurisdiction alone, to the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal
assumption of it and is not directed against erroneous conclusions of law or
fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. The High Courts
have, however, placed varying interpretations upon the principles laid down
by the Privy Council, so that, there is a mass of conflicting judicial opinion
as to what constitutes illegality or material irregularity within the meaning
of the section.
18. The difficulties in the interpretation of the section and the need to
resolve the conflict of decisions which, in the opinion of the Civil Justice
Committee, had given rise to ‘much bad law’ was felt by that Committee
and it made certain recommendations for the amendment of the law. Those
amendments related not only to the clarification of the language of Section
115 but also to the curtailment of the High Courts' revisional powers. As we
are making recommendations of our own in regard to the clarification of the
language of Section 115, it is unnecessary to enter into the history of the
legislation which was introduced to implement the recommendations of the
Civil Justice Committee and which was eventually not enacted.
19. Though we do not feel justified in recommending any general
curtailment in the powers of revision conferred by Section 115, we are of
the view that the difficulties created by conflicting judicial views in the
interpretation of the section need to be removed. We, therefore, make the
following recommendations indicating the lines on which Section 115
should, in our opinion, be amended:

(1) The expression 'case decided' in the section should be clarified so as to
include within it an interlocutory order including an order deciding an issue
from which no appeal lies.
(2) Provision should, however, be made in the section, limiting the power
of revision to such interlocutory orders which, if decided in favour of the
petitioner would be sufficient for the final disposal of the suit or proceeding;
or in which the order is likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an
irreparable injury.
(3) The words 'in which no appeal lies thereto' in the first part of the section
should be altered so as to make untenable the view of the Rajasthan High
Court that no revision will lie if the order could be brought before the High
Court eventually in second appeal or be made the subject-matter of a

16
(1884) 11 IA 237
17

AIR 1917 PC 71
9

ground of appeal to the High Court under Section 105 of the Civil Procedure
Code. Our intention is that the right of moving the High Court in revision
should be denied only in cases where an appeal lies either to the High Court
or to the District Court from the order in question.
(emphasis ours)

17. One can only imagine the mounting pendency that must have
prompted the Law Commission to issue such guidelines. Little less than
7 (seven) decades later, the situation has only turned from bad to
worse.
18. It is also for this reason that the legislature, by the Civil Procedure
Code (Amendment) Act, 1999, curtailed the scope of interference in
revisional jurisdiction. Routine resort to revision remains the reproach
that section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, too, resolves to
remedy.
19. While hearing an application for revision, particularly against an order
rejecting a plaint, the high courts must be cautious and interfere only
when the pleadings in the plaint palpably attract inter alia clauses (a)
or (d). We are conscious of the caution sounded by Hon’ble Krishna
18
Iyer, J. in paragraph 5 of the decision in T. Arivandandam v.
19
T.V. Satyapal . However, even this decision emphasises that the
ground in Rule 11 has to be fulfilled.

18
… The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading
of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear
right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see
that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion
of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly
under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial
courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus
litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. …
19
(1977) 4 SCC 467
10

20. Turning to the case at hand, apart from the lack of finding with respect
to error, if any, committed by the Trial Court, we also find that the
High Court while considering the revision applications before it, donned
the hat of the trial court. If the identity of the court were undisclosed,
bare reading of the judgment would unmistakably and inevitably lead
a reader to the conclusion that it is a judgment of the original court
rejecting a plaint. The High Court, unfortunately, erred here too. It
also erred by marching farther than the limited scope of inquiry
necessitated at the stage of consideration of an application under
Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Observations were made based on facts and
documents, which did not form part of the plaint. Without entering the
thickets of the matter, we notice material observations having been
made by the High Court concerning the validity of documents for which
the stage had yet to ripen. Trite it is, at the stage of considering an
application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, only the averments made in
the plaint and documents annexed thereto must be considered. With
a deep sense of anguish, we cannot but observe that the very
fundamentals of consideration of an application under Order VII Rule
11, CPC seem not to have been present in the mind of the High Court
in the present case.
21. On these considerations, we find the High Court to have faltered in
illegally exercising its revisional jurisdiction, circumscribed by the
conditions encapsulated in section 115, CPC.
11

22. Having held thus, it is time to move on to briefly touch upon one other
aspect which is often neglected. It cannot go unnoticed that the High
Court expended enormous judicial time in authoring a lengthy
judgment, albeit on an unworthy issue. The same time could have well
been devoted to a deserving lis . While setting aside of such judgment
would mean that the entire effort stands wasted, what is more
disquieting is that such misdirected effort does bring in its terrain more
disservice than service to the institutional cause. The high courts ought
to realise that prudent use of judicial time must remain the foremost
institutional priority.
23. We also note, in this regard, that due caution must be exercised whilst
granting stay of the trial. In the present case, while issuing notice on
th
the applications for revision, the High Court vide its order dated 18
September, 2019 (not placed on record), granted stay of the trial.
Subsequently, this Court too, continued the stay which has been
operating till date. The matter before the Trial Court has been
adjourned on 34 (thirty-four) occasions in view of the stay orders being
operational. The initiation of trial, 9 (nine) years on, is yet to see the
light of day; written statements are yet to be filed.
24. It is in this context that we deem it appropriate to make an observation
that the routine practice of the high courts of granting a stay of trial
while issuing notice in challenges to interlocutory orders has to be
disapproved. Unless the high courts, on an examination deeper than
prima facie , arrive at a finding that continuation of the trial would
12

seriously and irreparably prejudice the outcome of the revision or
adversely affect the parties, stay of the trial ought to be eschewed.
25. However, having regard to the reasons assigned by us while dealing
with the merits of the challenge to the impugned judgment and order,
the same stand set aside and we allow the appeals. The relevant suit,
thus, would revive on the file of the Trial Court.
26. In view of stay of the trial since the last 7 (seven) years, we grant
liberty to the defendants to file their respective written statements, if
not already filed, within 8 (eight) weeks from today. We request the
Trial Court, subject to the docket of matters before it, to frame the
issues within a further period of 6 (six) weeks of the written
statement(s) being filed. Bearing in mind the dicta of this Court in
High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar
20
Pradesh , we do not propose to set a timeline for conclusion of the
trial; however, it would be eminently desirable for the Trial Court to
endeavour to conclude the trial at the earliest without granting
unnecessary adjournments. The parties have assured to cooperate
with the Trial Court to facilitate an early decision.
27. Needless to observe, the Trial Court shall proceed with the trial
uninfluenced by the observations made by us or by the High Court in
the impugned judgment and order. All issues of fact and law are left
open for the parties to agitate before the Trial Court.

20
(2024) 6 SCC 267
13

28. The appeals are allowed on the aforesaid terms. Interim order, if any,
stand vacated. Interim applications, if any, stand disposed of.
29. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.




……………………….…………….J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)


……………………….…………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 19, 2026.
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