RAIPUR INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010010112026 2026:CGHC:45197
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 253 of 2026
Order Reserved on 21.08.2026
Order Delivered on 27.10.2026
1 - Raipur Institute Of Medical Sciences Through Authorized
Signatory, Sh. Krishna Kumar Vadhwa, S/o Shri M.R. Vadhwa,
Aged About 60 Years, R/o Rims Campus, Bhansoj Road, Nh-6,
Village Godhi, Raipur (C.G.)
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Medical Education Besides Avinash Times Square,
Sector 19, Kayabandha, Rakhi-1, Atal Nagar- Nava Raipur,
Chhattisgarh 492101
3 - Admission And Fee Regulatory Committee Constituted Under
The Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka
Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Act, 2008, Through Its
President, Admission And Fee Regulatory Committee, Womans
Polytechnic Premises, Bairan Bazar, Raipur, District Raipur,

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Chhattisgarh
4 - Commissioner Medical Education, North Block, Sector-19, I I
Floor, Swasthya Bhawan, New Raipur, Atal Nagar, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 284 of 2026
1 - Shri Balaji Institute Of Medical Science, Mowa Through Its
Authorized Sinatory, Namely Nitin Patel S/o Late Sh. Paramchand
Patel Aged About 41 Years R/o E- 9 Avanti Vihar, Daldal Seoni
Saddu Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Shri Balaji Medical Foundation A Society Registered Under The
Chhattisgarh Registrikaran Adhiniyam Through Its Member
Namely Nitin Patel S/o Late Sh. Paramchand Patel Aged About 41
Years R/o E-9, Avanti Vihar, Daldal Seoni Saddu Raipur (C.G.)
Shri Balaji Medical Foundation Having Its Registered Office At Shri
Balaji Hospital Campus Mowa, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.)
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Medical Education, North Block, Sector-
19, Ii Floor, Swasthya Bhawan, New Raipur, Atal Nagar (C.G.)
2 - Director, Medical Education Besides Avinash Times Square
Sector- 19, Kayabandh Rakhi 1 Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur
Chhattisgarh - 492101
3 - Admission And Fee Regulatory Committee Constituted Under
The Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik Shikshan Santha (Pravesh Ka

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Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) ) Act, 2008 Through Its
President Admission And Fee Regulatory Committee Womans
Polytechnic Premises Bairan Bazar, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.)
4 - Commissioner Medical Education, North Block, Sector- 19, Ii
Floor, Swasthya Bhawan, New Raipur, Atal Nagar (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioners in WPC No. 253/2026 :- Mr. Jitendra Singh
Bhasin along with Mr. Nishant Shokeen, Ms. Shalini Kashyap, Ms.
Rashmipriya & Mr. Anant Amrit Raj, Advocates
For Petitioners in WPC No.284/2026:- Mr. Manoj Paranjpe,
Senior Advocate along with Mr. Ujjawal Kumar Gouraha & Mr.
Kabeer Kalwani, Advocates
For State :- Mr. S.S. Choubey, Govt. Advocate
For Respondent – AFRC :- Mr. R.K. Gupta, Advocate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SB-Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. Since common questions of fact and law arise for
consideration in both these writ petitions, they are being
heard and decided by this common order.
2. For the sake of convenience, W.P.(C) No.253/2026 is taken
up as the lead case, and the facts of the said petition, as well

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as the reliefs sought therein, are being referred to for the
purpose of adjudication of both the petitions.
3. By way of these writ petitions, the petitioners have called in
question the orders/communications issued by the
respondents pursuant to the recommendations of the
Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, whereby the
hostel, mess and transportation charges proposed/collected
by the respective petitioner-institutions have been
reduced/determined and consequential directions have been
issued for refund of the alleged excess amount collected from
the students.
4. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that the
Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, while determining
the aforesaid charges, has exceeded the jurisdiction
conferred upon it under the Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik
Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka
Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2008. It is contended that the
Committee has failed to consider the material and financial
details furnished by the petitioners and has reduced the
charges without recording any finding of profiteering or
capitation fee and without assigning cogent reasons.
5. In W.P.(C) No.253/2026, the petitioner-Raipur Institute of
Medical Sciences has challenged, inter alia, the

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recommendation dated 03.04.2025 made by the Admission
and Fee Regulatory Committee, the consequential order
dated 18.09.2025 issued by the State authorities and the
subsequent order dated 23.09.2025 passed by the
Commissioner, Medical Education. The petitioner has also
questioned the competence of the Committee to determine
hostel, mess and transportation charges and has alleged
violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly
Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008. The petitioner has further
contended that the charges proposed by it were based upon
the actual expenditure incurred towards providing hostel,
mess and transportation facilities, and that the Committee,
without properly appreciating the material placed before it,
has substituted its own assessment and reduced the charges
substantially. It has also been contended that the Committee
proceeded on incorrect assumptions regarding the number of
students availing hostel and mess facilities and the
expenditure incurred by the institution.
6. In WPC No. 284 of 2026, the petitioner No.1 is a private
medical college run by petitioner No.2-Society. The dispute in
the present petition relates to the fixation of Hostel, Mess and
Transportation charges by the Admission and Fee Regulatory
Committee under the Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik Shikshan

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Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan)
Act, 2008. The petitioner institution had furnished the details
and documents justifying the charges claimed by it, namely
Rs.3,00,000/- per student per year towards Hostel and Mess
and Rs.2,50,000/- towards Transportation. However, by its
recommendation dated 03.04.2025, the Committee reduced
the same to Rs.78,059/- and Rs.13,719/- respectively.
Pursuant thereto, the State Government passed the order
dated 18.09.2025 and subsequently the order dated
23.09.2025 directing determination of the charges and refund
of the amounts collected by the petitioner. The petitioners
contend that the charges were reduced without recording any
finding of profiteering or considering the documents
submitted by the institution and without affording proper
opportunity of hearing under Section 9(2) of the Act, and
have therefore challenged the recommendation and the
consequential orders.
7. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, the
reliefs sought in WPC No. 253 of 2026 ( Raipur Institute Of
Medical Sciences vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others) are
taken as the common reliefs prayed for by the petitioners as
the nature of grievances and the reliefs claimed therein are

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substantially identical across both the petitions. In the said
writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs :-
“10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or such
other appropriate writ/order/direction quashing
and setting aside the impugned order dated
18.09.2025 passed by the Respondent No.1
(Annexure P/1), qua the Petitioner;
10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or such
other appropriate writ/order/direction quashing
and setting aside the impugned resolution dated
03.04.2025 passed by the Respondent No.3-
Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee
(Annexure P/2), qua the Petitioner,
10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or such
other appropriate writ/order/direction upholding
the fees charged by the Petitioner, submitted to
the DME vide letters dated 14.10.2022,
25.07.2023 & 31.07.2024 pertaining to
Mess/Canteen expenses, Transportation
expenses, Electricity charges, Hostel Building
expenses and Staff overhead for the Academic
Session 2022-23, 2023-34 & 2024-25;
10.4 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
pass any other order(s) that this Hon'ble Court
may deem just and necessary in the interest of
justice.

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10.5 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or such
other appropriate writ/order/ direction quashing
and setting aside the Impugned Order dated
23.09.2025 passed by the Respondent No.4
Commissioner, Medical Education (Annexure
P/23), qua the Petitioner.”
8. The reliefs sought in W.P.(C) No.284 of 2026 are also
reproduced hereinbelow for convenience:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders,
direction/directions quashing the decision of
the respondent authority dated 18.09.2025
(served on 16.12.2025) (Annex.P/1) and the
recommendation of the Admission and Fee
Regulatory Committee dated 03.04.2025 so
far as it relates to the petitioner college is
concerned and the charges proposed by the
petitioner college (for Session 2024-25) may
kindly be upheld.
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is
deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts
and circumstances of the case.
10.3. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to quash the order dated 23/09/2025
(Annexure P/10) issued by respondent no.1,
in the interest of justice and oblige.”

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9. Mr. Jitendra Singh along with Mr. Nishant Shokeen, Ms.
Shalini Kashyap, Ms. Rashmipriya & Mr. Anant Amrit Raj,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, while assailing
the impugned action, would submit that the Admission and
Fee Regulatory Committee (AFRC) has travelled beyond the
statutory jurisdiction vested in it under the Chhattisgarh Niji
Vyavasayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka Viniyaman Avam
Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Act, 2008 (for short, ‘the Act of 2008’). It
is contended that the power of the Committee is regulatory in
nature and is primarily intended to prevent profiteering and
collection of capitation fee. The Committee, therefore, could
not have mechanically substituted its own assessment for the
charges proposed by the unaided private educational
institutions. Learned counsel would further submit that the
petitioners had furnished relevant financial particulars,
expenditure statements and supporting documents before the
Committee, but the same have not been duly considered.
According to learned counsel, the impugned determination is
based on assumptions and incomplete data and there is no
finding that the charges proposed by the petitioners
contained any element of profiteering or capitation fee. It is
further submitted that the impugned recommendation dated
03.04.2025 was made without affording an effective

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opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, in violation of
Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008, which specifically provides
that the Committee shall give the institution an opportunity of
being heard before fixing any fee. It is, therefore, contended
that the impugned recommendation and the consequential
orders stand vitiated on account of breach of the principles of
natural justice.
10. Learned counsel would submit that the aforesaid issue is
also covered by the judgment of this Court dated 24.08.2023
passed in W.P.(C) Nos.3415 of 2023 and 3488 of 2023, as
well as the judgment dated 07.09.2023 passed in W.P.(C)
No.3782 of 2023, wherein the earlier exercise of fee fixation
undertaken by the AFRC and the State Government was set
aside for non-compliance with Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008
and violation of the principles of natural justice. It is submitted
that, despite the said directions, the respondents have again
undertaken the exercise without affording an effective
opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
11. Learned counsel would further rely upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Najiya Neermunda & Anr. v.
Kunhitharuvai Memorial Charitable Trust & Ors. , reported
in (2021) 5 SCC 515, as also P.A. Inamdar & Ors. v. State
of Maharashtra , reported in (2005) 6 SCC 537 , and Icon

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Education Society v. State of Madhya Pradesh , reported in
2023 SCC OnLine SC 289 , to contend that unaided
professional educational institutions have autonomy in
determining the fee to be charged, subject to regulatory
control to ensure that such fee does not result in profiteering
or collection of capitation fee.
12. It is also submitted that the Committee proceeded on an
erroneous assumption that all the students were availing
hostel and mess facilities, whereas the actual hostel
occupancy varied from academic year to academic year.
Learned counsel would submit that, for the financial years
2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25, against the total strength of
664, 867 and 889 students respectively, the number of
students residing in the hostel was 506, 652 and 732
respectively. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
assumption of 100% hostel occupancy was factually incorrect
and materially affected the determination of the charges.
Learned counsel would further submit that the Committee
has failed to consider the actual expenditure incurred by the
institutions towards hostel, mess and transportation facilities,
including salaries, utilities, maintenance, fuel, infrastructure,
hygiene and other operational expenses. It is contended that
the Committee proceeded on hypothetical figures, including a

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student strength of 600 MBBS and 60 MD/MS students,
which, according to the petitioners, was not the actual
number of students availing the facilities during the relevant
academic sessions.
13. Learned counsel would particularly refer to the AFRC
recommendation dated 03.04.2025 and submit that, on its
own showing, the Committee recorded that complete and
sufficient data was not available for accurately assessing the
actual cost structure and recommended submission of a
detailed cost sheet by the petitioner-institution. It is argued
that, despite the said recommendation, the Directorate of
Medical Education proceeded to direct refund of the alleged
excess amount without first undertaking the foundational
exercise of determining the actual cost incurred by the
institution. It is further submitted that the petitioners had, from
time to time, furnished detailed information and supporting
documents in justification of the charges, including a head-
wise justification relating to infrastructure, staff salaries, fuel,
maintenance, hygiene and capital expenditure. Learned
counsel would submit that such material has not been
properly considered while determining the impugned
charges.

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14. Learned counsel would also submit that the petitioners had
placed on record their financial position, including the
certificates issued by the Chartered Accountant indicating
losses incurred by the institution, and therefore, the
conclusion regarding the charges could not have been
arrived at without considering the complete financial material
produced by the petitioners. It is further submitted that the
impugned recommendation was not duly signed by all the
members constituting the Committee. According to learned
counsel, the Committee is required to consist of five
members, whereas the recommendation dated 03.04.2025
bears the signatures of only four members. It is contended
that the statutory composition of the Committee could not
have been disregarded while exercising the powers vested
under the Act of 2008 and that the decision-making process
is consequently vitiated. Learned counsel would further
submit that the consequential direction for refund of the
alleged excess amount collected from the students is also
unsustainable, particularly when the determination of the
charges itself is under challenge and no individual
determination has been made as to the students who actually
availed the concerned facilities. It is contended that the
refund direction could not have been issued mechanically

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without first determining the actual charges payable and the
amount, if any, collected in excess.
15. Learned counsel would lastly submit that the impugned
action also suffers from non-application of mind inasmuch as
the respondents have failed to take into consideration the
year-on-year escalation in operational costs, including salary,
statutory compliances, maintenance, utilities, consumables
and infrastructure upkeep. It is argued that such factors were
relevant for determination of the actual cost of providing the
facilities. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the impugned recommendation dated
03.04.2025 and the consequential orders dated 18.09.2025
and 23.09.2025 are liable to be quashed. In the alternative, it
is submitted that the matter may be remitted to the competent
authority for fresh consideration, after taking into account the
relevant material placed by the petitioners and after affording
them an effective opportunity of hearing in accordance with
Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008.
16. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Ujjawal
Kumar Gouraha & Mr. Kabeer Kalwani, learned counsel for
the petitioner in WPC No. 284 of 2026 submits that the
recommendation dated 03.04.2025 and the consequential
order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the Regulatory Committee

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are illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the
Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka
Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Act, 2008. It is
submitted that the Regulatory Committee has reduced the
Transportation, Hostel and Mess charges proposed by the
petitioner institution without recording any finding of
profiteering, unreasonableness or commercialization and
without assigning any cogent reason for disagreeing with the
charges proposed by the institution. Learned counsel submits
that the petitioner had furnished all relevant documents,
including its accounts, income and expenditure statements,
budget and other material, to justify the proposed charges,
but the same were not duly considered. It is further submitted
that the Committee has virtually fixed the charges itself,
whereas its power is confined to regulating profiteering and
ensuring that the fees and charges proposed by a private
institution do not amount to profiteering. It is also submitted
that Transportation, Hostel and Mess charges are required to
be considered having regard to the individual circumstances,
expenditure and facilities of each institution. Learned counsel
further submits that the impugned decision was taken without
affording proper opportunity of hearing as contemplated
under Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008 and was also passed at

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the fag end of the academic session. It is contended that the
recommendation was not signed by one of the members of
the Committee and, therefore, the decision suffers from legal
infirmity. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, including P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra ,
(2005) 6 SCC 537 , and the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C)
No.3674 of 2011, learned counsel submits that the impugned
recommendation and order are liable to be set aside.
17. Reliance has been placed upon the matters of Automotive
Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated Authority
and Others (2011) 2 SCC 258, Chhattisgarh Dental
College and Research Institute v. Shweta Kabra and
Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1169, Babu Verghese and
Others v. Bar Council of Kerala and Others (1999) 3 SCC
422, Saral Wire Craft Private Limited v. Commissioner of
Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax and Others
(2015) 14 SCC 523, Narayana Medical College v. State of
Andhra Pradesh and Others (2023) 2 SCC 636,
Rashtreeya Sikshana Samithi Trust Etc. v. Committee for
Fixation of Fee Structure of Private Professional
Colleges AIR 2022 SC 2434, Icon Education Society v.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (2024) 16 SCC 509,
Bindiya Khatri and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and

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Others 2025 SCC OnLine Utt 4626, Najiya Neermunda &
Anr. v. Kunhitharuvai Memoraial Charitable Trust and
Others (2021) 5 SCC 515, Glocal Medical College and
Super Speciality Hospital and Reserch Centre v. Union of
India (2017) 15 SCC 690, Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, Shanker Doon
and Others v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others
2019 SCC OnLine Del 6737 . Reliance has also been placed
in the judgments passed by this Court in the matters of
Margdarshan Sansthan Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. State
of Chhattisgarh WPC No. 3674/2011, Raipur Institute of
Medical Sciences v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. WPC
No. 3415/2023 and Harihar Prasad Parate v. State of
Chhattisgarh & Ors. WPS No. 3341/2015 .
18. Per contra, Mr. Sabhyasachi Choubey, learned State
counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the
impugned proceedings were initiated in exercise of the
complaint-adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Admission and Fee
Regulatory Committee (AFRC) under Section 4(9) of the
Chhattisgarh Niji Vyavasayik Shikshan Sanstha (Pravesh Ka
Viniyaman Avam Shulk Ka Nirdharan) Adhiniyam, 2008 (for
short, ‘the Act of 2008’), and not as part of any general
exercise of fee fixation under Section 9 of the Act. It is

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submitted that the proceedings arose out of complaints
alleging excessive collection and profiteering in respect of
hostel, mess and transportation charges, and the Committee,
after enquiry, recorded its findings and recommended refund
of the excess amount in accordance with Section 4(9) of the
Act. Learned State counsel would further submit that the
petitioners’ contention that the Committee has encroached
upon the autonomy of the unaided private institutions in the
matter of fee fixation is misconceived, as the impugned
action is referable to the distinct jurisdiction conferred upon
the Committee under Section 4(9) to enquire into complaints
relating to collection of fee in excess of the fee determined
and profiteering by an institution. According to learned
counsel, the judgments relied upon by the petitioners
regarding the limited regulatory role of the Committee in fee
fixation have no application to an adjudicatory proceeding
initiated upon a complaint of profiteering. It is further
submitted that Section 4(9) expressly empowers the
Committee, upon enquiry and finding of violation, to
recommend return of the excess amount collected to the
person concerned and also recommend imposition of fine.
Thus, according to learned State counsel, the direction for
refund is not an independent or arbitrary exercise of power

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but a statutory consequence flowing from the finding
recorded by the Committee.
19. Learned State counsel would submit that the plea of
violation of principles of natural justice is wholly
misconceived. The petitioner was afforded repeated
opportunities over a considerable period to furnish the
requisite information and supporting documents. The record
discloses that notices were issued and hearings were held on
several dates, including 15.01.2024, 07.02.2024, 07.01.2025,
03.02.2025, 19.02.2025, 24.02.2025, 25.02.2025,
27.02.2025, 03.03.2025, 10.03.2025 and 17.03.2025.
Learned counsel submits that the petitioner’s representatives
appeared before the Committee and were repeatedly
directed to furnish point-wise information and supporting
documents, but failed to furnish the complete material sought
by the Committee. Learned State counsel would further
submit that the petitioner itself admits having received and
responded to various notices issued by the Committee.
Therefore, the allegation that no opportunity of hearing was
afforded is contrary to the record. It is contended that the
petitioner, having been afforded repeated opportunities,
cannot subsequently allege violation of audi alteram partem
merely because the material furnished by it did not result in

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acceptance of its claim. It is submitted that the Committee
had specifically called upon the petitioner to furnish relevant
material concerning the hostel, mess and transportation
charges, including sanctioned layout plans, details of rooms,
bills and vouchers, electricity bills, staff particulars, ledger
accounts, construction expenditure, loan documents,
Chartered Accountant certificates, mess
expenditure/contracts, transportation agreements, vehicle
documents, log books, fuel and maintenance bills and
particulars of drivers. Learned State counsel submits that
such material was necessary for determining whether the
charges claimed by the petitioner were commensurate with
the actual expenditure incurred.
20. Learned counsel would submit that, despite repeated
opportunities, the petitioner failed to furnish the requisite
head-wise and student-wise cost justification. Consequently,
the Committee proceeded on the basis of the material
available on record. It is argued that a party which fails to
produce the primary material necessary for determination of
its own claim cannot subsequently assail the determination
on the ground that the authority had proceeded on the
available material. Learned State counsel would further
submit that the finding of excess collection was not based

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upon conjectures or surmises but upon the financial material
furnished by the petitioner itself. According to the
respondents, the justifiable expenditure on a ‘No Profit, No
Loss’ basis was worked out at Rs.96,407/- per student per
annum, whereas the petitioner had recovered Rs.5,50,000/-
per student per annum towards the concerned heads,
resulting in an excess collection of Rs.4,53,593/- per student
per annum. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s reliance
upon Chartered Accountant certificates showing overall
losses of the institution does not answer the specific issue
involved in the proceedings. Learned counsel submits that
the controversy before the Committee concerned the actual
expenditure attributable to hostel, mess, transportation and
allied heads, and therefore, consolidated financial losses of
the institution could not, by themselves, justify the charges
collected from the students.
21. Learned State counsel would also submit that the hostel,
mess and transportation facilities were required to be
optional, whereas the petitioner had recovered a
consolidated amount of Rs.5,50,000/- from the students
without demonstrating that the charges were separately
optional or that the students had the liberty to avail or decline
individual facilities. It is contended that such compulsory

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collection was inconsistent with the applicable regulatory
framework and the conditions governing the fee structure. As
regards the challenge to the competence of the Committee,
learned State counsel would submit that the plea of coram
non judice is without substance. It is pointed out that the
regulations framed by the State Government under Section
13 of the Act of 2008 prescribe a minimum quorum of three
members, whereas the impugned recommendation bears the
signatures of four members. It is, therefore, submitted that
the prescribed quorum stood duly satisfied. Learned counsel
would further submit that the Act does not require the
recommendation to bear the signatures of every member of
the Committee or prescribe unanimity in its decision-making
process. Learned State counsel would further submit that the
proceedings cannot be assailed on the ground that the
complaints were not confined to a particular academic
session. According to the respondents, Section 4(9) of the
Act prescribes no period of limitation for entertaining
complaints of profiteering or excessive collection. It is also
submitted that the recommendation records the petitioner’s
own fee structure for the subsequent academic session, and
therefore, the finding regarding excess collection was not
confined merely to one academic year.

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22. Learned State counsel has also raised a preliminary
objection regarding non-joinder of necessary parties. It is
submitted that the proceedings originated from complaints
made by students and the impugned orders direct refund of
the excess amount to the concerned students. Since the
petitioners seek to set aside the refund direction, the students
in whose favour the refund has been directed are directly
affected parties and ought to have been impleaded in the writ
proceedings. Learned counsel would submit that the
petitioners cannot seek an order adversely affecting the
rights of the complainant students without impleading them
as parties. It is, therefore, contended that the writ petitions
are liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of
necessary parties as well.
23. Learned State counsel would lastly submit that the
impugned recommendation dated 03.04.2025 and the
consequential orders dated 18.09.2025 and 23.09.2025 have
been passed by the competent statutory authorities, after
enquiry and after affording adequate opportunity to the
petitioners. It is submitted that no jurisdictional error, violation
of natural justice or perversity has been demonstrated
warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. On the aforesaid submissions, learned State counsel

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submits that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are
liable to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed upon the
judgment passed by this Court in Disha Education Society
v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others WPC No. 2112 of
2010 .
24. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3–Admission
and Fee Regulatory Committee (AFRC), Mr. Rajkumar
Gupta, supporting the submissions advanced by learned
State counsel, would submit that the impugned
recommendation dated 03.04.2025 was made by the
Committee in exercise of the statutory jurisdiction conferred
upon it under Section 4(9) of the Act of 2008, upon
complaints regarding excessive collection of hostel, mess
and transportation charges and alleged profiteering by the
petitioner-institution. It is submitted that the proceedings were
conducted after affording repeated opportunities to the
petitioner to furnish the requisite financial and supporting
documents, and that the Committee considered the material
available on record before arriving at its recommendation.
Learned counsel would further submit that the contention of
the petitioner that the AFRC had undertaken a fresh exercise
of fee fixation is misconceived, as the proceedings in
question arose from complaints alleging excess collection

25
and profiteering and were therefore distinct from the general
exercise of fee fixation contemplated under Section 9 of the
Act. It is submitted that Section 4(9) specifically empowers
the Committee to enquire into such complaints and, upon
finding excess collection, to recommend return of the excess
amount to the concerned persons and such other action as
may be permissible under the Act.
25. Learned counsel for the AFRC would further submit that the
petitioner was granted sufficient opportunity to place before
the Committee the relevant material concerning the actual
expenditure incurred towards hostel, mess and transportation
facilities. Despite repeated notices and hearings, the
petitioner failed to furnish complete and satisfactory head-
wise material necessary for determining the actual cost. The
Committee, therefore, proceeded on the basis of the material
available on record. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot
challenge the recommendation merely because the material
furnished by it was not accepted in its entirety. Learned
counsel would also support the submission of learned State
counsel that the plea of violation of principles of natural
justice is without substance, as the record demonstrates that
the petitioner was afforded repeated opportunities of hearing
and to produce the relevant documents. It is submitted that

26
the recommendation was passed after due consideration of
the material placed before the Committee and does not suffer
from any jurisdictional error or procedural illegality.
26. Learned counsel would further submit that the objection
regarding the constitution/quorum of the Committee is also
untenable. According to learned counsel, the applicable
regulations prescribe the requisite quorum, which stood duly
satisfied when the impugned recommendation was made.
The fact that the recommendation bears the signatures of
four members, according to learned counsel, does not render
the proceedings invalid. On the aforesaid submissions,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3–AFRC would
submit that the impugned recommendation was made in
accordance with the statutory framework and after following
the prescribed procedure and, therefore, no interference by
this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is warranted.
27. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
as well as learned counsel appearing for the respective
respondents, including learned counsel for the Admission and
Fee Regulatory Committee (AFRC), and perused the material
available on record.

27
28. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
as well as learned counsel appearing for the respective
respondents, including learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.3–Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee
(AFRC), and have perused the material available on record.
29. The principal issue which arises for consideration in these
writ petitions is whether the impugned recommendation dated
03.04.2025 and the consequential orders dated 18.09.2025
and 23.09.2025 can be sustained when the charges relating
to hostel, mess and transportation facilities have been
determined without a proper consideration of the expenditure
actually incurred by the respective institutions and without
undertaking the statutory exercise contemplated under
Section 9 of the Act of 2008 in its proper perspective.
30. The petitioners have specifically contended that the charges
proposed by them were founded upon the actual expenditure
incurred towards providing hostel, mess and transportation
facilities. They placed before the Committee various
particulars relating to infrastructure, salaries, electricity,
maintenance, fuel, hygiene, transportation, staff and other
operational expenditure. It is also their specific case that the
number of students actually availing the hostel and mess
facilities varied from academic year to academic year and,

28
therefore, the determination could not have proceeded on the
assumption of uniform or complete occupancy.
31. The material placed before this Court indicates that the
petitioners had furnished material relating to the expenditure
incurred towards hostel, mess and transportation facilities,
including expenditure on infrastructure, salaries, electricity,
maintenance, fuel, hygiene, transportation and other
operational requirements. The petitioners had also placed
material concerning the actual number of students availing
the hostel and mess facilities during the relevant academic
sessions. The determination made by the respondent-
Committee, however, does not demonstrate that the
aforesaid material was examined in its proper perspective
before arriving at the permissible charges.
32. It is true that the regulatory authority is entitled to scrutinize
the expenditure claimed by an institution and to prevent
profiteering or collection of capitation fee. The regulatory
power, however, does not dispense with the requirement of
considering the relevant material produced by the institution.
The exercise of determination has necessarily to be based
upon relevant and legally permissible considerations. Equally,
the authority cannot substitute an assumed expenditure

29
figure for the actual expenditure without recording cogent
reasons for rejecting the material produced by the institution.
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar (Supra), has
held that every institution is free to devise its own fee
structure subject to the limitation that there can be no
profiteering or collection of capitation fee. The principles
governing regulation of fee in private unaided professional
institutions have also been reiterated in Modern Dental
College & Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 353.
34. The contention of the respondents that several opportunities
were afforded to the petitioners has also been considered.
The record, as referred to by learned State counsel and
learned counsel for the AFRC, indicates that notices were
issued and hearings were held on several dates and the
petitioners were called upon to furnish various documents.
The existence of opportunity of hearing, however, is distinct
from proper consideration of the material furnished pursuant
to such opportunity. Compliance with the principles of natural
justice requires not merely an opportunity to submit
documents but also a meaningful consideration of the
relevant material before an adverse determination is made.

30
35. In Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (Supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the rule of
audi alteram partem includes reasonable opportunity to meet
the case and to explain the material relied upon, particularly
where the decision entails adverse civil consequences. The
relevant paras are quoted hereinbelow:-
“ 78. In Mohinder Singh Gill [(1978) 1 SCC 405] , upon
consideration of several cases, Krishna Iyer, J. in his
inimitable style observed thus: (SCC p. 434, para 48)
“48. Once we understand the soul of the rule as
fair play in action—and it is so—we must hold
that it extends to both the fields. After all,
administrative power in a democratic set-up is
not allergic to fairness in action and
discretionary executive justice cannot
degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there
ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience
and expense, if natural justice gains access. For
fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative
concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated
abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a
bee in one's bonnet. Its essence is good
conscience in a given situation; nothing more—
but nothing less. The ‘exceptions’ to the rules of
natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but
a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in
those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be
inferred by not affording an opportunity to

31
present or meet a case. Textbook excerpts and
ratios from rulings can be heaped, but they all
converge to the same point that audi alteram
partem is the justice of the law, without, of
course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying,
self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common
sense of the situation.”
79. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981)
1 SCC 664] , R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the
majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained
the meaning and scope of the concept of “natural
justice”. Referring to several decisions, His Lordship
observed thus: (SCC p. 666)
“Rules of natural justice are not embodied
rules. Being means to an end and not an end in
themselves, it is not possible to make an
exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there
are two fundamental maxims of natural justice
viz. (i) audi alteram partem, and (ii) nemo judex
in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has
many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the
case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain.
This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
administrative convenience or celerity. The
general principle—as distinguished from an
absolute rule of uniform application—seems to
be that where a statute does not, in terms,
exclude this rule of prior hearing but
contemplates a post-decisional hearing
amounting to a full review of the original order

32
on merits, then such a statute would be
construed as excluding the audi alteram partem
rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if
the statute conferring the power is silent with
regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing
to the person affected and the administrative
decision taken by the authority involves civil
consequences of a grave nature, and no full
review or appeal on merits against that decision
is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to
construe such a statute as excluding the duty of
affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all
its formal trappings and dilatory features at the
pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed
pragmatically, it would paralyse the
administrative process or frustrate the need for
utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair
play must not be jettisoned save in very
exceptional circumstances where compulsive
necessity so demands. The court must make
every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the
maximum extent possible, with situational
modifications. But, the core of it must, however,
remain, namely, that the person affected must
have reasonable opportunity of being heard
and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and
not an empty public relations exercise.”
83. The procedure prescribed in the 1995 Rules
imposes a duty on the DA to afford to all the parties,
who have filed objections and adduced evidence, a
personal hearing before taking a final decision in the

33
matter. Even written arguments are no substitute for
an oral hearing. A personal hearing enables the
authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the
witnesses, etc. and also clear up his doubts during the
course of the arguments. Moreover, it was also
observed in Gullapalli [AIR 1959 SC 308] , if one
person hears and other decides, then personal
hearing becomes an empty formality.
84. In the present case, admittedly, the entire material
had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he
had allowed the interested parties and/or their
representatives to present the relevant information
before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings
in the form of an order were recorded by the
successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the
appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order
passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of
natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having
been issued on the basis of the final findings of the
DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural
justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed
accordingly.”
36. In the present case, the grievance of the petitioners is not
confined merely to denial of an opportunity to appear before
the Committee. Their principal grievance is that the material
relating to actual expenditure, occupancy, infrastructure, staff,
utilities, maintenance, transportation and other relevant
heads was not duly considered while arriving at the

34
permissible charges. The said grievance goes to the root of
the decision-making process.
37.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Najiya Neermunda & Anr.
(Supra), has emphasized the necessity of consideration of
the relevant material and affording reasonable opportunity to
the management in the matter of fee determination
concerning private self-financing medical institutions.
“ 19. The other issue that requires to be
considered relates to the restrictions placed by
the High Court in the matter of fixation of fee by
the Committee. We find force in the submission of
Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State, that no fetter
can be placed on the exercise of power for fee
fixation by the Committee, which shall be in
accordance with the factors that are mentioned in
Section 11 of the 2017 Act. The High Court
committed an error in directing the Committee to
take into account only audited balance sheets,
and provisional profit and loss accounts in the
absence of audited balance sheets, to fix the fee.
Though we are in agreement with the submission
made on behalf of the managements that the fee
as proposed by them should be considered by
the Committee, it is no more res integra that the
right conferred on the institutions to fix fee for
professional courses is subject to regulation. It
need not be reiterated that unaided professional

35
institutions have the autonomy to decide on the
fee to be charged, subject to the fee not resulting
in profiteering or collection of capitation fee.
Regulation of fee is within the domain of the
Committee which shall ensure that the fee is non-
exploitative and reasonable. There is no need to
repeat the judgments of this Court, especially P.A.
Inamdar [P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2005) 6 SCC 537 : 2 SCEC 745] , which have
been copiously referred to by the High Court in
the 3 rounds of litigation to indicate the principles
to be followed for fixation of fee in private medical
colleges.
20. Suffice it to mention that the Committee shall
reconsider the proposals of the managements for
fee fixation 2017-18 onwards by taking into
account the factors mentioned in Section 11 of
the 2017 Act and the law laid down by this Court
in Modern Dental College & Research Centre
[Modern Dental College & Research Centre v.
State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353 : 7 SCEC 1] .
The delay that is caused in finalising the fee in
medical colleges is beneficial neither to the
institutions nor the students. Therefore, we direct
the Committee to expeditiously reconsider the
proposals of the private self-financing colleges for
fee fixation from 2017-18 onwards. Needless to
mention that fee for earlier years also needs to be
finalised in case it has not been done in respect
of any college. It can direct the managements to
furnish any information that is required for the

36
purpose of arriving at a decision that the fee
proposed by the managements is neither
excessive nor exploitative in nature. A reasonable
opportunity should be given to the managements
of private self-financing colleges in respect of
their proposals for fee fixation. The entire
exercise shall be completed within a period of
three months from today.”
38. The statutory scheme also requires the fee determination
exercise to be undertaken upon consideration of the relevant
financial material and after affording the institution an
effective opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the
requirement under Section 9(2) of the Act of 2008 cannot be
treated as a mere procedural formality. Where the authority is
required to determine or regulate the fee structure of a
private professional educational institution, the financial
material placed by such institution constitutes a relevant
component of the decision-making exercise.
39. The respondents have sought to distinguish the provisions
of Section 9 from the proceedings under Section 4(9),
contending that the present proceedings originated from
complaints alleging excessive collection and profiteering and,
therefore, constituted a complaint-adjudicatory exercise.
There can be no dispute that Section 4(9) confers jurisdiction

37
upon the AFRC to enquire into complaints regarding
excessive collection and profiteering and to take
consequential action in accordance with law. However, while
examining whether the amount collected is excessive, the
authority must necessarily determine the legitimate and
permissible cost/fee component on the basis of the statutory
framework and the relevant material available before it.
40. In other words, the characterization of the proceedings as
proceedings under Section 4(9) cannot authorize the
Committee to disregard the statutory safeguards and
principles governing determination of fee. The power to
enquire into an allegation of excess collection necessarily
carries with it the obligation to correctly determine the amount
which could lawfully be charged. Such determination must be
founded upon relevant material and cannot rest upon
assumptions which have the effect of excluding legitimate
expenditure incurred for providing the facilities.
41.T he aforesaid principle is also consistent with the law
declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Modern Dental
College & Research Centre & Ors. (Supra) wherein the
regulatory exercise concerning fee in private professional
institutions has been considered in the context of the

38
legitimate financial requirements of the institution and the
permissible regulatory control against profiteering.
42. The respondents have relied upon the figure of Rs.96,407/-
per student per annum as the permissible expenditure and
have compared the same with the amount of Rs.5,50,000/-
allegedly recovered per student per annum. However, before
arriving at such a substantial difference, the authority was
required to examine the actual expenditure under each
relevant head and record reasons for accepting or rejecting
the particulars furnished by the petitioners. A determination of
this nature, particularly where it results in a finding of excess
collection and a consequential direction for refund, must
disclose a rational nexus between the material placed on
record and the conclusion reached.
43. The requirement of recording reasons in such decision-
making is also settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) , wherein it has been
held that reasons operate as a restraint against arbitrary
exercise of power, demonstrate consideration of relevant
grounds and facilitate judicial review. The relevant para is
quoted hereinbelow:-
“ 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court
holds:

39
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to
record reasons, even in administrative decisions,
if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons
in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to
serve the wider principle of justice that justice
must not only be done it must also appear to be
done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid
restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision-maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-making
process as observing principles of natural justice
by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by
administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial
review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries
committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions
based on relevant facts. This is virtually the

40
lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these
days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors
have been objectively considered. This is
important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the
justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not
candid enough about his/her decision-making
process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be
cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons
or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated
with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the
sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial
powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone
to errors but also makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review
731-37] .)

41
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons
emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in
decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was
considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR,
at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford
[2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be given
for judicial decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play
a vital role in setting up precedents for the future.
Therefore, for development of law, requirement of
giving reasons for the decision is of the essence
and is virtually a part of “due process”.
44. The issue of hostel occupancy is also material. The
petitioners have furnished year-wise figures showing that the
number of students actually residing in the hostel was less
than the total student strength. If the authority intended to
proceed on a different basis, it was incumbent upon it to
record reasons for doing so and to explain why the actual
occupancy figures furnished by the institutions were not
accepted. The determination of expenditure cannot be
divorced from the number of students actually availing the

42
facility, particularly where the expenditure comprises both
fixed and variable components.
45. Likewise, expenditure towards salaries, electricity,
maintenance, fuel, infrastructure, hygiene, transportation,
staff and allied operational requirements cannot be excluded
merely because the authority considers the overall amount
claimed to be high. Each relevant head is required to be
examined in the light of the material produced, the nature of
the facility, the number of students availing the same and the
applicable statutory parameters. Where an expenditure claim
is rejected, reasons must be furnished so that the institution
is able to understand the basis of such rejection and the
Court is able to examine whether the decision-making
process was lawful.
46. The aforesaid approach is consistent with the principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra)
and Modern Dental College (supra), recognising the
relevance of the expenditure, infrastructure, facilities and
other legitimate components in determining the fee structure
of private unaided professional educational institutions.
47. The submission of the petitioners regarding the Chartered
Accountant certificates and the financial position of the
institutions also deserves consideration. While the overall

43
loss suffered by an institution may not, by itself, establish that
every individual charge levied upon a student is justified,
such financial material cannot be completely disregarded
where it is relied upon to demonstrate the actual cost of
providing the concerned facilities. The relevant question is
not whether the institution has suffered an overall loss, but
whether the particular expenditure claimed towards the
regulated facilities was genuine, relevant and supported by
material. That exercise does not appear to have been
satisfactorily undertaken.
48. The submission regarding the number of members who
signed the recommendation need not be examined
independently for the purpose of disposal of these petitions,
particularly when the impugned exercise otherwise fails to
withstand judicial scrutiny on the substantive ground of non-
consideration of relevant material. Even assuming that the
requisite quorum was available, satisfaction of quorum by
itself does not cure defects in the decision-making process
arising from failure to consider relevant financial material in
accordance with the statutory scheme.
49. Similarly, the question whether the complaints were confined
to a particular academic session need not be conclusively
determined in these proceedings. The impugned

44
determination itself must, in any event, disclose the factual
and financial basis on which the charges for the concerned
period have been examined. A general conclusion regarding
excessive collection cannot substitute a proper year-wise and
head-wise consideration where the expenditure and student
occupancy materially vary from one academic session to
another.
50. This Court is conscious of the limited scope of judicial
review in matters involving expert regulatory authorities.
Ordinarily, the Court would not substitute its own assessment
of the appropriate fee or expenditure for that of the statutory
authority. Judicial review, however, extends to examining
whether the authority has acted within the statutory
framework, considered relevant material, excluded irrelevant
considerations and followed the prescribed procedure. Where
the foundational exercise itself suffers from non-consideration
of relevant material, remand for fresh consideration becomes
necessary.
51. The requirement that a quasi-judicial or administrative
authority must record reasons and demonstrate consideration
of relevant material has been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. (Supra).

45
52. In Saral Wire Craft (P) Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs,
Central Excise & Service Tax, (2015) 14 SCC 523,
following observation has been made vide para 9:-
“ 9. It is in these circumstances that we are of the
clear conclusion that a miscarriage of justice has
taken place, in that the authorities/courts below
have failed to notice the specific language of
Section 37-C(1)(a) of the Act which requires that an
order must be tendered on the person concerned or
his authorised agent, in other words, on no other
person, to ensure efficaciousness. We must
immediately recall the decision in Taylor v. Taylor
[(1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] rendered venerable by
virtue of its jural acceptance and applicable for over
a century. It was approved by the Privy Council in
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [1936 SCC OnLine
PC 41 : (1935-36) 63 IA 372 : (1936) 44 LW 583]
and was subsequently applied in Rao Shiv Bahadur
Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC
322 : 1954 Cri LJ 910] , State of U.P. v. Singhara
Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2)] ,
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala [(1999) 3
SCC 422] and more recently in Hussein Ghadially v.
State of Gujarat [(2014) 8 SCC 425 : (2014) 6 SCC
(Cri) 26] . As observed by this Court in Babu
Verghese [(1999) 3 SCC 422] : (SCC p. 432, para
31)
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled
that if the manner of doing a particular act is

46
prescribed under any statute, the act must be
done in that manner or not at all.”
53. In the present case, the petitioners had placed before the
AFRC material concerning the actual expenditure incurred
towards hostel, mess and transportation facilities. The
impugned determination, however, does not demonstrate
adequate consideration of such material in the manner
required by the statutory scheme. The determination
consequently cannot be sustained merely on the ground that
the petitioners were given several opportunities to submit
documents. An opportunity of hearing has meaning only
when the material submitted pursuant thereto is duly
considered before arriving at an adverse conclusion.
54. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned
recommendation dated 03.04.2025 suffers from a material
infirmity in the decision-making process. Since the
consequential orders dated 18.09.2025 and 23.09.2025 are
founded upon the said recommendation, they too cannot be
permitted to operate in their present form.
55. The principles governing consideration of relevant financial
material and effective opportunity in the matter of fee
determination have also been recognised by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Najiya Neermunda (Supra).

47
56. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the matter requires reconsideration by the
competent statutory authority. Such reconsideration shall not
be an empty formality. The competent authority shall
undertake a fresh exercise in accordance with the Act of
2008 and the applicable regulations, particularly keeping in
view the requirements of Section 9, and shall consider the
relevant financial material produced by the petitioners.
57. While undertaking the fresh exercise, the competent
authority shall consider, inter alia, the actual student strength
and hostel occupancy for the relevant academic sessions,
the expenditure towards hostel, mess and transportation
facilities, salaries, electricity, maintenance, fuel,
infrastructure, hygiene, transportation, staff and other
relevant operational expenses, together with the supporting
documents produced by the petitioners. The authority shall
also examine the distinction between fixed and variable
expenditure wherever relevant and shall record reasons for
accepting or rejecting the material placed before it.
58. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion
on the quantum of fee or charges that may ultimately be
found permissible. The competent authority shall undertake
the exercise independently and in accordance with law. The

48
regulatory power to prevent profiteering and excessive
collection shall remain fully available to the competent
authority; however, any such conclusion must follow a lawful,
reasoned and material-based determination.
59. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned
recommendation dated 03.04.2025 passed by respondent
No.3–Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, the
consequential order dated 18.09.2025 passed by respondent
No.1 and the order dated 23.09.2025 passed by respondent
No.4, insofar as they relate to the petitioners, are hereby
quashed and set aside .
60. The matters are remitted to the competent authority/AFRC
for fresh consideration. The petitioners shall be afforded an
effective opportunity of hearing and shall be permitted to
place all relevant financial and supporting material on record.
The authority shall thereafter pass a fresh, reasoned and
speaking order in accordance with the Act of 2008, the
applicable regulations and the observations made herein.
61. In consequence of the aforesaid order, the directions for
refund founded upon the impugned determination shall also
stand set aside. Any question regarding excess collection, if
found permissible in law after the fresh determination, shall

49
abide by the fresh order to be passed by the competent
authority.
62. The fresh exercise shall be completed expeditiously,
preferably within a period of three months from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order, subject to the petitioners
extending full cooperation and furnishing the requisite
material within the time granted by the authority.
63. Both the writ petitions, accordingly, stand allowed in the
aforesaid terms.
64. There shall be no order as to costs.
65. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of accordingly.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha