SMT.MUNIYAMMA, vs THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 29 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT APPEAL NO.786 OF 2025 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
SRI. T. VENKATAPPA
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRs.
1. SMT. MUNIYAMMA,
W/O LATE VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
SRI. MUNIRAJAPPA .B.V
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRs.
2. SMT. MUNI YELLAMMA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
W/O LATE MUNIRAJAPPA .B.V
3. SRI. HINDUJA .B.M
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
W/O LATE MUNIRAJAPPA .B.V
4. SRI. VIVEK .B.M
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
S/O LATE MUNIRAJAPPA .B.V
5. SRI. PRASHANTH .B.M
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
S/O LATE MUNIRAJAPPA .B.V
Digitally signed
by C K LATHA
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
6. SRI. MANJUNATH,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
S/O LATE T. VENKATAPPA,
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
BELAGERE VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 087. …APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. FAYAZ SAB B.G., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BENGALURU URBAN,
BENGALURU - 560 009.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
BENGALURU NORTH SUB-DIVISION,
BENGALURU - 560 009.
3. SRI. N. CHANDRASHEKAR,
S/O LATE NARAYANA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
4. SRI. RAJASHEKAR,
S/O LATE NARAYANA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R-3 & R-4 ARE RESIDING AT
DOOR NO.243, HAL COLONY,
BENGALURU - 560 017. …RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. NILOUFER AKBAR, AGA FOR R-1 & R-2;
SRI. B. VACHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-3;
SRI. DAYANANDA K.G., ADVOCATE FOR C/R-4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED FINAL ORDER DATED 24.04.2025 PASSED IN
W.P.NO.16016/2022 (SC/ST) PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE AND ETC.,
- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA )
1. This intra-Court appeal is preferred by the appellants who
are the petitioners in Writ Petition No.16016/2022 (SCST)
impugning the order dated 24.04.2025 [ impugned order ] whereby
the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition filed
challenging the common order dated 30.03.2022 passed by the
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, rejecting the
claim for resumption and restoration of the granted land under the
provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [ the
PTCL Act ] and allowing the appeal filed by the purchaser.
BRIEF FACTS
2. The land bearing Sy.No.68/2 measuring 2 acres situated at
Balagare Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk [ schedule
property ] was granted on 29.04.1940 in favour of Sri Kari
- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
Thippaiah @ Thippaiah, belonging to the scheduled caste
community. The original grantee alienated the schedule property in
favour of Sri Narayana Reddy under a registered sale deed dated
22.02.1961.
3. In the year 1984-1985, nearly 23 years after the alienation
and about six years after the PTCL Act came into force, T.
Venkatappa, the son of the original grantee initiated proceedings
seeking resumption and restoration of the schedule property. The
Assistant Commissioner rejected the application by order dated
27.05.1988. Aggrieved thereby, T. Venkatappa preferred an appeal
before the Deputy Commissioner in SC.ST (Appeal) No.12/1995-
1996 which came to be dismissed on 13.04.1988. The said order
was challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No.274/2000. By
order dated 04.12.2001, the matter was remitted for fresh
consideration.
4. During the pendency of Writ Petition No.274/2000, another
application seeking restoration of the very same property was
instituted by the family members of T. Venkatappa in K.SC.ST No.
75/1999-2000. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the said
- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
application by order dated 07.05.2002. Aggrieved thereby, the sons
of the purchaser, Narayana Reddy, preferred SC.ST (Appeal)
No.16/2002-2003 before the Deputy Commissioner, who, by order
dated 26.04.2004, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of
restoration. The said order was challenged by the sons of T.
Venkatappa in Writ Petition No.7459/2005.
5. Meanwhile, another application seeking restoration of the
schedule property was filed by Smt. Muthamma, wife of T.
Venkatappa and Smt. Arakeramma, his daughter. The said
application was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner by
endorsement dated 11.10.2006, which was challenged before the
Deputy Commissioner in SC.ST (Appeal) No.114/2006-07. By
order dated 28.10.2010, the Deputy Commissioner directed to
defer the said appeal to await the result of Writ Petition
No.7459/2005 pending before this Court. Aggrieved thereby, Smt.
Muthamma and Smt. Arakeramma preferred Writ Petition
No.10920/2011.
6. Both Writ Petition Nos.7459/2005 and 10920/2011 were
heard together and disposed of by a common order dated
- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
17.11.2014. This Court set aside the orders dated 26.04.2004 and
28.10.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner and remitted the
matters for fresh consideration, observing that the original orders
pertaining to the grant, the nature of the grant and conditions
imposed thereunder required examination.
7. Pursuant to the order of remand, the Deputy Commissioner
took up SC.ST (Appeal) Nos.12/1995-96, 16/2002-2003 and
114/2006-07 together for consideration and by common order
dated 30.03.2022 dismissed the appeals preferred by the legal
representatives of the original grantee and allowed the appeal
preferred by the purchaser. The Deputy Commissioner held that
the proceedings for resumption and restoration had been initiated
after an inordinate delay and were liable to be rejected on the
ground of delay and laches.
8. It is also relevant to note that Writ Petition No.21790/2022
preferred by Smt.Arakeramma challenging the order of the Deputy
Commissioner came to be dismissed as withdrawn. The legal
representatives of T.Venkatappa challenged the order dated
- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
30.03.2022 before the learned Single Judge in the writ petition,
which was disposed of by the order impugned in this writ appeal.
THE IMPUGNED ORDER
9. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the material
on record and the rival contentions, held that the proceedings
seeking resumption and restoration of the schedule property had
been initiated after an inordinate delay of nearly 23 years from the
date of alienation. The learned Single Judge placing reliance upon
the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Smt . M. Manjula
1
and Others vs The Deputy Commissioner and Others , Smt.
Gouramma @ Gangamma vs The Deputy Commissioner and
2
Others and Smt.Akkayamma vs The State of Karnataka and
3
Others held that the Deputy Commissioner was justified in
rejecting the claim on the ground of delay and laches.
10. On the contention regarding the genuineness of the
permission allegedly granted by the competent authority for
alienation of the schedule property, the learned Single Judge held
1
2024: KHC: 51015-DB
2
2024:KHC:D:10666-DB
3
2024:KHC:48227-DB
- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
that the question did not require consideration. Even assuming that
no permission had been obtained and that alienation was contrary
to the conditions of grant, the proceedings for restoration, having
been initiated belatedly could not be entertained. Accordingly, the
learned Single Judge declined to interfere with the Deputy
Commissioner’s order and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved
thereby, the legal representatives of T. Venkatappa have preferred
the present appeal.
REASONS AND CONCLUSION
11. The question as to whether the proceedings seeking
resumption and restoration of granted land under Sections 4 and 5
of the PTCL Act can be initiated after an inordinate delay is no
longer res integra . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nekkanti Rama
4
Lakshmi vs State of Karnataka and Another , and Vivek M
5
Hinduja vs M Aswatha held that notwithstanding the absence of
any prescribed period of limitation under the PTCL Act,
proceedings seeking restoration of granted land allegedly alienated
in violation of the conditions of grant are required to be initiated
4
(2020) 14 SCC 232
5
(2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC
- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
within a reasonable time. The power conferred upon the statutory
authorities cannot be invoked after an unreasonable and inordinate
delay. It is also relevant to note that Section 5 of the PTCL Act was
subsequently amended by Karnataka Act No.30/2023, by insertion
of clauses (c) and (d) to Sub-section 1. The said amendment was
considered by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Gouramma @
Gangamma ( supra ) and observed at para No.3 as under :
"3.*
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for
the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the
provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses
(c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore,
the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles
away. These new clauses read as under:
“(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there
shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this
Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases
pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts
of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.”
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the
1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving
application for the resumption of granted land after it is
alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal
position. Such duplication happened even in English
legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The
question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute
is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to
- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the
statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what
the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation
period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no
limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now
too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains
to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at
all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between
alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its
resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the
decision lend support to this view:
“8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms
of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person
to make an application for having the transfer annulled as
void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which such an application can
be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which
suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of
Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs.,
(2017) 6 Scale 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy.
Commissioner (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether
Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the
Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo
motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief
was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River
which make agricultural operations impossible. An
application for restoration was made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it
was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for restoration of land
made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on
that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka
High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner,
(2000) 1 Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State
of Karnataka, (2006) 4 Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga, (2000) 2 Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that
- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time, are
overruled. …..”
(emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the
above case has not been altered by the subject
amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have
taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the
contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate
the law declared by the highest court of the country which it
did after considering all aspects of the matter including the
sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to
silence the voice of Nekkanti , it would have employed a
different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by
law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of
factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay
and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227
of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’
that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in
law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union
of India v. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25] make out this
point:
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and
distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly,
laches might be called a genus to a species by name
acquiescence. However, there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify
- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
that these principles find place in various statutes which
restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration
of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important
issue to be taken note of by the court.
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French
language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus
involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a
claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to
the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an
act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of
the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the
party approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a
party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a
waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other
party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”
12. The challenge to the said decision before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in SLP (C) Diary No.19020/2025 was dismissed on
09.05.2025.
13. Likewise a coordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. M.Manjula
and Others ( supra ) after considering the amendment to Section 5
of the PTCL Act and the decision in Gouramma ( supra ) reiterated
- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
the said proposition. The challenge before the Supreme Court to
the said decision in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).8421/2025
was also dismissed by the Court by order dated 01.04.2025.
14. Coming to the facts of the present case, at the cost of
repetition, the material facts are not in dispute and require brief
reiteration. The schedule property was alienated by the original
grantee under a registered sale deed dated 22.02.1961 in favour of
Narayana Reddy. The first application seeking resumption and
restoration of schedule property was initiated by T.Venkatappa, son
of original grantee only in the year 1984-85, nearly 23 years after
the alienation and approximately six years after the PTCL Act came
into force. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the said
application by order dated 27.05.1988.
15. The appeal preferred by T. Venkatappa before the Deputy
Commissioner was dismissed. Thereafter, Writ Petition
No.274/2000 was filed before this Court which resulted in an order
of remand for fresh consideration. During the pendency of the said
proceedings, another application seeking restoration of the very
same property was instituted by the family members of T.
- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
Venkatappa. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the said
application by order dated 07.05.2002. However, the Deputy
Commissioner by order dated 26.04.2004 allowed the appeal
preferred by the purchasers and set aside the order of restoration.
Yet another application seeking restoration of the same property
was initiated by Smt. Muthamma, wife of T. Venkatappa and Smt.
Arakeramma, his daughter, which was rejected by the Assistant
Commissioner on 11.10.2006. The subsequent proceedings in Writ
Petition Nos.7459/2005 and 10920/2011 culminated in a common
order dated 17.11.2014 whereby the matters were remitted to the
Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration.
16. Pursuant to the said remand, the Deputy Commissioner
considered all the three connected appeals and by common order
dated 30.03.2022 dismissed the appeals preferred by the legal
representatives of the grantee and allowed the appeal preferred by
the purchaser holding that the proceedings seeking resumption and
restoration had been initiated belatedly.
17. The principal contention advanced by the learned counsel for
the appellants is that alienation of the schedule property was
- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
effected without obtaining prior permission from the competent
authority and was therefore contrary to the conditions of the grant.
It is further contended that order of alleged permission dated
23.06.1960, relied upon by the purchasers was not available in the
records of the revenue department, as evidenced by the
endorsement issued by the competent authority.
18. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents contended that the legal representatives of the original
grantee have repeatedly initiated proceedings seeking restoration
of the very same property despite rejection of the earlier
applications. The Deputy Commissioner, having considered the
entire history of litigation and delay in litigating the proceedings,
rightly rejected the claims. It is submitted that the question
regarding genuineness of the alleged permission for alienation
does not arise for consideration once the proceedings seeking
restoration was found to be barred by unreasonable delay and
laches, which aspect has been rightly considered by the learned
Single Judge and declined to interfere with the order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner. The contention advanced by the appellants
does not merit acceptance. Even assuming that, as rightly
- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:60265-DB
WA No. 786 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010338962025
contended by the counsel appearing for the respondents, the
alienation was effected without obtaining requisite permission
contrary to the conditions of grant, the question remains whether
proceedings seeking restoration could be entertained after such an
inordinate delay.
19. The Deputy Commissioner rightly concluded that the claim
was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. The
learned Single Judge examined the settled and legal principles and
rightly held that the proceedings for restoration had been initiated
belatedly. Therefore, we find no infirmity or illegality in the
conclusion of the learned Single Judge, warranting any interference
by this Court. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.
20. The pending application also stands disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(K.S. HEMALEKHA)
JUDGE
CKL
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4