DALBEER SINGH (CONSTABLE NO. 6298) S/O SHRI HARNATH SINGH vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:39128-DB]
REPORTABLE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 233/2025
CNR: RJHC020188772025 | URN: SAW / 699U / 2025
Dalbeer Singh (Constable No. 6298) S/o Shri Harnath Singh,
Aged About 43 Years, R/o Saagaasi, Tehsil Nawalgarh, District
Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.
----Appellant
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Director General Of Police,
Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. Commissioner of Police, Police Commissionerate,
Government Hostel, M.I. Road, Jaipur
3. Deputy Commissioner of Police, DCP Headquarters,
Government Hostel, M.I. Road, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Mahendra Shah, Sr. Advocate
assisted by Mr. Akshay Dutt Sharma
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Samee Khan on behalf of
Mr. Bhuwnesh Sharma, AAG
DIVISION BENCH
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
Order
25/09/2026
Sanjay K. Agrawal, CJ:
1. Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 134 of the
Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, the appellant herein has
preferred this appeal challenging the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 15.05.2023, by which the petitioner’s/appellant’s writ
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petition has partly been rejected holding that the petitioner would
not be entitled for the monetary benefits.
2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on following factual
backdrop:
(i) The appellant herein was convicted by the Jurisdictional
Criminal Court for offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC
vide judgment and order dated 15.05.2017 and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 5 years with a fine of Rs.50,000/-,
which was reversed by the Appellate Court and he was acquitted
vide judgment and order dated 28.06.2017.
(ii) However, by order dated 08.08.2017 the appellant was
dismissed from service, but thereafter realizing the mistake that
he has been acquitted, vide order dated 16.02.2018 he was
reinstated in service.
(iii) The learned Single Judge has quashed the order dated
08.08.2017, holding that the petitioner would be entitled for the
consequential benefits, except monetary benefits. Against the
non-grant of back-wages, the appellant has preferred the instant
appeal.
3. The question would be whether the appellant would be
entitled for the back-wages from the date of termination till the
date of reinstatement that is 16.02.2018 as he has already been
acquitted on 28.06.2017.
4. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it
stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme
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Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji
Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity
1
Board, Himmatnagar in which their Lordships have considered
a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account
of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an
offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was
acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while
considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the
employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the
date of reinstatement held as under: -
“The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service
has already been ordered by the High Court. The only
question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was
his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was
taken into account for his not being in service of the
respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is
entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service
was terminated on the basis of the conviction by
operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to
the situation. The question of back wages would be
considered only if the respondents have taken
action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the
action was found to be unsustainable in law and
he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the
duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant.
Each case requires to be considered in its own
backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had
involved himself in a crime, though he was later
acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering
the service on account of conviction and
incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances,
the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back
wages. ”
2
5. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh ,
the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore
(supra) has been followed with approval.
1 (1996) 11 SCC 603
2 (2004) 1 SCC 121
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6. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India,
3
New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal , the Supreme Court has
considered a provision in the service regulation which provided
that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority,
shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of
such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: -
“15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all
blame and is treated by the competent authority as
being on duty during the period of suspension that such
employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the
said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the
power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of
such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The
power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During
this period, the employee renders no work. He is
absent for reasons of his own involvement in the
misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for
keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore,
cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his
salary and allowances for the period. That will be
against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively
inequitable to those who have to work and earn their
pay. …”
7. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v.
4
Mohammed Abdul Rahim , the Supreme Court considering the
earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra),
Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of
5
India , held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant
though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively
to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the
Act, and observed as under: -
“11. … During the aforesaid period there was therefore,
a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from
employing him. If the respondent could not have
remained employed with the appellant Bank during the
said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is
difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to
payment of salary during that period. His subsequent
3 AIR 1994 SC 552
4 (2013) 11 SCC 67
5 (2005) 8 SCC 747
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acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not
operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal
consequences of the conviction under the Act. The
entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be
judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement,
undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and
the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.”
8. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and
6
others , their Lordships have relied upon the decision rendered in
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and have held that the
appellant therein shall be entitled for back wages only from the
date of acquittal till the date of his reinstatement.
9. Coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant was
convicted by the trial Court on 15.05.2017 and was ultimately
acquitted on 28.06.2017, therefore, he could not have been
terminated on 08.08.2017. However, he has been reinstated on
16.02.2018 and as such, he would be entitled for the back-wages
from the date of termination (which is subsequent to his acquittal)
till the date of reinstatement and in light of the aforesaid
principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh
(supra), Baldev Singh (supra), Mohammed Abdul Rahim
(supra) and Raj Narain (supra), subsequent acquittal of the
appellant though obliterates his conviction, but it does not operate
retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the
conviction, however, the appellant would be entitled for back-
wages only from the date of termination (which is subsequent to
his acquittal) till the date of his reinstatement in light of decision
of the Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Narain (supra).
6 (2019) 5 SCC 809
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10. As such, the impugned order dated 15.05.2023 is partly set
aside to the extent of not granting back-wages. The appellant
would be entitled for the back-wages from the date of termination
dated 08.08.2017, subsequent to his acquittal, till the date of his
reinstatement on 16.02.2018.
11. With the above observations, the appeal stands allowed.
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
(INDERJEET SINGH),J (SANJAY K. AGRAWAL),CJ
8/KAMLESH KUMAR
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