NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA PIU JALGAON THROUGH IST PROJECT DIRECTOR SHIVAJI V PAWAR vs Bhaskar Ninu Zambare and Others
- Court
- Bombay High Court
- Case type
- Arbitration Appeal
- Decided on
- 01-04-2026
<div> <b>2026:BHC-AUG:13742</b><br /> <b>IN THE JUDICATURE OF HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY</b><br /> <b>BENCH AT AURANGABAD</b><br /> <b> ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 103 OF 2025</b><br /> National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon <br /> Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar . <b>..Appellant</b><br /> <b><i>VERSUS</i></b><br /> 1. Bhaskar Ninu Zambare,<br /> 2. Nalini Madhukar Zambare,<br /> 3. Hari @ Bhushan Madhukar Zambare,<br /> 4. Chhaya Dnyandev Bhangale,<br /> 5. Pushpa Yogesh Warke,<br /> 6. Ramchandra Bhaskar Zambare. <b>...Original Claimants/</b><br /> <b> Respondents</b><br /> 7. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition<br /> And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. <b>...Respondent</b><br /> ...<br /> Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh<br /> Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w <br /> Shubham Zalte<br /> Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. R. Bangar<br /> ...<br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8404 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/103/2025</b><br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13976 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/103/2025</b><br /> …<br /> <b>AND</b><br /> <b> ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 104 OF 2025</b><br /> National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon <br /> Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar <b>...Appellant</b><br /> <b><i>VERSUS</i></b><br /> 1. Manohar Hari Patil (died) Thr Lrs<br /> 1.1 Laxmibai Manohar Patil,<br /> 1.2 Pramod Manohar Patil,<br /> 1.3 Purushottam Manohar Patil,<br /> 1.4 Shrikrishna Manohar Patil,<br /> 1.5 Dinkar Hari Patil, <b>...Original Claimants/</b><br /> <b> Respondents</b><br /> 2. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition<br /> And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. <b>...Respondent</b><br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 1 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> ...<br /> Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh<br /> Advocate for Respondents No.1.1 to 1.5 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. <br /> More a/w Shubham Zalte<br /> Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. S. Sarvadnya<br /> ...<br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8406 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/104/2025</b><br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13977 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/104/2025</b><br /> ...<br /> <b>AND</b><br /> <b> ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 106 OF 2025</b><br /> National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon <br /> Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar <b>...Appellant</b><br /> <b><i>VERSUS</i></b><br /> 1. Sangita Sunil Patil,<br /> 2. Nilima Damodhar Warade, <b>...Original Claimants/</b><br /> <b> Respondents</b><br /> 3. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition<br /> And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. <b>...Respondent</b><br /> ...<br /> Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh<br /> Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w <br /> Shubham Zalte<br /> Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. R. Bangar<br /> ...<br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13979 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/106/2025</b><br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8410 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/106/2025</b><br /> …<br /> <b>AND</b><br /> <b> ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 108 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 2 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon <br /> Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar <b>...Appellant</b><br /> <b><i>VERSUS</i></b><br /> 1. Ganesh Nivrutti Varade, <b>...Original Claimant/</b><br /> <b> Respondent</b><br /> 2. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition<br /> And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. <b>...Respondent</b><br /> ...<br /> Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh<br /> Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w <br /> Shubham Zalte<br /> Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. D. Sanap<br /> ...<br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8414 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/108/2025</b><br /> <b>WITH</b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12518 OF 2025</b><br /> <b> IN ARBA/108/2025</b><br /> ...<br /> <b>CORAM </b> <b>: ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.</b><br /> <b>Dated</b> <b>: April 01, 2026</b><br /> <b>JUDGMENT :</b><br /> 1. By the present Arbitration Appeals, the appellant – National Highway<br /> Authority of India has challenged the order passed by the learned Principal<br /> District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,<br /> 1996, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of<br /> the said Act came to be rejected and the arbitral award passed by the<br /> learned Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 3 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> came to be confirmed.<br /> 2. Since all the Arbitration Appeals involve common questions of fact<br /> and law, they are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of<br /> by this common judgment.<br /> 3. For the sake of convenience, the facts in Arbitration Appeal No.103<br /> of 2025 alone are referred to. The brief facts of the appeal are as under :<br /> The National Highways Authority initiated acquisition proceedings for<br /> the purpose of widening National Highway No.6 from Jalgaon, Maharashtra<br /> to the Gujarat boundary. A notification under Section 3A of the National<br /> Highways Act, 1956 was issued on 11/11/2011. The said notification was<br /> published in the newspapers pursuant to communication dated 30/12/2011<br /> and the public notice was published on 23/01/2012. Subsequently, a<br /> declaration under Section 3D of the said Act was issued on 10/10/2012. <br /> 4. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) thereafter<br /> passed an award determining compensation at the rate of Rs.340/- per<br /> square meter. In addition thereto, compensation to the extent of 10% of<br /> the amount was granted towards easementary rights. The lands were<br /> classified into two groups, wherein the lands situated at village Kothali and<br /> village Muktainagar were treated as belonging to the same group.<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 4 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> 5. Being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the<br /> Competent Authority, the claimants preferred arbitration proceedings<br /> under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act seeking enhanced<br /> compensation as well as statutory benefits under Section 3G(7)(a) to (d) of<br /> the Act.<br /> 6. Before the Arbitrator, the claimants relied upon several sale<br /> instances and led evidence in support of their claim. The relevant sale<br /> deeds relied upon are as under:<br /> (I) Sale Deed No.1674 of 2005 dated 22/11/2005 showing<br /> consideration at the rate of Rs.3022/- per square meter in respect of<br /> Plot No.7 from land Gut No.562 situated at village Muktainagar.<br /> (ii) Sale Deed No.217 of 2010 dated 25/01/2010 showing<br /> consideration at the rate of Rs.3375/- per square meter in respect of<br /> land Gut No.1075 situated at village Muktainagar.<br /> (iii) Sale Deed No.331 of 2012 dated 13/02/2012 showing<br /> consideration at the rate of Rs.4000/- per square meter in respect of<br /> land Gut No.542/1 and 543, Plot No.40 situated at village<br /> Muktainagar.<br /> Apart from the above sale deeds, other sale instances pertaining to<br /> nearby villages were also placed on record.<br /> 7. Upon appreciation of the material on record, the learned Arbitrator<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 5 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> held that the registered sale deed dated 13/02/2012 was the most<br /> proximate in point of time and therefore could be relied upon for<br /> determination of market value. The Arbitrator further held that the<br /> claimants were entitled to compensation for severance and loss of property<br /> in terms of Section 3G(7)(b) and Section 3G(7)(c) of the National Highways<br /> Act. Accordingly, by award dated 26/07/2021 the Arbitrator granted<br /> enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 2800/- per square meter.<br /> 8. Being aggrieved by the said arbitral award, the appellants preferred<br /> an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act<br /> before the learned District Judge challenging the award. The said<br /> application came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeals under<br /> Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act have been filed.<br /> 9. The learned counsel <b>Mr. D. S. Manorkar</b> for the appellants has<br /> challenged the arbitral award as well as the order passed under Section 34<br /> on the following grounds:<br /> (I) <b>Illegal reliance on post-notification sale deed</b><br /> It is contended that the Arbitrator committed patent illegality by<br /> relying upon the post-notification sale deed bearing No.331 of 2012 dated<br /> 13/02/2012. According to the appellants, under Section 3G(7)(a) of the<br /> National Highways Act, the market value of the land is required to be<br /> determined as on the date of notification under Section 3A of the Act,<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 6 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> which in the present case was issued on 11/11/2011. Since the sale deed<br /> relied upon by the Arbitrator is subsequent to the said notification, the<br /> same ought not to have been considered for determination of<br /> compensation.<br /> (II) <b>Comparison of dissimilar properties</b><br /> It is further contended that the Arbitrator erroneously compared<br /> dissimilar properties. The lands of the claimants are agricultural lands<br /> situated at village Kothali, which is about one kilometer away from<br /> Muktainagar. However, the Arbitrator relied upon transactions relating to<br /> commercial plots situated within the municipal limits of Muktainagar. It is<br /> also submitted that the Arbitrator failed to consider the “size factor”, as<br /> the sale instance relied upon pertains to a very small plot.<br /> (III) <b>Illegality in awarding interest</b><br /> It is further submitted that the Arbitrator awarded interest at the rate<br /> of 9% per annum from 10/10/2012, though the possession of the acquired<br /> land was taken only after the award passed by the Competent Authority on<br /> 09/05/2013. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in <b>R.</b><br /> <b>L. Jain vs. Delhi Development Authority & others reported in</b><br /> <b>(2004) 4 SCC 79</b> it is contended that interest is payable only from the<br /> date of taking physical possession and not from the date of notification.<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 7 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> (IV) <b>Award of compensation without evidence</b><br /> It is further contended that the Arbitrator awarded compensation at<br /> the rate of Rs.280/- per square meter towards severance and Rs.246/- per<br /> square meter towards loss of easementary rights without there being any<br /> documentary evidence such as panchanama or other material to establish<br /> such loss. According to the appellants, the claimants failed to lead any<br /> evidence to show that they suffered any injury to other immovable<br /> property or loss of earnings due to the acquisition.<br /> 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the<br /> District Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the<br /> Arbitration Act to set aside the arbitral award.<br /> 11. <i>Per contra</i> , the learned Counsel <b>Mr. A. P. Bhandari</b> holding for <b>Mr.</b><br /> <b>K. M. More</b> appearing for the respondent/claimants relied upon the<br /> judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b>Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.</b><br /> <b>Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 1988 SC 1652</b> ,<br /> particularly <b>para 4</b> , clause <b>(9)</b> of the judgment, and submitted that even<br /> post-notification sale deeds can be relied upon unless it is specifically<br /> pleaded that the prices mentioned therein are inflated or the transaction<br /> itself is challenged as not genuine. He further submitted that the sale deed<br /> relied upon by the Arbitrator is executed only about three weeks after the<br /> notification and there is no evidence to suggest that the price mentioned<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 8 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> therein is inflated. The sale deed is bona fide and has not been challenged<br /> by the NH Authority on the grounds of fraud or inflation.<br /> 12. As regards the compensation towards easementary rights is<br /> concerned, it is submitted that the Competent Authority for Land<br /> Acquisition (CALA) itself granted compensation to the extent of 10%<br /> towards easementary rights in accordance with the statutory mandate, and<br /> the Arbitrator has granted consequential relief in consonance with the<br /> enhanced compensation.<br /> 13. As regards compensation for loss of profit and severance in terms of<br /> Section 3 G (7) (b) and (c) of the National Highways Act, 1956, it is<br /> submitted that the claimants have specifically stated in their affidavit that<br /> they have suffered losses on account of the acquisition, and the said<br /> statement has not been controverted by the National Highways Authority.<br /> 14. Apart from the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the<br /> respondent further submits that there were several other acquisition<br /> proceedings pertaining to the same notification dated 11/11/2011. In one<br /> such case, land bearing Gut No.453 of village Muktainagar came to be<br /> acquired and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs.3200/- per<br /> square meter on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 13/02/2012. In<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 9 of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> the said proceedings also, compensation was awarded towards<br /> easementary rights as well as for loss of business. The said awards were<br /> challenged by the Authority, however, the challenge failed and the same<br /> was also not accepted by this Court. It is submitted that in respect of about<br /> 36 such cases, the awards have already been satisfied by the appellant.<br /> 15. The learned Counsel for the respondent, therefore, submits that once<br /> the Arbitrator has passed the award on the basis of relevant considerations<br /> and material placed on record, and the same has been confirmed by the<br /> Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,<br /> this Court, in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act,<br /> would be slow in interfering with the same.<br /> 16. In support of the above submissions, reliance is placed upon the<br /> judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b>Associate Builders v. Delhi</b><br /> <b>Development Authority reported in AIR 2015 SC 620</b> and <b>PSA Sical</b><br /> <b>Terminals Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambaranar Port</b><br /> <b>Trust, Tuticorin reported in (2023) 15 SCC 781</b> .<br /> 17. Having considered the rival submissions, the first question that<br /> arises for consideration before this Court is whether the Arbitrator could<br /> have relied upon the sale deed dated 13/02/2012 or whether there is any<br /> legal bar in relying upon the said sale deed.<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 10</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b>Chimanlal Hargovinddas</b> (Supra)<br /> has laid down the parameters to be considered while determining<br /> compensation. It has been observed that while determining market value,<br /> various factors are required to be taken into consideration and one of such<br /> factors is that even post-notification sale instances can be taken into<br /> account if (i) they are very proximate in point of time, (ii) they are genuine<br /> transactions, and (iii) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser<br /> to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in<br /> development prospects.<br /> 19. The said principle has also been followed by this Court in <b>Goa</b><br /> <b>Industrial Development Corporation v. Maria Tereza N. Quadros</b><br /> <b>reported in 2016(3) All MR 810</b> and in <b>Pandurang Ramrao</b><br /> <b>Somvanshi v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2025 BHC (AUG)</b><br /> <b>14723</b> .<br /> 20. Considering the aforesaid judgments, there is no absolute bar in<br /> taking into consideration a post-notification sale deed; however, the<br /> market value is required to be determined with reference to the date of the<br /> notification. Applying the principles laid down in <b>Chimanlal</b><br /> <b>Hargovinddas</b> (supra), it can be seen that the sale deed relied upon by<br /> the Arbitrator is executed merely about three weeks after the notification.<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 11</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> There is no evidence on record to indicate that the sale price mentioned<br /> therein is inflated and the transaction itself has not been challenged as not<br /> being genuine. There is also no contest as regards the bona fide nature of<br /> the said sale deed.<br /> 21. Even if the other sale deeds placed on record (noted at para 6<br /> above) are considered and the prices therein are suitably adjusted for<br /> yearly escalation, the resultant price would broadly correspond with the<br /> price reflected in the sale deed dated 13/02/2012.<br /> 22. In such circumstances, when the Arbitrator has relied upon the said<br /> sale deed dated 13/02/2012 for determination of compensation and the<br /> District Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the<br /> Arbitration Act, has not interfered with the same, this Court, while<br /> exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act,<br /> would be slow to interfere with the determination of compensation based<br /> on the sale deed dated 13/02/2012.<br /> 23. As regards the compensation towards easementary rights is<br /> concerned, the same was initially granted by the Competent Authority for<br /> Land Acquisition (CALA) and the said grant was not specifically challenged<br /> by the National Highways Authority while contesting the enhancement of<br /> the market value of the land. Consequently, upon enhancement of the<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 12</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> compensation for the acquired land, there would naturally be a<br /> corresponding increase in the total amount payable towards loss of<br /> easementary rights. Similarly under Section 3 G (7)(c) compensation is<br /> also granted by CALA. <br /> 24. As regards the grant of compensation under Section 3G(7)(b) and (c)<br /> of the National Highways Act, 1956, it is to be noted that the claimants<br /> have made specific statements in their affidavits regarding the losses<br /> suffered by them on account of the acquisition. In the case of <b>Krishna</b><br /> <b>Balchandra Hadfadkar and Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer</b><br /> <b>and The Managing Director, reported in MANU/MH/0159/2013</b> , this<br /> Court has held that even if the issue of severance is not raised or framed,<br /> the same has to be considered if the facts justify severance. This Court in<br /> Krishna (supra) has observed as under :<br /> “22. it is true that in the reference application, the applicants<br /> had not claimed compensation towards severance charges. It<br /> is also true that no issue was framed int hat regard. However,<br /> the fact remains that due evidence was led by the applicants<br /> on this aspect. In the case of “Caetano Jose Filomeno (Dr.)”<br /> (supra), this Court has held that the question of severance of<br /> land was liable to be considered even if no such issue was<br /> framed and even if no such plea was taken by the applicant in<br /> his application for reference.”<br /> 25. Similarly in the case of <b>Dr. Caetano Jose Filomeno Jacinto de</b><br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 13</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> <b>Loiola Pereira vs. Deputy Collector, South, Sub-Division and Ors.,</b><br /> <b>reported in 2005 (1) All MR 797</b> , this Court at paragraph No.22 held as<br /> under : <br /> “22. The next grievance made on behalf of the applicant is<br /> that by the present acquisition their remaining property of<br /> survey No.363/1 was severed as a result of which it has now<br /> remained landlocked without there being any access. The<br /> applicant in his evidence before the Court had stated that in<br /> view of the acquisition the property under survey No.363/1<br /> remained blocked without any access. There is no doubt that<br /> no issue on this aspect was framed by the Court nor such a<br /> plea was taken by the applicant in his application for<br /> reference. Nevertheless if the Court is required to determine<br /> the market value of the acquired land by sitting, on the<br /> armchair of a willing purchaser and in our view it is right so,<br /> this factor certainly ought to have been considered by the<br /> learned Trial Court. Shri Noronha has placed reliance on<br /> several decisions regarding this aspect of the case. In<br /> Government v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.<br /> Ltd. MANU/MH/0092/1941 : A.I.R.1942 Bom 105 wherein this<br /> Court observed that when large proportion of frontage is<br /> acquired and a relatively small amount of frontage is left with<br /> the owner of the remaining land, he is entitled to some<br /> compensation in respect of severance. Reliance has also been<br /> placed on the case of Radhey Shyam v. Haryana State<br /> MANU/PH/0155/1981 wherein it is observed that the claimants<br /> were entitled to compensation for severance. In the case of<br /> Smt. Kasturi Devi an Ors. vs. The Collector, Nainital<br /> MANU/UP/0607/1982: A.I.R. 1983 All 338 after the acquisition<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 14</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> of 20,000 Sq. ft. of land the remaining area was deprived of<br /> frontage on the road and a Division bench of that Court<br /> observed that this would certainly diminish the value of the<br /> land to some extent. However, no evidence was produced to<br /> show as to what extent the value of the remaining land had<br /> diminished, but still the Court held, that it was difficult to hold<br /> that severance of the disputed land had diminished the value<br /> of the remaining land and in the absence of positive evidence,<br /> the Court considered to award Rs.2000/- as damages<br /> sustained by the applicants on account of severance of land.<br /> Int he case of Amirbibi and Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition<br /> officer, MANU/GJ/0146/1984: AIR1981 Guj 219 a division bench<br /> of that court stated that it could not be laid down as a rule of<br /> law that where expert assistance is not available and where a<br /> reasonable guess can be made form whatever evidence there<br /> is on record, the Court would be precluded form doing so only<br /> because the expert evidence is not led in a particular case.<br /> The Court further felt that damage suffered by the claimants<br /> could not go uncompensated altogether and that they should<br /> make their best endeavour to meet out justice to them,<br /> although they must be on guard while doing so, as their<br /> conclusion must be based on a broad basis and commonsense<br /> inference. The Court therefore proceeded after considering<br /> pros and cons of the questions to award compensation for<br /> injurious affection to Rs.2/- per sq. metre as it would serve the<br /> purpose.”<br /> 26. The Arbitrator has considered the uncontroverted affidavits and the<br /> evidence while determining the compensation. It is evident that the lands<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 15</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> of the claimants were not acquired in their entirety, but only partially for<br /> the purpose of widening or expansion of the National Highway. This<br /> position is also reflected in their claim applications filed before the CALA.<br /> Each of the claimants specifically raised the issue of severance<br /> before the CALA, and the same is duly recorded in the CALA awards. For<br /> ready reference, one such objection and the corresponding finding are set<br /> out in the table below -<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>vtkZpk<br>e/;orh<br>@,l<br>vkj<br>dez kad</th><th>vtZ izkIr<br>fnukad</th><th>TksMh<br>vf/klqpusrhy<br>ifzl/n l-ua-@x-<br>ua@Hk[q kaM dz- o<br>{ks=</th><th></th><th>gjdrnkj@<br>fgrlacaf/krka<br>ps ukao o<br>iRrk</th><th>gjdrnkj@ fgrlacaf/kr<br>blekpk vtkZr uewn<br>gjdrhaps eqn~ns ¼FkksMD;kr<br>ekx.khpk ri’khy½</th><th>gjdr<br>vtkZlksc<br>r v½<br>blekus<br>nk[ky<br>dsysyh<br>dkxni=s<br>c½<br>lquko.kh<br>P;k<br>fno’kh<br>d½<br>lquko.kh<br>P;k<br>fno’kh<br>uarj</th><th>gjdr<br>vtkZojhy fu.kZ;</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>l-ua- @<br>x-ua-<br>Hkw[kaM<br>dz-</td><td>{ks= pkS-<br>eh-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>3 v</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>9@1@13</td><td>dksFkGh<br>xV ua-<br>110@1</td><td>1768</td><td>Jh vfuy<br>ukjk;.k<br>taxys oxSjs<br>jk- dksFkGh<br>rk-<br>eqDrkbZuxj</td><td>1½ feGdr ckxk;rh o<br>lHa kkO; fcu’ksrh Lo#ikph<br>vlwu lia kfnr {ks=kl pkyw<br>cktkj Hkkokus o izfr pkS-<br>eh- #-3000@& njkus<br>uqdlku HkjikbZ<br>ns.ksr ;koh- feGdr<br>okf.kT; {kersph vkgs<br>Eg.kwu pkS-QqV njkus@ pkyw<br>cktkj Hkkokus uqdlku<br>HkjikbZ feGkoh-<br>2½ va’kr% {ks=</td><td>V½<br>vWMOgkds s<br>V Jh-<br>ok- ,-<br>egktu<br>o ih-<br>lh-<br>pkS/kjh<br>;kaps<br>odhyi=</td><td>lquko.khps oGs h<br>vtZnkj @<br>odhy xSjgtj-<br>1½ gjdrhr<br>uewn ekx.;kaP;k<br>iq”B~;kFkZ<br>dks.krkgh iqjkok<br>tksMysyk ukgh<br>R;keqGs gjdr<br>QsVkG.ksr ;sr<br>vkgs-<br>2½ feGdrhps</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 16</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>lia knukeqGs moZjhr {ks=kps<br>voewY;u y{kkr ?ksrk<br>R;kph ;ksX; rh uqdlku<br>HkjikbZ feGkoh-<br>3½ laiknu {ks=krhy<br>ihOghlh ikbZiykbZu ¼fofgj<br>1@2 fgLlk½ ;kaps<br>ewY;kadu gksmqu uqdlku<br>HkjikbZ ns.ksr ;koh-<br>4½ tkxsps @<br>cka/kdkekps ,dq.k<br>fdaerhoj 10 ofgokV<br>%<br>jDde ns.ksr ;koh-<br>5½ Hkwlia knu dk;nk<br>1894 ps rjrqnhuqlkj<br>tfeuhps@cka/kdkekps ,dq.k<br>jdesoj 30 fnykl<br>%<br>jDde o ;ksX; rs dkWiksuaV<br>ns.ksr ;kos-<br>6½ jk”Vªh; egkekxZ<br>vf/kfu;e 1956 ps<br>dye 3Mh e/khy<br>rjrqnhuqlkj ;ksX; rh<br>uqdlku HkjikbZ<br>ns.ksr ;koh-</th><th></th><th>moZjhr {ks=<br>lia knu gksmqu<br>uqdlku HkjikbZ<br>ns.ksph dk;|kr<br>rjrqn ulysys<br>gjdr QsVkG.ksr<br>;sr vkgs-<br>3½ la;qDr<br>ekst.kh i=dkr<br>uewn<br>ikbZiykbZups<br>ewY;kadu gksmqu<br>uqdlku HkjikbZ<br>ns.ksr ;sbZy-<br>4 o 5½<br>tkxsps@<br>cka/kdkekps<br>fdaerhoj 10<br>%<br>ofgokVhph<br>jDde ns.ks]<br>Hkwlia knu dk;|<br>kP;k rjrqnhuqlkj<br>tfeuhps @<br>cka/kdkekps<br>jdesoj 30<br>%<br>fnyklk jDde<br>@ dkWaiksuaV<br>ns.ksph dk;|kr<br>rjrwn ulysus<br>gjdrh<br>QsVkG.ksr ;sr<br>vkgs-<br>6½ cktkj<br>Hkkokizek.ks<br>ewY;kadu<br>Bjforkauk<br>dk;ns’khj<br>i/nrhpk voyac<br>dj.ksr ;s.kkj<br>vkgs-</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> 27. The acquisition for widening of road takes place of a large strip of<br /> land, generally narrow in width, affecting only a portion of larger land<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 17</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> holdings belonging to several land owners. As a result, such acquisition<br /> may cause severance and may also adversely affect the usability and<br /> economic utility of the remaining land. The Arbitrator, taking into<br /> consideration the affidavits and statements of the claimants as well as the<br /> nature of the acquisition, has granted compensation towards severance.<br /> 28. The power of the ‘Court’ to interfere with arbitral award under<br /> Section 34 and of this Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act needs<br /> to be noted before considering the above submissions on merits of arbitral<br /> award. The Supreme Court in the case of <b>PSA Sical Terminals Private</b><br /> <b>Limited Vs. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambaranar Port Trust</b><br /> <b>Tuticorn and Anr. reported in (2023) 15 SCC 781</b> has observed that it<br /> is a settled legal position, that in an application under Section 34, the court<br /> is not expected to act as an appellate court and reappreciate the evidence.<br /> The scope of interference would be limited to grounds provided under<br /> Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The interference would be so warranted<br /> when the award is in violation of "public policy of India", which has been<br /> held to mean "the fundamental policy of Indian law". A judicial intervention<br /> on account of interfering on the merits of the award would not be<br /> permissible. However, the principles of natural justice as contained in<br /> Section 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration Act would continue to be the<br /> grounds of challenge of an award. The ground for interference on the basis<br /> that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is now to be understood<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 18</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> as a conflict with the "most basic notions of morality or justice". It is only<br /> such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court, that can be set<br /> aside on the said ground. An award would be set aside on the ground of<br /> patent illegality appearing on the face of the award and as such, which<br /> goes to the roots of the matter. However, an illegality with regard to a mere<br /> erroneous application of law would not be a ground for interference.<br /> Equally, reappreciation of evidence would not be permissible on the ground<br /> of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.<br /> 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b>PSA Sical Terminals Private</b><br /> <b>Limited </b> (supra) has further observed that a decision which is perverse,<br /> though would not be a ground for challenge under "public policy of India",<br /> would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the<br /> award. However, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which<br /> ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and<br /> liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.<br /> 30. To appreciate the test of perversity, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in<br /> <b>PSA Sical Terminals Private Limited </b> (supra) in para 42 has further held<br /> as under :-<br /> “42. To understand the test of perversity, it will also be appropriate<br /> to refer to paragraph 31 and 32 from the judgment of this Court in<br /> Associate Builders (supra), which read thus:<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 19</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> 31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or<br /> so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the<br /> same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is<br /> settled law that where:<br /> (i) a finding is based on no evidence, or<br /> (ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to<br /> the<br /> decision which it arrives at; or<br /> (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,<br /> such decision would necessarily be perverse.<br /> 32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments.<br /> In <i>Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &</i><br /> <i>Sons</i> [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], it was held: <br /> "7. ... It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by<br /> ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into<br /> consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously<br /> defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the<br /> blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in<br /> law."<br /> In <i>Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police </i> (1999) 2 SCC 10, it was held: <br /> "10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between<br /> the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a<br /> decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is<br /> thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon<br /> it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on<br /> record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon,<br /> howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 20</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered<br /> with.”<br /> 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 14 in the case of <b>MMTC Limited</b><br /> <b>Vs. Vendanta Limited reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163</b> has further<br /> observed that as far as interference with an order made under Section 34,<br /> as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such<br /> interference under Section 37, cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid<br /> down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an<br /> independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only<br /> ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not<br /> exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an<br /> arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by<br /> the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely<br /> cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.<br /> 32. As observed in above noted Judgment of Supreme Court i.e. <b>PSA</b><br /> <b>and M.M.T.C.</b> , (Supra) the power of this Court to interfere with an arbitral<br /> award is extremely limited. Unless the award suffers from <i>patent illegality</i><br /> or falls within the limited grounds contemplated under Section 34 of the<br /> Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, interference would not be<br /> warranted. The scope of interference becomes even narrower while<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 21</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the said Act.<br /> 33. This Court has also taken into consideration that in respect of the<br /> same acquisition proceedings, several other awards have attained finality<br /> on account of delay in filing application under Section 34 of the Act.<br /> 34. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the<br /> opinion that no case is made out for interference with the award passed by<br /> the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has assessed the value of the land<br /> considering the relevant material before him and has granted<br /> compensation for severance, loss of business, and loss of easementary<br /> rights. The same is based on the material on record and is in accordance<br /> with the law as noted in the above-referred judgments of this Court.<br /> Consequently, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the<br /> Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court finds no reason to<br /> interfere with the impugned judgment under Section 34 and the award,<br /> passed by the Arbitrator. <br /> 35. In view of the orders passed in all the arbitration appeals today, all<br /> civil applications seeking withdrawal of amounts are allowed. However,<br /> since the National Highway Authority intends to challenge this order, the<br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 22</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b><br /><br /> Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth<br /> applicants shall furnish an undertaking to this Court stating that, in the<br /> event any favourable order is passed in favour of the National Highway<br /> Authority, they will redeposit the amount withdrawn within a period of four<br /> weeks.<br /> 36. All other pending applications for interim relief/ stay stand disposed<br /> of. <br /> <b>( ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J. )</b><br /> <i>vj gawade/-.</i><br /> <b> </b> <b>Page </b> <b> 23</b> <b> of </b> <b> </b> <b> 23</b> <b> </b></div>